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Russia-EU External Security Relations: Russian Policy and Perceptions

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Russia-EU External Security Relations: Russian Policy and Perceptions

Abstract

Despite high level declarations about the importance of deeper relations between Russia and the EU, the cooperation is developing slowly. Four common spaces for deeper cooperation have been identified. Of these, the cooperation within 'the Common Space of External Security' harbours maybe the largest difficulties.

This report looks at Russian policy and perceptions of the relations with the EU in the field of external security. Where and by whom are decisions on these relations taken in Russia? Which are the Russian security policy interests in relations to the EU? How does Russia view the European Security and Defence Policy and the EU engagement in the European neighbourhood? The report also analyses how Russia views the prospects for cooperation within the Common Space for External Security.

Keywords

Russia, EU, external security, security policy, frozen conflicts, European neighbourhood, crisis management, ESDP, Common Space of External Security

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Sammanfattning

Trots högnivådeklarationer om vikten av fördjupade relationer mellan EU och Ryssland har samarbetet utvecklats långsamt. Fyra områden för fördjupat samarbete har tagits fram, varav ett rör extern säkerhet. Inom detta område finns kanske de största svårigheterna.

Denna rapport granskar den ryska policyn och synen på relationerna till EU när det gäller extern säkerhet. Var och av vem tas beslut om dessa relationer i Ryssland? Vilka är de ryska säkerhetspolitiska intressena gentemot EU? Hur ser Ryssland på den europeiska säkerhets- och försvarspolitiken och EU:s ökade engagemang i dess östra grannskap? Rapporten analyserar också hur Ryssland ser på utvecklingsmöjligheterna inom ”samarbetsområdet för extern säkerhet”.

Nyckelord

Ryssland, EU, extern säkerhet, säkerhetspolitik, frusna konflikter, europeiska grannskapet, krishantering, ESFP, Gemensamma området för extern säkerhet

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05.04.2005 Russia, Krasnodar region
Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) met EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (right). The meeting was held in the Russian presidential residence of Bocharov Ruchey outside the Back Sea resort of Sochi.

Cover photo by: Dmitry Azarov/Kommersant

Preface

Since the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1999 the EU and Russia have discussed how to develop their external security relations. This has proved to be a complicated process. In order to provide a greater understanding of the Russian rationale in the cooperation, this report studies the Russian policy and perceptions of the EU as a security policy actor.

The report is primarily written for decision-makers and officials within the EU who deal with relations with Russia, but also for interested researchers in this field. The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) conducts research both on Russia and the EU, and the authors are experts from these respective fields. The report thus combines expertise in the European Security and Defence Policy with expertise in Russian foreign policy.

This report could not have been written without the information collected during interviews in Moscow and Brussels. The authors want to sincerely thank the Russian officials, parliamentarians and researchers as well as the EU diplomats and officials who have contributed with information. Their open account on views and experiences from the cooperation was essential for the analysis.

Many valuable comments have been received during the writing process. The authors are especially grateful to Professor Bo Petersson at Lund University who examined the report at a seminar at FOI and contributed with constructive and wise comments, and also to Dr. Stefan Olsson at FOI for valuable remarks that helped to improve the report. Helpful comments have also been received from other colleagues at FOI.

Stockholm, February 2007
Karin Anderman, Eva Hagström Frisell, Carolina Vendil Pallin

Executive Summary

The cooperation between the European Union and Russia on external security has, despite ambitious intentions on both sides, so far developed at a slow rate. In order to increase the EU's understanding of the Russian positions on security policy cooperation it is important to study the Russian decision-making structures, national interests and perceptions of the EU's external security policy.

Russian decision-making on security policy towards the EU often appears obscure to an outside observer. Obviously, the Presidential Administration and, ultimately, the president retain firm control over most important decisions regarding Russian security policy. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have a certain degree of influence on Russia's policy towards the EU and then not least when it comes to the EU as a security policy actor. The foreign minister is the Russian informal coordinator for the *Common Space of External Security*, adopted by the EU and Russia in 2003. Most of the analytical expertise on the EU is found at the Ministry, where the Russian proposals for the *Road Map for the Common Space of External Security* were drafted. Furthermore, the Russian mission to the EU has grown considerably in recent years and has become one of Russia's largest foreign representations. Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov has considerable influence over Russia's EU policy and is a key person when it comes to external security relations with the EU. The mission can be considered one of the centres of coordination of Russia's policy on EU affairs. Meanwhile, the Russian knowledge of how the EU works has become more solid in Moscow as well in recent years as a result of concerted efforts to increase efficiency in Russian decision-making on EU affairs – efforts that Brussels in some cases has supported.

During Putin's terms in office, Russia has clearly manifested a strong interest towards the EU. Despite Putin's declared pragmatism and orientation towards interests rather than ideology in foreign policy, a number of ideas retain their hold over the minds of Russian decision-makers. One of these is the idea that Russia must remain a great power, not least within its neighbourhood, the former Soviet area. Russia therefore covets equal status with its partners, including the EU. This is also one of the reasons why Russia prefers bilateral relations with the most influential countries of the EU. These ideas complicate relations between Russia and the EU, and as Russia's economy has grown stronger its confidence and assertiveness on the international scene have done so as well.

Putin's main objective in developing the cooperation with the EU was to strengthen the Russian economy that was in a poor state at the time when he took office. Another important interest was to deepen the external security relations with the EU. In the beginning of Putin's first term in office, Russia saw the EU defence identity as a means to counterbalance US influence in Europe and globally. Russia feared being left out of the European security architecture and saw cooperation with the EU as a tool for inclusion in the European security system. Russia thus took an early interest in the ESDP, with a clear ambition of developing cooperation within the framework of the emerging EU external security policy.

The Russian position on the ESDP has since changed from endorsement to what best can be described as a wait-and-see policy. Today, the EU is not the only security policy actor in Europe with whom Russia cooperates. Russia gradually improved its relations with the US and NATO during Putin's first term in office. Meanwhile, security cooperation with the EU did not develop as fast or in the way that Russia expected. Russia did not gain the inclusion and equality within the decision-making framework as it desired. This has fuelled disappointment in Moscow when it comes to cooperation with the EU on external security. Additionally, Russia came to harbour doubts as to the EU's capacity as a security policy actor. Russia is well aware of the fact that the EU has internal difficulties in agreeing on common foreign policy positions. The ESDP is not perceived in Moscow as a coherent policy, and there is a tangible Russian scepticism concerning concrete progress made by the EU in developing the ESDP. The security relationship has been further complicated by EU enlargement in 2004 and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The EU has gradually become more involved in its eastern neighbourhood, where Russia is a key actor. For the EU, the main objective within the Common Space of External Security is to develop cooperation with Russia in the European neighbourhood, including on solving the conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus.[1] Russian officials understand the security interests of the EU in creating a secure environment around its borders and, in principle, perceive these interests as legitimate. However, this perception is combined with a Russian goal of maintaining control in the region, as well as with a considerable degree of distrust of the EU's intentions. The developments in Ukraine in 2004 are widely believed in Russia to have been orchestrated by the West and triggered concerns that similar developments would take place in other CIS (Commonwealth of States) countries such as Belarus – perhaps even in Russia itself. Consequently, Russia has displayed distrust of the *European Neighbourhood Policy* that was launched in 2004 and EU missions, such as the

[1] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, Permanent Representation of the UK, Brussels, 26 September 2006.

Ukraine-Moldova Border Assistance Mission, in the region. Moscow has also tried to influence the EU process in devising action plans for the countries in the South Caucasus.

Russian and EU interests in the region are often diverging. Russia is, basically, interested in maintaining the *status quo* in the CIS region. This position tends to run contrary to the EU's interests in promoting democracy and market economy in the region. It is therefore hard for Russia to see EU-Russia cooperation in the European neighbourhood as a win-win situation. Also in relation to the frozen conflicts, interests are diverging. Russia is deeply sceptical of any initiatives that would change the *status quo* or threaten Moscow's dominating role in these conflicts. Consequently, Russia sees little need for larger EU involvement. All this must be taken into account when assessing the prospects for future EU-Russia cooperation on the 'frozen conflicts'.

The cooperation within the Common Space of External Security has developed at a very slow pace. Although an elaborate political dialogue has been established, both Brussels and Moscow deplore the lack of concrete cooperation within this Common Space. There are several reasons behind the lack of results in security cooperation thus far. First, it has to be recognised that both the EU and Russia still are in a stage of developing their security policies and strategies to deal with the new challenges that have emerged. A second problem is the lack of trust between the two parties. The EU is distrustful of Russian initiatives within the security field, and appears to be looking for a Russian hidden agenda – this is the case not least among some of the new EU member states. Russia in its turn sees a hidden agenda behind EU engagement in the European neighbourhood and towards Russia itself. There is an influential strand of Russian thinking that portrays the West (more so the US than the EU) as an international actor that wants Russia to remain weak, vulnerable and marginalised.

Third, there is a large gap between Russian and EU strategic interests in the relationship. The EU's goals in building its relations with Russia are to foster a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in the country and to maintain European stability.[2] The Russian interests revolve around economic cooperation, the idea of multipolarity and maintaining its image of a great power. The EU's objective to promote a democratic development in Russia is, furthermore, perceived in Russia as the EU forcing its values upon Russia – something that Russia increasingly finds unacceptable.

[2] The European Commission's Delegation to Russia (1999a) *EU Common Strategy on Russia*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 11 December 2006, last updated: 4 June 1999, address: http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_244.htm These interests are still the overall ones behind the EU's policy towards Russia.

Fourth, Russia wants to achieve equality in decision-making with the EU and resents being faced with *faits accomplis* after the EU has negotiated its position among its member states. Russia has also promoted concrete interests, such as leasing of Russian air transportation capabilities for crisis management and civil protection, and has put forward a number of initiatives along this line. For different reasons the EU wants to proceed slowly, while Russia is eager to pursue its initiatives and grows impatient with the EU's hesitancy. For the EU, on the other hand, the main priority within the Common Space – to engage Russia in concrete cooperation in the European neighbourhood – is a highly complicated task and an area where Russia wants to move forward only slowly.

Finally, there are fundamental differences in the decision-making cultures of the EU and Russia, a fact that has complicated the dialogue not only within the security field, but in other areas as well. The EU is working according to a bottom-up approach, delegating responsibility for negotiations to the expert level. In Russia, on the other hand, a top-down approach is prevailing. This difference in cultures has made it difficult to find the right formats for cooperation. While the EU favours expert meetings, such meetings have not been productive since the Russian experts who attend these usually lack the necessary mandate to negotiate or take decisions. Both sides seem aware of the need to find better functioning formats for cooperation.

Overall, these asymmetries make it difficult to achieve advanced and practical cooperation within the Common Space of External Security. Russia's increasingly self-contained foreign policy points to growing difficulties in the EU-Russia external security relations, not least on cooperating in the European neighbourhood. At the same time, the well-established dialogue on external security constitutes a positive example of cooperation within the Common Space of External Security. Moscow attaches great importance to the high-level political dialogue with the EU on international affairs, most importantly on Iran and the Middle East. Furthermore, the promotion of dialogue and exchange of views at the level of officials and experts as well as the participation in training courses and exercises may contribute to an increased understanding of the respective policies and decision-making procedures of the EU and Russia.

Contents

Tables

1. Introduction

1.1. Russia and the European Union – A Complicated Relationship

Russia has often had an ambiguous approach to Europe. On one hand it has been looking for integration with Europe, while, on the other, strong feelings of sovereignty have led to a withdrawal from mainstream European development.[3] This ambiguity is still utterly present in Russia's policy towards the EU. Russia's European choice has been clearly stressed by Putin during his two terms in office. For example, in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly in 2003 he stated: 'An important element of our foreign policy is growing closer and becoming truly integrated into Europe. Of course, this is a complex and lengthy process. But this is our historical choice. It has been made'.[4] However, Russia is repeatedly emphasising its sovereignty and that it is not aspiring for EU membership. Hence it does not consider itself to have to adapt to EU norms. Instead it wants to remain an independent power that cooperates with the EU on equal terms. Behind this rhetoric lies the idea that Russia should develop in accordance with its own history and interests. It is not open to all influences from Europe or susceptible to European values and norms imposed from the outside. This self-assertiveness has strengthened during Putin's second term in office, as has authoritarian tendencies domestically.

While Russia's perceptions of the EU are ambiguous, the EU is struggling with similar problems. The EU is primarily driven by the ambition to create conditions for peace and prosperity on the Continent. Close ties with neighbouring Russia are a natural part of such an objective, as is the interest to foster a democratic and stable development in the country. At the same time, the EU is expressing concerns over the internal development in Russia and the EU's approach towards the country is increasingly debated among its member states. In addition, the EU is struggling with internal difficulties in finding a common position on Russia – a problem that also spills over to the Union's policy towards its eastern European neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the EU's goal to promote democracy in Russia is a policy that Moscow to an increasing degree finds unacceptable and humiliating.

Despite the diverging strategic interests and the growing strains that the internal developments in Russia put on the relations, both parties remain convinced of

[3] H. Smith (2006) 'Introduction: Russia's Policy Towards the European Union' in H. Smith (ed.), *The Two-Level Game: Russia's Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union* (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications), p. 8.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

the importance of developing the relationship further. The goal to create a strategic partnership based on common values and interests is constantly repeated, despite the fact that these ingredients are conspicuously lacking in the relationship.

The EU-Russia relations have developed within the framework for cooperation that was established by the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* (PCA), which came into force in 1997. The PCA sets up a highly formalised political dialogue at different levels, from summits at the highest political level to meetings at the senior official level. It is the most institutionalised relationship the EU has established with another third state. The PCA was initially agreed upon for a period of ten years and the parties therefore tried to initiate negotiations on a new agreement already in 2006. However, the planned start for this in November 2006 was delayed since Poland refused to enter negotiations before certain demands on Russia were met. Negotiations are now planned to start during 2007.[5]

Within the framework of the PCA, the EU and Russia in 2003 agreed to establish four common spaces for cooperation. Today the substance of the cooperation can be found within the *Common Economic Space*, the *Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice*, the *Common Space of External Security* and the *Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects*. Of these, the Common Space of External Security provides maybe the biggest difficulties. It includes political dialogue on international issues as well as cooperation on crisis management within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Russia has, since the ESDP was launched in Cologne in 1999, closely followed the development of the policy. Russia early on showed an interest in developing its security relations with the EU as well as for concrete cooperation in the security field. At the EU-Russia Summit in Paris 2000, the two sides issued a joint declaration stating their mutual intention to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe. This intention was further confirmed at the Summit in Brussels in 2001 that paved the way for increased dialogue and new meeting formats within the sphere of security policy. In the *Roadmap for the Common Space of External Security*, agreed upon in 2005, the scope for cooperation was further defined.

[5] It is far from certain that the EU and Russia will be able to agree on a new agreement during 2007. A future agreement will need to be ratified by the parliaments of the signatory states. However, at the EU-Russia Summit in May 2006 the parties made a commitment to let the PCA remain valid until a new agreement enters into force. See Council of the European Union (2006a) *17th EU-Russia Summit, Sotchi, 25th May 2006*, 9850/06 (Presse 157), last accessed: 19 December 2006, last updated: 25 May 2006, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit17_25-05-06/council_press_release_eu-russia_summit.pdf

It could be argued that the prospects for security cooperation between Russia and the EU have increased in recent years. The EU has gradually developed the ESDP and launched its first ESDP operations. Consequently, there are now concrete opportunities for cooperation on crisis management, both in the military and the civilian field. The EU is strengthening its foreign policy and is to an increasing degree becoming an actor in the global arena. Through enlargement, the EU and Russia now share a common neighbourhood, where the security challenges are manifold. As the EU is slowly becoming more engaged in this region, opportunities for joint initiatives could emerge. In addition, the institutional framework for political dialogue is extensive and there are numerous meeting formats where security cooperation could be discussed and developed.

While there are plenty of studies of the overall relations between Russia and the EU, the research available on the security aspects of the cooperation is so far limited. One of the most interesting works is Andrew Monaghan's article about Russian perceptions of the security relations and prospects for such cooperation.[6] Derek Averre has studied the EU-Russia cooperation on security affairs including the progress within the roadmap for external security.[7] Dov Lynch and Dmitry Danilov have conducted interesting analyses of a strategic partnership between the EU and Russia including the security relations.[8]

1.2. The Aim of this Study

In developing its cooperation on external security with Russia, it is important for the EU to understand the Russian expectations of this relationship. In order to contribute to a deeper knowledge and understanding, the aim of this study is to examine Russian policy on EU affairs and Russian perceptions of the EU external security policy. The analysis of Russian policy will discuss where

[6] A. Monaghan (2004) 'Does Europe Exist as an Entity for Military Cooperation?', *The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 47–62 and A. Monaghan (2005) *Russian Perspectives of Russia-EU Security Relations*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Russian Series - 05/38, last accessed: 24 August 2005, last updated: not specified, address: http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Russian/05%2838%29-AM.pdf

[7] See D. Averre (2006) 'Russia-EU Security Cooperation' in H. Smith (ed.), *The Two-Level Game: Russia's Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union* (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications) and D. Averre (2005a) 'The EU-Russian Relationship in the Context of European Security' in D. Johnson and P. Robinson (eds.), *Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 73–92.

[8] See D. Lynch (2005) *What Russia Sees* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies), Chaillot Papers, Chaillot Papers No. 74 and D. Danilov (2005) 'Russia-EU Cooperation in the Security Field: Trends and Conceptual Framework' in H. Smith (ed.), *Russia and Its Foreign Policy* (Saarijärvi: Kikimora Publications), pp. 111–124.

decisions are taken and by whom, what the Russian national interests towards the EU are and also what external factors influence the current policy. The analysis of Russian perceptions will focus on the ESDP, the EU's neighbourhood policy and the Common Space of External Security.

In this study, the term EU external security policy is used to describe the whole range of EU instruments that constitute the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP). This term is thus not limited to the ESDP, which contains the EU civilian and military crisis management instruments. It also includes other CFSP instruments, such as political dialogue, cooperation in international organisations, appointment of EU Special Representatives for conflict areas, Commission policies, etc. The study will, however, not touch upon the field of Justice and Home Affairs, although several measures related to security policy are being developed in this field.

1.3. The Structure of This Report

The first part of the report will examine the Russian mechanisms for decision-making on EU affairs. It will study the different institutions and decision-makers who determine Russia's policy *vis-à-vis* the EU's external security policy. It will further, mainly by analysing the concepts available on Russian foreign and security policy, identify Russian interests in its relationship with the EU. It will also note the external factors that influence Russia's policy towards the EU. This chapter will provide an understanding of mechanisms, ideas and fundamental interests that determine the Russian policy and perceptions when it comes to the external security relations with the EU.

The second part will examine the Russian perceptions of the EU's external security policy and the EU-Russia security cooperation. It will, first, analyse Russian perceptions of the ESDP. Second, it will study the Russian view on the EU as a security policy actor in the European neighbourhood. Since this area is the main interest of the EU within the security cooperation with Russia, it will be given extensive attention. The Russian perceptions when it comes to EU enlargement will be covered in this chapter. Third, Russia's perceptions of the security cooperation with the EU, primarily within the Roadmap for the Common Space of External Security, will be examined.

