UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa

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Cover: African Union Transfers Authority to UNAMID, El Fasher, Sudan, 31 Dec. 2007. UN Photo by Shereen Zorba

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Sammanfattning

Denna rapport presenterar resultaten av en studie kring samverkan mellan FN, EU och AU i fredsfrämjande insatser i Afrika, genomförd på uppdrag av Utrikesdepartementet.

FN, EU och AU är tre olika organisationer, med olika komparativa fördelar, interna strukturer och processer, förmågor och erfarenheter. Med utgångspunkt i aktuella fall av interorganisatorisk samordning (UNAMID, AMIS, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, MINURCAT, och AMISOM) presenterar rapporten några av de utmaningar som finns avseende samordning i fredsfrämjande insatser idag. Insatserna diskuteras genom att använda kategorierna hybrider, samtidiga insatser, och transition mellan insatser. Ett antal viktiga faktorer som påverkar inter-organisatorisk samordning analyseras. Idéer kring förbättrad samordning förs fram, inom områdena förbättrad strategisk inriktning, förbättrad samordning i fält, samt stöd till kapacitetsutveckling.

Rekommendationerna belyser ett antal viktiga områden för att potentiellt kunna förbättra samordningen mellan FN, EU och AU i framtida insatser. Bland annat framhålls vikten av att öka ömsesidig kunskap och förståelse, och att sträva efter transparens och gemensamma åtgärder i den strategiska processen. Vidare föreslås ett antal möjliga mekanismer för förbättrad samordning i fält, exempelvis ett gemensamt koordineringsforum och decentraliserad beslutsrätt. Därutöver ges rekommendationer för hur FN, EU och andra partners kan stödja AU i dess kapacitetsutveckling.

Nyckelord: FN, EU, AU, civil-militär samordning, samverkan, interorganisatorisk samverkan, fredfrämjande insatser, fredsbevarande insatser, strategisk process, strategisk planering, stöd till kapacitetsutveckling.

Summary

This report presents the results of a project, commissioned by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the coordination between the UN, EU and AU in multinational and multifunctional peace operations in Africa.

The UN, EU and AU are three different entities, with individual comparative advantages, internal structures, capabilities, experiences and roles. This report presents some of the coordination challenges inherent in contemporary peacekeeping, through the use of examples from recent missions in Africa where coordination between these three organisations has been an issue (eg UNAMID, AMIS, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, MINURCAT, AMISOM). A distinction is made between *Hybrids and Support Missions*, *Co-deployment* and *Transitions*. Several factors affecting inter-organisational coordination of peace operations are analysed, together with a presentation of findings and ideas for enhanced coordination from a wide range of sources. Core elements are *enhanced strategic direction*, compensating for perceived 'strategic deficits', *enhanced coordination arrangements in the field* and *enhanced capacity building*, as a coordination situation in itself and as a potential enhancer for coordination in missions.

The final recommendations highlight several areas requiring attention regarding the efforts of enhancing future UN-EU-AU coordination. These revolve around, eg promotion of mutual understanding and organisational learning, jointness in key stages of the strategic process and a wide range of practical mechanisms for field coordination, such as joint coordination bodies and the decentralisation of decision-making authority. In addition, a series of recommendations for UN, EU and other partners' support to AU capacity building is put forward.

Keywords: UN, EU, AU, Peace Operations, Peace Support Operations, Peacekeeping, Coordination, Inter-organisational Coordination, Civil-Military Coordination, Strategic Planning, Field Coordination, Capacity Building.

Contents

Executive Summary

The UN, EU and AU are all active in peace operations in Africa. The high demands on their peacekeeping capabilities, and their parallel mandates, have led to a situation where the UN, EU and AU have to coordinate their peacekeeping efforts.

The aim of this report is to analyse factors affecting inter-organisational coordination between the UN, EU and AU in peace operations and to present ideas for enhanced coordination. Based on examples from some of the most recent missions in Africa, the report seeks to bring forward recommendations on structural and procedural enhancements that may be of generic value.

The emerging partnership between the UN, EU and AU in peace operations is predominantly founded in a mutual relationship of resource-dependency, legitimacy and sharing of values. However, the UN, EU and AU have different internal structures, levels of experience of and resources for peacekeeping operations, and therefore different comparative advantages for peace operations in Africa. These 'unequal' traits impact on inter-organisational coordination.

The UN is flexible, employs comparatively efficient mechanisms for large-scale resource-management, and acts with the full legitimacy of the international community. However, political realities and decision-making procedures may work against both timely deployment and sustained engagement in areas of fragile or failed peace. The nascent procedures for accommodating the emerging peacekeeping partnerships, and a modus operandi for interacting with regional organisations, have to be formalised and continuously refined.

The EU has several tools for conflict prevention and crisis management at its disposal, and it is currently engaged in several missions Africa. In addition, the EU provides funding to support conflict prevention, crisis management and capacity building, through mechanisms such as the African Peace Facility. However, the EU has difficulty in coordinating its member states and institutions when it comes to foreign and security policy. This creates problems in relations with third countries and international organisations. As for the other organisations, mustering resources for peace operations is a problem, affecting both decisions to deploy and long-term commitment.

The AU is compared to the other two organisations very young. From its birth in 1999, decisions have been taken to create the fundamentals of a future architecture for peace and security. Since 2003, the AU has launched several missions to African conflicts, including engagements in some of the most complex situations, such as Darfur and Somalia. The laudable missions undertaken by the AU so far,

however, indicate a gap between the ambition and will to engage and the access to matching capabilities. In none of its larger missions, authorised or intended troop levels have been reached. The AU is dependent on external resources to be able to conduct peace support operations and significant capacity building efforts are required to reach envisioned future objectives.

The UN-EU-AU relationship is evolving, through agreements and codification of best practices. Issues revolving around organisational learning are also important. The planning processes, however, differ between the UN, EU, and AU, and they are rarely conducted in a coordinated and synchronised manner. In missions, partnerships take on different forms. Three broad categories of such arrangements have been identified in this study: Hybrids, Co-deployments and Transitions.

The advantages and disadvantages of hybrid missions – such as UNAMID – remains yet to been seen. UN officials voice concerns that the experience has been cumbersome, stating that the UN system is designed to manage UN operations, not hybrids. However, UNAMID is not fully deployed and functioning yet. Hybrids and support missions promote experience-sharing and organisational learning, and the AU, as an institution, has already learned a lot. The hybrid arrangement may also provide legitimacy and be the single politically viable option.

Another arrangement is the 'co-deployment' instrument, such as in Chad and the Central African Republic, where EUFOR is deployed alongside the UN mission MINURCAT. In general, the co-deployment instrument allows for political and military control over own resources, including the time and nature of their use, and costs. The co-deployment set-up lends the legitimacy provided by the mandate and it constitutes a signal of shared values between the UN and EU concerning the situation at hand. In return, incentives for information sharing and the prospects of the synergies, unity of direction, and organisational learning that may come from further integration are reduced.

'Transitions', or sequential operations, allow for exploitation of comparative advantages of the different organisations. One organisation might be willing and capable to act fast in response to an emerging crisis, as the AU. Another may have the finances, mechanisms and capabilities for large multifunctional missions, post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development at their disposal, such as the EU and UN. Highly specific and costly capabilities can be deployed for one stage of an operation, and then be withdrawn for use elsewhere. The transition instrument, however, contains risks since it relies on a level of predictability of partnership that currently does not exist in UN-EU-AU relations. The view of the appropriate time for transition may differ between the organisa-

tions. Another risk is that the ownership and responsibility for the outcomes of the various stages of a peace operation may become blurred. The inheritance of both perceptions and structures in a handover of responsibility is also a source of friction. UNAMID still struggles with the legacy of the perception of AMIS.

This report deals with the prospects for enhanced coordination through attention to three main areas: *Enhanced Strategic Direction*, *Enhanced Coordination Arrangements*, and *Enhanced Capacity Building*. These are all important to build mutual knowledge and trust in inter-organisational coordination arrangements. In the final chapter several recommendations which highlight areas that require attention in efforts to enhance UN-EU-AU coordination are presented.

In order to create predictable inter-organisational relations there is a need to develop frameworks and modus operandi for the emerging pattern of peace operations in Africa, with quick intervention by the AU, and transition to the UN when the situation so permits, with possible co-deployment to reinforce by the EU at certain points. Coordination in missions is dependent on strategic direction. The better the strategic direction sets the prerequisites for coordination, the better the coordination in the field will work. Several recommendations are made here, revolving around issues such as e.g. promotion of mutual inter-organisational understanding; increased 'jointness' in analysis, planning, management, and evaluation; strengthened representations in capitals; and the potential use of professional planning experts.

In field coordination, though highly dependent on personalities, an important structural issue is the agreement on common operational procedures for cooperation and information exchange between the different executives and Heads of Missions. The recommendations given in this report centre on factors such as: harmonisation of political direction; delegation of authority; co-location of headquarters; and the use of coordination forums and common implementation plans.

Cooperative efforts to build capacity entail coordination challenges, but such efforts also build mutual knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of the processes and structures in each organisation. Cooperative capacity building is a potential enhancer for coordination in missions. Important aspects include: coordination of partner support to the AU, based on regular needs assessments; promotion of balanced strategies directed at the continental, regional and bilateral levels; strengthening of AU reporting and administrative capacity; and support to the AU development of civilian crisis management capabilities.

1 Introduction

1.1 Increasing Involvement in Peace Operations in Africa

The complexities and number of African conflicts have put pressure and strain on the international community. International governmental organisations devoted to upholding peace and security are struggling, together with a multitude of non-governmental actors. Never before in history has the United Nations (UN) had so many peacekeepers in the field, and never before have the demands on the peacekeeping capabilities of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) been so high.

The UN, EU and AU have to coordinate their peacekeeping efforts given the demand on these organisations and their parallel mandates. Cooperation and coordination between the UN, EU and AU is difficult because of their inherent differences. The UN has managed peacekeeping efforts for 60 years, the EU started to develop its capability to conduct crisis management operations some ten years ago and the AU embarked on its first peace support operation (PSO), in Burundi, in 2003.[1] In terms of resources and capabilities, the UN and the EU are in a more advantageous position than the AU. The financial imbalance, as well as historical links between non-African and African states, can create friction between the organisations.

Peacekeeping has evolved from the UN being responsible for all the components of a mission (police, military and civilian), to co-deployment with another organisation or, as in the case of Sudan, a 'hybrid' mission between two international organisations. In other instances, a UN mission might have to take over when the mandate of another mission expires, which requires a smooth transition at a sensitive point of time in the mission's life. The need to develop the structures and processes for inter-organisational and multi-actor coordination is evident.

The internal coordination within the UN, EU and AU is complex in itself. Despite genuine efforts to overcome administrative hurdles and coordination problems within the three organisations, challenges remain. This report will show

[1] However, its predecessor, OAU, had been involved in peace operations in Chad in 1979–1982. There was also a pan-African peacekeeping mission to Zaire (DRC) in 1978–1979. See Williams, P. D. (2006) "The African Union: prospects for regional Peacekeeping after Burundi and Sudan", *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 33, p. 353.

that such factors impact negatively on inter-organisational coordination between the three. In addition, although general agreements addressing inter-organisational coordination are under development, insufficient mutual knowledge and understanding of the structures, decision-making procedures and modus operandi in the design and preparation of missions lead to 'ad-hocism' in coordination arrangements at both strategic and field level.

Using examples from some of the most recent missions in Africa as references – the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); the EU Forces in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), including relations to United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and UNAMID; and the current discussion of a potential transition of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to a UN mission – this report presents some of the coordination challenges inherent in contemporary peacekeeping. The number of contributing factors to this seems insurmountable. Nevertheless, an effort is made to present findings and ideas for enhanced coordination that have been put forward by interviewees, in other reports and in a different, somewhat related, field of study: Multifunctional coordination. The report will focus on elements such as *enhanced strategic direction*, compensating for perceived 'strategic deficits', *enhanced coordination arrangements in the field* and *capacity building*, as a coordination situation in itself and as a potential enhancer for coordination in missions.

1.2 The Aim of the Report

This project was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Department for Security Policy, and extends from January 2008 to October 2008. It studies coordination between the UN, EU and AU in multinational and multifunctional peace operations in Africa. The purpose of the project is to contribute to Swedish policy development for situations where inter-organisational coordination takes place. A continuous dialogue and several seminars have been held with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for this purpose.

This report constitutes the final documentation of the project findings. The aim of the report is to analyse factors affecting inter-organisational coordination between the UN, EU and AU in peace operations and to present ideas for enhanced coordination. It concludes with a series of recommendations, highlighting several areas requiring attention in the effort of enhancing future UN-EU-AU coordination. Although every peace operation is unique, the report seeks to identify and recommend structural and procedural enhancements that may be of generic value in more than one setting.

In this report, the term 'peace operation' is used to refer to a broad range of operations, including peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peace building and humanitarian operations. In connection to the case studies, references are made to 'peacekeeping operations' to denote the more distinct character of the military, police and civilian engagements to achieve a secure environment and support a sustainable peace.[2] This terminology stems from the UN, while the EU refers to crisis management operations. The AU refers to 'peace support operations', and, therefore, this term will also be used in the report.

1.3 Method and Delimitations

The modus operandi of the research team has been up-to-date fact-finding trips, where concrete examples of cooperation and coordination were sought. The team has undertaken research in Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Brussels, New York and Paris. This document is based on the findings from these trips. UNAMID and EUFOR Tchad/RCA have been used as case studies and references to these missions are made throughout the report. In accordance with the project guidance, results from other fields of coordination study (multifunctional coordination) have influenced fact-finding and interviews.

