This report describes possible future arms control treaties on nuclear weapons, in the light of ongoing technological development of new military systems of strategic importance. Three conditions need to be met for a meaningful arms control treaty to be possible: the agreement must contribute to strategic stability, the scope of the agreement must, as far as possible, require mutual rights and obligations, and, the agreement must be predictable and allow implementation to occur in a verifiable manner. Achieving a treaty on arms control of nuclear weapons is more difficult if different types of military capabilities are to be included. First, it becomes more complicated to weigh different capabilities against each other. Secondly, the security policy consequences become less clear, as many military systems also have a bearing on states outside the treaty. Finally, if different parties have different capabilities that are included in the treaty, it will entail different commitments and verification activities, which risks undermining confidence in the implementation of the agreement by each party. Our conclusion is that there are currently no clear incentives for a nuclear arms control that goes beyond extending the New START between the United States and Russia, but that such an extension meets the above-mentioned conditions, despite the ongoing military technology development in these two states.