1.4. Framework of Analysis

The analysis of Russia's security policy towards the EU in the main constitutes an exercise of foreign policy analysis. This report will, to a considerable extent,

use a model proposed by Bobo Lo and Dmitrii Trenin for analysing the mechanisms and environment of decision-making on foreign policy in Russia. According to this method, several factors that determine Russian policy should be studied, namely the institutional framework including the role of different individual actors, the role of ideas and interests that guide decision-makers, special interests of different cliques in society and, finally, the impact of external factors on Russian foreign policy. The model helps to identify conceptual principles that can serve as an effective basis for understanding.[9]

In this report this method is used to reveal the underlying principles that determine the Russian policy towards the EU. The model has therefore been adapted to fit this purpose. Hence, in Chapter 2 the decision-making institutions on EU affairs – and then especially on European external security – are analysed. This analysis of the decision-makers involved as well as the bureaucracy that they rely on is complemented by a discussion of the ideas and interests that underpin this elite's view of the world. In addition, there are a number of external factors that influence Russian decision-making and a developed web of regional organisations, in which Russia plays a pivotal role, that are important to take into account when analysing Russian policy *vis-à-vis* the EU. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the underlying principles and thus give a greater understanding of, and a background to, the Russian perceptions discussed in the following chapter.

In order to distinguish between the different sources that have been used, mainly official statements, interviews and analytical articles, the various actors have been divided into two categories according to the function they perform. This gives an indication as to the importance of each actor or institution within the decision-making system and the principal role that it performs. The two categories are:

1. decision-makers and officials. This group includes both people in central executive positions, such as the president, his top officials, the prime minister and his deputies, government ministers and their deputies and government officials with a responsibility for providing advice, analysis and for implementing policy. What these people included in this category have in common is that their statements have been interpreted as official Russian policy. Although government officials do not have the mandate to make official statements their perceptions are probably not radically different from those expressed by decision-makers.
2. people who influence more indirectly through domestic opinion and public debate. This is an unwieldy category that includes everyone from

[9] B. Lo and D. Trenin (2005) *The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, Carnegie Moscow Center, last accessed: 4 October 2005, address: http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/books/9200doklad_fin.pdf.

parliamentarians, who, it could be argued, are very close to power, to independent researchers and NGOs. What unites the people in the category is the fact that they are formally outside the executive government machinery, although many of them undoubtedly have very close connections with it. Certain individuals within this category appear to influence policy making at least as much, sometimes more, than some officials are able to. Nevertheless, this is done indirectly and the statements made by this category should be analysed accordingly and certainly not as official Russian policy.

1.5. A Note on the Sources Used in This Study

While there is relatively rich material available on the Russian academic and public debate on Europe, the views of decision-makers are only gleaned from public statements and interviews. This problem is hardly unique to Russia. The ideas and interests that influenced a particular foreign policy decision are notoriously difficult to determine to an outside observer – especially at the time decisions are made or shortly after.[10] The main way of attacking this inherent difficulty has been to conduct semi-structured interviews with senior officials both in Brussels and in Moscow. These interviews serve the purpose of providing more detailed answers that go beyond official statements to the questions examined. They also add a unique material to this report.

While the focus of the study is to examine the official Russian view, interviews in Moscow were made at ministries that have contacts with the EU on issues related to external security. Interviews were thus conducted at different departments at the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations. Interviews carried out at the Russian Federal Assembly, which do not represent the government's view, are used as reference material. Interviews at the Presidential Administration and the Security Council were not possible to arrange. The authors did not have the opportunity to influence the selection of specific officials to be interviewed.[11] However, since those interviewed were of senior rank and were able to give the official view, they should be representative for the purpose of the study. All three authors were present at the interviews and the notes have been thoroughly compared. But, since no tape recorder or interpreter was used during interviews, few quotations will be made from these. The interviews both in Brussels and Moscow were made under the promise of anonymity.

[10] The process can usually only be understood later when memoirs are published and the actors involved are more likely to agree to disclose how events actually developed behind closed doors.
[11] The interviews were arranged with the help of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow which contacted the relevant ministries and requested interviews at departments identified by the authors.

The interviews have been complemented by the official documents available – such as the Russian *National Security Concept*, the *Foreign Policy Doctrine*, the *Strategy for the Development of the Russian Federation's Relations with the European Union in the Medium-Length Perspective* together with statements made by and articles written by decision-makers.

2. Russia as a Foreign and Defence Policy Actor

2.1. The Domestic Institutions that Shape Russia's Policy on EU Affairs

The executive branch, especially the structures that are subordinated to the president, plays the dominant role in shaping Russian security policy. In part, this state of affairs is decided by the Constitution which gives the deciding role to the president on all security and defence matters. In essence, the executive branch has become bifurcated into one part that deals with economic and social affairs, namely the prime minister and the ministries and other government institutions that are subordinated to him, and another part that deals with security policy, which consists of the president, his administration and the ministries and government institutions directly subordinated to him.[12] The parliamentary branch has very limited scope of influence and responsibility in security and defence affairs.

Russian policy making on EU affairs is to a large degree divided among various institutions. As will be obvious below, much of the responsibility for coordinating Russia's policy has been delegated to Brussels, where the EU ambassador Vladimir Chizhov currently plays a central role. In addition, four people have been appointed informal coordinators in Moscow for each of the four EU-Russia Common Spaces. Of these, two are serving in central positions in the Presidential Administration (Viktor Ivanov, who coordinates the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, and Sergei Yastrzhembskii, coordinator of the Common Space of Research, Education and Culture) and two are ministers (Viktor Khristenko, responsible for the Common Economic Space, and Sergei Lavrov, who coordinates the Common Space of External Security).[13] In addition, the Presidential Administration appears to take considerable interest in shaping Russia's policy *vis-à-vis* CIS countries. In other words, the external relations of the EU when it enters this sphere are probably not merely a matter of coordination for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID).

[12] Lo and Trenin describe this division in terms of 'high' and 'low' policy, where high policy 'comprises matters of war and peace, foreign affairs, defence and domestic security' and low policy 'economic, financial, social and other issues'. Lo and Trenin, *The Landscape...* , p. 11. For a list of which ministries and institutions that are subordinated to the president, see Presidential Decree No. 314, 9 March 2004, 'On the System and Structure of the Federal Organs of Executive Power of the Russian Federation'.

[13] Interview at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 12 October 2006.

The President and the Presidential Administration

The Russian Constitution places responsibility and powers in the sphere of security policy firmly on the president's shoulders. The president is head of state, decides the 'basic direction of the domestic and foreign policy' and represents Russia internally as well as internationally (art. 80); he confirms the military doctrine and appoints and dismisses the highest military leadership as well as Russian ambassadors (art. 83). In the sphere of foreign policy, the president 'embodies the leadership of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation', conducts negotiations as well as signs international treaties (art. 86). It should also be noted that a wide array of federal laws and regulations additionally strengthen the powers of the president in the security policy sphere. In particular the constitutional federal law 'On the Government of the Russian Federation' stipulates that the president:

> …through his decrees and instructions directs the activity of federal ministries and other federal organs of executive power, which are in charge of questions of defence, security, internal affairs, foreign affairs, avoiding emergency situations and liquidating the consequences of natural calamities.[14]

In other words, it would seem that the formal powers of the president in the sphere of security policy are without limitation. However, in practice, he is bound to rely on a number of institutions for information, advice and execution of his policy. Closest at hand is the Presidential Administration. This institution is only mentioned in passing in the constitution, but has grown considerably since it came into existence. Its structure is determined through presidential decree and its inner workings are often hard to examine and understand for an outsider.[15] The formal structure and the division of responsibilities between the top officials are available from presidential decrees and instructions and constitute a good starting point for examining the role of the Presidential Administration in Russia's formulation of its policy vis-à-vis the EU and then especially its foreign and defence policy.[16]

The Head of the Presidential Administration has usually been considered a very influential man in the Kremlin, albeit not primarily in the sphere of security policy. The current Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Sobianin follows this tradition. Of his two deputies, Vladislav Surkov and Igor Sechin, the latter is the one with the most influence on security affairs, albeit not principally on questions concerning international security. Instead, there are three presidential assistants (*pomoshchniki*) who handle such questions. Of

[14] Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation, No. 2-FKZ, 17 December 1997, article 32.
[15] For an excellent introduction on the Presidential Administration, see E. Huskey (1999) *Presidential Power in Russia* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe).
[16] See Presidential Decree No. 400, 25 March 2004; No. 490, 6 April 2004 (and the regulations for the Presidential Administration that accompany it) and Presidential Instruction No. 578, 20 April 2004.

these, Viktor Ivanov has been present in an advisory function at recent summits between Russia and the EU ever since the Common Spaces became prominent in EU-Russia relations.[17] Meanwhile, Sergei Yastrzhembskii combines the post of presidential assistant with that of 'presidential representative on questions related to the development of relations with the European Union'. As such he is present at EU-Russia summits and has given interviews on EU-Russia relations. However, his responsibility seems to be overarching and not especially related to the ESDP or the EU external security policy.

Although Yastrzhembskii formally has overall responsibility for EU affairs within the Presidential Administration his ability to fulfil such a function in all spheres must be doubted. He has at his disposal only a small staff of about ten people who are located within the Secretariat of the Head of the Presidential Administration.[18] Since Yastrzhembskii's own staff is rather limited, he must to a considerable degree be dependent upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for analyses and, not least, maintaining contacts with Russia's delegation in Brussels. However, there are rumours that there exists a certain degree of rivalry between Yastrzhembskii and Sergei Lavrov, which greatly complicates coordination on EU affairs between the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[19]

The third presidential assistant with a potential role in these matters is the presidential assistant on foreign policy and international relations Sergei Prikhodko. The exact responsibilities and influence of Prikhodko are unclear, but he does not seem to play a large role in Russian policy towards the EU. Rather, his main role is to furnish the president with analytical material from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on all foreign policy issues that the Presidential Administration prioritises. For example, it appears that the president and a small circle of advisors around him coordinate policy on Georgia, while Prikhodko requests briefings and analyses from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to go into the decision-making procedure.[20] All in all, there does not appear to be a single

[17] Viktor Ivanov was present at the 13th EU-Russia Summit in Moscow on 21 May 2004, the 14th Summit in The Hague on 25 November 2004, the 15th Summit in Moscow on 10 May 2005, the 16th Summit in London on 4 October 2005 as well as at the 17th Summit in Sochi on 25 May 2006.

[18] Interviews with the Embassy of Finland in Moscow, 11 October 2006 and Instruction No. 1958 of the Presidential Administration, 25 December 2004. According to Andrew Monaghan, an 'autonomous department' for EU-Russia relations has been established within the administration. Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 10. However, this is not evident from the information provided on the website of the Presidential Administration and it has not been possible to confirm this through interviews in Moscow.

[19] Interview with the Embassy of Finland in Moscow, 11 October 2006.

[20] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006. There are also nine presidential advisors (*sovetniki*). Their respective influence varies, but is generally smaller than that of the presidential assistants. It is not likely that any of these presidential advisors play prominent roles in influencing Russia's policy *vis-à-vis* the EU. Aleksandr Burutin advises the president on military affairs and

high-level official within the Presidential Administration who is responsible for the EU's external security policy.

The Presidential Administration is divided into thirteen directorates plus a handful of other organisational units that enjoy the same status as a directorate (such as the apparatus of the Security Council, the Secretariat of the Head of the Presidential Administration). Of these the Directorate on Foreign Policy might at times play a role mainly as a collator of foreign policy analysis that is passed on to the Presidential Administration from, primarily, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is also possible that some relevant analysis and information is filtered through the Directorate of Information and Documentation. In addition, the Directorate for Press Service and Information has a role in preparing official information. However, it is important to keep in mind that the Presidential Administration, in spite of employing over two thousand people, hardly has the capacity to manage EU affairs on its own, but is dependent upon other ministries and other institutions for information and analysis.

The Security Council

The apparatus of the Security Council is, formally, part of the Presidential Administration. The Council itself, however, constitutes a consultative organ for the president on security policy. At times, the Security Council and its apparatus have played a prominent role in security policy-making and its influence peaked while Sergei Ivanov was its secretary. Although the meetings of the Security Council have probably become more regular under Igor Ivanov, its influence is not comparable to that under Sergei Ivanov.[21] Under Putin the Council has come to include 25 members (including the president who is its chairman). It is obvious that very little in the form of operative decision-making takes place in such a large group. The entire Security Council meets only about once every three months and it is reasonable to assume that these meetings first and foremost constitute an opportunity for Putin to inform the members about the general policy direction that he wishes to pursue and what his officials should prioritise in their work.

Even the inner circle, which consists of twelve permanent members, is rather large and has come to include both speakers of parliament and two deputy prime ministers. This inner circle meets every Saturday and it is quite possible that it plays a certain role in operative security policy-making. However, the external security policy of the EU probably does not figure prominently on the agenda of these meetings. There are two main reasons for this conclusion. Firstly, the

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Aslambek Aslakhanov on developments in the North Caucasus, but any connection to the ESDP or EU foreign policy appears farfetched even for these two presidential advisors.

[21] For a more detailed study of the Security Council, see C. Vendil (2001) 'The Russian Security Council', *European Security,* Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 67–94.

profile of the top officials of the Security Council's apparatus suggests that its role in overall foreign policy formulation has diminished considerably.[22] Secondly, there are indications that the Department for International Security within the apparatus has been abolished. The reshuffle of the interdepartmental commissions of the council also suggests that this is the case.[23] However, the Security Council seems to have retained an interest in certain foreign policy issues – mainly CIS affairs. All in all, the conclusion is that the Security Council plays a very limited role in influencing Russia's policy *vis-à-vis* the EU, except indirectly when these issues have broader implications for other security spheres that are the domain of the council – such as the CIS and military security.[24] There are signs that the Security Council's role is about to change, but there are as of yet no strict rules for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinating its activities with the Security Council.[25]

The Prime Minister

Russia's prime minister plays a limited role in foreign affairs. Although he is usually present at EU-Russia summits, his influence on Russia's policy *vis-à-vis* EU external security policy is probably negligible. He is instead present in his capacity as coordinator of economic, financial and social policy. However, in the case of the present Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, it is worth noting that he was Russia's official representative at the EU between May 2003 and March 2004 (when he was appointed prime minister). In other words, Fradkov is a prime minister who has first hand experience of Brussels and was instrumental in strengthening Russia's delegation there (see below p. 23ff.).

Fradkov is furthermore Chairman of the Governmental Commission on Economic Integration, which is responsible for coordinating Russia's policy in the CIS, EU and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Forum). Although the main

[22] In 2006, the only deputy secretary of the Security Council with a career primarily within the foreign service, Nikolai Spasskii, left his position to become Director of the Department of Economic Cooperation with CIS Countries at the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade.

[23] The Security Council no longer publishes how its apparatus is structured. It was formerly organised into directorates, but since the administrative reform in 2004 it seems that the apparatus is divided into departments instead. An indication that there is no Department of International Security is the fact that the head of a department is usually included in each interdepartmental commission. Since 2005, there has no longer been an interdepartmental commission on international security. A reasonable guess is that the number and responsibilities of the interdepartmental commissions mirror relatively well the structure of the apparatus. Interestingly, there is still an interdepartmental commission on CIS affairs. The membership of the interdepartmental commissions was established by Presidential Decree No. 601, 12 June 2006; Presidential Decree No. 1244, 28 October 2005. See also C. Vendil Pallin (2005b) *Ryskt säkerhetspolitiskt beslutsfattande: Förändringar inom ryska Säkerhetsrådet [Russian Security Policy Making: Changes within the Russian Security Council]* (Stockholm: FOI), FOI MEMO 1503.

[24] Another indication that it is concerned mainly with CIS affairs is that the European Commission has dealt with the Security Council and the deputy secretaries Nikolai Spasskii and Yurii Zubakov on the issue of frozen conflicts. Interview in Moscow, 13 October 2006.

[25] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

focus of the commission is economic integration, its importance as a general coordinating forum on EU and CIS affairs should not be entirely disregarded. The commission is required to meet at least once a year, but, according to officials in Moscow, it does so about four times a year.[26] Its sessions are presided over by Fradkov in his capacity as chairman of the commission, or by the Deputy Chairman Viktor Khristenko, Minister of Industry and Energy.[27] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is represented in the commission by four of its eight deputy ministers, among whom are Aleksandr Grushko, responsible for EU affairs, and Grigorii Karasin, responsible for CIS affairs. In addition, Russia's ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov is a member of the commission.[28] When this commission was created in 2004, a commission on CIS affairs headed by Khristenko was abolished. There is also an interdepartmental working group, the chairman of which is Grushko. All heads of departments who cooperate with the EU are represented in this working group, which is responsible for coordination and preparations for meetings in Fradkov's commission.[29]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MID is often dismissed as mainly occupying the function of implementing policy, while the formulation of foreign policy takes place elsewhere. Although it is true that many foreign policy decisions are taken outside MID and that the minister of foreign affairs is then faced with *faits accomplis*, the ministry still plays an important role. Certain policy areas are still in the main handled by MID and the president is dependent on the considerable analytical expertise that resides within its walls.[30] It is also worth noting that Russia's network of embassies and a number of other official representations abroad are administered through MID. Indeed, the Russian delegation at the EU is one of these and has grown considerably in recent years.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov is designated coordinator for the Common Space of External Security.[31] In addition, his ministry was largely

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[26] *Ibid.*

[27] The statutes of the commission (Government Resolution No. 570, 21 October 2004) are available at Government of the Russian Federation (2004) *Polozhenie o Pravitelstvennoi kommissii po voprosam ekonomicheskoi integratsii*, Government of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 6 November 2006, address: http://www.government.ru/government/coordinatingauthority/fradkov/ekon_voprosi/polozhenie/

[28] The membership of the commission was established by Government Instruction No. 1472-r, 25 October 2006, Government of the Russian Federation (2006) *Sostav Pravitelstvennoi kommissii po voprosam ekonomicheskoi integratsii*, Government of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 6 November 2006, address: http://www.government.ru/government/coordinatingauthority/fradkov/ekon_voprosi/sostav/

[29] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

[30] B. Lo (2003) *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 33–34.