Several potentially important perspectives on inter-organisational coordination have been discussed with the project sponsors along the way. For reasons pertaining to time, resources and the complexity of the research, several of these perspectives will not be the object of discussions here, other than as examples. Excluded perspectives relate to the coordination challenges rooted in intangibles, such as political will and non-permissive political environments, and to issues revolving around how political, media and popular perceptions of missions affect the coordination between the UN, EU and AU.

Another complicating factor is that the member states of the EU and AU also are members of the UN, and, therefore, can contribute directly to UN peacekeeping efforts. In this report, however, the focus lies on the relationship between the three organisations.

During the course of the project, the importance of financial arrangements in inter-organisational coordination has become evident. While such arrangements are referenced to at numerous occasions in the text, a thorough study of the

[2] To facilitate the reading of the report, the term 'peacekeeping' will be used to describe all operations managed by or in cooperation with the UN DPKO, including peace enforcement operations. For definitions see United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, 18 January 2008, p. 97.

various mechanisms of the UN, EU and AU has been beyond the limits of the study. Therefore, where financial arrangements are mentioned and treated in the text, there may be an incomplete set of information underpinning the findings.

1.4 The Outline of the Report

This report starts with setting the stage for contemporary peace operations in Africa. In chapter 2, an overview of the three focal organisations (the UN, EU and AU) is presented, to establish the fact that although they are all active in the area of peace and security in Africa, they are three different entities with specific comparative advantages. Some of the existing inter-organisational agreements between the UN, EU and AU are also highlighted. In chapter 3, the political, legal and strategic framework for peace operations is outlined, including their basis in the UN and AU Charters, as well as an overview of the planning processes of the three organisations.

Subsequently, in chapter 4, the report introduces the emerging pattern of inter-organisational coordination in contemporary peace operations, looking at some of the major types of arrangements for such coordination: hybrids and support missions, co-deployment and transitions. This chapter includes several references to the cases studied.

The relationship between the three organisations includes a significant element of UN and EU support for AU capacity building. Therefore, chapter 5 focuses on such arrangements in which the three organisations are involved. These cooperative efforts to build capacity entail coordination challenges in themselves. In addition, inter-organisational support for capacity building increases mutual knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of the processes and structures in each organisation.

In chapter 6, tentative ideas for enhancing inter-organisational coordination are presented, based on the results of interviews and fact-finding trips. In addition, this chapter uses another, similar field of study – multifunctional coordination – as a potential source of ideas that could enhance coordination between the UN, EU and AU in the various types of arrangements.

The report ends by presenting key conclusions about UN-EU-AU coordination, together with recommendations and suggestions on how this vital relationship for peace operations in Africa might be further enhanced.

1.5 Acknowledgements

This project and the report have been made possible through the positive support of a wide range of individuals. First, the research team would like to thank the project sponsors Carl-Magnus Eriksson and Johan Carlsson for the opportunity to conduct the study, and for the many instances of stimulating dialogue during the project. Gratitude is also directed to all the participants at seminars conducted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for their constructive input.

The research team has conducted a significant number of interviews. While not mentioned by name here, they have all provided invaluable input to the project, and we would like to express our sincere gratitude for allocating time and energy to respond to our queries. We would also especially like to recognise the efforts undertaken to set up and coordinate the interviews by the Swedish delegations in New York, Addis Ababa, Brussels, Paris and Khartoum. A special thanks to Percy Hansson, military attaché in Addis Ababa.

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2 Setting the Stage: Three Unequal Entities

The three organisations under study in this report have different levels of experience of and resources for peacekeeping operations. This 'unequal' relationship has a large impact on the inter-organisational coordination between the three in peace support operations. This chapter introduces the different roles of the UN, EU and AU in peacekeeping in Africa and analyses internal challenges within each organisation which affect the inter-organisational coordination between the three. It also presents the core inter-organisational agreements on cooperation and coordination that exist between the UN, EU and AU.

Since the role of the UN when it comes to peacekeeping is generally well known, this chapter will present the role of the EU and the AU in peace support operations in greater detail. As the AU structure for peace support operations is still under formation, a substantial part of the chapter is devoted to a presentation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the gap between the political will and the current capabilities in the AU.

2.1 The United Nations

In 2005, the UN celebrated 60 years since its inception. Since the end of the Second World War, the organisation has managed complex crises and conflicts all over the world. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, and, since then, there have been a total of 63 UN peacekeeping operations around the world.[3]

The UN and its numerous agencies offer a wide variety of tools for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations are today engaged in national dialogue and reconciliation, elections, promotion of human rights and rule of law, protection of civilians etc.

Peacekeeping operations are authorised and mandated by the Security Council, consisting of 15 members of the UN, including the 'permanent five' (The People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA). The other ten are elected by the General Assembly to be non-permanent

[3] In 1948, the Security Council authorised the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/

members for a term of two years. Decisions are taken by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.[4]

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) executes the decisions of the Security Council. The role of the DPKO is to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, together with the Department of Field Support (DFS), so that they can effectively fulfil their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG). DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. DFS is responsible for support functions, such as logistics, communications, personnel, field budget and finance.

All UN member states share the costs of UN peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of member states, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.[5] Military forces and equipment are obtained from Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) through a force generation process, to meet the requirements of the specific Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Member states are asked to provide formed contingents and individuals as detailed in Memoranda of Understanding (MoU).

UN-led peacekeeping operations have recently reached unprecedented levels, putting a lot of strain on civilian, police and military capabilities. Currently, the UN has approximately 120,000 peacekeepers in the field, which can be compared to the low point in the mid 1990s, when some 25,000 personnel were deployed.[6] Even if the UN system, because of its general mandate and experience, today represents the most advanced system for peacekeeping, the high demand for peace operations around the world has led to a situation where the organisation must seek aid from other intergovernmental and regional organisations to be able to manage the growing number of conflicts around the world. This resource-dependency is one of the main incentives for UN-EU-AU coordination. Steps have been taken by the UN to accommodate this increasing demand

[4] Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Chapter V, Articles 23 and 27.
[5] As of 1 January 2008, the top ten providers of assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations were: the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, China, Canada, Spain and the Republic of Korea. See DPKO webpage: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
[6] Interview, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, 28 March 2008.

for coordination with others, in part based on a discussion of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 (UN Charter) on the role of regional organisations and its contemporary interpretation.

2.2 The European Union

Since its inception over 50 years ago, the EU has created conditions for peace and stability in Europe through economic and political integration among its member states. During the past ten years, the Union has, in addition, developed a capability to engage in peace support operations outside its territory. Since its first police mission was launched in 2003, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU has undertaken 20 civilian and military operations. With an initial emphasis on the Balkans, the EU is currently engaged in missions in Europe, Africa and Asia.[7]

Being a regional organisation covering many policy areas, the EU has several tools for conflict prevention and crisis management at its disposal. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) include instruments for political dialogue and coordination of the member states foreign policies. Within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the member states provide civilian (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) and military resources for peace support operations. In addition, the instruments of the European Commission related to trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid can be used to prevent and manage crises. This broad spectrum of civilian and military instruments is often considered to be the EU's main advantage when it comes to conflict prevention and crisis management.

Decisions on establishing peace support operations are taken by the Council of the European Union, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the 27 member states. The process is strictly intergovernmental with unanimity as the decision-making rule. This ensures a high degree of influence for the member states throughout the process. Decisions are prepared by a number of committees with member states' representatives and with support from the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Most importantly, the Political and Security Committee (EU PSC), consisting of ambassadors from the 27 member states, has a responsibility to continuously monitor the international situation and provide political control and strategic direction of peace support operations. The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) holds a key position to influence the foreign policy decisions in the Council and ensure their implementation. The SG/HR is also part of the 'Troika', together with the Commission and the member state holding the

[7] http://www.consilium.europa.eu

Council Presidency, which represents the Union in meetings with third countries and international organisations.[8]

The EU system of financing peace support operations differs between civilian and military operations. Civilian operations are normally financed through the Commission budget for the CFSP. However, in practice, the member states often have to make voluntary contributions to complement these limited funds. Member states participating in military operations bear the costs for their own personnel and resources. The so-called 'common costs' for the operation, eg the headquarter functions, are jointly financed by the member states, based on their relative gross national income.

In addition, the Commission can provide funding to other international organisations in order to support conflict prevention and crisis management. The African Peace Facility (APF), created out of the 9th and 10th European Development Fund (EDF), is one example through which the Commission and the member states provide support to capacity building and peace support operations carried out by the AU.

One inherent weakness in the EU is the difficulty of the member states to agree and talk with one voice when it comes to foreign and security policy. This creates problems in relations with third countries and international organisations. The member states have particular problems to reach common positions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the two permanent members of this body – the UK and France – reserve their right to promote their national interests rather than common EU positions. There are also problems to coordinate the external policies of the various institutions of the EU, most notably the Commission and the Council Secretariat. One exemplary attempt to increase coherence between the institutions is the set-up of a joint delegation to the AU consisting of both Commission and Council Secretariat staff, headed by a joint EU Special Representative (EUSR). The proposed Lisbon Treaty includes several innovations along these lines to further increase the coherence of the EU foreign policy, for example the appointment of a new High Representative/Vice President of the Commission and the set-up of an European External Action Service integrating the relevant Commission and Council Secretariat departments.

Another problem for the EU is the strained resources for peace support operations. In the latest operations it has become apparent that the member states have problems to recruit personnel for larger civilian operations as well as to make

[8] Björkdahl, A. & Strömvik, M. (2008) *EU Crisis Management Operations, ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies), p. 13–20.

large and long-term commitments of military resources. For the ESDP operation in Chad/CAR, it took five force generation conferences for the member states to commit the necessary military resources.[9]

2.3 The African Union

The AU is, compared to the other two organisations, very young. The AU was born out of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at a summit in Sirte, Libya, in 1999. The aim of the AU was to focus on the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent as a prerequisite for the implementation of development and integration. The Constitutive Act of the African Union came into effect in May 2001. In 2002, the organisation and the procedures of the AU were agreed upon.[10]

The main bodies of the AU are the Assembly – composed of the 54 Heads of State or Government or their representatives – the Executive Council – composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs – and the Commission.[11] The Assembly is the supreme organ of the AU, the Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly and the Commission is the Secretariat of the AU and is composed of the Chairperson,[12] the Deputy Chairperson and eight Commissioners with staff.

In July 2001, a decision was taken to create the Peace and Security Council (PSC),[13] the highest authority in the APSA. Other elements of APSA include the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Panel of the Wise (PW).[14]

[9] Björkdahl, A. & Strömvik, M. (2008), p. 33.
[10] Jörgel, M. & Utas, M. (2007) *The Mano River Basin Area; Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone* (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College and Swedish Defence Research Agency), p. 25.
[11] The AU is also composed of the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialised Technical Committees; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and Financial Institutions. See the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000.
[12] The current Chairperson is Jean Ping (Gabon), elected on 1 February 2008.
[13] AU Assembly Decision AHG/Dec 160 (xxxvii) of the Summit of Lusaka, July 2001.
[14] Lecture by Dr Istifanus S. Zabadi, Dean, African Centre for Strategic Research and Training, National War College, Abuja, Nigeria, held at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sandö, Sweden, 9 May 2006.

2.3.1 The Peace and Security Council

The PSC is the standing decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Chairmanship is held by countries in alphabetical order and rotates on a monthly basis. There are 15 countries in all, one from each region (East, North, South, West and Central Africa) chosen for three years and the other ten elected for a period of two years.[15] Decisions 'shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus', but a qualified majority suffices.[16] There are no provisions in the PSC Protocol for permanent membership on the Council.[17]

The PSC is, therefore, the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace missions and operations. However, as a rule, the AU has sought the support of the UN Security Council for all missions, mainly for legitimacy purposes but also because this is a requirement for access to the financial resources from the APF provided by the EU.[18]

2.3.2 The Peace and Security Directorate

The PSC is supported by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD implements the decisions of the PSC and manages the AU's PSO. While undergoing frequent re-organisation, it currently consists of a Secretariat to the PSC and of two Divisions" the Conflict Management Division (CMD) and the PSOD. The CMD consists of an 'Early Warning Unit' and a 'Conflict Management and Resolution and Post Conflict Unit'. The PSOD – consisting of a MSC and ASF unit, and an Operations and Support Unit – gives the strategic and operational directives to AU's peace-keeping operations. The Division can be compared to UN's DPKO, although

[15] Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, Articles 1, 5 and 8.
[16] Ibid., Article 8 para. 13.
[17] In practice, however, Nigeria has become a permanent member of the PSC for the West Africa region. South Africa was urged by the countries in the southern region to become a permanent member on behalf of them, but it declined. Interviews: Embassy of Nigeria, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008 and Embassy of the Republic of South Africa, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008.
[18] Cilliers, J. (2008) *The African Standby Force, An Update on Progress* (Institute for Security Studies).

with significantly less resources.[19] The PSOD will plan, organise and direct the ASF when fully established.[20]

2.3.3 The African Standby Force

The ASF concept was approved, in 2004, to enable the PSC to rapidly deploy troops in Africa for a range of missions – from small military observation missions to robust peace enforcement interventions.[21] For the first time, Africa had a common position and an action plan for the development of its peace operations capacity.[22] The ASF Policy Framework Document provides for military, police and civilian components.

The ASF is nominally composed of five regional standby brigades:

- The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) brigade (SADCBRIG);
- The East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM)[23] brigade, which goes under the name Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG);
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIG);
- The North African Regional Capability (NARC) brigade, which goes under the name North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); and
- The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG), or Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC).

An MoU was signed in Addis Ababa in January 2008, addressing cooperation between the AU and RECs/Regional Mechanisms (RM) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. It commits the parties to work together to make the ASF fully operational and outlines the modalities of interaction between the AU and the RECs/RMs, with respect to the ASF. The MoU includes specific arrangements for cooperation, including information exchange, meetings and other mechanisms for enhancing cooperation. It also contains provisions on

[19] The DPKO has over 600 employees, with a reinforcement of 295 to staff the Department of Field Support and the PSOD, at the time of writing this report, it operates with little more than a handful of staff. A Consultancy Team from the UN has recently recommended a structure of 200 persons to staff the PSOD.
[20] Bogland, K., Egnell R. & Lagerström, M. (2008), p. 24–25.
[21] Six scenarios have been developed with timeframes from 14–90 days for deployment.
[22] De Coning, C., (2007) *Peace Operations in Africa, the Next Decade* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), Working Paper No. 721, p. 11.
[23] The responsibility for developing EASBRIG has been transferred from IGAD to the newly established EAPSM, since IGAD does not include the full range of members in East Africa. See Cilliers, J. (2008).

institutional presence (including liaison officers) and joint activities in the field of cooperation, as well as a clause on cooperation with the UN and other international actors.[24]

All five brigades are supposed to be operational by 2010,[25] prior to which each region has to go through its own series of exercises, ending with a final continental level exercise in 2010. By then, each region should have their civilian, military and police components identified, rostered and trained. Doubts have been expressed regarding achieving this target within the allocated time.

During the first phase of its development, the AU has given priority to the development of the military dimension of the ASF. A key challenge for the AU is to equally develop the civilian and police dimensions of the framework. In order to ensure a balance in the development of the three ASF components, a declaration was issued on 28 March 2008, by the Ministers of Defence and Security of the member states of the AU, assuring that the police/gendarmerie and civilian components of the ASF will be appropriately addressed and enhanced.[26] The term 'brigade' was criticised because the terminology is not useful when actually describing a multidimensional operation that consists of military, police and civilian components.

A Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF has recently been developed,[27] as well as an ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan.[28] The Policy Framework provides for a civilian-led multidimensional mission management structure, including substantive components such as human rights, humanitarian aid, good governance etc. The Framework also suggests a mission-level management structure that will typically consist of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCCs,

[24] Draft Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordination Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, AU-RECs/EXP/2(II), REV. 3.
[25] Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, Article 13.
[26] Declaration on 28 March 2008 of the Ministers of Defence and Security of the Member States of the African Union, Second Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa. Review of Progress of the Operationalisation of the ASF and the MSC.
[27] Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, 29 August–1 September 2006, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. It was considered and noted at the meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence and Security and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security in March 2008.
[28] Established at a Technical Experts Task Team Meeting on 11–13 April 2007, in Addis Ababa.

a Force Commander, a Police Commissioner, various heads of substantive civilian components and a HoM Support.[29]

When undertaking its functions, the ASF will, where appropriate, cooperate with the UN, its Agencies and other relevant international and regional organisations.[30]

2.3.4 The Military Staff Committee

The role of the MSC is to advise and assist the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements. It is composed of Senior Military Officers of the member states of the PSC.[31] All members of the PSC do not, for political or economic reasons, have military attachés in Addis Ababa, and, therefore, the MSC has never been able to reach a quorum. Instead, informal consultations are taking place with military attachés from those member states that have military representatives in Addis Ababa, but this forum has no legal status.[32]

2.3.5 The Continental Early Warning System

In January 2007, the Executive Council endorsed the framework for the CEWS and requested the Commission to take all the necessary steps for the timely and full implementation of the CEWS by 2009.[33] The CEWS will consist of a Situation Room, located at the CMD in Addis Ababa, responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an early warning indicators module. Observation and monitoring units of the RMs will be linked directly to the Situation Room.[34] The Situation Room exists but, to date, the CEWS has not been linked to the regional early warning systems.[35]

[29] In the Policy Framework, the term 'Mission Support' is used to refer to the administrative and logistics support function referred to as 'civilian administration' in the original ASF Policy Framework. This is the same terminology as is used by the UN, and, therefore, ensures interoperability.

[30] Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, Article 13. Referring to interventions pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

[31] Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, Article 13, para. 8–12.

[32] Interview, African Union Peace Support Operations Division, Addis Ababa, 16 September 2008.

[33] Interview, United States Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008.

[34] Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, Article 12, para. 3: "*The Commission shall also collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organisations […] to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System.*"

[35] Interview, United States Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008.

2.3.6 The Panel of the Wise

The PW is composed of five highly respected African personalities "who have made outstanding contributions to peace, security and development in Africa".[36] They are selected by the Chairperson of the Commission for a period of three years. The PW advises the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. The PW met for the first time in February 2008 – it still needs a secretariat and resources before it can function efficiently.

2.3.7 The Gap between Will and Capabilities

The missions undertaken by the AU so far indicate a gap between the ambition and will to engage and the access to matching capabilities. In all of its larger missions, none of its authorised or intended troop levels have been reached.[37] Significant problems in force generation, financial commitments and political coordination of member states in the implementation phases have been encountered.

The main contributors to the budget of the AU are South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Libya, which each contribute with 15 per cent. The other 49 member states of the AU contribute with the remaining 25 per cent. Financial contributions to the ASF shall reflect this assessed scale. However, the actual will of member states to contribute with funding to AU missions has been questioned.[38] Without significant contributions from external sources, such as the EU, US, UK, Canada and other international partners, it is likely that the AU would not have been able to undertake any of its peacekeeping efforts.[39] Even small military observer missions have proven too costly to be funded solely from the AU's own budget.[40] Therefore, the work of the AU PSOD relies on outside funding.

[36] Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, Article 11.
[37] See Svensson, E. (2008) *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency), Ekengard, A. (2008) *The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – Experiences and Lessons Learned* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency) and Hull, C. & Svensson, E (2008) *The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)- Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency).
[38] Interview, African Union, Darfur Desk, 22 February 2008.
[39] Cilliers, J. (2008).
[40] The African Peace Facility is an instrument of the European Development Fund aimed at supporting the AU and RMs to tackle conflicts by increasing capacity in the planning and conduct of PSOs and by supporting African PSOs. de Coning, C. (2007), p. 12.

The AU PSOD does not have its own dedicated budget with multi-annual periodicity, and, therefore, has difficulties making long-term planning for sustained missions.[41] The dependency on external resources is problematic, it confines the AU's ability to make decisions and scarce headquarter resources are consumed for donor reporting. Donors, on the other hand, are discontent with the lack of transparency and accountability within the AU.

Several partners, including the UN, EU, NATO and G8, however, supply capacity-building support on the continent in the form of financial assistance and training of personnel.[42] In fact, there is currently more funding available than the AU is able to absorb.[43]

While expectations are high on the AU as an emerging regional security organisation, it seems evident that the AU has insufficient institutional capacity. For example, the PSC's decisions are not always based on up-to-date information and linked to the required capabilities and resources.[44]

As underlined by the recently conducted AU Audit, there is need for a number of structural improvements.[45] Currently, the AU is dependent on the few individuals staffing its departments, and the structures do not hold by themselves. The PSOD only has a handful of staff dedicated to developing strategies, planning and managing peace operations. Resort is often made to ad-hoc solutions, with external funding for specific missions, instead of developing permanent planning and management capabilities within the AU. Administration, procurement, long-term planning, logistics, salaries and deployment of civilians etc are not under the PSOD's control, therefore, making it difficult to plan for comprehensive, multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The degree of institutionalisation is, in other words, very low.

To sum up, the current AU capabilities and structures for peace support operations are under development, with significant efforts required to reach envisioned future objectives. This has impacts on the inter-organisational relationship between the UN, EU and AU, making the latter much more of a recipient in terms of, eg finances and support for capacity building.

[41] Interview, African Union, Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), 21 February 2008.
[42] Center on International Cooperation and Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsätze (2008) "Towards an Understanding of Peacekeeping Partnerships; Prospects Lessons Learned and the Future of Partnerships in Africa".
[43] Interviews: Addis Ababa, Embassy of Sweden, 19 February 2008 and US Mission to the African Union, 20 February 2008.
[44] Interview, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008.
[45] Audit of the African Union, 18 December 2007 and interview, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008.

2.4 Inter-organisational Agreements

The UN, EU and AU all emphasise the importance of effective multilateral cooperation to promote peace and security. The relationship between the UN, EU and AU, when it comes to peacekeeping, is defined in several agreements on cooperation and coordination. The UN-EU relationship is based on a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management from 2003.[46] This declaration calls for increased coordination at the working level in the fields of planning, training, communication and best practices. Since 2003, the UN-EU Steering Committee, which consists of officials from the UN Secretariat and the EU Council Secretariat and Commission, meets twice a year to direct the coordination efforts.

Based on the experience of the EUFOR DR Congo support to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in 2006, the UN and the EU issued a Joint Statement, in June 2007, including six points to further enhance coordination.[47] These points build on the Joint Declaration and range from regular senior-level political dialogue and information exchange to the establishment of technical coordination mechanisms for crisis situations where the UN and the EU are jointly engaged. In order to facilitate joint planning for these missions, the organisations, in June 2008, adopted a set of guidelines for joint UN-EU planning.[48] These guidelines provide for the establishment of a UN-EU joint coordination group to support planning efforts in joint peacekeeping operations. They also include checklists for elements to be included in UNSC Resolutions (UNSCR) authorising EU missions and elements to be included in technical arrangements between the UN and the EU in the field.

With regard to the UN-AU relationship, the UN member states agreed to the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity building with the AU at the 2005 World Summit.[49] Following the summit outcome, the UNSG and the Chairperson of the African Commission, in 2006, signed a Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building for the African Union.[50] The Declaration reflects the common commitment of the UN and the AU to maintain peace and

[46] Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 19 September 2003.
[47] Council of the European Union, Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 7 June 2007.
[48] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions, 13 June 2008.
[49] See UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005.
[50] Declaration enhancing UN-AU cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, Addis Ababa, 16 November 2006.

human security, promote human rights and post-conflict reconstruction and advancing Africa's development and regional integration. It outlines strategic priorities and provides a holistic framework for UN system-wide support to the capacity-building efforts of the AU. As part of the deal, the UN DPKO's office in Addis Ababa was established to help operationalise the ASF to be able to plan, deploy and manage complex peacekeeping operations.[51]

The EU-AU relationship builds on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which was adopted at the Lisbon summit in December 2007.[52] The joint strategy constitutes a long-term framework for Africa-EU relations and will be implemented through three-year Action Plans. Within the strategy, cooperation on peace and security is one of the priority areas, and the first Action Plan, covering the period 2008–2010, establishes three priority actions in this field:

- Enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security;
- Full operationalisation of the APSA; and
- Predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations.

In the strategy, the EU committed to support capacity building, in particular through the APF, the EU financial instruments for crisis management, the Euro RECAMP programme (which supports the build-up of the ASF) and bilaterally by the member states. The EU also declared the will to support Africa's efforts to mobilise funding for peacekeeping operations from the APF, the G8 and other international partners, as well as a future mechanism for UN funding under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

[51] Interview, United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations Office, Addis Ababa, 8 September 2008.
[52] Council of the European Union, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 9 December 2007.

3 The Political and Strategic Framework for Peace Operations

Inter-organisational coordination is dependent on the overall political and strategic framework for peace operations. This chapter introduces the political process of UN mandates and examines their different natures, including a discussion on Chapter VIII delegation to regional organisations. It also provides an overview of the strategic planning processes of the UN, EU and AU. Following this, attention is given to the fact that peacekeeping missions operate in an environment dependent on wider political considerations. Peacekeepers can only create stability, not peace. Finally, this chapter includes a short section highlighting something that is often forgotten in discussions of peacekeeping operations – the ultimate aim to transfer responsibility to the host country government.

3.1 The Mandate for Peacekeeping

3.1.1 Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter

The term 'peacekeeping' is not found in the UN Charter. Dag Hammarskjöld referred to peacekeeping operations approved under "Chapter Six and a Half". If the parties to a conflict fail to settle it by peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, it should be referred to the UNSC.

If there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the UNSC will, if government consent cannot be achieved, take action in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UNSC may call upon members of the UN to employ economic or diplomatic sanctions against the defaulting state.[53] If the UNSC considers that these measures would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.[54]

Peacekeeping missions established under Chapter VI are formally limited to self-defence. This has created problems in situations where peacekeepers have been in need of a more robust mandate.[55] The outcry of dismay over the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica led to a debate on the responsibility to protect (R2P). In

[53] Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.
[54] Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations.
[55] The use of force other than in self-defence has evolved during recent years for Chapter VI mandated missions.