[31] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

responsible for drafting the Russian proposals for the text of the Road Map for this Common Space. Inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Grushko is responsible for 'general European and Euro-Atlantic organisations'. He is one of eight deputy ministers (of which one is first deputy minister and one secretary of state). Grushko's past diplomatic career suggests an interest in arms limitation questions and he was Head of MID's Department for General European Cooperation (DOS) between 2001-2002, before becoming deputy minister of foreign affairs. Grushko is also chairman of an interdepartmental working group on EU affairs (see above p. 22). DOS is the most important department handling relations with the EU, although there are three European departments that are responsible for relations with a number of individual European countries. These are involved when Russia prioritises bilateral rather than multilateral relations.[32] However, it is DOS that maintains contact with Russia's EU delegation in Brussels. In spite of the considerable expansion of the EU delegation in recent years, DOS has not grown in size. The number of people who specialise in EU politics and security policy are only about a handful.[33]

In addition, there are a number of departments that deal with CIS affairs. The Second Department on CIS (2SNG), responsible for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and the Fourth Department on CIS (4SNG), which handles the South Caucasus, could become involved when the ENP or frozen conflicts are on the agenda in relations with the EU. Additional functional, rather than geographical, departments involved in EU security policy are the Department for Questions of Security and Arms Limitations (DVBR) and the Department for New Challenges and Threats (DNV).

The Russian EU Delegation in Brussels

In recent years, the Russian EU delegation in Brussels has increased substantially in size and scope. It is now one of Russia's largest foreign representations and to a degree a centre of coordination of Russia's policy on EU affairs. The initiative for this change was taken by Mikhail Fradkov during his time as ambassador in Brussels and came to fruition under Vladimir Chizhov, who was appointed ambassador to the European Union in July 2005.[34] Chizhov came from the position as deputy minister of foreign affairs and had

[32] The countries of Europe are divided between the First European Department (1ED), the Second European Department (2ED) and the Third European Department (3ED).
[33] All in all, about 80 officials work at DOS. Probably about half of these constitute support personnel. Only about 10–12 officials deal mainly with EU affairs, while the rest focus on other European matters, such as Russia's relations with the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Of the officials who focus on the EU, perhaps as few as four concentrate on political and security relations. Interview at MID, 12 October 2006 and Monaghan *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 10.
[34] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006 and the interview with the newly appointed Chizhov in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 12 September 2005, p. 9.

before then worked in leading positions at several of the MID departments in charge of European affairs. He was known as an outspoken critic of alleged discriminatory practices against the ethnic Russian population in Estonia and Latvia.[35] As so often is the case, personality no doubt plays a substantial role in deciding the influence of a particular institution. In the case of the Russian EU delegation, it is safe to assume that Chizhov through his earlier professional career and personal network has gathered enough clout to make his delegation in Brussels at least one of the important centres of gravity for Russian decision-making on EU affairs.

From being a rather modest delegation of about fifteen people only a few years ago, the Russian delegation in 2006 comprised just under fifty diplomats, of which 30–35 were from MID and the rest from other ministries, such as the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Defence (since 2002) and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations (since 2005). Chizhov alone has four deputies in Brussels and there is, in addition to the diplomats from various ministries, a sizable contingent of support personnel. All in all, the delegation comprises about one hundred people.[36] This has, of course, further expanded the role of the Russian EU ambassador as a coordinator of EU policy in Brussels. Consequently, Chizhov has been central in formulating the Russian position in the public debate on integration with the EU.

The Ministry of Defence

The Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov is often singled out as one of the persons who is closest to Putin. Since November 2005 he has been combining the post of minister of defence with that of deputy prime minister with special responsibility for reforming the military industrial complex. This is at the top of his agenda rather than EU affairs. Nevertheless, Ivanov's profile in international affairs is notably higher than previous ministers of defence. Inside the Ministry of Defence, there is a Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation (GUMVS). The head of this directorate is General Colonel Anatolii Mazurkevich.[37] In addition, there is a section for international relations under

[35] See, for example, the interviews with Chizhov in B. Vinogradov (2004) *'Stolitsu Rossii rano perenosit v Briussel' [It Is Still Early to Make Brussels into Russia's Capital],* Novye izvestiia, last accessed: 24 October 2006, address: http://www.newizv.ru/news/2004-04-13/5899/ See also RIA Novosti (2005) *Interviu predstavitelia RF pri Evropeiskikh soobshchestvakh Chizhova [Interview with Russia's Representative at the European Union Chizhov],* RIA Novosti, last accessed: 24 October 2006, address: http://www.rian.ru/interview/20050902/41282159-print.html

[36] Interview at MID, 12 October 2006 and at the Federation Council, 12 October 2006. See also the list provided at the EU Delegation of the Russian Federation (2006) *Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Communities,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 8 November 2006, address: http://www.russiaeu.mid.ru/doc/spisok_en.htm

[37] He replaced the controversial Leonid Ivashov in July 2001, who had made himself known for a highly critical view of Western intentions. C. Vendil Pallin (2005a) *Russian Military Reform: A Failed*

the aegis of the General Staff, which, in turn, constitutes part of the Ministry of Defence. However, most of the Russian MoD's international relations are managed through Mazurkevitch's directorate.

Since May 2002, there have been two representatives of the Ministry of Defence included in the Russian EU delegation in Brussels.[38] They maintain contacts with the EU Military Committee (EUMC). In addition, the ministry takes part in regular meetings at General Staff level with the EU. The ministry would become more directly involved in EU relations and the ESDP especially if the question arises whether Russia should participate in peacekeeping missions. The Armed Forces have a brigade based in Samara that is especially trained for taking part in operations abroad. So far, this brigade has primarily been involved in operations in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia and it is not officially designated a 'peacekeeping brigade', although it is often referred to as such in Russian and international media.[39] However, the exchange in EU and Russian relations concerning defence affairs is so low that precious little coordination of policy is required between MID and the Ministry of Defence.[40] Even less cooperation is called for between the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Defence.[41]

Any decision to participate in military operations abroad is made by the president. The decision is then directed to the Federation Council that, according to the constitution, has to approve the decision (see below). The Ministry of Defence is not directly involved in the decision as such, except to the degree that the minister of defence, through, for example, his membership of the inner circle of the Security Council, is able to influence the president's decision. The costs of the operation are usually covered by a special fund that is set aside for such purposes by the Ministry of Defence if the decision is taken early in the year. When the question of a military operation abroad arises later in the fiscal year, there is a governmental fund that covers the costs if the Ministry of Defence's funds have run out. The latter was the case with the Russian mission to Lebanon that was decided upon in the autumn of 2006.[42]

Other Ministries and State Institutions

According to Russian officials, just about all ministries are represented in the Russian delegation to the EU. However, on closer inspection, only a few ministries have a substantial representation and exchange with the EU – among

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Exercise in Defence Decision Making (Stockholm: FOI), Scientific Report, FOI-R--1777--SE, pp. 200–201.

[38] Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 2.

[39] Interview at the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), 11 October 2006.

[40] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

[41] Interview at the Russian MoD, 11 October 2006.

[42] Interview at the Russian MoD, 11 October 2006.

them are, of course, the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development and the Ministry of Industry and Energy. When it comes to defence and foreign affairs, the only ministry that appears to have a constant representation with outspoken ambitions to increase cooperation, apart from MID and the Ministry of Defence, is the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations (MChS). It has sent representatives to the Russian delegation in Brussels since 2005 (as well as to NATO). The MChS has also approached the EU with proposals for expanded cooperation as early as in 2003.[43] In Moscow, the Department for International Affairs, which is headed by Jurii Brazhnikov, coordinates the MChS's relations in Brussels.[44]

The Federal Assembly – The State Duma and the Federation Council

Formally, the Russian parliament, the Federal Assembly, has very little influence over Russia's policy towards the EU. Its remit in foreign, security and defence policy is rather limited. The lower house of parliament, the Duma, could in theory influence these policy areas as well as others through the budget review process, since the Duma approves the state budget each year. However, in practice, the Duma's possibilities to exercise oversight in the field of foreign, security and defence policy are very limited. It is only in recent years that members of parliament have been privy to any details of defence spending. Indeed, for many years, the Duma deputies have received less information on Russia's defence budget than international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE, to which Russia reported such matters on a regular basis.[45]

Putin's relationship with the Duma differs significantly from the troubled one which Yeltsin had. A few months before Putin was elected president, a newly created party close to him, United Russia, enjoyed surprising success in the parliamentary election in December 1999. As a result, Putin has been blessed with a very pliable Duma, which attentively follows the Kremlin policy in most questions. The parliamentary election in 2003 strengthened the position of United Russia even further and this party is now firmly in control of all the most influential positions in the Duma. Its representatives are speaker and first deputy speakers of the Duma and the party has assumed chairmanship of all the Duma committees. In other words, although there might at times emerge statements from the Duma that do not entirely follow the Kremlin line, many of these are

[43] Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 12.
[44] Ministry of Civil Defence Matters and Emergency Situations of the RF (2006) *Departament mezhdunarodnoi deiatelnosti [Department for International Activity],* Ministry of Civil Defence Matters and Emergency Situations of the RF, last accessed: 23 November 2006, last updated: not specified, address: http://www.mchs.gov.ru/article.html?id=187.
[45] For an excellent examination of this, see J. Cooper (2006) 'Society-Military Relations in Russia: The Economic Dimension' in S. L. Webber and J. G. Mathers (eds.), *Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 131–156.

probably tacitly approved by Putin and his inner circle as, for example, useful tests of public and international opinion.

As a foreign policy issue, Russian relations with the EU are the prerogative mainly of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, the chair of which is Konstantin Kosachev. However, this committee also has a subcommittee that has been specialising in EU affairs since 2005. This subcommittee is chaired by Andrei Klimov, who also is a member of the United Russia faction. It is in more or less daily contact with MID and the Presidential Administration and, among other things, organises round tables with representatives from these institutions.[46] There is a separate Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Compatriots. This committee is chaired by Andrei Kokoshin, who by virtue of his past career as first deputy minister of defence and secretary of the Security Council has a wide network and considerable clout in Moscow politics, even from the vantage point of the Duma. The Committee on CIS Affairs and Compatriots is concerned not least with the question of the frozen conflicts and Kokoshin was one of the people who the EUSR for the Southern Caucasus Peter Semneby met while in Moscow in 2006. There is also a Duma Committee on Security, but the focus of this committee is mainly on internal security and to the degree that it deals with EU affairs at all is probably concerned only with the Common Space for Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally, there is a Duma Committee on Defence, which is chaired by the former military officer Viktor Zavarzin. However, taking into account the low activity of relations between Russia and the EU on the ESDP, it is unlikely that the Committee on Defence spends very much time on such matters.

The upper house of parliament, the Federation Council, has even less influence over foreign and defence policy. According to the constitution, its remit in this sphere is limited to approving decisions to send Russian troops abroad and to being 'informed' about the introduction of martial law or a state of emergency in the country. The balance of forces within the Federation Council is not primarily decided by party affiliation. Instead, each deputy represents a region (two are appointed from each of Russia's 88 regions). Under Yeltsin, the Federation Council at least had the potential of becoming an independent institution.[47] Under Putin, the Kremlin has acquired considerable influence over who is appointed to the Federation Council. Although the control mechanism is different, the Kremlin has managed to rein in the upper house of parliament as well as the lower, the Duma.

[46] Interview at the State Duma, 12 October 2006.
[47] The deputies were identical with the head of each region and the speaker of the region's parliament and thus received their mandate in direct regional elections.

The array of Federation Council committees differs somewhat from that of the Duma, but there is a Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is chaired by Mikhail Margelov, and this is the natural focal point for discussions on EU affairs in the Federation Council. Even more interestingly, one of the deputy chairmen of this committee Vasilii Likhachev was Russia's ambassador to the EU in 1998–2003 and has continued to show an interest in the development of EU-Russia relations upon returning home to continue a political career.[48] There is also a Committee on CIS Affairs, chaired by Vadim Gustov, and a Committee on Defence and Security, chaired by Viktor Ozerov. On the whole, however, the Federation Council and its committees play only a very limited role in influencing Russia's policy on ESDP matters and the EU's external relations. Its deputies are, just like the Duma deputies, free to participate in the debate, but usually receive less attention than their Duma counterparts.

The Academic Community, Think Tanks and Society

There are a number of academic institutions that have certain influence on Russian policy – not least since academics often serve as official or unofficial advisors to the state institutions described above. In other words, the degree to which the academic institutions are independent of the state varies considerably. In the case of the MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), it is closely connected to MID. This institute furnishes MID with new recruits and the European College, which was established with support from the EU in order to stimulate education on European affairs, is a part of the MGIMO. In addition, there is a European Institute which is part of the Russian Academy of Science. The head of the institute is Nikolai Shmelev, but one of the deputy directors Sergei Karaganov is perhaps the most well known of its academics. According to his own curriculum vitae, he has been hired as an advisor by a number of state institutions, the Security Council, the Federation Council and by Sergei Prikhodko within the Presidential Administration.[49] Another analyst who works at this institute is Dmitrii Danilov, who has published frequently on EU-Russia affairs.

The list of research institutes could be made considerably longer. Nevertheless, the MGIMO and the European Institute are excellent examples of academic institutions that influence Russian EU policy at least indirectly. The European Institute also publishes a journal, *Sovremennaia Evropa* (*Contemporary Europe*). Worth mentioning are also the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), where Vladimir Baranovskii is deputy director and a researcher not least on EU affairs, and the Institute of Strategic

[48] See, for example, his article V. N. Likhachev (2006) 'Russia and the European Union', *International Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 102–114.
[49] European Institute (2006) *Karaganov Sergei Aleksandrovich, D.I.N.*, European Institute, last accessed: 10 November 2006, address: http://www.ieras.ru/karaganov.htm.

Studies and Analysis. The latter publishes the journal *Vestnik Analitiki*, and has relatively well developed relations with Russian decision-makers within the state administration.

In addition, there are think tanks that play a role in shaping the Russian debate. Among the more influential is the network the Council on Foreign and Defence Politics (*Sovet vneshnei i oboronnoi politiki*, SVOP). This network of academics and officials (former and still active) produces its own analyses and maintains active links with state institutions. Sergei Karaganov is, moreover, a member of SVOP's presidium and has published analyses of Russia-EU relations under the aegis of SVOP. Indeed, 'Russia and the EU' is listed as one of the ten projects that the council devotes its activity towards.[50] SVOP was also one of the founders of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs*, which is published in both Russian and English and has quickly established itself as one of the more important journals on international relations in Russia. This journal regularly publishes articles on EU-Russia relations. Another think tank worth mentioning is the Committee 'Russia in a United Europe' (RUE), which has a distinctly liberal approach to the topic of Russia's place in Europe. The coordinator of this committee Nikolai Ryzhkov is one of the few liberal deputies who still retain a seat in the Duma. The analyst and researcher Nadia Arbatova is also active in RUE.

On the whole it can be concluded that the academic community and think tanks do play a role in shaping Russia's policy on EU affairs. They do so primarily by virtue of their expertise as well as through the personal connections and access they possess within the state institutions rather than through initiating debate in the national media. Russia's national television stations are today controlled directly or indirectly by the Kremlin, as are many of the larger national newspapers. In addition, there is little in the way of independent organisations or NGOs. During Putin's second term, these have found themselves under stricter control from the Kremlin through new legislation and overall tighter restrictions on their activities. The Public Chamber, established by Putin in 2005, does little to rectify this lack of independent opinion building in Russian society since the organisations that are included there are vetted by the Kremlin before their representatives become accepted as members. The Head of the Public Chamber's Commission on International Cooperation and Societal Diplomacy Viacheslav Nikonov has made a career as an independent researcher at think tanks as well as connected to different presidential commissions. He is also a member of SVOP and of the editorial board of *Russia in Global Affairs*.

[50] For information about SVOP, a list of its members and publications, see http://www.svop.ru.

2.2. Ideas, Identity, Ideology and Interests

Most analysts agree that Russian foreign policy in recent years has not been, as was often the case in the Soviet times, inspired by ideology. The foreign policy is declared not to be conditioned by ideological biases – whether rivalry with the West or integration into it – but instead by national interests.[51] This change took place already with the fall of the Soviet Union, but during Putin's time in office, the leadership's emphasis on interests instead of ideology has been even more evident.

Overall, foreign policy making has been more realistic as well as coherent and less erratic under Putin compared to the Yeltsin era.[52] Putin has, during his terms in office, emphasised that he conducts a pragmatic foreign policy based on interests. In his annual address to Parliament in 2002, Putin stated that 'Russian foreign policy will in the future be organized in a strictly pragmatic way, based on our capabilities and national interests'.[53] This partly new policy orientation was to a degree a reaction to Yeltsin's often confusing and contradictory foreign policy line, but it also stemmed from the realisation of Russia's, at least at the time, vulnerable and economically weak position. Putin realised that Russia was not able to influence certain events in the international arena and concluded that it would be counterproductive to try to do so. Putin has on several occasions practised the principles of pragmatism – for example, in accepting the NATO enlargement to the former Eastern bloc, as well as the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty. As one analyst puts it: 'Putin's pragmatism consists in accepting the – however unpleasant – reality that Russia does not have the means to avert'.[54]

A more pragmatic Russian foreign policy does not mean that only objective interests are determinants. Aspects of identity and ideas, sometimes still influenced by Soviet history, affect Russian foreign policy. After the collapse of

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[51] See, for example, the discussion in Lo and Trenin, *The Landscape...* , pp. 14–15.

[52] See, for example, Averre, 'The EU-Russian Relationship in the Context of European Security' in Johnson & Robinson (eds.), *Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations*, p. 75. This is not to say that ambiguous statements and actions do not occur under Putin. Indeed, there are a number of intriguing examples of this. In other words, it would be a mistake to assume that foreign policy making is done by one homogenous group, see Y. E. Fedorov (2005) 'Russia's Foreign Policy: Basic Trends under President Putin' in H. Smith (ed.), *Russia and Its Foreign Policy* (Saarijärvi: Kikimora Publications), pp. 9–34.

[53] Presidential Administration (2002) *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 21 November 2006, last updated: 18 April 2002, address: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2002/04/18/0000_type70029type82912_70662.shtml.

[54] C. Rontoyanni (2002) 'So Far, So Good? Russia and the ESDP', *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, p. 817. On the evolution of Putin's pragmatism, see D. V. Trenin (2006) *Integratsiia i identichnost: Rossiia kak "novyi Zapad" [Integration and Identity: Russia as the "New West"]* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Evropa"), pp. 239–244.

the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a fundamentally new situation. In a very short time span, Russia went from being a great power to a beneficiary of humanitarian aid from the West. It found itself economically bankrupt and with little influence left in the world outside of its immediate neighbourhood, the former Soviet space. To both the Russian elite and the population, this new situation was humiliating and difficult to accept. During the last 15 years Russia has tried to form a new post-Soviet identity and to define a new position in the world. Russia is still working its way through this process, which has proved to be rather difficult. The legacy from the Soviet era and the challenge to accept a radically new foreign policy environment complicate the process.