2005, the UN General Assembly codified the R2P, stating that each individual state has the primary responsibility towards its own population, but if national authorities "manifestly" fails to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,[56] and peaceful means prove to be inadequate, the UNSC has the responsibility to act under Chapter VII in a "timely and decisive manner".[57] These principles were upheld by the Security Council in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.[58]

The AU has incorporated the concept of R2P in its Constitutive Act, therefore, going further in its commitments towards peace and security than the UN. The AU has the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the AU Assembly "in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." A member state of the AU also has the right to request intervention from the Union to restore peace and order.[59]

Despite these commitments, the mandate of a mission is always the product of political will and compromises. Sometimes this can work to the advantage of a peace mission.[60] In other cases, the UNSCR is the result of lengthy negotiations and resistance from important stakeholders, be it among the permanent members of the Security Council or by the host nation itself, as was the case for the conflict in Darfur. The Government of Sudan (GoS), who has an important ally in the People's Republic of China, ignored UNSCR 1706 (2006), which extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur.[61] After lengthy negotiations, and in part due to a shift in strategic stance by China,[62] the GoS agreed to a joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID, who took over after AMIS (on 1 January 2008) received the mandate, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), to prevent the disruption

[56] Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Articles 6–8.
[57] UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, para. 138–139.
[58] UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1674, 28 April 2006, see in particular para. 4 and 26.
[59] Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4 (h) and (j).
[60] For example, the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, has a fairly extensive mandate with regard to the use of force. UNIFIL is authorised to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. It is also authorised, without prejudice to the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. UNSCR 1701, 11 August 2006, para 12.
[61] UNSCR 1706, 31 August 2006.
[62] Huang, C-H (2008) "China's Evolving Perspective on Darfur: Significance and Policy Implications", Nordic Africa Institute, Conference paper, 22 September 2008.

of its implementation and armed attacks, and to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the GoS.[63]

Across the border, in Chad and the CAR where the conflict has connections to the situation in Darfur, the EU operation is only authorised, under Chapter VII, to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.[64] The UNSG has criticised the limited mandate of the operation. In a report from July 2008, the UNSG stated that EUFOR and its UN counterpart, MINURCAT, are not in a position to address the problem of cross-border movement by armed groups. The mandates limit the role of the two missions to addressing only the consequences and not the root causes underlying the conflict in Chad. The UNSG also noted that "unless these fundamental issues are addressed, and in the absence of a viable dialogue between the Government and all opposition groups, the resources invested by the international community in Chad risk being wasted."[65]

The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, has questioned why the EU is sending military forces if the mandate is only to protect refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). China argues that unarmed police forces would suffice for this task and that the mandate has been interpreted too broadly by the EU.[66]

Linking a peacekeeping operation with a particular chapter of the UN Charter can be misleading for the purpose of operational planning, training and mandate implementation, according to the 2008 Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations. In assessing the nature of each peacekeeping mission and the capabilities needed to support it, TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) should be guided by the tasks assigned by the mandate, CONOPS and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component, and the Directive on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component.[67]

3.1.2 Chapter VIII – Regional Arrangements

The UN is overstretched. Today it has more than 120,000 peacekeepers in the field.[68] According to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council should encourage regional arrangements or agencies to promote peace and secu-

[63] UNSCR 1769, 31 July 2007, para. 15 (ii).
[64] UNSCR 1778, 25 September 2007, para 6 (a) (i) and (ii).
[65] Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, 8 July 2008, para. 52.
[66] Interview, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Khartoum, 14 February 2008.
[67] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, 18 January 2008, p. 14.
[68] Interview, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, New York, 28 March 2008.

rity at the regional level. The Security Council may delegate responsibility for peace enforcement to regional actors provided that no military action is taken without the authorisation of the Security Council.[69]

As a conflict erupts or worsens, consultations will start taking place between the member states of international organisations. One or more parties may insist on a UN role as a precondition for contributing troops. International organisations' attention to a conflict and the subsequent mandate is often dependent on member states or partners having a particular interest in a region. For example, France has close ties with Chad and as a strong member of the EU and a permanent member of the Security Council, it was instrumental for attaining the necessary support for a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) allowing EU forces to be deployed in Chad.[70]

In contemporary Africa, partly because of its history of colonisation and late liberation, there is significant support for predominantly African approaches to peace and security, showing to the world that the continent can handle its own problems. From time to time, reference is made to the device *African solutions to African problems*. Indeed, the AU's Constitutive Act includes provisions for interventions far exceeding those of other organisations. There are still impediments, however, for the AU to act alone for long periods of time. The largest contributors to the AU might already be overstretched in their resources, and other countries in Africa may not be able, or willing, to contribute to peace support operations. There are also potential political impediments, as some member states may have less inclination to support interventions to promote democracy and human rights. Even the most practical considerations, such as effectiveness of troop reimbursement mechanisms, may affect the willingness and ability to pledge troops to UN rather than to AU operations.[71]

In 2005, the UN stressed the importance of supporting regional and subregional organisations, particularly in Africa, in conflict prevention measures, such as *inter alia* early warning and mediation capacities.[72] It also expressed its intention to hold regular meetings with heads of regional organisations and enhance communication efforts. States were urged to provide human, technical and financial assistance to African regional and subregional organisations. At the 2005

[69] Articles 52–53 of the Charter of the United Nations.
[70] UN Security Council Resolution 1778 was, in principle, drafted by France. Interview, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, New York, 28 March 2008.
[71] Interview, UNAMID Official, 14 February 2008 and Embassy of Nigeria, Addis Ababa, 20 February 2008.
[72] UNSCR 1625, 14 September 2005.

World Summit, there was a resolve to include, as appropriate, the regional organisations in the work of the Security Council.[73]

In 2008, the UN took further steps towards enhancing the relationship between the UN and regional organisations. In UNSCR 1809 (2008), the Security Council welcomed the efforts of the AU and subregional organisations to undertake peacekeeping operations in the continent in accordance with Chapter VIII. It encouraged effective cooperation with the AU PSC and welcomed the development regarding cooperation between the UN, AU and EU.

With regard to the financing of operations, it is often claimed by the AU that when the Security Council endorses a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the UN should also provide the funding for it. The reason for this is the unpredictable financial situation that the AU PSOD finds itself in with regard to peacekeeping operations.[74] UNSCR 1809 addresses this issue by stating clearly that regional organisations have the responsibility for securing human, financial, logistical and other resources for their organisations, including obtaining contributions by their members and soliciting contributions from donors.[75]

Regional organisations, in general, have very little impact on the UN mandate process. Normally, the impact of a specific regional organisation in the mandate process would be dependent upon the actions of those member states who are also members of the UNSC.

3.2 Planning for Peacekeeping

In parallel to the discussions on the mandate, the plans for a peacekeeping mission start taking form. Consultations are taking place between member states as well as between organisations. The planning processes, however, differ between the UN, EU and AU, and they are described below.

3.2.1 The United Nations

During the initial period of consultations, the UNSG may decide to conduct a Strategic Assessment of the conflict situation, with the aim of identifying different options for engagement. The Strategic Assessment involves consultations with regional and intergovernmental organisations, key partners, the poten-

[73] UNSCR 1631, 17 October 2005.
[74] Interview, African Union, Peace Support Operations Division, 21February 2008.
[75] UNSCR 1809, 16 April 2008.

tial host nation, relevant UN organs as well as TCCs and PCCs. The Strategic Assessment allows planners and decision-makers to conduct a system-wide analysis of the situation, identify conflict resolution and peace-building priorities and define the appropriate framework for engagement.

An Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) has been adopted by the UN to facilitate the planning of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations. The Strategic Assessment is part of that process. The IMPP is guided by specific planning principles and assumptions and requires the full engagement of key UN actors, both at headquarters (HQ) and the country level, as well as consultations with the national authorities and other relevant external actors. The IMPP is meant to be implemented in a flexible manner, taking into account varying circumstances and timeframes, while ensuring that adequate planning standards, outputs and key decision points are respected.[76] The IMPP provides an inclusive framework to engage external partners, such as regional organisations and bilateral donors.[77]

An Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), consisting of all relevant UN stakeholders, is established to implement the IMPP. The IMTF is a headquarter-based body that will be established immediately following the UNSG's decision to initiate the IMPP for a specific country. Prior to the decision to establish an integrated mission, the IMTF would normally be led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), but, once decided, the IMTF will be led by DPKO.[78] In the case of Somalia, the Strategic Assessment was carried out only after the IMTF was established.

If a peacekeeping mission is envisaged, a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) is usually deployed to the conflict area. Joint Assessment Missions (JAM) have been conducted by the AU and the UN before the establishment of UNAMID[79] and by the EU and the UN before the establishment of MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The Joint Fact-Finding Missions to Chad proved to be important for the subsequent relationship between the UN and the EU.[80]

[76] The IMPP was formally endorsed in the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process, Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, 13 June 2006. See also the Note of Guidance from the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions, 9 February 2006.
[77] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, 18 January 2008, p. 53–57.
[78] Senior representatives of all the main branches of the UN, as well as the UNCT and the SRSG if he or she has been appointed, are included in the IMTF.
[79] UN Security Council, 5439th meeting, 16 May 2006.
[80] The EU and UN held weekly Video Tele Conferences (VTCs) regarding the planning of the Chad/CAR operation. Interview, Council Secretariat, DG E VIII (Defence issues), 5 March 2008.

The role of these assessment missions is to analyse and assess the overall security, political, humanitarian, human rights and military situation on the ground, and the implications of an eventual peacekeeping operation.[81] Based on the findings of the TAM or the JAM, the UN Secretary-General usually issues a report to the Security Council, recommending options for the possible establishment of a peacekeeping operation, including its size and resources. The Security Council may then pass a resolution authorising an operation and determining its size and mandate.[82]

When the UNSC has adopted a resolution calling for a peacekeeping operation, the execution of the decision is handed over to the DPKO. The findings of the TAM/JAM provides the basis for the operational planning and the DPKO subsequently finalises the CONOPS, leads the force generation process and drafts some of the basic legal documents of the mission.

Supported by an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) at country level, the appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) develops the Mandate Implementation Plan for the mission. The responsibilities of the IMPT entail leading, facilitating and supporting joint mission/UN Country Team (UNCT) strategic planning, implementation and monitoring of plans and facilitation of follow-on operational activities. The IMPT should, for this purpose, work closely with the IMTF.

3.2.2 The European Union

Compared to the UN, the EU planning process for peacekeeping operations involves the member states to a higher degree.[83] It consists of several steps, which require a unanimous decision by the Council consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states. The process is highly complex, and several steps can be taken in parallel, depending on the situation. Within the EU framework, there are no permanent structures for military-strategic command and control, which means that for each operation a separate Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and Operations Commander (OpCdr) has to be designated to support the strategic planning for the operation.

[81] The TAM may consist of representatives from several departments and offices within the UN Secretariat, as well as specialised agencies, funds and programmes, and it should involve actors from the UNCT.

[82] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, 18 January 2008, p. 47–49.

[83] This section is based on the so-called Crisis Management Procedures for EU operations. See Council of the European Union, Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, 3 July 2003.

In the EU, consultations on a possible peacekeeping mission are normally initiated in the EU PSC. The first step in the planning process is the elaboration of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which describes the general political assessment of the situation, the overall objective of the operation and the proposed courses of action. The CMC is drafted by actors in the Council Secretariat and the Commission and discussed by the member states' representatives in the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). In order to prepare the CMC, the Council Secretariat might undertake fact-finding missions.

After the CMC has been approved by the Council, the EUMC and CIVCOM, drawing on their support structures in the Council Secretariat, are tasked to suggest more detailed strategic options for the operation. This forms the basis for the formal decision to take action, which is approved by the Council in the form of a Joint Action. The Joint Action includes the mandate for the operation, its objectives and the relationship to other ongoing operations in the area. It also specifies the chain of command, the designated OpCdr and OHQ and the financial arrangements for the operation.

Thereafter, the OpCdr for military operations will develop the CONOPS, based on guidance from the EUMC. For civilian operations, the permanent Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) drafts the police and civilian CONOPS. After the Council has approved the CONOPS, the OpCdr for military operations and the Head of Mission (HoM) for civilian operations develop the Operational Plan (OPLAN) and start the force generation process. Finally, the Council agrees on the OPLAN and takes a formal decision to launch the operation.

3.2.3 The African Union

As the standing decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the AU PSC is the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace missions and operations.[84] Informed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and the structural means at his disposal (eg EWS), the Chairperson of the AU Commission may decide on launching an assessment mission. Based on such inputs, the PSC decides on the nature and scope of the mandate for a peace operation. However, as a rule, the AU has sought the support of the UN Security Council for all missions, mainly for legitimacy

[84] Exceptions include situations of grave circumstances (eg genocide) and operations without consent of the recipient state, where, upon recommendation of the PSC, an AU Assembly decision would be required. See Bogland, K., Egnell R. & Lagerström, M, (2008).

purposes. On paper, the AU planning process resembles that of the UN. The Commissioner for Peace and Security and the PSD constitute the executive function of initiating, planning, managing and evaluating peace operations based on the decisions taken by the PSC.

To aid in these tasks, AU Planning Elements (PLANELM) are to be established in the AU HQ and in the five regions of the ASF. The HQ PLANELM will have the capacity to plan for all potential missions, as well as all the multidimensional aspects of such potential missions. Similar to the UN process, the PLANELM should form an Integrated Assessment Team that can undertake on-site assessments of the prevailing conditions likely to be met by the peace support operation.

The PLANELM is responsible for developing an integrated mission plan, in consultation with all stakeholders.[85] To facilitate this process, it is envisaged that the PLANELM will establish, for each new mission, an Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) consisting of representatives of all AU units that may be called upon to play a role in the operation. In addition, a Planning Consultation Forum (PCF) should be established, which can serve as a vehicle for consultation and coordination with external (non-AU) stakeholders and partners.[86] Once the PSC has authorised a specific peace operation, the planning responsibility will transfer from the generic planning unit to a Mission Task Force (MTF).[87]

The PLANELMs are still under development. In the regions, core elements have been established, with the exception of North Africa.[88] In the AU HQ, the same people are used for the planning of the ASF and actual PSOs, and planning and management bodies have, so far, been created on an ad-hoc basis. For the AMISOM, for example, a Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) was

[85] Other departments within the AU Commission, TCCs/PCCs and RMs, relevant members of the UN family and other international and regional organisations, bilateral partners, the parties to the conflict, where appropriate, and the government and civil society of the country that will host the PSO.

[86] Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, 29 August – 1 September 2006, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, para. 19-27.

[87] The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) can be seen as an example of such a MTF. The UN DPKO's Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) concept should also be studied in this context.

[88] Only in SADC, EASBRIG and ECOWAS PLANELM are civilians included. In SADC and ECOWAS, these civilians are part of the political structure of the organisations and not directly devoted to ASF.

established under the direction of the PSOD. Because of the severe understaffing of the PSOD, UN planners helped to develop the CONOPS for AMISOM.[89]

3.2.4 Synchronisation and Harmonisation

In practice, the planning processes of the UN, EU and AU are rarely conducted in a coordinated and synchronised manner. A UN mandate is generally considered a prerequisite for the later stages of the strategic planning process of the EU and AU. Where partnerships are envisaged from the outset, the importance of the synchronisation of planning processes and structural harmonisation is very high. Despite the fact that the planning processes differ in nature, there are ways of overcoming this through structural harmonisation and joint agreement on guidelines to connect core stages of the respective organisation's processes.[90]

3.3 The Relationship with the Wider Political Process

The aim of every peacekeeping operation is to create an environment conducive to sustainable peace and security and democratic governance. However, some peacekeeping operations have been deployed for decades due to the absence of a lasting political settlement between the parties. Diplomatic efforts must be undertaken to ensure dialogue between warring parties. A peacekeeping operation can only create stability in a conflict area; it cannot, in itself, create lasting peace.

Delicate problems arise as peacekeeping operations might not always be perceived as neutral. UNAMID carries the legacy of AMIS, which was seen as the protector of the DPA. Not all parties to the conflict signed the DPA, and neither AMIS nor UNAMID has been perceived as a neutral partner. For AMISOM, which has a mandate that includes provisions for support to the transitional federal institutions, perceptions of the mission's partiality may negatively affect future negotiations between the opposing parties.[91]

Diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of a dispute may benefit from being disassociated from the mission and yet, the presence of a peacekeeping

[89] Interview, United Nations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations Office, Addis Ababa, 19 February 2008.
[90] For example, the United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions, 13 June 2008.
[91] Interview, African Union, Darfur Desk, 22 February 2008.

mission can be used as both carrot and stick in the negotiations. It has been argued that resort to resource-heavy peacekeeping operations could be avoided with a more proactive approach to conflict prevention and a heightened use of mediators as a tool to answer tough political questions that lie at the heart of a given conflict. An appropriate balance between peacekeeping, mediation and conflict prevention is desirable.[92]

In Darfur, peace negotiations have been particularly difficult considering that the warring factions several times have split and reunited. The AU-UN mediation team has been faced with a close to impossible task. The GoS has allegedly undermined the establishment of the UNAMID by refusing the blue helmets[93] visas for international staff and by imposing flight restrictions, retaining cargo, refusing land allocation for UNAMID bases etc.[94] Yet, the AU-UN partnership was perceived as a positive trait by the local population.

A peacekeeping operation can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process. In the absence of such a commitment, any peacekeeping mission runs the risk of becoming paralysed, or, even worse, being drawn into the conflict.

[92] Center on International Cooperation and Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsätze (2008) "Towards an Understanding of Peacekeeping Partnerships; Prospects, Lessons Learned and the Future of Partnerships in Africa".
[93] Blue helmets are worn by UN peacekeepers as opposed to the green helmets that are used by AU peacekeepers.
[94] Interview, UNAMID official, Khartoum, 13 February 2008.

4 Coordination Arrangements for Peace Operations

Partnerships have now become the predominant architecture for peacekeeping operations. According to the Center on International Cooperation's (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace Operations for 2008, 40 out of the included 50 operations operate in some form of cooperative partnership in peacekeeping.[95] This chapter will explore some of the major types of inter-organisational coordination arrangements, examining Hybrids and Support Missions, Co-deployments and Transitions.[96]

4.1 Incentives for Inter-organisational Coordination

There are several drivers behind the increased demand for inter-organisational coordination in peace operations. Most relate to the fact that the current nature, scope and frequency of international engagements have left the international and regional organisations in a situation of 'overstretch', where capabilities are limited and, therefore, complementary partners are often sought. Such *resource-dependency* has – together with features such as *neutralising competition* and *organisational survival* – been designated as part of the family of 'materialist' motives for inter-organisational coordination.[97] However, there are other more intangible elements – so-called 'ideational' motives – involved, which include *sharing of values*, *legitimization* and *organisational learning*.[98] To the latter group of motives, building on the findings of this project, indications are that elements of sharing of responsibility, accountability and moral burden are equally important. If incentives for coordination are in place, the next issue is what form this arrangement should take. The three broad categories used in this report: Hybrids, Co-deployments and Transitions, are chosen partly based on the nature of the incentives, and partly because a specific arrangement may be the only viable option in a given situation.

[95] Center on International Cooperation, (2008) *Annual Review of Global Peace Support Operations* (New York University).
[96] CIC makes the distinction between Hybrid, Parallel and Sequential Operations.
[97] Haugevik, K. M. (2007) *New Partners, new possibilities. The evolution of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace operations* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs).
[98] Haugevik, K. M. (2007).

4.2 Hybrids and Support Missions

Since 2003, the Darfur Crisis has taken over 200,000 lives and more than 2.2 million people have been displaced. After the Ceasefire Agreement in N'Djamena in 2004,[99] the AU decided to authorise the African Mission in Sudan in Darfur to monitor, verify, investigate and report on the violations of the Ceasefire Agreement. AMIS I consisted of 60 military observers to start with and was later reinforced with a 300-strong protection force to provide security for the observers. In October 2004, the AU decided on an enhanced mission, which included police officers. AMIS II was to contribute to the overall security situation in Darfur, and to secure the delivery of humanitarian relief and support the return of IDPs.[100] AMIS had its HQ in Khartoum and got strategic direction from the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa.[101]

AMIS was supported by the EU, through the so-called EU support mission to AMIS.[102] The EU provided strategic airlift and training of African troops, planning and technical assistance, assets and equipment, as well as 100 military advisers and 50 police officers to support and train the civilian police component.[103] An EU coordination cell was established in Addis Ababa with the aim of providing coherent and timely EU support to AMIS. The cell's purpose was to ensure coordination at strategic level with other partners, in particular the UN and NATO. It acted under the authority of the EUSR and comprised of a political adviser, a military adviser and a police adviser. The coordination cell was also established to manage the day-to-day coordination with all relevant EU actors.[104]

[99] Comprehensive Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Agreement between GoS, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 8 April 2004, N'djamena.

[100] Lecture by Dr Istifanus S. Zabadi, Dean, African Centre for Strategic Research and Training, National War College, Abuja, Nigeria, held at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sandö, Sweden, 9 May 2006.

[101] At the time the DITF was created, the PSOD almost did not exist. The DITF became an independent body, created outside the AU Peace and Security Directorate, probably to circumvent the lengthy hiring procedures of the AU and to allow for partners to second staff. DITF was set-up by member states, the UN and seconded staff from the EU, and this structure was perceived to function well. When UNAMID was set-up, the DITF was disbanded and reorganised as a 'Darfur Desk' within AU PSOD, primarily to only retain contacts with TCCs contributing to AMIS and UNAMID. Interview, African Union, Darfur Desk, Addis Ababa, 22 February 2008.

[102] Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on the European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.

[103] http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=956&lang=EN

[104] Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005, Art 5 and Council Joint Action 2007/245/CFSP of 23 April 2007, amending Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP on the EU civilian-military supporting action to the AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan with regard to the inclusion of a military support element providing assistance to the setting up of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

One conclusion that the EU has drawn from its support mission to AMIS is that it is better for the EU to *coordinate with* rather than to support an AU operation. The EU provided lots of resources to AMIS but had problems influencing the decision-making.[105] It has been argued that in the future the EU should take responsibility for the resources provided and demand adequate control over operations.[106]

During UN-AU consultations in Addis Ababa in November 2006, on the situation in Darfur, it was decided that the way forward for the UN to support AMIS was a three-phase approach, consisting of a light support package, a heavy support package and, finally, a transition to an African Union/United Nations hybrid operation.[107] UNAMID took office after AMIS in January 2008.[108]

It was decided that a Joint AU-UN Special Representative (JSR) should be appointed for the operation by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN; that the Force Commander, who had to be an African, would be appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission in consultation with the Secretary-General of the UN and that the mission itself would benefit from UN backstopping and command and control structure.[109]

UNAMID was established mainly with African troops inherited from AMIS, and the JSR has dual reporting lines to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security in Addis Ababa and the UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping Operations in New York. The Police Commissioner of the operation was appointed by the AU in consultation with the UN, and the Deputy JSR was appointed by both organisations.

All command and control structures are located in the El Fasher HQ, and public information is directed by the UN.[110] In order to ensure that operations run smoothly and effectively, it was decided that a Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), with dedicated staff capacity, would be established in Addis Ababa.[111] The JSCM was created more for the AU, as a troubleshooting body, aimed at pre-empting problems between the AU and the UN.[112] The Head of the

[105] DITF was better at taking advice from the EU than the AMIS headquarters.
[106] Interview, Council Secretariat, EU Military Staff, Brussels, 5 March 2008.
[107] UN-AU High-level Consultation on the situation in Darfur, 16 November 2006.
[108] The operation was accepted by the GoS after lengthy negotiations, and UNSCR 1769 was passed by the Security Council on 31 July 2007.
[109] Peace and Security Council Communiqué of 30 November 2006.
[110] Interview, African Union, Darfur Desk, Addis Ababa, 22 February 2008.
[111] Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur (S/2007/307), 5 June 2007, para. 56–63.
[112] Interview, United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Integrated Operations Team for Darfur, New York, 27 March 2008.

JSCM will be from the UN and the Deputy from the AU. The body will not take any decisions; it will relay information and make recommendations to the AU and UN.[113] The JSCM is, to date, not functional and the delay can partly be attributed to different opinions between the UN and the AU about its size and function.[114]

The leadership of UNAMID is African, the troops are mostly African, but all other functions of UNAMID are run by the UN in accordance with UN standards and principles. UN officials already complain that the process of creating and managing the hybrid has been too cumbersome. However, the advantages and disadvantages of a hybrid mission in the broader picture remains to been seen. UNAMID is not fully deployed and functioning yet,[115] but it is clear that the AU, as an institution, already has learned a lot about peacekeeping operations from the UN.[116]

To sum up, the hybrid arrangement may provide legitimacy and be the single politically viable option (as for UNAMID). Hybrids and support missions also promote experience-sharing and organisational learning. However, when being in a support role to another organisation, questions regarding control over own resources (for example the EU support to AMIS) arise. For the UN, the UNAMID constellation also put additional strain on coordination arrangements, as the UN system is designed to manage UN operations, not hybrids. Ad-hoc coordination mechanisms for hybrids, such as the JSCM, upset the chains of command and information flows in a very developed and institutionalised system, and this is not something the UN desires. While it may be too early to evaluate the hybrid instrument and its potential benefits concerning, eg organisational learning, the UN seem to be of the opinion that the hybrid has been a burdensome experience, and not something to be repeated.[117]

[113] Interview, African Union, Darfur Desk, Addis Ababa, 22 February 2008.
[114] Interview, United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Integrated Operations Team for Darfur, 27 March 2008.
[115] As of 17 April 2008, the total strength of UNAMID uniformed personnel was 7,019 troops, 274 military staff officers, 146 military observers, 1,551 individual police officers and one formed police unit of 140 personnel. Recruitment of civilian positions currently stands at 26 per cent of full capacity. Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 9 May 2008.
[116] There is an important distinction to be made, in that many African countries have a long-standing tradition and profound experiences of contributing to UN operations. The organisational learning discussed here is centred on the transfer of experiences, best practices and effective mechanisms for planning, management and evaluation of PSOs to the AU, as a young, regional organisation.
[117] Interviews: Khartoum, 11–14 February 2008 and United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Integrated Operations Team for Darfur, 27 March 2008.

4.3 Co-deployment

It is not unusual for the UN to be deployed to a country or a region alongside another peacekeeping mission. This is, for example, the case in Chad and the CAR, where EUFOR Tchad/RCA is deployed alongside the MINURCAT.

The UN initially wanted the EU Forces subordinated to the SRSG, as in UN peacekeeping missions, but this structure was not acceptable to EU member states.[118] Instead, the EU has stipulated in its Joint Action that the EU Force Commander will, on issues relevant to his mission, maintain close contacts with MINURCAT. The EU Operation Commander will, in close coordination with the SG/HR, liaise with DPKO on issues relevant to his mission. The SG/HR, assisted by the EUSR, in close coordination with the EU Presidency, will act as the primary point of contact with the UN. For this purpose, the SG/HR is authorised to release EU classified information to the UN.[119]

In an exchange of letters between the EU Council Secretariat and the DPKO, the relations between the EU Force Commander and the SRSG have been further elaborated. The letters enable the call for support at field level, without reference to the highest level.[120]

A particular coordination problem for the operation in Chad/CAR arises in relation to UNAMID. MINURCAT has, according to UNSCR 1778 (2007), the mandate to liaise closely with the GoS, the AU and UNAMID to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region. The EU is invited to take part in the liaison and support of these activities.[121] Given the current tensions between Chad and Sudan, coordination across the border becomes politically sensitive. To date, there are no formal ties between UNAMID and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, due to the GoS' reluctance toward the mission in Chad.