The idea that Russia has a unique historical experience and should develop and transform independently and according to its own capacity has gradually gained ground. This is linked to Russia's improved economy under Putin and the new opportunities that this entails when it comes to regaining a position of influence internationally. This explains an increased sensitivity to criticism from the outside world of the Russian development and democracy. Kremlin officials have recently chosen the term *sovereign democracy* to express the core of this idea.[55]

The Russian elite shares a number of other ideas and interests that influence foreign policy making, such as the self-image of a great power and a desire for equal status with the most powerful members of the international community.[56] The European Union does not constitute an exception to this rule and, as will be evident below, a consistent demand from Moscow has been that relations should be built on equality rather than on Russia simply accepting European *acquis*. According to Dmitry Trenin, Moscow does not share Brussels' vision of a 'wider Europe'. Instead, Russia envisages a 'two-component construction':

> The leadership of Russia is intent not so much on domestic Europeisation of Russia, i.e. on 'arrange itself under Europe', as it is on international parity with the EU and Brussels' recognition of the countries of the CIS as being within the sphere of Russian interests.[57]

The insistence on equality with the EU is closely linked to the idea of Russia as a great power. The Russian Federation came into existence on the wreckage of the dismantled Soviet Union and its crumbling empire, which had never been a

[55] See, for example, V. Surkov (2006) *Nasha rossiiskaia model demokratii nazyvaetsia "suverennoi demokratiei" [Our Russian Model of Democracy Is Called "Sovereign Democracy"],* Yedinaia Rossiia, last accessed: 11 December 2006, last updated: 28 June 2006, address: http://www.edinros.ru/print.html?id=114108 See also A. A. Kokoshin (2006) 'Real Sovereignty and Sovereign Democracy', *Russia in Global Affairs,* Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 105–118.
[56] For a discussion on this, see Lo and Trenin, *The Landscape...* , p. 16.
[57] Trenin, *Integratsiia i identichnost,* p. 333.

nation state. Instead, Russian national identity was always intimately linked to that of its position as a great power (*derzhava*) and 'great powerness' (*derzhavnost*). This aspect of Russian identity is far from dismantled in Russia today and the power and legitimacy of Russia's leadership is to a degree linked to its ability to project, at the very least to a domestic audience, an image of great powerness. Although Moscow appears to have abandoned its ambitions to be a world power on the scale that the Soviet Union was, it is determined to keep as much of its influence as possible in the CIS. One of the cornerstones of Russian identity in this respect is Ukraine. Russian elites as well as the population feel great affinity with the fellow Slavic Ukraine, and Russian history usually traces its roots back to the Kiev State in the ninth century. Another case in point is, of course, Belarus, which is another Slavic state within the CIS.

When Putin came to power he signed both a *Security Concept* and a *Foreign Policy Concept*, which outlined the situation in Russia and the policy that Russia should pursue. *The Security Concept* of 2000 is mainly preoccupied with discussing the 'new world order' that Russia was faced with after the fall of the Soviet empire. Russia was deeply worried by US domination in the world and the lack of other 'poles' in influencing world events. The strategy emphasises the idea of *multipolarity*, the Russian buzzword in the late 1990s and the main principle in Russian foreign policy at the time. The concept discusses different instruments of limiting US and NATO influence in the world. The *Security Concept* identifies Russian national interests in the economic sphere as a key objective. A sound and developed economy is, according to the Concept, a base for realising Russia's national interests. Other national interests include that of consolidating Russia as a great power and as one of the influential centres in a multipolar world. *The Foreign Policy Concept* of June 2000 also revolves around the principle of multipolarity and puts forward the OSCE, of which Russia is a member, as the key security organisation in Europe.

Both concepts put the focus on Russia's relations with the CIS members as a priority.[58] It is clear that Moscow's interpretation of multipolarity gives it a specific role in the CIS. Putin stated in a speech as late as in the summer of 2006 that Russia has no neo-imperial ambitions in these states. Indeed, Russia, in his view, 'was the initiator of granting them independence'. However, in a number of CIS states, Putin had observed 'attempts to ignore relations that had

[58] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2000a) *Kontseptsiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [National Security Concept of the Russian Federation]*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 11 December 2006, last updated: 10 January 2000, address: http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd, pp. 1–3, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2000b) *Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation]*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 19 December 2006, last updated: 28 June 2000, address: http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd, p. 10.

developed between peoples for centuries'. In the same speech, Putin made it clear that Russia had no intention of removing its peacekeeping forces from the conflict zones in the CIS 'notwithstanding the open provocations that we are encountering'.[59] Indeed, Russian analysts have suggested a 'division of labour' between the EU and Russia, where the CIS remains firmly in the Russian sphere of influence whereas the EU can take responsibility for, for example, the Balkans.[60]

Russian Interests in Relation to the EU

In the *Foreign Policy Concept*, the relations with the EU were said to be of key importance and the Union was described as one of the most important economic and political partners for Russia. It concludes that processes that emanate from the European Union to an increasing degree will influence the situation in Europe as a whole. The development of an EU security and defence policy is mentioned as one of these processes, as is the foreseen enlargement of the Union. According to the concept, Russia should study these processes and try to achieve its own goals in the process. It should also try to realise its interests through bilateral relations with the individual member states. The instrument of bilateralism has remained important. When talking about relations with the EU in 2003, Putin stressed that the integration into Europe was gradually being realised through bilateral relations as well as through developing a strategic partnership with the European Union.[61] According to the Concept, the developing political-military dimension of the EU should be given special attention.[62] The *Security Concept* does not treat relations with the EU, neither as an interest nor as a threat. The forthcoming NATO enlargement is mentioned as a threat, but there are no such references to EU enlargement.

A special concept on Russia's strategy towards the EU was adopted in 1999. This concept, *Russia's Middle Term Strategy towards the EU in 2000–2010*, was produced in answer to the EU's *Common Strategy on Russia* that was adopted earlier the same year. The Middle Term Strategy is dated and not used

[59] Presidential Administration (2006g) *Vystuplenie na soveshchanii s poslami i postaiannymi predstaviteli Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Speech at Meeting with Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation]*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 18 December 2006, last updated: 27 June 2006, address: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/06/107802.shtml

[60] See, for example, Danilov, 'Russia-EU Cooperation... ' in H. Smith (ed.), *Russia and Its Foreign Policy*, p. 121.

[61] Presidential Administration (2003) *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 11 December 2006, last updated: 16 May 2003, address: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/05/16/0000_type70029type82912_44692.shtml

[62] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki...* , p. 11.

as a document that guides policy today.[63] It is, nevertheless, interesting to study the interests that Russia saw in its relations with the EU at the time and to note some of the expectations that Russia had for future cooperation with the Union. Most of the strategy concentrates on economic cooperation, but the security perspective is given considerable attention as well.

According to the strategy, the aim of it was to ensure Russia's national interests in its relations with the EU. These were to be realised through, first, the establishment of a 'pan-European system of collective security' and, second, through mobilisation of the economic potential and managerial experience of the EU to promote the development of a market economy in Russia.[64] The strategy thus emphasised collective security and economic development as Russian national interests in relation to the EU.

Although the term 'multipolarity' is not mentioned explicitly in the document, it is clear that the Middle Term Strategy derives from this very principle. It is evident from the strategy that Russia saw the EU defence identity as a means to counterbalance US influence in Europe. Russia wanted to obtain a strategic partnership with the EU and suggested that such a partnership would include the following:
- To 'ensure pan-European security by the Europeans themselves without isolation of the United States and NATO, but also without their domination of the continent'.
- To work out Russia's relation to the defence identity. This would include promoting practical cooperation in the area of security, such as crisis management and arms limitations. The strategy states that such cooperation should counterbalance NATO-centrism in Europe.[65]

The term multipolarity is seldom used today, but the idea is still present in Russian foreign policy. The Russian leadership sees the EU as one pole of a multipolar system and seeks to develop a close relationship with it as a counterweight to the US. The interest in balancing US dominance both in Europe and in global issues, such as Iran, the Middle East peace process and North Korea, is still an important motivation for Russia in its security policy cooperation with the EU.[66]

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[63] That the strategy has no real operational value was confirmed during interviews at the Russian Foreign Ministry. There are no preparations or work undergoing on updating Russia's EU strategy. The same could be said about the EU's strategy on Russia.
[64] Diplomaticheskii Vestnik (2006), *Russia's Middle Term Strategy towards the EU (2000–2010),* No 11. The strategy can also be found on the homepage of the European Commission's delegation to Russia, last accessed: 13 November 2006, address: http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_245.htm, p. 1.
[65] *Russia's Middle Term Strategy,* p. 2.
[66] Interview with Del. of EU COM, the State Duma, 13 October 2006.

Two main Russian ideas were present already in 1999: it is stated that the partnership should be based on *equality* and *without dividing lines*. Those words have stuck in Russian rhetoric and are still of principal importance for Russia in its relations with the EU. That the security architecture in Europe should be built without dividing lines is stated repeatedly in the text. This phrase reflects a fear in Moscow of being excluded from European security cooperation and ultimately from Europe itself. For Russia, inclusion in the new European security framework was of uttermost importance. At the time, the new security architecture in Europe was just starting to take form and it was more uncertain than it is today. The EU was starting to develop its defence identity, and NATO was preparing for enlargement and adapting to new tasks after the abolition of the Warsaw Pact. For Russia, it was important that the emerging security architecture should be based upon an organisation, in which Russia had decision-making rights.[67] Consequently, it tried to promote the OSCE as the main security organisation in Europe. In the strategy, Russia even counts on the EU supporting this Russian objective.[68] The EU and Russia should 'intensify cooperative work in order to preserve and strengthen the OSCE as a key basis of the European security'.[69] Today, Russia has mainly abandoned this idea, and is trying to work for inclusion and decision-making rights within the main security organisations in Europe, which are the EU and NATO.

The term equality is closely linked to the wish for inclusion. As already discussed, Russia desired equal status with the most powerful entities in Europe. This would include the EU as well as the most prominent member states within the EU. The Russian insistence on equality and on being included in the decision-making process, not least when discussing joint crisis management, is continuously emphasised by Russian decision-makers today.

Furthermore, the strategy towards the EU stated that Russia would not become an accession country to the EU, but should 'retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies /…/'.[70] Russia is, in other words, not striving to become a member of the EU and thus expects to be treated as an equal partner on equal terms by the EU. Consequently Russia does not see the need to subscribe to the EU's definition of values and interpretations of democracy. Russia does not see itself as an object, upon which 'European values' should be imposed. This idea has consistently been underlined since 1999. Putin in 2006 stated that the EU should respect the historical diversity of

[67] Rontoyanni, 'So Far, So Good?', p. 815.
[68] *Ibid*., p. 816.
[69] *Russia's Middle Term Strategy*, p. 3.
[70] *Ibid*., p. 2.

European civilisation. He claimed that it would be wrong to try to 'force artificial "standards" on each other'.[71]

The Russian focus on the CIS is evident also from the Middle Term Strategy. Russia's dominance within the CIS is stressed, as are Russia's special interests in the region. Russia should thus 'oppose possible attempts /from the EU/ to hamper the economic integration in the CIS, in particular through maintaining "special relations" with individual countries of the Commonwealth to the detriment of Russia's interests'.[72] Russia thus maintained that it had more legitimate interests in the CIS than, for example, the EU and that it had the right to oppose possible attempts from the EU to promote its relations with other CIS member states. Russia also expressed hope that the partnership with the EU would help to strengthen Russia's position within the CIS.

Even though the cooperation between Russia and the EU might not have developed as fast as Russia expected or in the way that Russia would have liked to have seen, this relationship has continuously been mentioned as a key national interest for Russia during Putin's presidency. The Kremlin stresses that Russia's place is in Europe and that Russia is a European country.[73] Putin underlines the importance of Russia's partnership with the EU in his annual speeches to the Parliament and it is evident that Russia sees the EU as a key strategic partner. In the annual address of 2006, Putin pointed out that the EU is Russia's biggest partner and emphasised that the work on implementing the EU-Russia Common Spaces is important.[74]

2.3. External Factors

Russia's European policy is not shaped by internal factors alone. A number of external factors, largely outside the control of Moscow, come into play as well. These are the activities of other states, international trends linked to globalisation and fluctuations in world prices, to mention but a few. In addition, major events, such as, for example, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and natural disasters can sometimes galvanise Russia against or in favour of European integration. For example, the war in Iraq raised hopes in Moscow that

[71] Putin (2006) 'Europe has nothing to fear from Russia', *Financial Times*, 21 November 2006.
[72] See *Russia's Middle Term Strategy*, 'Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of an Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS…'
[73] See, for example, Putin's article in the *Financial Times*, 21 November 2006.
[74] Presidential Administration (2006a) *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 11 December 2006, last updated: 10 May 2006, address: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml.

it would be able to further improve its bilateral relations with other important EU states that opposed the US; natural disasters, such as earthquakes, both provide Moscow with an opportunity to display its capacity for a swift relief response and usually causes states to unite in sympathy; the unprecedented high energy prices have, in turn, made it possible for Russia to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.

Russia and the International Community

Brussels is only one of several centres of power that Russia watches closely. Most importantly, US actions are the subject of intense interest in Moscow. Russia is eager to be treated as a great power and, perhaps most importantly, being treated as such by Washington. In other words, the policy choices – especially vis-à-vis Russia – in Washington are bound to affect Moscow's foreign policy. There is furthermore a tendency for Moscow to interpret the West as synonymous with or a derivative of the US. This is certainly the case when it comes to how Russia looks at NATO and its activities. However, even Europe's policy choices are sometimes seen in Moscow as dependent upon Washington's. This view coexists with Moscow's tendency to seek to build coalitions with European states against the US, for example, in the months leading up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Preferably, Russia would like to maintain good relations with Washington. However, the most damaging course of action that Washington could take, from Moscow's perspective, would be to ignore Russia's claim for a special status and degrade it to one of many second rate powers. This is one of the main reasons why Russia has always rated its G8 membership as one of the most important elements in its foreign policy.

China is another great power that influences Russian foreign policy choices through its actions. Moscow has often tried to play the 'Chinese card' in its negotiations with the EU – not least on energy matters, claiming that it could easily divert its energy export eastwards. Actually, Russia is probably at least as wary of Chinese intentions as it is of American or European. However, maintaining cordial relations with China is an important foreign policy goal for Russia and cooperation has recently intensified between Moscow and Beijing. An indication of the improved relations was the signing of a border treaty in 2004 ending a long-lasting dispute. In addition, Russian and Chinese troops conducted a joint military exercise in 2005. Russia's relations with China have implications not only for EU energy policy, but also in terms of which role Moscow is able to assume in negotiations that are central to the EU's foreign and security policy, for example, on North Korea and Iran.[75]

[75] See, for example, RFERL (2005) *Russia: Joint Military Exercises With China A Result Of New Strategic Partnership* http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/40554110-295C-4760-9635-BCC86A121F45.html.

It is impossible for Russia to remain aloof of such international phenomena as globalisation and then not least the fluctuation of prices on the international markets for raw materials and energy, since this is where Russia's most important export goods are traded. Nor is Russia able to decide the course of action – except peripherally – taken by international organisations that do not include Russia. The EU is among these, but also NATO, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to mention but a few. For example, the decision by the EU and NATO to enlarge eastwards was something that Russia was unable to stop, although it, for example, tried to influence the nature of the EU enlargement by initially refusing to extend the PCA to the new member states. Russia's main strategy for dealing with external factors seems to be to endeavour to increase the country's national sovereignty.[76] In other words, Moscow remains suspicious of integration as a means of reducing its vulnerability to external factors.

2.4. Russia's Web of Regional Co-operation on Security and Defence

Although usually ignored by Brussels, Russia has positioned itself at the centre of a complicated web of regional international organisations – most important of which is the CIS. To Russia, these organisations are an important tool for trying to achieve integration and cooperation within the former Soviet space (excluding the Baltic States). To many of the other states, the CIS, first and foremost, constituted a means of reaching a civilised divorce from Moscow, but Russia has stubbornly maintained that the CIS and the other organisations grouped under its umbrella are regional organisations and ought to be recognised as such (see also below, p. 40). From Moscow's vantage point, it finds itself at the centre of a distinct region, the relations of which are structured to some degree by these organisations. Common to all of these, is the fact that Russia remains the focal point and heart of this network. This bolsters Russia's status as a great power and to a considerable degree helps to legitimise the leadership in place in Moscow since 'great powerness' has always been an essential feature of Russian national identity.

Russia has sought to use these regional organisations for international co-operation. Most important among these from a security policy perspective are the organisations presented below: the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Russia-Belarus Union. However, there are also a number of organisations for economic co-operation that may play a role when it comes to security policy considerations as well. For example, the United

[76] See, for example, the analysis made by the chairman of the Duma Committee on the CIS and Compatriots, Kokoshin, 'Real Sovereignty... ', pp. 105–106.

Economic Space (UES) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) are interesting in the case of Ukraine, which is a member of the former but not the latter. The UES has united Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in a Common Economic Space since 2003. However, this does not involve a customs union. The EurAsEC, on the other hand, is a customs union between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. In order for Ukraine to reach a free trade agreement with the EU it is important that it does not join the customs union with Russia (it can, however, have a free trade agreement with both the EU and Russia).[77] The membership in the different regional organisations also provides a fairly good indicator of the degree of integration and closeness of relationship that Russia has achieved with the former republics of the Soviet Union (see Table 1).

Table 1. Membership of Russia's Web of Regional Co-operation

	CIS	CSTO	Union RF-Belarus	UES	EurAsEC
Russia	X	X	X	X	X
Belarus	X	X	X	X	X
Ukraine*	X			X	
Moldova*	X				
Georgia	X				
Armenia	X	X			
Azerbaijan	X				
Kazakhstan	X	X		X	X
Kyrgyz Republic	X	X			X
Uzbekistan**	X	X			
Tajikistan	X	X			X
Turkmenistan ***	X				

** Neither the Ukrainian nor the Moldovan Parliament has signed the CIS Charter. In other words, their membership is not fully formalised.*
*** Uzbekistan joined the CSTO in June 2006.*
**** Turkmenistan has downgraded its CIS membership and is now an 'associate member' of the CIS.*

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Russia's role within the CIS has been dominating ever since this organisation came into existence in late 1991. In many ways, the CIS was a weak organisation already from the start. Indeed, it has often been stated that Russia

[77] Interview at COM, in Brussels, 26 September 2006. Furthermore, the CSTO (see below) and EurAsEC signed a co-operation agreement between their respective secretariats in October 2004, RIA Novosti (2004) *Sekretariaty ODKB i EvrAzES podpisali protokol o vzaimodeistvii*, RIA Novosti, last accessed: 16 November 2006, address: http://www.rian.ru/politics/20041025/715239.html.

saw the CIS as a way of integrating the area of the former Soviet Union, while the other members regarded it primarily as a way of dissolving the union peacefully. Nevertheless, meetings take place at regular intervals between the members of the CIS, albeit in different configurations according to which cooperation fora the members have agreed to join. All in all, there are twelve members of the CIS and these are all former republics of the Soviet Union that became independent in 1991 – except for the three Baltic States that never even considered joining the CIS.