Furthermore, the EU Force Commander will, without prejudice to the chain of command, consult and take into account political guidance from the EUSR, in particular on issues with a regional political dimension, except when decisions

[118] Interview, Council Secretariat, DG E VIII (Defence Issues), Brussels, 5 March 2008.
[119] Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, Article 9, para. 1–3 and Article 14.
[120] This was not the case for operation EUFOR DR Congo, which was launched in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election in 2006, when all inter-organisational decisions had to be channelled up to headquarters before a decision could be taken and executed. Interview, Council Secretariat, EU Military Staff, Brussels, 6 March 2008.
[121] UNSCR 1778, para. 2 (d) and 7.

have to be taken urgently, or when operational security is paramount.[122] The EUSR for Sudan's mandate was extended, in December 2007, to the EU military operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR.[123] Providing the EUSR with a regional perspective is of great value to the EU, but could, presumably, undermine his political role in Sudan given the perception by the GoS that EUFOR Tchad/RCA are supporting the Chadian Government. The coordination between the EUSR, the SRSG and the Force Commander in Chad/CAR, as well as their coordinated or uncoordinated liaisons with UNAMID, remains to be seen.

The EU forces will be deployed for a period of 12 months from 15 March 2008, when initial operating capability was declared by the EU.[124] Currently, the UN has commenced transition planning for a UN takeover of EUFOR responsibilities, as a result of the six-month review of the mission that was finalised in September 2008.[125] Whether the UN will be able to meet the timeline for the transition to a new and more robust mission remains to be seen. This, in turn, may have consequences for the EUFOR re-deployment. A peacekeeping force is necessary for the protection of MINURCAT's 300 police officers, 50 military liaison officers and civilian personnel, as well as for facilities, installations and equipment.

In general, the co-deployment instrument allows for an organisation to retain political and military control over its own resources, including the time and nature of their use, and costs. As in EUFOR DR Congo and Chad/CAR, the co-deployment set-up still lends the legitimacy provided by the mandate and it constitutes a signal of shared values with the UN and EU concerning the situation at hand. Also, the notion of a short co-deployment with a clear end date may potentially be more politically viable in the EU, where member states bear the costs for their contributions, than protracted engagements with complex objectives in volatile and violent environments. In return, the prospects of the synergies and organisational learning that may come from further integration are reduced. Co-deployments also challenge coordination in a mission area, as they increase the number of power-hubs present. Having, eg a SRSG, a HoM, an EUSR and an EUFOR Force Commander in the field, under separate chains of command and with weak coordination arrangements, may well be troublesome. In addition, co-deployments are often limited in time and scope, which reduce

[122] Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007, Article 8, para 2.
[123] Mr Torben Brylle was appointed EUSR for Sudan by Council Decision 2007/238/CFSP of 19 April 2007, appointing the European Union Special Representative for Sudan.
[124] UNSCR 1778 (2007).
[125] Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, 12 September 2008, and UNSCR 1834 (2008).

the incentives for transparency and information sharing,[126] and these features may work counter-productively to the institutionalisation of trust and long-term commitment in PSO partnerships.

4.4 Transitions

In Europe, the tradition has been for the UN and NATO to hand over missions to the EU.[127] In Africa, a widespread perception is that the UN normally would take on the responsibility for long-term peace building after an early intervention by the AU, possibly also including a short-term reinforcement by the EU. The AU forces can be deployed early in a conflict situation and the UN only engages after there is an overarching peace agreement in place.[128] This was the situation in Burundi with the AU and the UN and with ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

The Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF is premised on the understanding that AU PSOs are likely to cooperate closely with the UN and that the UN, in some instances, may take over responsibility from the AU. It recognises that most African civilian, police and military peacekeepers are trained to deploy both in AU and UN operations. The Policy Framework, therefore, aims at achieving coherence between AU and UN integrated management structures, as well as its police and civilian components, "so that the ease with which missions and its personnel can transition between the AU and the UN is enhanced".[129]

The view of the appropriate time for transition of peacekeeping capabilities differs between the UN and the AU. As a principle, the UN does not deploy if there is no cessation of hostilities on the ground. With regard to the situation in Somalia, for example, the UN Secretary-General recently reported that unless

[126] EUFOR DR Congo and MONUC.

[127] For example, the transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina from SFOR to EUFOR-Althea, from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) to the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and the double-hatting of the High Representative and the EU Special Representative (EUSR). In Kosovo, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EUSR/International Civilian Representative (ICR), Head of the International Civilian Office (ICO), have been deployed alongside the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with a view to take over, although this is very controversial at the time of writing this report.

[128] Some sentiments in Africa are that the underfunded AU engages early in conflicts to strengthen weak ceasefires and that the well-resourced UN is only willing to take over once the situation has stabilised. See Mtimkulu, B. (2005) "The African Union and Peace Support Operations", *Conflict Trends*, no 4.

[129] Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, 29 August – 1 September 2006, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, para. 6 and 17.

there are broad-based political and security agreements and acceptable conditions on the ground, there is no window of opportunity for deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM.[130]

In a subsequent UNSCR, the Secretary-General was requested to provide an updated, comprehensive, integrated UN strategy for peace and stability in Somalia, including an assessment of United Nations Political Office for Somalia's (UNPOS) capacity to implement the strategy, followed by possible relocation of UNPOS and the UNCT HQ to Mogadishu. A joint planning unit was to be established in the office of the SRSG and further technical advisers would be provided to the AU's SPMU in Addis Ababa. The UN did provide several planners to help with the setting up of the operation. Such contributions to the planning of a mission might help a smooth transition to the UN at a later stage.

In the Resolution, the Security Council expressed "its willingness to consider, at *an* appropriate time, a peacekeeping operation to take over *from* AMISOM, subject to progress in the political process and improvement in the security situation on the ground".[131] In the meantime, the Security Council has called for member states which have offered contributions to AMISOM to fulfil their commitments, and for other members to provide financial resources, personnel, equipment and services for the full deployment of AMISOM. The UN pledges might not be satisfactory in the eyes of the AU, who wants the UN to take over the operation.

In the UN Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, it is stated that, in circumstances where a UN peacekeeping operation is required to assume responsibility from non-UN led peace operations, an effort should be made to develop a mutually agreed joint transition plan, outlining the modalities, steps and timeframes for achieving transition and the assumption of UN responsibility. Such a plan should spell out implications for the UNCT and other partners in order to ensure consistency of approach and timing with the overall mission planning process. It is emphasised that efforts should be made to ensure security and stability at a moment of political fragility.[132]

[130] Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 14 March 2008. See, in particular, the contingency planning for a UN integrated peacekeeping mission in Somalia, scenario 4, para. 16 and 32.
[131] UNSCR 1814, 15 May 2008, para. 2–4 and 8–9.
[132] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practises Section, 18 January 2008.

Transitions, or sequential operations, may be chosen because they allow for exploitation of comparative advantages of the different organisations. One organisation might be willing and capable to act fast in response to an emerging crisis, as the AU. Another may have the finances, mechanisms and capabilities for large multifunctional missions, post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development at their disposal, such as the EU and UN. Highly specific and costly resources, such as strategic and operational airlift, Special Forces or field hospitals, can be used for one stage of an operation, and then be withdrawn for use elsewhere. The transition instrument, however, contains risks since it relies on a level of predictability of partnership that currently does not exist in UN-EU-AU relations. A noteworthy example is the remaining confusion on potential UN transitions after AMISOM and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, despite an increased willingness signalled by recent resolutions. Furthermore, the ownership and responsibility for the outcomes of the various stages of a peace operation may become blurred. The inheritance of both perceptions and structures in a handover of responsibility is also a source of friction. UNAMID still struggles with the legacy of the perception of AMIS.

Determining when a peacekeeping operation has successfully terminated its mission is a complex issue. Domestic peace can be deemed sustainable when the parties are able to move their conflict from the battlefield into an institutional framework where disputes can be settled peacefully. The transition from a peacekeeping operation to subsequent phases of engagement should be factored into the planning process from the outset, with a view to clearly delineating the roles and responsibilities of all active organisations in the conflict environment. Reliable benchmarks and indicators are required to determine when the peacekeeping operation can begin the process of hand-over and withdrawal. The benchmarks must be developed in close collaboration with the national authorities, relevant organisations and partners and civil society, taking into account longer-term strategic goals. The withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation must ensure minimal disruption of international programmes as a result of the mission's departure, and minimise the impact on the host population and environment.[133]

[133] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practises Section, 18 January 2008. p. 85–90.

5 Support to Capacity Building

Capacity building is an area for inter-organisational coordination between the UN, EU and AU. Compared to the UN and EU, the AU structures and processes for peace operations are still under formation. The lack of institutionalisation and resources in the AU, as discussed in chapter 2, is another reason for the promotion of capacity building. This chapter introduces capacity-building initiatives undertaken by partners to the AU.

Efforts are currently being made in an enlarged G8 forum to coordinate funding. In addition, the UN DPKO has established an office in Addis Ababa aimed at supporting the capacity building of the AU PSD, and the EU has established a 'double-hatted' Council/Commission office authorised to coordinate projects and funds from the EU institutions.

5.1 The Africa Clearing House

The major bilateral and multilateral partners to the AU provide coordinated support to capacity building through the Africa Clearing House (G8++), which brings together European states, the US, Canada, Russia, Japan, People's Republic of China, NATO, EU, UN SHIRBRIG,[134] AU and others. The aim of the Africa Clearing House is to establish a high-level multilateral forum for exchange of information on security assistance and cooperation programmes for the African continent, and to create a mechanism for coordination of activities.

The G8 has emphasised that support for the APSA should include the strengthening of the PSC, the ASF, the CEWS and the PW, but also of basic infrastructure such as budgeting and accounting systems, which are fundamental to the smooth functioning of systems. Chronic human resource shortfalls in the African institutions undermine African Strategic management capacity at HQ and in the regions. These limitations undermine African leadership of the capacity-building process and African capacity to absorb partner assistance. Support for institutional human and other resources is, therefore, a priority. Long-term commitments to support institutional capacity-building, with minimal conditionality, will deliver a more sustainable progress.[135]

[134] Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations.

[135] Ramsbotham, A., Bah S. & Calder F. (2005) The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of current G8 and African Activities and potential areas for further collaboration (Chatham House, the United Nations Association-UK and the Institute fro Security Studies).

Effective donor coordination promotes cohesion, understanding, genuine dialogue and cooperation. A Partner Group has, therefore, been formed in Addis Ababa, currently chaired by the UK. The PSD has urged Partners to consider the possibility of allocating funds collectively to certain areas of peace and security work.[136] The Partner Group has committed to support and fund the PSD Implementation Plan for 2008–2009. A Partner may choose to pay for activities directly or through an implementing agency.[137]

5.2 United Nations Expertise and Support

The UN has recently expressed its determination to further enhance its relationship with regional organisations, in particular the AU, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It underlined the importance of implementing the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the AU, mainly focusing on peace and security, in particular the operationalisation of the ASF.[138] The Secretary-General has recommended that to strengthen and improve the delivery for capacity building, the UN should improve and better coordinate the various African Peacekeeping training initiatives, including the development of regional centres for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support. Such training should include human rights, international humanitarian law and a module on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000).[139]

The UN DPKO recently facilitated a three-person consultancy team to examine the PSOD's structural requirements with regard to conducting effective planning and management of peacekeeping operations. The report found that the AU cannot continue to conduct PSO under the current structure. The authority should be delegated to the PSOD to recruit mission personnel, to provide administrative support, to initiate tender procedures, to make financial commitments etc. It recommended a structure of around 200 people, including a civilian component as well as a capability to interface with other civilian agencies. There is sufficient goodwill from the international community to supply the funding, but it remains to be seen if and when the proposed changes will be approved by the Permanent Representatives Committee consisting of all AU member states. This enlarged

[136] Communiqué 14 May 2007, Annual Consultations between AU, RECs, G8 member states and other partners.
[137] Draft Joint Arrangement between the African Union Peace and Security Department and International Partners, 4th draft, 17 June 2008.
[138] UN Security Council Resolution 1809.
[139] Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, 7 April 2008.

PSOD will, of course, have implications for the wider structure of the AU Commission, and it is now up to the Commissioner for Peace and Security to mitigate concerns from member states.

5.3 European Union Financing and Training Initiatives

The main channels for EU support to the AU are the APF and the Euro RECAMP programme. The APF, created from the 9th EDF in 2004, is a fund through which the Commission and the member states provide support to the continental level as well as the regional and subregional organisations to take responsibility for PSOs.[140] Since the APF is financed by the EDF, it can only provide support to Sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa) and cannot finance hard-core military costs, such as salaries to troops, uniforms, arms etc.[141] The new APF, created out of the 10th EDF, runs from 2008–2010, and the priorities for it have been discussed with the AU and regional organisations. It will support PSOs, capacity building, conflict prevention, mediation and some aspects of post-conflict reconstruction.[142]

Euro RECAMP is an EU Council (ESDP) project, taken over from France, to reinforce the African capacities with regard to prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The focus of the project is to support the launch of the ASF. The aims of the RECAMP cycle are to:

1. reinforce political and strategic capacity of the PSOD to create strategic planning documents, and to establish a clear chain of command between the AU and the regions;
2. support the training of military and civilian staff at strategic and operational level and to organise seminars to train people on specific issues, such as gender, SSR, policing etc,[143] and to
3. conduct a final exercise, a Command Post-Exercise (CPX), that will be held at continental level in 2010, in order to support the AU review process of the ASF.[144]

[140] Between 2004 and 2007, the APF encompassed €384 million of which more than €300 million went to AMIS. The remaining funds have been used for support to 30 positions in the PSOD, liaison offices for regional organisations in Addis Ababa, administration and financial management of regional organisations and staff for the PLANELM's in the regional brigades of the ASF. ESDP Newsletter (2007) *Africa-EU*, No 5, page 21.
[141] Interview, European Commission, DG Europe Aid, Brussels, 6 March 2008.
[142] Interview, European Commission, DG Europe Aid, Brussels, 6 March 2008.
[143] The training will be implemented through African Centres of Excellence.
[144] Council Conclusions on ESDP, 19 November 2007.

The Euro RECAMP cycle is mainly funded by bi-lateral donations from member states of the EU and from the APF (€20 million). Non-European partners are also contributing significantly. The US will mainly conduct tactical and logistical training of the ASF, and Canada has offered peacekeeping training through the Pearson Centre. The UN has helped design the training programmes and the AU has specifically requested training on the UN IMPP.[145]

The planning and training of the ASF represent areas where the EU, AU and UN cooperation is fully functional and beneficial to the capacity-building of African troops. The initiating conference for the RECAMP cycle will be held in November 2008.

[145] ESDP Newsletter (2007), p. 20.

6 Ideas for Enhanced Coordination

Previous chapters have concerned some of the fundamental structural and process-related preconditions for coordination among the UN, EU and AU, including examples of mission-specific arrangements and capacity-building initiatives. This chapter will explore ideas for overcoming some of the impediments for cooperation, building both on the findings from the interviews and fact-finding trips conducted during the project, and on various research and best practice relating to enhanced coordination. It will present ideas for improved coordination in three main blocks: enhanced strategic direction, enhanced coordination arrangements in the field and enhanced capacity building.

6.1 Learning from Other Fields of Study

Looking at inter-organisational coordination, quite a few similarities can be found with another realm of study, ie dealing with 'multifunctional', 'whole-of-government' and 'comprehensive' approaches. Such approaches for application of all sources of national or organisational power are now emerging as the preferred framework for most contemporary peace operations (although still riddled with implementation problems).[146] While generally addressing a different problem – resource-dependencies and coordination between different instruments and professions in complex and multifunctional environments – several concepts and techniques that are under trial in this field may prove to be of some value to the issues at hand in this report. Naturally, various definitions and interpretations of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) concepts exist. It is generally used to describe both a general *collaborative culture* between a multitude of actors involved in an engagement to resolve complex contingencies and emergencies, and the wide scope of *coordinated and collaborative actions* undertaken by them to achieve greater harmonisation in the analysis, planning, management and evaluation for that engagement.[147]

[146] See, for example, Derblom, M., Egnell, R., and Nilsson, C. (2007) *The Impact of Strategic Concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations*, (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Institute) and Nilsson, C. (ed.) (2008) *Challenges in the Implementation of Multifunctional Approaches* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Institute), Memo 2474.

[147] United States Joint Forces Command, The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5, draft working paper v 0.11, September 2007. With a national perspective, the comprehensive approach is generally associated with terms such as 'inter-agency' or 'interdepartmental' cooperation, or 'Whole-of-Government' approaches. In multinational and regional organisations, similar perspectives include words such as 'multidimensional' and 'multifunctional' engagements.

The research and development efforts in the CA field indicate three areas of particular interest for enhancing the relationship between different actors:[148]

- The need for enhanced strategic guidance, meeting a perceived 'strategic deficit', signified by limited strategic direction and agility, and insufficient coordination arrangements at strategic level which are negatively impacting on coordination prospects at field level,
- The need for better and more efficient coordinating structures and processes for joint analysis, planning, management and evaluation, often referred to as 'implementation', to fill the gap between the political-strategic level and field level, to help achieve better strategic linkage, agility and coordination prospects,
- The need for strengthening of coordination arrangements in the field.

The discussion in the previous chapters indicate that these three broad areas may be relevant here.[149] Bearing in mind the different context (multifunctional coordination), this report tries to explore these areas in the context of UN-EU-AU relations, to assess their relevance and to see if they can provide some input to the discussion.

6.1.1 United Nations Integrated Missions[150]

The UN Integrated Missions (IM) has its basis in some of the recommendations made in the 2000 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping'.[151] IM is often put forward as representing the most mature conceptual development of coordinated multi-actor approaches to international peace operations. However, there is a gap between the concept itself and its implementation, predominantly at strategic level where IM has yet to be fully put into practice.

The integration of missions is an attempt to make use of all available resources to deal with the challenges faced by a peace support operation at its various stages. Through the IM concept, the UN has sought to develop a shared understanding of

[148] See Nilsson, C. (ed.) (2008).
[149] The importance of some of these, eg Joint planning to address problems of strategic coordination and common political frameworks for action, has also been underlined by the United States Joint Forces Command, The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5, draft working paper v 0.11, September 2007.
[150] This section builds on Hull, C. (2008) *Integrated Missions – A Liberia Case Study* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency).
[151] Popularly known as the 'Brahimi report', commissioned by the UN to make recommendations for reform of the UN peacekeeping system after its experiences during the 1990s. Among other things, the report pointed out that DPKO lacked the structures for the coherent mission planning needed for a successful and efficient approach to peace operations.

the mandates and functions of the various agencies and actors within the UN system, to ensure coordination and effectiveness and to prevent duplication of tasks. Each UN agent is to maintain their own mandate, identity and responsibility, but the concept prescribes establishing clear structures, processes and mechanisms of coordination to connect these individual entities and form one coherent approach based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of priorities and desired over-arching aims. The integrated concept also seeks, to the greatest extent possible, to promote coherence and harmonise the activities of other external actors – such as international donors, International Organisations (IOs), international and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local governments, regional organisations, neighbouring states and other external stakeholders also engaged in the peace effort.

The main conceptual tools to achieve integration and coordination suggested by the IM concept are:

- A clearly defined *strategic framework* outlining the purpose of UN engagement and desired objectives, based on the particular context of the intervention;
- A *process* through which the entire UN system can be mobilised in a coherent pursuit of commonly defined objectives; and
- A clear *structure* for internal and external communication and coordination.

At field level, an integrated command structure, facilitating coordination and communication between UN actors has been institutionalised as a guiding principle. Other, issue-specific coordination mechanisms are suggested to facilitate coherence and mutual support between mission internal and external actors. Their application has been more informal and ad hoc, formed and adjusted in response to emerging challenges and as appropriate regarding the availability of structures provided by other organisations. Particularly, the endeavour of increasing coherence with non-UN actors has been a case of practical 'trial and error'. IM is also supposed to include an integrated planning process designed to formulate a common strategic framework by which the wider UN system can be engaged in a multifunctional approach. This has not been more than partially implemented, and it has often faced difficulties due to the range of actors that need to be involved.

The experiences of applying IMs so far indicate that integrated command structures for internal relations, communication and coordination are under way, but when it comes to external actors the structures are still informal and improvised. The envisioned processes for joint mission planning are perceived as impractical and poorly implemented. The IM, to date, has also failed to achieve the wider

scope of integration: ie at strategic level, to outline a framework identifying joint objectives and the arrangement of UN engagement.

6.1.2 European Union Comprehensive Approach[152]

The CA, as presented by the UK, Austria and Finland in 2005, intended to further refine elements of the EU Crisis Management procedures adopted in 2001 and the guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), endorsed in 2003.[153] The main driver behind the tri-lateral initiative was a sense that the organisation's growing ambitions, responsibilities and relatively new position as an international crisis management actor with multifunctional capability (as outlined in the European Security Strategy of 2003) needed additional procedural support to be realised. The main objective of the initiative was to find ways to tackle the imperative of coherence across pillars, institutions and missions to ensure that all components of EU Crisis Management initiatives and operations complement each other in such a way that they enhance the overall effectiveness of the EU response.

Some of the key principles of the CA are that it advocates:

- ways of treating the instruments at the organisation's disposal as 'tools in a toolbox', coordinated through supported-supporting relationships;
- an emphasis on integrated planning; addressing coordination arrangements; and
- a focus on the desired outcomes.

However, it does not specifically address relations to external partners and actors.

Focusing on the planning process, CA also touched upon some of the requirements such planning would put on the analysis (eg joint assessment and analysis, including root causes, key actors etc) of the situation at hand and the necessary preparations for evaluation.[154]

Another core element was the Management of Operations part,[155] also referred to as 'CMCO in the field'. It underlined the importance of a common understanding of the operation's objectives by all deployed personnel, facilitated by pre-

[152] This section builds on Derblom, M., Egnell, R., and Nilsson, C. (2007).
[153] United Kingdom, Austria and Finland non-Paper, Enhancing EU Civil-Military Coordination, (2005).
[154] European Union Political-Military Group, Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning, (November 2005).
[155] Council of the European Union, Civil-Military Coordination: Framework Paper of Possible Solutions for the Management of EU Crisis Management Operations, April 2006.

deployment briefings and a renewed focus on the need for better training and exercise policies, targeting coherence between civilian and military components. As a way to achieve a high degree of coherence among EU-actors, the co-location of EU HQs at field level was proposed, as well as the harmonisation of administrative borders. This would greatly benefit the fostering of a culture of coordination, as well as create synergies of logistics, security etc.

The Management of Operations-initiative[156] also discussed the issue of unified chains of command. It stated that even though this might not be possible yet, it should be considered in coming EU-operations. The EUSR is given a central role, functioning as the focal point of coordination in the field – although 'without prejudice to the military chain of command'. The initiative also advocated the use of 'EU Coordination Groups', including the different executives of the EU present in the field, eg the EUSR, the Presidency, the Force Commander, the HoM, the Head of Commission delegation etc. The Group would serve as a centre for internal coordination.

Further, it was proposed that the EU should enhance its pooling of resources. For example, functional expertise like political and legal advisors could support both the Force Commander and the HoM. There should also be a closer coordination and synchronisation of logistics and supply lines, eg transport, fuel and lines of communication. This approach could also be adopted for EU information strategies by pooling resources and, therefore, increase the impact in terms of unity and visibility. Also, improved information-sharing in the field was highlighted, as well as the possible gains of a Joint Theatre Intelligence Centre in the area of operations. It also advocates the need for coherent and unified EU media policies, based upon and harmonised with the EUs overall information strategy and master messages, to increase local visibility and understanding of what the mission intends to accomplish.

As for the UN IM initiative, there is a problematic gap between available concepts and organisational practice. After the Presidency-initiative in 2005–2006. there has only been some limited development of the EU CA, although it retains its status as an endorsed concept. In general, it seems as it has yet to be implemented in an ESDP-mission.[157]

[156] Council of the European Union, Civil-Military Coordination: Framework Paper of Possible Solutions for the Management of EU Crisis Management Operations, April 2006.
[157] See, for example, Derblom, M., Egnell, R., & Nilsson, C. (2007).

6.2 Enhanced Strategic Guidance

6.2.1 Clear Strategic Direction

Both concepts referred to above give significant attention to the need for clearly defined strategic frameworks as a prerequisite for coordination. By formal and explicit top-level statements of how, when and why different actors should combine their efforts, a mutual understanding of the mandates, approaches and tasks of different actors is promoted. This is perhaps the most important element of enhanced strategic direction: to establish a level of predictability in the inter-organisational partnerships. While every engagement is unique and requires a set of unique political decisions to come into effect, mechanisms for predictable relations should be developed and included in common frameworks.

In fact, in looking at multifunctional coordination, many evaluations indicate that contemporary endeavours in peace building suffer from insufficient strategic direction. A study conducted in 2004 found that a majority (more than 55%) of the 336 peace-building projects studied were not linked to an overarching strategy for the country in which they were implemented.[158] This resulted in friction in both planning, implementation, coordination and assessment. Furthermore, it impacted and created problems with coordination of financial flows in donor governments, both in the country and in general.[159]

The conclusions from the Utstein study stem from the broader peace operations field, focusing on peace building, and may not be directly transferable to UN-EU-AU coordination in peacekeeping in Africa. However, the importance of clear, achievable and accepted strategies for also improving inter-organisational coordination seems evident. In terms of general strategies, common political frameworks should be considered a prerequisite before partnerships become operational.[160] The inter-organisational agreements, such as the *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management* or the *Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation*, are important, as they set the stage for the situation-specific strategies (mandates, implementation plans, OPLANS etc) for the actual engagements. As has been shown, these are of emergent character, and they are ‘under implementation’ at best. These frameworks would potentially benefit from frequent revisions, with particular focus on harmonisation of doctrine, training and feedback of experiences. The aim should be to promote

[158] Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together – Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, 2004.
[159] See, for example, Derblom, M., Egnell, R., & Nilsson, C. (2007).
[160] Center on International Cooperation and Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsätze (2008).

inter-organisational understanding, and to start to conceptually and collaboratively develop modus operandi for various coordination arrangements, be it transitions, hybrids or co-deployments, and for transitions to local government. Such efforts can be supported through joint education efforts (eg the 'UN-EU education days'), exchange of officials, participation and observatory functions in exercises and training programmes,[161] and inclusion of related subjects in training curricula within the organisations.

The UN has taken initiatives in this direction, through the formalisation and publishing of the *Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations*. Although this is a UN-only document, it contains some elements on relationships to other actors and organisations, for instance regarding facilitation of transitions.[162] A similar example encountered during this study is the AU-UN policy framework for the development of civilian crisis management capability, where enhanced coherence is highlighted to ease the transition of personnel and missions between the two organisations.[163]

Arguments have been made that the UN should strive to formalise UN support and collaboration with regional organisations, such as the AU, perhaps even including mechanisms that generate financial and resource support for regionally led peace operations, authorised by the UNSC on a case-by-case basis. Finding a possible legal framework in Chapter VIII, this approach would enhance the UN's longer-term ability to work with regional organisations, such as the AU, and, potentially, other regional actors. In transition situations, such a mechanism could potentially assist in earlier planning for transitions; harmonise collaboration in areas like deployments and logistics and better support planning and peace-building efforts that involve both organisations.[164]

Keeping the political nature of the mandate process in mind, the inclusion of more specific instructions for coordination arrangements in the mandate itself is desirable. Common guidelines for transitions, to a subsequent mission, and to local government, should be drafted.