Russia plays a dominating role within the CIS. The heads of the CIS countries meet twice a year while the heads of government of the CIS meet four times a year. Russia is chairman of neither of these councils (Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev chairs the Council of Heads of State, while the Prime Minister of Tajikistan chairs the Council of Heads of Government). The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs meets more often and is the working organ of the CIS on questions concerning coordination of foreign affairs between the meetings of heads of state and heads of government. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov chairs this council. The ministers of defence of the CIS meet at least once every three months, but without the participation of Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine. The Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov is chairman of the Council of Ministers of Defence. In 1995, a Coordination Committee on Questions of Air Defence was created and subordinated to the Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS. The Russian commander of the Air Force Army General Vladimir Mikhailov is chairman of this coordination committee. There is also a Council for the Commanders of the Border Troops of the CIS. This council is also chaired by the Russian representative, the commander of the Russian Border Troops Army General Vladimir Pronichev. His deputy General Lieutenant A. Manilov chairs the Coordination Service of the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops of the CIS.[78]

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)

The CSTO consists of an inner circle of seven countries within the CIS that have agreed to cooperate on security affairs. These states include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and, since June 2006, Uzbekistan. The CSTO traces its origins to the signing of a Collective Security Treaty (CST) on 15 May 1992 – a treaty that was registered with the UN on 1 November 1995. Starting in 1999, activity within the framework of this treaty was intensified and in 2002 the CSTO was founded on the basis of the CST. On 18 September 2003, the CSTO was made into an 'international regional organisation' with a view of being recognised by the UN as a regional

[78] Commonwealth of Independent States (2007) *Ustavnye organy SNG [Constituting Organs of the CIS]*, CIS, last accessed: 1 February 2007, address: http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=192.

organisation according to Chapter Eight of the UN Charter. Overall, achieving international recognition for the CSTO has been an important goal, not least for Moscow. Sergei Lavrov has actively sought to engage NATO in co-operation with the CSTO – something NATO has so far refused to do – and both the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation are courted as partners by the CSTO.[79]

The highest decision-making institution of the CSTO is the Council on Collective Security, in which all the heads of the member states are included. In addition there are a number of consultative organs: the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Council of Defence Ministers, the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils. There is also a secretariat. The General Secretary of the CSTO is Nikolai Burdiuzha, who was previously Head of the Presidential Administration and Secretary of the Russian Security Council (before that he was Director of the Russian Federal Border Service). A clear trend within the CSTO, as within the other organisations discussed in this section, is that Russian officials occupy central positions – if not the top position, then certainly the first deputy position.[80]

The military co-operation within the CSTO has intensified considerably since Putin came to power. For example, the CSTO has made a commitment to take upon itself the task of conflict management in the CIS region.[81] There is a Joint Staff of the CSTO and, according to a decision taken in 2001, a Collective Rapid Reaction Force for the Central Asian Region, which consists of four battalions (one each from Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan). Since 2004, the CSTO has staged an anti-terrorist exercise (Rubezh) each year, to which the member state contributes units from their respective armed forces. In Rubezh-2006, which took place in Kazakhstan, the CSTO claimed that about 2,500 servicemen took part.[82] The overall impression of a new impetus to military cooperation within the CSTO was strengthened further by Sergei

[79] C. Vendil Pallin (2006b) *NATO-operationen Active Endeavour: Ett test för det militära samarbetet mellan NATO och Ryssland [The NATO Operation Active Endeavour: A Test for Military Co-Operation Between NATO and Russia]* (Stockholm: FOI), FOI MEMO 1626, p. 22. See also Collective Security Treaty Organisation (2006a) *Obshchie svedeniia [General Information]*, ODKB, last accessed: 16 November 2006, address: http://dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm.

[80] Collective Security Treaty Organisation (2007) *Organy sozdannye v ramkakh ODKB [Institutions Created within the Framework of the CSTO]*,ODKB, last accessed: 1 February 2007, address: http://dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm.

[81] A. I. Nikitin (2006) *Russian Perceptions and Approaches to Cooperation in ESDP*, Institute for Security Studies, Analysis, last accessed: 4 December 2006, address: http://www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy145.pdf.

[82] Collective Security Treaty Organisation, *Obshchie svedeniia [General Information]*, Collective Security Treaty Organisation (2006b) *V Kazakhstane proshli ucheniia "Rubezh-2006" [The Exercise "Rubezh-2006" Took Place in Kazakhstan]*, ODKB, last accessed: 16 November 2006, address: http://dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm.

Ivanov's remarks on 1 December 2006 that envisaged a geographic division of spheres of responsibility between NATO and the CSTO.[83]

The Russia-Belarus Union

The union between Belarus and Russia came into existence in 1996. Many of the grand plans for cooperation have petered out, but there is a level of cooperation in the military sphere that should be taken into account. This concerns not least air defence and joint exercises within this field of cooperation which take place on a regular basis. At a meeting of the CIS ministers of defence in late November 2006, this was formalised by the signing of a treaty on Joint Systems of Air Defence (EC PVO). The commander of this joint system will have the power to independently decide to use Belarusian and Russian forces without consulting with the leadership of Belarus.[84]

Nevertheless, Russia has harboured serious doubts about the degree of cooperation that it is wise to get into with Belarus with Aleksandr Lukashenka at its helm. At a meeting in September 2006 between Putin and the State Secretary of the Russia-Belarus Union Pavel Borodin, this became obvious yet again. However, Russia did increase its budget allotment to the Union.[85] A much-coveted hypothesis of how Putin could stay in power after 2008 has been that he would become President of the Russia-Belarus Union. It does not seem the most likely outcome, but it nevertheless deserves taking into account. During 2006, Pavel Borodin unveiled a number of projects aimed at strengthening the Russia-Belarus Union as a subject of international relations. He stated that a Union parliament should be elected in 2007 and a president and vice-president the year after. A referendum was planned to take place in late 2006, but now seems to have been postponed to a later not specified date.[86]

To conclude, Russia has had limited success in achieving international recognition for the various regional organisations within the CIS area that it constitutes the heart of. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to expect that Moscow will be discouraged by this in the near future or dismantle its regional network in the CIS. Not only does this web of organisations play a certain role in structuring cooperation between Russia and the CIS members, but also Russia's

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[83] *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 1 December 2006, p. 1.
[84] *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 November 2006, p. 1.
[85] Presidential Administration (2006c) *Nachalo vstrechi s Gosudarstvennym sekretarem Soiuznogo gosudarstva Rossii i Belorussii Pavlom Borodinom*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 24 September 2006, last updated: not specified, address: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/09/111239.shtml.
[86] RIA Novosti (2006) *Soiuznyi biudzhet RF i Belorussii budet trekhletnim, zaiavil Borodin* [The Union Budget of the Russian Federation and Belarus Will Be Adopted on a Three-Year Basis, Stated Borodin], RIA Novosti, last accessed: 1 February 2007, address: http://www.rian.ru/politics/cis/20061218/57093565.html.

central role in these serves as an important legitimatising device for the current leadership in convincing its population and elites that Russia remains a great power – at least in a region that many Russians still consider a Russian zone of influence. In addition, it is worth noting the steps taken within the CSTO to intensify cooperation in the sphere of conflict management. Although only a handful of states are members of the CSTO, to Moscow its existence legitimises to a degree the presence of its troops in several of the frozen conflicts.

3. Russian Perceptions of the External Security Policy of the European Union

The analysis will here focus on Russia's perceptions of the EU's external security policy. First to be studied will be the Russian view on the ESDP and, to a degree, the CFSP. The practical interaction between Russia and the ESDP has been limited so far, but significant developments in Russia's perception of it have taken place. In connection with the EU enlargement in 2004 the EU started to increase its engagement in the EU's eastern neighbourhood. The Russian perceptions of the EU enlargement as well as the Union's increased engagement in its eastern neighbourhood are the next element of the EU's external security policy to be examined in this chapter. Finally, this chapter looks at the Russian perceptions of the EU-Russia cooperation within the Common Space of External Security.

3.1. The European Security and Defence Policy

Already in 1999, the Russian *Medium Term Strategy towards the EU* highlighted the development of a European defence identity and the prospects for security cooperation with the EU. In 2000–2002, Russia's position on the ESDP was overall positive.[87] Russian diplomacy keenly pursued a dialogue with the EU on the prospects for bilateral cooperation in the security sphere and looked favourably upon European cooperation developing outside of NATO and the transatlantic link.[88] Today, Russian officials view the ESDP in a less positive light than in the early stages of the concept. Russian statements and analyses today indicate a sense of scepticism, distrust and to some degree disappointment. Indeed, interest in the ESDP is overall limited and articles in the Russian media are few and far between.

There are several reasons behind this changed attitude. First, the environment in Europe has changed considerably since 2002. The launch of the ESDP in 1999 coincided with a period of sharp deterioration in Russia's relations with NATO. This was essentially a result of the alliance's military campaign in Yugoslavia and Russia's resistance to the operation. As a consequence, in the spring of 1999 Russia suspended its participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme

[87] See, for example, Rontoyanni, 'So Far, So Good?', pp. 813–814; F. Splidsboel-Hansen (2002) 'Explaining Russian Endorsement of the CFSP and ESDP', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 443–456; interview at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 25 September 2006.
[88] Rontoyanni, 'So Far, So Good?', p. 813.

and the Permanent Joint Council, the predecessor to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Against this background, the EU was perceived as a key partner for Russia in developing a European security system with limited participation of NATO and the US. Since 2001, Putin's administration has worked to improve its relations with the United States and it has resumed and considerably developed its cooperation with NATO, resulting in the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002. Though important, the EU is at present only one of several partners in the security field.

Secondly, the positive Russian view of the EU and the ESDP in 2000 was to a considerable extent based on misperceptions and a lack of deep knowledge about the policy as such. As already discussed in Chapter 2.2 the *Medium Term Strategy towards the EU* assumed that the EU shared Russia's vision of a new security architecture in Europe. The strategy suggested that Russia and the EU together should intensify efforts to strengthen the OSCE as a basis of the European security. As it turned out, the EU did not share this vision. Russia also assumed that the EU would not develop its relations with the CIS countries. These early perceptions to a considerable degree stemmed from wishful thinking rather than a realistic assessment and analysis of the ESDP. [89]

Thirdly, cooperation between Russia and the EU in the security sphere has not developed in the way that Russia wanted. Moscow has from the beginning been eager to develop these relations, and has prepared several non-papers on how to deepen the security cooperation. The EU, meanwhile, has been busy with its internal processes and cautious in its responses. Nor has the scope of cooperation developed in the way that Russia hoped, and Moscow is disappointed with the limited access that it has gained to the EU structures (see below Section 3.3).

Fourthly, there has been a growing scepticism in Russia as to the progress made within the ESDP itself. Russian officials have realised that the EU is still in a stage of developing its capabilities and perceive this process as slow and uncertain. The ESDP is seen as a vague concept and there are doubts as to the EU's capacity to develop its own military capabilities.[90] One Russian interlocutor claimed that the ESDP had not as of yet developed into an efficient structure and only exists on paper.[91]

Today, the Russian evaluation of the ESDP is thus less positive than in the early stages of the policy. Consequently, the Russian interest in the ESDP has

[89] *Russia's Middle Term Strategy*; Rontoyanni, 'So Far, So Good?', pp. 815–816.
[90] Interview at the Permanent Mission of Russia to the EU, 26 September 2006; interviews at the Federation Council, the Russian MoD, the State Duma, 11–13 October 2006.
[91] Interviews at the Federation Council, 12 October 2006.

decreased. Knowledge of the ESDP is still limited to those officials in Moscow and Brussels who deal directly with EU security policy. However, these have developed a sound knowledge about the EU's institutions, decision-making and the ESDP.[92] They know what to expect to a larger degree than previously. There no longer exist serious misperceptions of the ESDP among these Russian officials. The attitude today towards the ESDP could be described as sceptical, but politely interested. Despite this more cautious attitude, Russia still perceives the EU's security policy as a significant element and wants to develop its security relations with the Union. Russian officials closely follow the EU's internal developments. However, given the more sceptical view, Russian officials understand that it will take time to develop cooperation and expectations are more realistic, albeit considerably lower than they were initially.

Certain initial evaluations of the ESDP linger on. For example, parliamentarians still consider the EU as a possible counterbalance to US and NATO dominance in Europe.[93] Although the views expressed in the parliament do not represent the government's position, it can be assumed that this opinion is shared by at least sections of the Russian decision-making establishment. It is probably still a weighty factor in making the EU an important partner for Russia. Russia recognises the EU's ambition to be a global security actor and sees it as a pole that can compensate for US and NATO authority globally as well. The EU is perceived as an ally in certain international issues. The dialogue that Russia has with the EU on international issues like Iran and the Middle East peace process is highly valued by Russia (see Chapter 3.3).[94] At the same time, some Russian parliamentarians would prefer to see the EU become more independent of the US and NATO. They see the EU as far too influenced by the US and ask themselves if the EU is a political actor in its own right.[95] The ESDP is perceived as a modest shadow of NATO with a slightly different configuration, or as a blueprint that is still awaiting implementation.[96]

As mentioned above, Russia harbours doubts as to the EU's capacity as a security policy actor. These doubts concern both the political and military dimensions. Russia is well aware of the different opinions within the EU itself and the internal difficulties in forming a solid foreign policy. The Polish decision not to support negotiations on a new PCA at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki on 24 November was in Moscow interpreted along these lines. It was

[92] Interviews with the Permanent Representation of France to the EU, the European Commission, 26–27 September 2006.
[93] Interviews at the Duma and the Federation Council, 12–13 October 2006.
[94] Interviews at the Russian MFA and the State Duma, 12–13 October 2006.
[95] Interviews at the Duma and the Federation Council, October 2006.
[96] Nikitin, *Russian Perceptions...* , p. 10.

seen as an internal EU problem in coordinating its policy. Russian decision-makers and officials often point to the failure to adopt the new EU constitution and its implications for the EU's foreign policy.[97] The European Security and Defence Policy is not really perceived by Moscow as a coherent or even coordinated line.[98]

When it comes to the military dimension, Russia is sceptical of the EU's military capabilities. Despite this, Russian officials find it important that the EU continues to develop its capabilities, including the battle group concept.[99] This is considered to be a necessity if the EU wants to become a credible actor in the global arena.[100] On the whole, it is obvious that Russia considers military might, the possession of a powerful 'army', as a prerequisite to having a say in security policy and military affairs on the international scene. The Russian term '*armiia*' is usually used to denote the armed forces of Russia as a whole and more than once, the Russian officials interviewed referred to the fact that the EU currently lacks 'an army'.[101]

The most visible progress within the ESDP is to be found in the number of operations launched in conflict areas. Russia on the whole welcomes the EU's involvement in crisis management. The global outreach remains somewhat unclear to some Russian experts, who note that the minority of operations undertaken in 2003–2006 belong to core Europe (Western Balkans), while the majority are outside Europe – in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.[102] The Ministry of Defence finds it natural that the EU, being a global actor, is involved in crisis management activities in different regions and conflicts outside of Europe.[103] Among Russian parliamentarians, there is also an understanding of the difference between the EU and NATO operations and recognition of the broader instruments that the EU has at its disposal when it comes to crisis management.[104] However, according to one EU diplomat, the concept of civilian crisis management, as it is defined and used within the EU, is not always clear to Russian interlocutors. Overall, Russia does not posses the kind of capabilities that can contribute to civilian crisis management, like police and rule of law

[97] Interview with Sergei Yastrzhembskii in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 November 2006, www.ng.ru/politics/2006-11-21/4_es.html.
[98] Nikitin, *Russian Perceptions...* , p. 10.
[99] Interviews at the Russian MFA and the MoD, 11–12 October 2006. This perception was further confirmed in interviews in the Duma and Federation Council, 12 October.
[100] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[101] Interview at the Russian MFA, the MoD, 11–12 October 2006.
[102] Nikitin, *Russian Perceptions...* , p. 10.
[103] Interview at the Russian MoD, 11 October 2006. The MoD finds it more difficult to accept that NATO is involved in out of area operations.
[104] Interview at the State Duma, 12 October 2006.

experts. Indeed, some Russian officials confuse the concept with that of civil protection.[105]

3.2. The European Union as a Security Policy Actor in the European Neighbourhood

Russian perceptions of the EU enlargement

The enlargement of the EU in 2004 to include the former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and several former members of the Warsaw Pact influenced Russia's perception of the EU. Already in its *Middle Term Strategy towards the EU*, Russia stressed the need to try to achieve advantages from the forthcoming enlargement, not least in the economic field, while preventing possible negative consequences for Russia. Apart from safeguarding Russian economic interests, Russia stressed the need to safeguard the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States. As a reserve option, that is, if Russia's interests were not met, Russia would refuse to extend the PCA to the new member states.[106]

The view among Russian officials prior to the enlargement was generally positive. Initially, Russia highlighted the economic advantages that enlargement would entail for Russia, including prospects for increased trade. This positive view did, however, hide some serious concerns. As enlargement approached, there was a growing fear that Russia in some fields would suffer from the enlargement. Russian officials were concerned that Russian trade with the new member states would not increase as had been previously assumed, but instead be reoriented towards the unified EU market. Moscow also worried about loosing foreign investments, which would be directed to the new member states rather than to Russia.[107]

Another growing concern were the trips made by Russian citizens to and from Kaliningrad, which prior to enlargement had taken place without visas. As a result of Lithuania's membership of the EU, Russian citizens would need visas to travel from one part of Russia to another, a fact that was unacceptable to Russia. This was seen as a concrete example of how Russia would suffer from enlargement. A third worry was that the enlargement would, in a negative way, affect the Union's policy towards Russia. Russian officials feared that the new member states that often advocated a tougher policy towards Russia would seek a major role in the EU's formulation of a unified Russia policy. In addition, the

[105] Interview with EU diplomat in Moscow, 11 October 2006.
[106] *Russia's Middle Term Strategy*, p. 6.
[107] I. Oldberg (2004) *Membership or Partnership: The Relations of Russia and Its Neighbours with NATO and the EU in the Enlargement Context* (Stockholm: FOI), Scientific Report, FOI-R--1364--SE, pp. 48–49.

EU enlargement coincided with the second round of NATO enlargement to essentially the same countries. While the EU argued that this development strengthened the security architecture in Europe and would lead to a more secure Europe without dividing lines, it made Russia feel more insecure.

Russian discontent at the time of the enlargement was thus substantial and it was determined to secure its interests and to try to gain as much compensation as possible. In 2004, three months before enlargement, Russia stated that it wanted to change the PCA so as to compensate for the worsening conditions for Russian export and accordingly refused to extend the agreement to the new member states.[108] After negotiations with the EU, Russia eventually agreed to an extension of the agreement shortly before May 2004. The Kaliningrad visa issue was also resolved in a satisfactory way to both parties' liking. It is today put forward by both the EU and Russia as a good example of mutual cooperation.[109] However, the Russian perception that it has been suffering from negative consequences of enlargement has lingered on. As late as the autumn of 2005 the president's representative on EU matters Sergei Yastrzhembskii stated that he was worried about the lack of progress in connection with enlargement. He was especially worried about the new member states' negative view of Russia, and their influences on the Union's policy towards Russia.[110]

Today, concerns about the new member states' views of Russia are still voiced frequently in Moscow. Russia has complicated bilateral relations with several new member states and argues that these countries negatively affect the EU's policy on Russia. Russia tries to counteract this by raising its concerns in bilateral meetings with other member states. It also frequently brings up the situation for the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia in meetings with the EU.[111]

Russia has not publicly criticised the EU decision to approve Rumanian and Bulgarian membership by January 2007. One concern is that the economic ties

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[109] See, for example, the interview with Sergei Yastrzhembskii in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 November 2006, p. 4.
[110] S. Yastrzhembskii (2005) *Kak sdelat bolee effektivnoi sistemu sotrudnichestva Rossii i ES? [How Can the System of Cooperation between Russia and the EU Be Made More Effective?]*, Committee 'Russia in a United Europe' (RUE), last accessed: 23 November 2006, address: http://www.rue.ru/publ/Book-23.pdf
[111] See, for example, Stefan Wagstyle, 'Putin Glosses over Tensions between EU and Russia', *Financial Times*, 4 October 2006 and Presidential Administration (2006b) *Joint Press Conference with the Prime Minister of Finland Matti Vanhanen, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, Secretary General of the EU Council and EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 3 January 2007, last updated: 24 November 2006, address: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/11/24/2355_type82914type82915_114506.shtml.

that Russia has today with the two countries should not suffer from EU membership, something that Russia is discussing with the EU Commission. Russia is also anxious that the new member states should not, which, from the Russian viewpoint, has been the case in the past, be allowed to negatively affect the EU's view on Russia.[112] Most important to Russia seems to be, as was the case in 2004, to ensure that Russia does not find itself worse off from an economic or security perspective.

Russian Perceptions of the European Neighbourhood Policy

In connection with the enlargement in 2004 a concept for the EU's neighbours, including the former Soviet republics bordering the EU, was formulated within the EU. The concept was initially discussed under the working name *Wider Europe*. It was a manifestation of the EU's increased interest in the CIS area, with the main objective of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe and of 'strengthening stability, security and well-being in these countries'.[113] The aim was essentially to strengthen security around the EU through closer relations and integration. The countries concerned would be offered a deeper political relationship and economic integration with the EU. The policy was formally launched in May 2004, shortly after the enlargement, as the *European Neighbourhood Policy*. As a part of this policy, specific *Action Plans* were to be drawn up for each neighbouring country.

Russia was initially a part of the *Wider Europe* concept. This was, however, not welcomed in Russia. Instead it caused indignation in Moscow, which strongly objected to being placed in the same group as countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.[114] Russia, considering itself a great power, insisted on a special partnership with the EU, and refused to be part of the EU initiative. Consequently, when the European Neighbourhood Policy was formally launched it did not include Russia.[115]

Russia's own interests in the European neighbourhood are a vital element in its foreign policy. The significance that Russia attaches to maintaining its great power status in the CIS area was discussed in Chapter 2.2. In the Russian *Foreign Policy Concept* it was mentioned as a priority to maintain bilateral and

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[112] See, for example, Chizhov in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 October 2006, p. 13.
[113] Commission of the European Union (2006) *The Policy: What Is the European Neighbourhood Policy?*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 11 December 2006, last updated: 4 December 2006, address: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm
[114] See, for example, D. Suslov '"Evropeiskii vybor" pod voprosom' [European Choice under Question], *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 5 May 2004.
[115] The European Neighbourhood Policy includes Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in Eastern Europe and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia in the south. Action plans have now been launched for all the Eastern European countries except for Belarus.

multilateral relations with the CIS countries. This priority has since been confirmed in Putin's annual addresses to the Parliament. In the address of 2006, Putin stressed that Russia's relations with its closest neighbours were and will remain an integral part of Russian foreign policy.[116] Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently tried to retain its influence in the former Soviet area and it continues to see itself as the main guarantor of security and stability in its immediate neighbourhood.[117]

The CIS is an important instrument for Russia to maintain the close ties between the former Soviet republics. Russia has, during the last couple of years, tried to strengthen the CIS institutions (see also Chapter 2.4). In addition, Russia has frequently used other instruments than the CIS to assert its influence in the region, such as trade sanctions and increased energy prices. The gas crisis in Ukraine in the winter of 2005/06 is one example of this. It can further be exemplified by increased gas prices for Moldova, import bans on Moldovan and Georgian wines and mineral water, support for Transnistria over the implementation of the Moldova-Ukraine customs agreement and the strong reaction to the Georgian expulsion of Russian military agents in the autumn of 2006.[118]

How does Russia, with its manifest interests in keeping control of the CIS area, look at EU engagement in the region today? The signals are contradictory. Officially, Russia does not object to the EU's engagement in the CIS area. In a statement on the European neighbourhood policy in the autumn of 2006, Ambassador Chizhov argued that the long-term and fundamental interests of Russia and the EU in the region are quite compatible. He assured that Russia did not claim to have exclusive rights as regards cooperation with the post-Soviet countries, but that the EU must respect the legitimate interests of Russia in this region.[119] According to Chizhov, Russia is ready to cooperate with whoever has

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[116] Presidential Administration, *Presidential Annual Address, 10 May 2006*. This emphasis on the CIS in rhetoric is far from new. Yeltsin often underlined the importance of integration with the former Soviet republics. However, these statements were seldom followed by concrete measures to achieve integration in practice. Under Putin, rhetoric has to a larger degree than under Yeltsin been matched by action. On the mismatch between rhetoric and action, see M. Light (2005) 'Foreign Policy' in S. White, Z. Gitelman and R. Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

[117] Averre, 'Russia-EU Security Cooperation' in H. Smith (ed.), *The Two-Level Game: Russia's Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union*, pp. 134–135.

[118] For an analysis of Russian energy policy *vis-à-vis* the western CIS and the Caucasus, see R. Larsson (2006b) *Russia's Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia's Reliability as an Energy Supplier* (Stockholm: FOI), Scientific Report, FOI-R--1934--SE, pp. 201–235.

[119] V. Chizhov (2006) *Remarks by Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities, at the 135th Bergedorf Round Table, Berlin, 1 October 2006,* EU Delegation of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 11 December 2006, address: http://www.russiaeu.mid.ru/doc/st_en.htm.

'objective' interests in this region, including the EU.[120] However, he did not expand on what constitutes 'objective interests'. Russian officials stress that there should be no contradiction between the EU's and Russia's policy in the CIS, as these countries should have good relations with both. In other words, EU integration does not have to contradict CIS integration. Russian officials claim that the EU and the CIS are not rivals in the region, but admit that a degree of competition exists between the EU and Russia. The EU is today viewed as having legitimate interests in the CIS area. This message is conveyed both at the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as in the Parliament. It is, however, emphasised that the EU in its relations with the former Soviet republic ought to take account of Russia's interests in the region.[121]

Russia is suspicious of EU policies towards Ukraine and Belarus, two Slavic countries with special significance for Russian identity (see Chapter 2.2). In Russia, the events in Ukraine in 2004 are widely believed to have been orchestrated by the West and there is a worry of similar developments taking place in other CIS countries, such as Belarus, and, to some degree, in Russia itself. Russia has objected to NATO membership for Ukraine, but it has not officially protested when it comes to Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership.[122] Moscow realises that in some fields, like trade relations and expert cooperation, Russia is not as attractive to Ukraine as the EU. According to Ukrainian officials, Russia is nevertheless trying to influence the EU's policy towards Ukraine by pointing to the internal problems in the country in meetings with the EU.[123] In the case of Belarus, the EU would like to see a dialogue with Russia on how to jointly address the negative developments in the country. The EU has tried to raise the situation in Belarus in meetings with Russia but the Russian side has been unwilling to discuss the situation. From different statements it is clear that Russia and the EU have very differing views on the development in the country. For example, Putin viewed the presidential elections in March 2006 as legitimate, while the EU considered them flawed.[124]

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[120] Chizhov in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 October 2006, p. 13.
[121] Interviews at the MFA, the MoD and the State Duma, 11–13 October 2006.
[122] For a discussion about Russian views on Ukraine, see J. Hedenskog (2006) *Ukraine and NATO: Deadlock or Re-start?* (Stockholm: FOI), User Report, FOI-R--2165--SE.
[123] Interview at the mission of Ukraine to the EU, 27 September 2006.
[124] Putin congratulated Lukashenko on the victory and claimed that the election results pointed to voters' trust in Lukashenko's policies and to the further prosperity of the Belarusian people, RIA Novosti (2006) *Putin Congratulates Lukashenko on Election Victory*, RIA Novosti, last accessed: 13 December 2006, last updated: 20 March 2005, address: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060320/44576538.html. See also the statement released by the Russian MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2006) *Zaiavlenie Ministerstva innostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii po itogam prezidentskikh vyborov v Belorussii [Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Results in the Presidential Election in Belarus]*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 2 January 2007, address:

Russia has no interest in working jointly with the EU towards a democratic development in the country. On the contrary, Russia is highly suspicious of the EU's intentions in Belarus, including the visa restrictions that the EU has imposed. In Russia this is an example of 'double standards'. It is argued that the EU, for political reasons, looks between its fingers at similar developments elsewhere. The example most frequently referred to is the human rights situation for the Russian population in Estonia and Latvia.[125]

The overall feeling among the EU institutions in Brussels is that Russia is still rather sensitive to EU engagement in the CIS area and is unwilling to discuss practical cooperation. In the negotiations on the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security Russia even opposed the term 'common neighbourhood'. Since then the compromise has been 'regions adjacent to both the EU and Russia' as is evident from the text in the road map. It is worth noting, though, that Ambassador Chizhov in a statement in October 2006 actually argued in favour of the term 'common neighbourhood'.[126]

Some EU institutions find that Russia is increasingly open to have a dialogue with the EU on Moldova and Georgia and that Moscow is beginning to view the EU engagement in the region in a more positive light. There is an impression that Russia is becoming less suspicious of EU intentions regarding Transnistria. However, the signals from Moscow are mixed and not always consistent.[127]

When it comes to Russian perceptions of the concept of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the official signals from the Russian side and the actual experiences in Brussels are somewhat contradictory. Russian officials claim to be positive towards the ENP. The Russian Foreign Ministry stresses that it does not see any problems with the ENP and that it does not object to CIS countries becoming greater involved with the EU. NATO membership for CIS countries would be unacceptable to Russia, but this is not the case when it

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http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/8a15b43ae2d7c96443256999005bcbb8/8184933140d7085cc3257137003c6abe?OpenDocument. The statements contrast greatly with the evaluation made by the EU of the elections, Council of the European Union (2006c) *Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Presidential Elections in Belarus, 7682/06 (Presse 87),* Council of the European Union, last accessed: 2 January 2007, last updated: 22 March 2006, address: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cfsp/88962.pdf

[125] See, for example, Putin's answers to emailed questions in July 2006, Presidential Administration (2006d) *Otvety na voprosy, postupivshie k internet-konferentsii Prezidenta 6 iulia 2006 goda [Answers to Questions Delivered at the President's Internet Conference on 6 July 2006],* Presidential Administration, last accessed: 2 January 2007, address: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/07/108539.shtml

[126] Russia started to object to EU policy in this area and to the very term 'common neighbourhood' about one and a half years ago. Interview at the Permanent Representation of Sweden, 25 September 2006. Chizhov, *Statement at 135th Bergedorf Round Table.*

[127] Interviews at the European Commission, Council Secretariat and Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, 26 September 2006.

comes to integration with the EU.[128] In discussing the role of the ENP, Russian officials suggest that it could be used to influence the recipient countries in a positive way.[129]

Within the EU, the experiences of Russia's perceptions are different. Some EU officials have the impression that Russia is sceptical about the ENP and that it fears that the aim behind the policy is to weaken Russia. The Russian criticism has not, however, been very specific. It seems to stem from a general fear that the EU wants to drag these countries into its sphere of influence and impose European standards upon them. For example, Russia wanted to be consulted by the EU on the devising of the ENP Action Plans for the South Caucasus. It was mainly interested in the foreign and security policy aspects of the action plans and the texts on the 'frozen conflicts'.[130]

The Unresolved Conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus

Within the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU also started to pay increased attention to the regional conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus with the aim of achieving greater EU involvement in the settlement of these conflicts. In the Action Plans for Moldova (2004), Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia (2006) considerable space is devoted to the 'frozen conflicts' in these countries. The Action Plan for Moldova states that the EU should devote 'sustained efforts towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict'. In Georgia, the EU should contribute to the conflict settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, according to the Action Plan. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was mentioned as the first priority area in the Action Plan for Azerbaijan. Apart from supporting the existing negotiation formats for the conflicts the EU would 'intensify the EU dialogue with the states concerned with a view to acceleration of the negotiations towards a political settlement'.[131]

When it comes to EU engagement in the 'frozen conflicts' it is obvious that Russia is worried about EU influence and interference, although the signals here also remain quite contradictory. Russia has a special interest and a key role in the conflicts of Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Russia has supported these secessionist areas, while avoiding to recognise their independence. Nor is it eager for these regions to become part of

[128] Interviews at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[129] One official suggested that the focus of the ENP Action Plans should be to encourage a more responsible behaviour in Georgia and to promote economic and social well-being in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Interviews at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[130] Interviews in Brussels, 26 September 2006.
[131] The action plans for Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3 .

Russia.[132] It appears as if Russia would prefer a status quo in the region, i.e., that the conflicts remain unresolved. Russia could then maintain its influence in Georgia and Moldova and at the same time ensure that the countries remain dependent upon Russia. This would complicate NATO membership for these countries. Russia hardly has an interest in incorporating any of these areas into Russia, or in recognising their independence, but argues for models of federalism.

Russia, sometimes within the framework of the CIS, has a military presence in the conflict areas in Moldova and Georgia. According to the Russian view, the CIS has played a positive part in containing regional conflicts in the post-Soviet area. It is perceived that Russia has helped defuse tension in these conflicts. According to Putin, Russia will continue to carry out its peacekeeping missions in the regions.[133] Russian peacekeeping troops have been present in Transnistria, the secessionist region in Moldova between the Dniester River and Ukraine, since 1992. Present is also the remnants of the 14th army, the *Operational Group of Russian Federation in Moldova* that has been stationed in Moldova since 1956. Moldova, which is included in the ENP, has called for greater EU involvement in the Transnistria conflict and wishes to see a multilateral peacekeeping mission that could replace the Russian troops. Meanwhile, Russia has no intention of withdrawing all its troops at this point. It considers the situation to be too volatile and states that any changes on the ground are potentially dangerous. Russian officials also point to the Transnistrian referendum in September 2006, which was not acknowledged by the EU as an indicator of the fact that the population wanted the troops to stay.[134]

The Russian military presence in Abkhazia consists of a Russian peacekeeping force that has a CIS mandate. There is also a separate UN monitoring mission in the region (UNOMIG), the security of which is provided for by the CIS troops. Georgia is dissatisfied with the Russian presence and is calling for increased international involvement. The Russian force has supported the Abkhazian side in the conflict and cooperation with the UN mission has at times been tense. During 2006, Georgia renewed its efforts to rid itself of the Russian troops, while Russia used the increasingly tense situation as an argument for keeping its troops in Abkhazia. In South Ossetia, the OSCE has the responsibility for the peace process and the organisation has a mission in place. South Ossetia and Russia are sceptical of the OSCE mission, which they consider to be pro-

[132] Presidential Administration (2006e) *Stennogramma "priamoi linii s Prezidentom Rossii Vladimirom Putinym" [Shorthand Report of "Direct Line with the President of Russia Vladimir Putin"*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 13 December 2006, last updated: 25 October 2006, address: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/10/112959.shtml.
[133] Presidential Administration, *Presidential Annual Address, 10 May 2006.*
[134] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

Georgian.[135] In South Ossetia there is a joint peacekeeping force in place that consists of Ossetians, Russians and Georgians. Georgia has accused the mainly Russian force of being biased, and would like to see a multilateral force in its place.[136]

In Nagorno-Karabakh the status issue is maybe the most difficult to solve. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, a decision that led to war between Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenian forces. The war lasted until 1994, when a cease-fire was reached, with Moscow as a mediator. This area, populated mainly by Armenians, is today occupied by Armenia.[137] Russia and EU member states are part of the negotiation format, the so-called Minsk group, under the OSCE. There seems to be a lack of interest in finding a solution both from the parties directly involved and from Russia. Armenia and Azerbaijan have not, as is the case in Moldova and Georgia, called for more EU involvement.[138]

When it comes to EU engagement in the conflicts, Russia officially claims that it does not monopolise the right to be a guarantor for a solution to the frozen conflicts. Russian officials state that they do not see any antagonism between Russia and the EU on this matter. It is quite clear, however, that Russia considers it natural that it should have the *main* influence in dealing with the frozen conflicts. The EU should not try to limit Russia's influence in this regard. Such a policy would, according to Russian officials, be ineffective and lead to failure.[139]

So far the EU has become involved foremost in Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict. Russian officials claim that Russia is prepared to listen to all constructive proposals for a durable solution that takes into account the territorial integrity of Moldova, but with a special legal status for Transnistria.[140] EU engagement so far has given rise to some suspicions in Russia. The EU's actions at the time of the Russian so-called Kozak Memorandum in 2003, which constituted a Russian proposal as to how to resolve the conflict, is still annoying

[135] R. Larsson (2006a) *Konfliktlösning i Kaukasus: en säkerhetspolitisk lägesuppdatering 2006 [Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus: A Security Political Update 2006]* (Stockholm: FOI), User Report, FOI-R--2108--SE, pp. 30–32, 49–51.
[136] *Ibid*., pp. 53–54. Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006 and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2006) *Istoricheskaia spravka konflikta,* Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, last accessed: 3 January 2007, address: http://www.mil.ru/848/17521/17519/17534/index.shtml.
[137] Larsson, *Konfliktlösning...*, pp. 61–62.
[138] *Ibid*., p. 70.
[139] Interview at the Russian MoD, 11 October 2006.
[140] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006. This is, moreover, the Kremlin policy as well. See, for example, Presidential Administration (2005) *Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie prezidentov Rossii i Ukrainy,* Presidential Administration, last accessed: 13 December 2006, last updated: 15 December 2005, address: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2005/12/98972.shtml#.

Russian officials. The Russian side claims that the Moldovan President initially looked favourably on the plan, but subsequently changed his mind, influenced by the EU. In November 2003 Solana declared that he was not in favour of the Kozak Memorandum, which made Moldova decide to reject it.[141] Russian officials claim that the Kozak Memorandum could have been the beginning of a negotiating process and that the way in which the plan was received put the process back and led to a deterioration in relations. Russia sees the EU's and ultimately the US's hand behind the Moldovan President's rejection of the plan. Another strong irritant for Russia has been the customs regime that Ukraine, on the EU's initiative, launched in March 2006 at the Transnistrian border to stop the widespread smuggling from the region. According to the customs regime, all companies that export goods from Transnistria have to be registered in Moldova. The majority of Transnistrian companies have since registered in Moldova. Russia does not acknowledge any benefits of the regime and describes it instead as a blockade with humanitarian consequences.[142]

Russian officials state that Russia is prepared to discuss cooperation with Brussels on Moldova. However, they have not proposed how this joint cooperation could be formalised and express a tangible degree of scepticism as to the benefits of EU participation. Russian officials clearly stress that in such cooperation the existing formats should essentially be preserved.[143] This would imply that Russia is reluctant to change both the negotiation format and the mandates of the peacekeeping missions. Yasterzhembskii in November 2006 said that new elements could be added to the existing mechanisms, but warned that this must be done very carefully and with the consent of all parties in the conflict.[144] Because of the secessionist region's dependency on Russian support, it is not likely that Transnistria would agree to any new formats without the blessing of Moscow.

In 2005, the EU and the US became observers in the negotiation format for Transnistria. The format includes the two parties of the conflict, Moldova and Transnistria, assisted by three mediators: Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. Russia did not object to the participation of the EU and the US, and Jastrzhambskii and other Russian decision-makers and officials point to the so-called 5+2 talks as an

[141] For a background on the Kozak Memorandum, see A. Johansson (2006) 'The Transnistrian Conflict after the 2005 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 510.
[142] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[143] Interviews at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[144] See, for example, the interview with Sergei Yastrzhembskii in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 November 2006, p. 4.

example of EU-Russia cooperation on the conflict.[145] The talks have, however, been suspended since March 2006, when the Ukrainian customs regime was introduced.

The relations between Russia and Georgia seriously deteriorated during the autumn of 2006. The situation has influenced Russian rhetoric towards the EU at a time when the union is developing closer relations with Georgia. Though stating that there is no reason why Georgia could not have good relations both with the EU and with Russia, Russian diplomats are annoyed at how Georgia uses its relations with the EU and NATO against Russia. They find that Georgia uses the rapprochement with the EU as a *carte blanche* to do what it wants in the settlements of the conflicts and in its relations with Russia and perceives that Georgia is trying to shift the burden of solving the problems of South Ossetia and Abkhazia onto Brussels. Russia wants the EU and the US to consider the situation in the whole region when taking decisions regarding Georgia. According to Russian officials, NATO's decision to intensify the dialogue on 21 September reinforced this tendency for Georgia to act partially and was not well timed.[146]

Russia considers the scope for cooperation with the EU on the frozen conflicts in Georgia rather limited. At the same time, Russian officials and analysts acknowledge the EU's leverage in the region. They would like the EU to use this in order to influence the Georgian leadership by explaining the situation to the Georgians and press for a more constructive Georgian policy through, for example, the ENP action plan.[147]

Russian decision-makers and officials as well as academics and parliamentarians point to the Kosovo status issue as important when it comes to finding future solutions to the conflicts in the CIS.[148] In the Russian view, the solution to Kosovo will be seen as a precedent for other conflicts and the secessionist regions in the CIS. It is evident that Russia is waiting for the decision on Kosovo, before making any changes in its position on the unresolved conflicts discussed above. Although it is unlikely that Russia wishes for all of these secessionist regions to become independent, Moscow will probably try to use

[145] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006 and N. Melikova (2006) 'Sergei Yastrzhembskii: Ia vizhu zainteresovannost Evrosoiuza', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 November 2006, p. 4.

[146] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

[147] Interviews at the Russian MFA and the State Duma, 12 October 2006.

[148] Presidential Administration (2006f) *Transcript of the Press Conference for the Russian and Foreign Media*, Presidential Administration, last accessed: 3 January 2007, last updated: 31 January 2006, address: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/01/31/0953_type82915type82917_100901.shtml, interviews at the Russian MFA and the Duma, 12 October 2006.

Kosovo's future status as a bargaining chip in negotiations on the frozen conflicts.

Perceptions of the EU Special Representatives and EU Missions

As a lead in its more active policy towards the European neighbourhood and especially with regard to the frozen conflicts, the EU Council appointed special representatives (EUSR) for Moldova and the South Caucasus in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The objective and mandate was to contribute to a solution to the conflicts in the regions.[149] The EUSR for the South Caucasus was mentioned in the action plans for the South Caucasus in connection with Nagorno-Karabakh and the conflicts in Georgia. According to the action plans, the EU should continue to develop the role of the EUSR for the South Caucasus in conflict resolution.[150]

The Russian side seems to have accepted these new functions. According to officials at the Foreign Ministry, the special representatives are assessed as a useful mechanism, providing that they operate within the existing negotiating formats. The special representatives sometimes visit Moscow to discuss the region and these visits seem to be appreciated. Certain officials view the EUSRs as important interlocutors and find that it is easier to talk to them than to the EU institutions and the troika.[151] The EU has launched two security-related missions in the shared neighbourhood. An ESDP mission was launched in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) in 2004 and lasted for a year. This was the first ESDP rule of law mission ever. It supported the Georgian reform process in the criminal justice sector through advice and monitoring. The THEMIS mission did not evoke any negative reactions from Russia.[152]

In 2005, an EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched and is still ongoing. The aim of the mission is to provide advice and training to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services, especially on the Transnistrian part of the Moldova-Ukraine border. Moscow has been, and, to some extent, still is, sceptical of EUBAM; Russia complained that it had not been consulted on EUBAM and that the

[149] Council of the European Union (2005) *Council Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP of 23 March 2005 appointing the European Union Special Representative for Moldova*, Official Journal of the European Union, last accessed: 5 January 2007, last updated: 3 March 2005, address: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_081/l_08120050330en00500052.pdf and Council of the European Union (2006b) *Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 Appointing the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus*, Official Journal of the European Union, last accessed: 5 January 2007, last updated: 21 February 2006, address: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_049/l_04920060221en00140016.pdf

[150] The Action Plans are available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3.

[151] Interviews at the Russian delegation to the EU, 26 September 2006 and the Russian MFA, 13 October 2006.

[152] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

operation was directed against Transnistria.[153] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees no need for the mission. Instead, the situation at the Transnistrian border is considered to be calm. The ministry does not see any positive results from the mission. At the same time, it hesitates to talk about any negative results from the establishment of the mission. It claims that it has not negatively affected Russian relations with Ukraine.[154]

3.3. The Common Space of External Security

The PCA Framework and the Common Spaces

The EU-Russia external security relations have largely developed within the framework for cooperation established by the PCA. The PCA was agreed upon by the European Council and Russia in 1994 and entered into force in December 1997. The PCA sets up a highly formalised political dialogue at different levels, from summits at the highest political level to senior-level meetings.[155] In fact, it can be labelled the most institutionalised relationship the EU has established with another third state.[156]

To Russia this formalised political dialogue is very important. In the course of developing the EU-Russia relationship Russia has continuously pushed for increased political dialogue at different levels. Brussels, on the other hand, would like to see less frequent meetings rather than the reverse. EU officials also claim that the institutional framework set up by the PCA is flawed, especially when it comes to meetings at the senior official and expert level.[157]

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[153] Interview in Brussels, 26 September 2006.
[154] Interviews at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[155] At the highest political level, the PCA provides for biannual summits between the Presidents of the EU Council and Commission on one side and the President of the Russian Federation on the other. On the EU side, the Secretary-General of the EU Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy also participates in these meetings. At ministerial level, the PCA has established a Cooperation Council, which is tasked to monitor the implementation of the agreement. In this Council, meetings are held between members of the EU Council and Commission on one side and members of the Russian government on the other. At the parliamentary level, meetings are held in a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. In addition, the PCA provides for regular meetings between the EU Troika and Russia at the senior official level. Commission of the European Union (1997a) *Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 18 December 2006, last updated: 1 December 1997, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_russia.pdf.
[156] For a comparison with the EU's relations with other third countries, see M. Vahl (2006) *A Privileged Partnership? EU-Russian Relations in a Comparative Perspective* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies), DIIS Working Paper, DIIS Working Paper No. 2006/3, pp. 8–9.
[157] Interview, European Commission, 26 September 2006.

The establishment of this formalised political dialogue can be seen as a way for Russia to gain political equality with the EU at least at a symbolic level. Being able to point to equality in relations with the EU is important to Moscow in order to boost its status as a great power. Such symbolic displays of equality are important and intended not least for domestic consumption. This is one of the reasons why Russia is eager to participate in meetings, such as the informal EU meeting for heads of government in Lahti in October 2006.

In order to promote an equal partnership, Russia has pushed for a political dialogue with all the EU Member States in a 25+1 format, which is inspired by the meeting format of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The EU side has, however, insisted on being represented by the Troika, which includes representatives from the member state holding the Presidency of the Council, the Council Secretariat and the Commission, in the political dialogue with Russia. The EU has also insisted on keeping its decision-making autonomy and adamantly refused to allow Russia to take part in it.[158]

After the PCA came into force, the formalised political dialogue between the EU and Russia has proved to be an important framework for discussion of enhanced cooperation in different fields. However, it has become apparent that the frequent summits produce a multitude of political declarations rather than concrete cases of cooperation. At the St Petersburg summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to establish, within the framework of the PCA, four Common Spaces (a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Common Space of External Security and a Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects) in order to promote more practical cooperation.[159] This development also had a symbolic value to the Russian side. Instead of being considered an object of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, which had recently been proposed by the EU, Russian decision-makers wanted to promote cooperation within the PCA framework. At the St Petersburg summit, the EU and Russia also agreed to replace the malfunctioning ministerial-level Cooperation Council with a Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), which was tasked to monitor and coordinate all areas of cooperation. The PPC would meet more frequently and in different formats depending on the issue to be discussed.[160]

[158] D. Averre (2005b) 'Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?', *European Security*, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 176.
[159] Commission of the European Union (2003a) *Joint Statement*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 18 December 2006, last updated: 31 May 2003, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/sum05_03/js.htm.
[160] *Ibid.*

Although the agreement on the Common Spaces aimed at deepening cooperation, the EU and Russia had problems agreeing on the practical steps to implement them. This coincided with increasing tensions in the EU-Russia relationship due to the disagreements on EU enlargement in May 2004 and the Ukrainian elections in November 2004. The developments during this period made some Russian academics and officials question the relationship with the EU. A Russian roundtable analysis in January 2005 revealed a feeling that the Russian possibilities to influence were severely limited and that the EU, through enlargement and its increasing engagement in the immediate neighbourhood, was becoming increasingly aggressive towards Russia and its interests. Among academics and officials there were different views on how Russia should tackle this new situation. Some analysts and practitioners suggested a pause regarding cooperation with the EU while Russia developed a strategy and could strengthen its position. Others argued for new instruments to create a closer, more practical and meaningful cooperation.[161]

In the end, the EU and Russia were able to adopt road maps for the creation of the four Common Spaces at the Moscow summit in 2005.[162] These road maps form the basis for the current EU-Russia cooperation, since they set out the objectives as well as the agenda for cooperation in the medium-term. The implementation of the road maps has formed the basis for discussions at the subsequent summits and will probably play an important role in the negotiations on a new EU-Russia agreement.

The Political Dialogue on External Security

Russia put forward early several proposals to enhance the cooperation with the EU on external security. These early initiatives mainly resulted in the creation of different formats of dialogue on external security affairs. A substantial part of this political dialogue takes place within the framework created by the PCA. Discussions related to external security form an important part of the bi-annual summits between the EU and Russia. A dialogue on these issues is also maintained at the ministerial level in meetings between the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers' Troika and the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister. In addition, regular meetings take place at the political director level between the EU and Russia.

At the summit in Paris in 2000, the EU and Russia agreed to further strengthen their dialogue on external security and following this agreement several new

[161] See, for example, the report and recommendations from a workshop on 21 January 2005, where Russian academics and practitioners discussed the problematic relationship with the EU, Karaganov *et al.*, *Russia-EU Relations...*

[162] Commission of the European Union (2005a) *Conclusions*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 18 December 2006, last updated: 10 May 2005, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/index.htm.

meeting formats have been established between the new ESDP structures and Russian authorities. In 2001, the EU and Russia decided to hold regular consultations on international developments and crisis management between the General Secretary of the Council/High Representative of the CFSP (GS/HR) Javier Solana and Russian authorities, primarily the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The EU and Russia also agreed to discuss crisis prevention and management in monthly meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC), represented by the Troika and the Russian Ambassador in Brussels. In response to specific events, the PSC or its Chairman could also have additional meetings with the Russian Ambassador.[163]

Contacts between the emerging EU military structures and Russian authorities were also established. In 2002, a Russian contact person was assigned to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to facilitate information exchange on military crisis management matters. Further, in May 2002, the first meeting between the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Russian Chief of Staff was held (see also Section 2.1).[164]

In order to provide for possible Russian participation in EU military crisis management operations, the EU side in 2002, at the Seville European Council, adopted *Arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the European Union and Russia on crisis management*. In the event of a crisis, this document calls for intensified dialogue and consultations between the EU and Russia in the period leading up to a Council decision. This intensified dialogue should serve to exchange views on the crisis situation and inform Russia, as a potential contributor, of the military options considered by the EU side. According to the document, Russia will, however, only be invited to participate in an operation after the concept of operations has been approved by the EU. If Russia decides to take part, Russia would be invited to participate in the Committee of Contributors alongside participating EU member states. This Committee would play a key role in the day-to-day management of the operation.[165] These arrangements were, however, not subject to negotiations with the Russian side

[163] Commission of the European Union (2000) *Joint Declaration on Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters in Europe*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 7 December 2006, last updated: 30 October 2001, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_30_10_00/stat_secu_en.htm, Commission of the European Union (2001) *Joint Statement, Press: 342 - Nr: 12423/01*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 7 December 2006, last updated: 3 October 2001, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_10_01/dc_en.htm.

[164] Commission of the European Union (2002a) *Joint Statement*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 7 December 2006, last updated: 29 May 2002, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_02/state.htm.

[165] Council of the European Union (2002) *Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy (10160/2/02)*, COSDP 188, 22 June 2002, last accessed: 28 November 2006, address: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/71189.pdf.

and are still contested by Russia as a basis for its participation in EU crisis management operations (for further discussion see below). It is also worth noting that similar or identical provisions were adopted by the EU for the participation of Ukraine and Canada in crisis management.

The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security

During the first years, the creation of the Common Space of External Security did not result in any large changes when it came to cooperation on these issues between the EU and Russia. Measures to promote increased dialogue and cooperation on external security were discussed within the PCA meeting format and a political dialogue on external security was already in place. However, there were some examples of concrete cooperation. In 2003, Russia participated in the first EU crisis management operation – the EU police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU also invited Russia to participate in the 2003 joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise.[166] The Russian side, however, wanted to expand cooperation further and proposed cooperation, among other areas, on crisis management, civil protection, long-haul air transport and mine-clearing.[167]

The adoption of the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security in May 2005 was, however, an attempt to specify the different areas of cooperation and promote concrete results. The Road Map initially reiterates the common objectives of the EU and Russia in the field of external security. These objectives are, to a large extent, formulated according to the already agreed common language from the EU-Russia summits. Some key phrases among the objectives are 'an international order based on effective multilateralism', cooperation to 'address the global and regional challenges and key threats of today' and 'creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values'. The Road Map also states that the 'regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders' constitute a particular area for cooperation.[168]

The Road Map further sets out five priority areas for EU-Russia cooperation, which will be described below:

- Strengthened dialogue on the international scene,
- Fight against terrorism,
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
- Cooperation on crisis management,
- Cooperation on civil protection.[169]

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[166] Commission of the European Union, *Joint Statement, 6 November 2003,*
[167] Interview at the Federation Council, 12 October 2006.
[168] Commission of the European Union (2005b) *Road Map for the Common Space of External Security*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 8 December 2006, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/road_map_ces.pdf.
[169] Ibid.

Russian officials dealing with EU-Russia external security relations look favourably upon the adoption of the Road Map. They find that there is a need to move from political declarations by presidents and ministers to practical cooperation. To these officials it is important to decentralise the dialogue and hold more expert-level meetings. The EU side has, however, raised concerns over the lack of results of such expert level meetings, which it attributes to the centralised decision-making structures and lack of coordination on the Russian side.[170]

A closer analysis of the Road Map, however, reveals that it is lacking new visions for the EU-Russia external security relationship. It is based on the already agreed areas for cooperation and, to a large extent, repeats the agreed language of the EU-Russia external security cooperation or, as one analyst has put it, the 'Euro-Russki diplomatic-bureaucratic borsch'.[171] To conclude, the Road Map mainly contributes to the creation of a technical and bureaucratic agenda for the EU-Russia cooperation on external security.[172]

Strengthened Dialogue on the International Scene

As already mentioned, the EU-Russia external security relationship is highly formalised and political dialogue on international affairs is maintained in different fora, from summits to meetings between the PSC Troika and the Russian Ambassador in Brussels. At a lower level, the EU and Russia also hold regular meetings between several EU Council working groups in the field of external relations, represented by the Troika, and representatives from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic staff at the Russian Mission in Brussels also maintains an informal dialogue with EU officials.[173]

Within this framework for dialogue, Russian officials especially value the meetings between the Russian Ambassador and the PSC Troika.[174] In fact, Russia is only the third country that has monthly consultations with the PSC. These meetings constitute an opportunity for the EU and Russia to discuss and share their respective views on international problems and conflicts, including the situation in the European neighbourhood. Considering that the current Russian EU Ambassador Chizhov is an important Russian decision-maker on

[170] Interview at the Russian MFA, Federation Council, 12 October 2006, European Commission, 26 September 2006, Permanent Representation of Finland, 26 September 2006.
[171] M. Emerson (2005) *EU-Russia Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy*, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 71, May 2005, last accessed: 19 December 2006, address: http://www.ceps.be/.
[172] Averre, 'Russia-EU Security Cooperation' in H. Smith (ed.), *The Two-Level Game: Russia's Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union*, p. 134.
[173] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[174] Interview at the Federation Council, the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.

EU affairs, these meetings are valuable to promote overall EU-Russia cooperation on external security.

According to Russian decision-makers, the EU and Russia have common views when it comes to solving certain international problems, most importantly Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. Russian officials note that these issues are regularly discussed in meetings between the SG/HR Javier Solana and the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov. The EU and Russia also cooperate within the UN on these issues. According to a Russian parliamentarian, with only indirect influence on the official policy, the EU and Russia have converging views, which differ from those of the US, on a number of key challenges and threats.[175]

On the whole, Russia appears ready to allow the EU to take responsibility for developments and conflict management in the Balkans.[176] However, when it comes to the European neighbourhood, it is more difficult to discern a common approach between the EU and Russia (as analysed in Section 3.2). Nevertheless, Moscow has since 2005 accepted the EU participation, as an observer, in the negotiation format on Transnistria.

The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security aims at further strengthening this dialogue, both bilaterally and within regional and international organisations. It calls for an increased exchange of views at all levels on initiatives, strategies, concepts and international contacts related to external security. It further promotes academic cooperation and exchange between the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and Russian academic bodies. In order to develop the links between the EU and Russian military structures, it proposes the establishment of contacts between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Russian authorities.[177]

The Road Map further states that the 'regions adjacent to the EU and Russia borders' constitute a particular focus for the dialogue. At the same time, it stresses that joint initiatives on conflict prevention and settlement should support 'efforts in agreed formats' and 'international organizations and structures, in particular the UN and the OSCE'.[178] As discussed in Section 3.2 these phrases

[175] Putin in the *Financial Times*, 21 November 2006; Chizhov in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 October 2006, p. 13; interviews, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 October 2006 and Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Duma, 13 October 2006.
[176] A. Moshes (2006) *Prospects for EU-Russia Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation*, EU-Russia Centre, The EU-Russia Review, Issue Two, last accessed: 14 December 2006, last updated: November 2006, address: http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/assets/files/REVIEW2_final.pdf.
[177] Commission of the European Union, *Road Map...*
[178] *Ibid.*

are very important to the Russian side when it comes to the settlement of the frozen conflicts in the European neighbourhood.

Fight against Terrorism

Cooperation in the fight against terrorism was first raised at the EU-Russia summit in October 2001, taking place merely a month after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In November 2002, the EU and Russia adopted a joint statement on the fight against terrorism, which outlined several areas of cooperation. It contained provisions for increased cooperation both in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), including the exchange of information between Europol and the Russian Federation, and in the field of external security, focusing on cooperation in relevant international and regional fora.[179] In the 2003 agreement to create the Common Spaces the cooperation in the fight against terrorism was consequently included in both the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice and the Common Space on External Security. Since this study focuses on the latter, this analysis will be limited to the EU-Russia cooperation in international and regional fora.

Russian officials stress that the fight against terrorism is an important area for cooperation within the Common Space. Some Russian analysts, however, doubt the EU capabilities when it comes to counter-terrorism and see few prospects for cooperation. Other analysts claim that the lack of agreed definitions and perceptions of what constitutes terrorism leads to problems in the cooperation. This has, for example, caused Russian accusations of double standards in the EU when it comes to certain Chechen groups.[180]

The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security contains several provisions for EU-Russia cooperation within the counter-terrorism framework established by the UN. This includes cooperation to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions related to terrorism and the UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols. The Road Map also mentions cooperation in the framework of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. It further promotes intensified bilateral dialogue at political and expert level as well as coordination during international meetings.[181]

[179] Commission of the European Union (2002b) *Joint Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 17 December 2006, last updated: 11 November 2002, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11_02/js_terr.htm.
[180] Interviews at the Russian MFA and the State Duma, 12–13 October 2006; Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 3; Averre, 'Russia-EU Security Cooperation' in H. Smith (ed.), *The Two-Level Game: Russia's Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union*, p. 133.
[181] Commission of the European Union, *Road Map...*

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Russian decision-makers often stress that the EU and Russia have common views when it comes to strengthening the international regimes for non-proliferation. Other analysts, however, claim that the EU and Russia have different interests and different ways of prioritising the most urgent issues to tackle in this area.[182]

The Road Map of the Common Space of External Security aims at strengthening the dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, export controls and disarmament in order to bring positions closer together and coordinate actions within the existing international fora. It specifies all the different fora where nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile non-proliferation activities should be strengthened. In addition, the Road Map calls for enhanced cooperation when it comes to old ammunitions, certain conventional weapons and small arms. It further promotes intensified bilateral dialogue at political and expert level as well as coordination during non-proliferation or disarmament meetings. Cooperation in the context of the G8 Global Partnership is especially mentioned.[183]

Cooperation on Crisis Management

The cooperation on crisis management, which constitutes the fourth priority area of the Road Map, has proven to be one of the most problematic issues of the EU-Russia security relationship. This is largely due to the fact that Russia does not accept the conditions stipulated by the Seville arrangements, which were adopted by the EU in 2002 for third states' participation in EU crisis management operations. The Russian objections to these arrangements are linked to the Russian identity of being a great power, which motivates the demand for political equality in the EU-Russia relationship. To the Russian side, cooperation on crisis management would require joint planning and decision-making. Russia is thus not interested in becoming a mere contributor to EU operations or, as one Russian official put it, 'Russia does not want to be a taxi driver for the EU'. Again, the format established for decision-making and operative cooperation between Russia and NATO is viewed as a positive example for joint operations.[184]

So far, Russia has only participated in one EU operation under the conditions stipulated by the Seville arrangements. In 2003, Russia decided to send four police officers to the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, to the Russian side, the experiences of this mission underline what it

[182] Putin in the *Financial Times*, 21 November 2006; Chizhov in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 October 2006, p. 13; Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 4.
[183] Commission of the European Union, *Road Map...*
[184] Interview at the Russian MoD, 11 October 2006.

considers as the basic problem with the stipulated forms for Russian participation in EU operations. According to Russian officials, these officers could not participate on an equal footing and did not have the opportunity to be promoted.[185] The Russian officers were eventually withdrawn from Bosnia.

The EU side is of course aware of the Russian objections to the Seville arrangements, but has so far preferred to retain the planning and decision-making autonomy of the EU when it comes to crisis management operations. In order to make joint operations possible, especially when it comes to the frozen conflicts in the European neighbourhood, the EU has gradually started to discuss the possibility of other arrangements for Russian participation. Javier Solana in December 2006 raised the possibility to discuss, within the framework of the post-PCA agreement, Russian participation in EU operations on a more 'equal footing'.[186]

Another obstacle to EU-Russia cooperation on crisis management is the difficulties to determine in which conflicts they could cooperate. In the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security, the 'regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders' are specified as a particular area for cooperation. However, as mentioned earlier, to the Russian side it is imperative that initiatives in this region should support 'on-going efforts in agreed formats', a phrase which has been included in the Road Map.[187] At the same time an increasing openness towards EU engagement can be discerned (for further discussion see Section 3.2). The possibility of EU-Russia cooperation in this region seems to be greatest when it comes to Transnistria in Moldova.[188]

Taking into account the difficulties to cooperate in the European neighbourhood, some EU member state officials have suggested that it might be easier to cooperate on crisis management in conflicts outside this area. Russia has, for example, displayed an interest in participating in the future EU civilian crisis management operation in Kosovo. It has also been suggested that the EU and Russia could cooperate on logistics and air transportation in Sudan. [189] However, as the experience from Lebanon shows, Russia might be more interested in

[185] Interview at the Russian MFA, 12 October 2006.
[186] Presentation by Javier Solana at the seminar "Current Challenges for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy – a Closer Look at our Eastern Neighbourhood", The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 7 December 2006 and interviews at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, Council Secretariat, 25–26 September 2006.
[187] Commission of the European Union, *Road Map...*
[188] Interviews at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, Council Secretariat, Permanent Representation of France, 26–27 September 2006.
[189] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, 26 October 2006.

providing bilateral support rather than participating in multinational operations.[190]

Another problem in achieving EU-Russia joint crisis management, which so far has not been much discussed, is that of achieving interoperability between the forces. Today, the few efforts that are made in this field are related to the cooperation with NATO. No such work is ongoing within the EU-Russia framework of cooperation.[191] The EU side could also find it politically awkward to cooperate with Russian peacekeeping forces due to their previous participation in different conflicts, e.g., the war in Chechnya.[192]

These are important obstacles to joint crisis management, but the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security does contain a number of small cooperative steps to create the conditions for joint crisis management in the future. The Road Map calls for the exchange of views, at the expert level, on the respective crisis management procedures of the EU and Russia as well as the establishment of contacts between the respective crisis management structures. As was mentioned above, regular consultations are held between the Russian Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the EUMC and Russia has appointed a contact person to the EUMS, who has regular meetings with the Director General of the EUMS.[193]

In order to facilitate concrete cooperation on crisis management, the Road Map states that the EU and Russia should conclude a standing framework on legal and financial aspects of crisis management as well as an agreement on information protection. The Road Map also reiterates earlier discussed cooperation in the fields of logistics, long-haul air transport and training and exercises.[194] These fields have, however, so far only resulted in limited cooperation. When it comes to air transportation, Russia has for several years offered strategic airlift capabilities on a commercial basis, but the EU has so far refused any formal agreements. However, after the agreement between NATO, Russia and Ukraine in March 2006, some EU member states have access to Russian and Ukrainian capabilities through NATO's Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS).[195] In the field of training and exercises, Russian officials have participated in EU training courses and Russia has regularly been invited as observers to EU crisis management and military exercises.

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[190] C. Vendil Pallin (2006a) 'Future EU-Russia Relations', *RUSI Newsbrief*, Vol. 26, No. 10, pp. 109–111.
[191] Interview at the Russian MoD, 11 October 2006.
[192] Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 4.
[193] Commission of the European Union, *Road Map...*
[194] *Ibid*.
[195] Monaghan, *Russian Perspectives...* , p. 3; interview, Delegation of Russia to the EU, 26 September 2006.

Cooperation on Civil Protection

In the last few years, Russia has proposed several initiatives to the EU and bilaterally to its individual member states to develop the cooperation in dealing with natural disasters. In Russia, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations (MChS) has wide-ranging responsibilities to handle different types of disasters. According to MChS officials, Russia also has unique transportation and logistical resources to be able to respond to disasters. In 2003, Russia consequently proposed the creation of a joint European centre for dealing with natural disasters, a proposal that was reiterated in 2006.[196]

The EU side has, however, not been able to respond to these Russian initiatives, since there are important limitations on the EU's responsibility when it comes to disaster response. Civil protection, which is the EU term for this field, is largely the national jurisdiction of the member states. Furthermore, the EU cooperation that has been established in this field is based on the European Community (EC) Treaty, which means that the Commission handles these issues and that civil protection does not form part of the CFSP. Russian officials have become aware of this state of affairs and have instead sought cooperation bilaterally with individual member states and with NATO. Civil protection is also mentioned as a priority sector within the Northern Dimension.[197]

Nevertheless, the EU and Russia have developed small-scale cooperation on civil protection. In May 2004, the EU and Russia signed an administrative agreement between the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) of the Commission and the Crisis Centre of the MChS. This agreement provides for exchange of certain practical information, but also of information on emergencies and sets up a regular exchange between the staff of the two centres. The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security reiterates this agreement and adds some further cooperative steps. These include, among others, an invitation for experts to participate in training courses and an invitation for observers to watch exercises. In 2005, the MChS also appointed a representative to the Russian Delegation to the EU, which has promoted the informal contacts between the Commission and the MChS.[198]

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[196] *Ibid.*, p.12; interview at the Russian Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations (MChS), 13 October 2006; European Commission, 16 November 2006.

[197] Interviews at the Russian MFA, MChS, 12–13 October 2006; Russian Delegation to the EU, 27 September 2006 and European Commission, 16 November 2006. See also Commission of the European Union (1997b) *Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document*, Commission of the European Union, last accessed: 3 January 2007, address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/frame_pol_1106.pdf.

[198] Commission of the European Union, *Road Map...* ; interviews, MChS, 13 October 2006; European Commission, 16 November 2006.

Russia is, however, not satisfied with these limited agreements and continuously proposes more permanent structures for cooperation. For example, Russia has suggested that the EU and Russia should create a joint European air transportation squadron. According to Russian officials, a pool of helicopters, heavy airlift and amphibious aircraft would allow the EU to use Russian resources, which the EU member states lack, to deal with disasters. Civil protection is further regularly discussed in the political dialogue between the EU and Russia.[199]

To conclude, Russia attaches great importance to the formalised political dialogue on external security with the EU, particularly when it comes to international problems, such as Iran and the Middle East. At the same time, Moscow pushes for equality in the relationship and its inclusion in EU decision-making, especially when it comes to crisis management. Furthermore, Moscow has put forward several initiatives for increased cooperation, for example, the lease of Russian air transport capabilities for crisis management and civil protection. The EU has, however, been hesitant or unwilling to agree to these proposals. Within the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security the parties have, however, agreed to several small steps to promote cooperation. The exchange of views at the level of officials and experts may lead to an increased understanding of the respective policies and decision-making procedures of the EU and Russia – as may participation in training courses and exercises.

[199] Interview at the Russian MChS, 13 October 2006; European Commission, 16 November 2006.

Conclusions

Despite an initially strong interest in mutual cooperation within the field of external security, the **cooperation between the EU and Russia has proved highly difficult to promote**. The reasons are manifold and can be divided into two main categories. Firstly, there are a number of practical difficulties, such as radically different decision-making cultures and, at least until recently, a lack of widespread and deep knowledge on the Russian side of how the EU functions. Secondly, there are fundamental differences when it comes to values and overall goals and often even in the interests that Russia and the EU wish to attain through their cooperation in the field of external security. This gap has widened in connection with the more assertive foreign policy and the authoritarian domestic policy that have developed in Russia under Putin.

It would thus appear that the future for deepened security relations between Russia and the EU is rather bleak. At the same time, both Russia and the EU have **gained better knowledge and a more realistic picture of each other's basic interests and goals**, as well as a deeper understanding of the respective decision-making machineries. Russian officials are learning more about the EU, and the general knowledge today is much greater than a few years back. Increased knowledge and realistic expectations make the prospects for concrete and sincere cooperation more favourable. Russia is also increasingly learning to deal with different EU institutions, such as the EU High Representative and the EU Special Representatives (EUSR) for Moldova and the Southern Caucasus.

When it comes to Russian perceptions of the EU's external security policy, the national identity and the ideas that dominate within the decision-making elite cannot be ignored. Russia's **identity as a great power** to a large extent determines the development of the EU-Russia external security relationship today. Within the *Common Space of External Security*, Russia values the political dialogue on international issues, such as Iran and the Middle East. This dimension is important since it demonstrates Russia's status in the world. Maintaining high-level meetings with the EU and upholding the institutional framework within the PCA are also important for Russia's image as a great power.

Closely linked to this image is the **desire for relations on equal terms**, which is paramount for Russia in its relations with the EU. One immediate consequence in the area of security cooperation is that the Seville crisis management modalities for third country cooperation are not acceptable to Russia. Another is a manifested preference in bilateral relations with the most powerful EU member states. The idea of equality has been consistently underlined during

2006, and will be of continued principal importance for Russia in developing the relationship with the EU.

The idea that Russia has **a unique historical experience** and should develop independently and in its own capacity has strengthened during Putin's second term. Russia has a need to express its independence in relations with the EU. As Russia's economy has improved and the country has begun to feel more confident and self-sufficient, Moscow is increasingly making a point of the fact that it is not applying for membership of the Union. Russian decision-makers similarly stress that Russia is not an object of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is therefore not obliged in any way to adjust to EU standards and norms, but is cooperating as an equal. This trend risks complicating the relations even further. The negotiations on the new PCA will show how Russia values the relations with the EU. Interesting enough, neither Russia nor the EU consider themselves demanders in the negotiations.

The main objective for the EU within the Common Space for External Security is to develop cooperation with Russia in the European neighbourhood. For Russia, **maintaining its role within the former Soviet Union is of vital importance** and maybe the main priority in its foreign policy. This goal is linked to the identity of a great power, as Russia attaches great importance to its dominance in the region and to its role within the CIS. Given its strong interests in maintaining authority in the European neighbourhood, Russia is highly suspicious of other actors' interference in the region, and perceives this in the terms of a zero-sum game. In other words, Russia harbours a considerable degree of distrust of EU intentions in the CIS region including Russia itself. This feeling was strengthened by the problems related to EU enlargement and the events in connection with the presidential election in Ukraine in 2004. It is therefore difficult for Russia to see a win-win scenario in EU-Russia cooperation in the European neighbourhood. At the same time, Russia does understand the EU interests in the region from a security point of view, and does not officially object to EU engagement in the region. In Russian official rhetoric, an increasing openness towards EU engagement can be detected. This is confirmed by some officials in Brussels who point to a higher degree of openness in the ongoing dialogue. Russian officials and analysts are aware of the appeal and leverage that the EU has in the region, a leverage that probably will increase over time. This awareness could eventually trigger a more positive attitude to cooperation with the EU even in the European neighbourhood.

Another objective for the EU is to engage Russia in **crisis management**. However, concrete cooperation in this field is not likely in the near future. Firstly, Russia does not accept the EU arrangements for Russian participation in EU crisis management operations. A fundamental condition for Russia would be

that it is offered participation in a possible mission on equal terms. Secondly, the EU and Russia do not seem to have a common interest to cooperate in any particular conflict. A joint peacekeeping operation in the CIS area does not seem to be acceptable to Russia at this point. Thirdly, the practical preconditions for military or civilian cooperation in crisis management are not very promising, since little or no work has been done in order to achieve greater interoperability between the EU and Russia.

From the EU's point of view, the case of **Transnistria has been put forward as the most promising area of cooperation** in the European neighbourhood. The relations between Russia and Moldova seemingly improved at the end of 2006, which possibly could facilitate for a political solution and a joint EU-Russia mission. Cooperation could not take place though under the present Seville arrangements. Given the Russian scepticism of EU involvement, there has to be a clear benefit for Russia taking part in such a mission, such as gaining equal terms in the participation. Russia would not be willing to enter such discussions prior to a solution on Kosovo. Russia is determined to continue to use the example of Kosovo as an argument when it comes to negotiations on the frozen conflicts.

The unsolved problems within the field of crisis management also mean that there are currently no mechanisms in place to use if one of the frozen conflicts, for example, in Georgia, would seriously deteriorate and one side in the conflict calls for EU military support. Nor is there a political understanding between the EU and Russia on consultations in such an event, or a basis for joint crisis management that could be rapidly employed.

Despite the bleak prospects for concrete cooperation in the field of external security, **maintaining the well-established political dialogue** on external security is a precondition for enhanced cooperation in the future. To Moscow the high-level dialogue on international affairs has a symbolic value and the monthly meetings between the Russian EU Ambassador and the PSC Troika are viewed as an important forum for discussions on international problems and conflicts. Since the Russian counterpart Ambassador Chizhov seems to have significant influence on Russia's EU policy, such meetings could constitute an opportunity also for the EU to put forward the Union's views. Furthermore, the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security outlines several **small steps to promote cooperation**. The exchange of views at the level of officials and experts as well as the participation in training courses and exercises may contribute to an increased understanding of the respective policies and decision-making procedures of the EU and Russia.

Even though concrete cooperation with Russia is difficult to obtain in the European neighbourhood, the EU could continue engaging in its supportive missions in the region. The Russian disapproval of EU engagement should not be exaggerated. Russia has come to accept the EUSRs for the region and the separate EU missions.

A well-functioning meeting structure is essential in developing cooperation, not least at the expert level. The institutional framework has developed over time with the creation of more flexible tools like the Permanent Partnership Council. An important task in formulating a new partnership agreement to replace the current PCA would be to create more appropriate and flexible meeting formats for the political dialogue.

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Despite high level declarations about the importance of deeper relations between Russia and the EU, the cooperation is developing slowly. Four common spaces for deeper cooperation have been identified. Of these, the cooperation within 'the Common Space of External Security' harbours maybe the largest difficulties.

This report looks at Russian policy and perceptions of the relations with the EU in the field of external security. Whereand by whom are decisions on these relations taken in Russia? Which are the Russian security policy interests in relations to the EU? How does Russia view the European Security and Defence Policy and the EU engagement in the European neighbourhood? The report also analyses how Russia views the prospects for cooperation within the Common Space for External Security.

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