[161] Interview, United Nations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations Office, Addis Ababa, 19 February 2008.
[162] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, 18 January 2008.
[163] Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, 29 August – 1 September 2006, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, para. 6 and 17.
[164] Holt, V. K. & Andrews, K. N. (2007) "UN-AU Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa", Stimson Center Issue Brief. The UNSCR 1809 addresses such furthering of relations, but makes it quite clear, however, that regional organisations must bear their own costs.

The strategic process takes place at different places (eg New York, Addis Ababa, Brussels). Strong mutual representation offices for the organisations in the respective capitals may prove beneficial to coordination. Currently, the offices of the AU in Brussels and New York would benefit from being reinforced with mission planning and management competencies (with links to the AU PSD) and strengthened with defence attaché offices (or equivalent).[165] In EU-AU relations, there may be value in expanding the general inter-organisational dialogue to also include the military committees (when operational in AU), and other strategic elements, such as the planning functions in the EU Council Secretariat and the military-strategic HQ and AU PSD.

Inter-organisational coordination arrangements entail challenges when it comes to the formulation and distribution of joint messages to support the overall objectives of the mission. In addition, in complex environments, the public perception of the nature and efficiency of the coordination arrangement is highly sensitive to allegations of deficiencies. Significant attention must be put on crafting joint information and communication strategies in support of the mandate, the strategic objectives and the nature and quality of the coordination arrangement.

6.2.2 Inclusive Analysis, Planning and Evaluation

Inter-organisational coordination in the strategic process for missions, while arguably benefiting from the more institutional enhancers noted above, is another issue. In this context, *timing* and *inclusiveness* seems to be at the heart of the problem.[166] Timing, in that the coordination needs to take place at specific decisive stages, and inclusiveness, in that the complementary capabilities and comparative advantages of the organisations involved need to be exploited throughout the strategic process. Significant friction seems to stem from the perceptions of 'not having been involved' or 'not having been adequately consulted with' when it comes to efforts to enhance coordination *ex post*. From interviews conducted during the course of the study, there is advocacy for early and inclusive involvement, ie even in fact-finding and analysis preceding the mandate deliberations, as a means to enhance coordination at later stages.

[165] Interviews: Brussels, Permanent Representation of the African Union, 5 March 2008, and Council Secretariat, DG E VIII (Defence issues), 6 March 2008.
[166] See United States Joint Forces Command, The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5, draft working paper v 0.11, September 2007.

Additional support for this can be found in concepts that address multi-actor planning environments. As mentioned above, joint fact-finding and collaborative analysis is one important tool.[167] The Utstein study notes that the lack of a common 'picture', as well as poor communication and understanding between key players, lead to lack of synergy and differing perspectives and processes.[168] In addition, overall conflict analysis needs strengthening in order to improve the understanding of the conflict in a wider context. A study by the World Bank[169] has shown that analysing the situation collaboratively is a key precursor to coherent action. Attempts to conduct analysis separately and then combine the results are not sufficient.

The UN Strategic Assessment[170] instrument is designed to meet this requirement, but retains a focus of UN consulting with others before doing its own assessment, rather than conducting it collaboratively. While there may be sensitivities[171] for the EU and AU to be involved in early stages of the process, there can also be potential benefits of having regional organisations more involved in the analysis and assessment of options. An increased inclusiveness could potentially allow for a more informed choice of coordination arrangement, and for premeditated mitigation efforts concerning the risks associated with each structure. This is equally relevant concerning the TAM, JAM and joint fact-finding instruments, as the results of such efforts will inform the mandate, and the nature and size of a potential operation. There are indications that where joint fact-finding and assessments have been made, as by the UN-EU in Chad/CAR and by the AU-UN in Darfur, the general perception is that these have contributed to better coordination.[172]

Additionally, planning processes that allow for multi-actor contributions are needed. While the strategic process has a political primacy, with political decisions made at crucial stages of the process, an important integral element is the process of turning the political strategy, including mandates, into plans of action (here referred to as 'implementation'). In theory, there should be a coherence in the whole process of strategy formulation and turning the strategy

[167] Multinational Experimentation 5 (MNE5), Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation – Outline Concept, Draft, Version 2.5, (2008).
[168] Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together – Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, 2004.
[169] World Bank, Report No. 36446-GLB, 21 June 2006, 'Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational Challenges'.
[170] See section 3.3.1
[171] It may be imperative for an actor to retain political freedom of action as long as possible in the strategy process. Early commitments are, therefore, generally avoided, which means that candid mutual analysis of a conflict situation may be difficult.
[172] Interview, Council Secretariat, EU Military Staff, 5 and 6 March 2008.

into action, from the strategic analysis phase, through decisions on desired outcomes and the choice of instruments, to operational, functional planning and the decision on specific activities to manage the crisis, including monitoring and evaluation.[173]

In practice, the implementing part of the process is often influenced to an even greater degree by different planning cultures, approaches and individual actor interests. Besides a general asymmetry of resources available for planning itself, and time perspectives, differences in language, terminology and concepts may affect inter-organisational coordination negatively. Nominally, implementation planning processes are tailored to the organisations and actors involved, and the situation on the ground, with the formal outputs being the implementation plan(s) of various nature. In the ad hoc environment of contemporary inter-organisational coordination, this creates friction. Therefore, solutions that build on finding structures that can provide 'an amalgam of existing processes',[174] rather than advocating a single, universally accepted process, are increasingly put forward.

The Utstein study shows that cooperation and companionship between all stakeholders in the initial stages of a peace-building effort (ie design and preparation stage) create goodwill, confidence and dedication, and might ultimately lead to coordination, collaboration and increased efficiency. In addition, ownership of the planning and implementation processes by core stakeholders contributes to success and sustainability. Finally, lack of cooperation with, or understanding of, conflicting parties might lead to project failure.[175] In the hybrid UNAMID, several arrangements – ranging from the appointment of key individuals to mechanisms for information exchange – seem designed to facilitate UN-AU relations. In practice, most of these are not operational, due to the fact that the UN operates on its own procedures. The leadership of UNAMID is African, the troops are mostly African, but all other functions of UNAMID are run by the UN in accordance with UN standards and principles (see section 4.2).

Joint planning based on inclusiveness has proved to be an enhancer for coordinated action, eg the UN-EU preparations for the missions in Chad and the CAR. Cooperation in the planning process is not only important, it is crucial to acquire

[173] Derblom, M., Egnell, R., & Nilsson, C. (2007).
[174] Such as the United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, Guidelines for Joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions, 13 June 2008. See also Multinational Experimentation 5 (MNE5), Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation – Outline Concept, Draft, Version 2.5, (2008).
[175] Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together – Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, 2004.

a common understanding of the objectives of a mission and the method for implementing and achieving these objectives. Joint planning should include 'planning for evaluation', with a design to support joint evaluation in the later stages of the mission. This supports another important element, ie JAM. A coordinated assessment of progress, such as the mid-mandate review for the operations in Chad and the CAR, provides the basis for joint decisions on subsequent enhancements to the mission structure, coordination arrangements and review of plans.

Another area that may be decisive for enhancing coordination between co-deployed organisations, or organisations engaged in a potential transition of authority, is 'joint evaluation'. A collaborative assessment of progress and of the situation on the ground requires information exchange and discussions on analysis and interpretation. This promotes mutual understanding and transparency. It is important to capture any remaining lessons learned at the end of the mission by conducting After-Action Reviews (AARs), which may benefit those responsible for the planning and conduct of future joint operations.[176] However, there are challenges involved. Evaluation must be set against accepted, preferably pre-planned and joint, objectives, and this is not always the case. If a joint evaluation becomes instrumental to a significant change in coordination arrangements, as, eg for the potential transition in Chad post-EUFOR, there may be a risk for bias in the evaluation due to political considerations.

Collaborative analysis, joint implementation planning and focus on evaluation have, although still perceived as value-adding, their own problems. In multi-actor environments, a 'neutral' facilitating part to guide the process and to reinforce capacity in cumbersome parts of the planning process may be needed. There are examples of such capacities being trained and deployed, such as the UK Stabilisation Unit's facilitator/planners, used in joint planning efforts between government departments, but also internationally, eg Afghanistan and Somalia.[177] While a high premium is put on knowledge and experience of different planning processes and organisational cultures in multifunctional environments, a specific skill-set required is that of facilitation and inter-group conflict resolution.

[176] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practises Section, 18 January 2008, p. 85–90.
[177] Such facilitators have also been the object of experimentation in the MNE series.

6.3 Enhanced Coordination Arrangements in the Field

The studies of multifunctional coordination reveal a desire to enhance the structures and processes for coordination in the field. Hybrids, co-deployments and transitions would tentatively benefit from having established structures and processes for coordination in analysis, planning, management and evaluation at various stages of the engagement. Common responses to queries about potential enhancers in field coordination are:

- Mechanisms for regulated information exchange;
- Extensive use of liaisons;
- Co-location, or regular consultation meetings, between field offices; and
- Harmonisation of administrative borders.

In situations where limited general and specific strategic direction exists, the nature of the arrangement tends to include a high degree of ad-hoc arrangements. While not always desirable, it is important to acknowledge that this can also be a positive thing. Such arrangements are generally designed to meet field-level needs, therefore, being more in tune with the situation at hand. This presupposes decentralised decision-making.

An example can be found in the UNAMID - EUFOR Tchad/RCA relations (see also section 4.3). Rejecting subordination to the UN, the EU (through the 'exchange of letters') decentralised field consultation and information exchange with the UN to the EU Force Commander. MINURCAT's wide mandate to liaise with GoS, AU and UNAMID, and to which the EU is invited to be a part, also leaves room for field-level design. At the same time, top-level information exchange was provided for through the UN-EU SG/HR (assisted by the EUSR and in coordination with the EU presidency) relations.[178]

Suggestions for enhanced coordination advocate the use of single focal points for coordination and information exchange in the field. Prospects of in-theatre coordination are enhanced if political direction comes from one office.[179] In inter-organisational coordination arrangements, such as co-deployments or transitions, the number of potential sources of direction increases. The UN system has addressed this issue in its IM concept, with some progress. Both the UNAMID

[178] Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007, on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, Article 9, para. 1–3 and Article 14. The nature of the EU-UN cooperation was, at the outset of the operation, not formalised, but it was eventually given a structure with mutual liaisons at DPKO and EU OHQ. Interview, EU OHQ Official, Paris, 20 May 2008.

[179] UN Integrated Missions, EU Comprehensive Approach.

transition and the MINURCAT-EUFOR Chad/CAR co-deployment revealed a UN desire to be 'in the lead'. However, all other things being equal, even in such arrangements, temporary subordination to a lead actor should be a possible enhancer. The minimum level may be to agree on common procedures for cooperation and information exchange. If possible, a dedicated forum could be created, where the executives of the different interacting organisations meet regularly.[180]

An important factor for field coordination is to provide venues for the different executives and HoMs to meet and share information. The mechanisms for cooperation vary from ad-hoc telephone calls to regular meetings in a formalised forum with a stipulated agenda. In the latter case, the forum may benefit from being convened around an overall implementation plan, encompassing all the mandated tasks in a mission, and jointly agreed upon by the different stakeholders in the field. Such an instrument tentatively helps in delineating the areas of responsibility and avoiding overlap. The plan should be inclusive of all international actors and have local buy-in, and, if possible, have strong links to initial planning at strategic level.

The use of liaisons is nominally thought to be important in promoting information exchange and facilitating common understanding in each organisation. Importantly, a liaison officer has to have sufficient access to the right position in the organisations involved.[181] Liaisons also need thorough training, knowledge, understanding and experience of the organisation to which he or she is seconded.

In multifunctional coordination, many advocate the benefits of being co-located in the field, or at least having set the stage for regular consultation between field offices through weekly meetings, Video Teleconferences (VTC) etc. The choice of co-location of field offices should, if politically viable, be considered key to enhance coordination. Another potential enhancer for coordination in co-deployment and hybrids, is harmonisation of administrative borders as suggested by the EU CA concept. Friction sometimes arises from concrete details, such as having different designators on geographical areas and points, and from high-level differences in regional responsibility.

Regardless of the choice of coordination arrangement, the display of unity of objectives and unity of effort is crucial. Inter-organisational coordination is highly sensitive to 'attacks' on the nature and quality of the arrangement, and of

[180] See the EU CA concept of 'EU Coordination Body' and the focal role of the UNSG and his office in UN missions. Such coordination bodies have been created in multi-actor environments, eg in Kosovo.

[181] Swedish Armed Forces HQ (2007). Swedish EBAO Development After the Autumn Experiment 2006.

its motives and effectiveness. Building again on coordination in multi-actor environments, the importance of joint information and communication strategies and mechanisms must be underlined. This is an element that lends itself to risk when it comes to strategic deficit. Inter-organisational coordination arrangements entail challenges when it comes to formulation and distribution of joint messages to support the overall objectives of the mission. In addition, in complex environments, public perception of the nature and efficiency of the coordination arrangement is highly sensitive to allegations of deficiencies. Based on a Joint Information and Communication Strategy, significant attention must be paid to designing forms for joint press coordination and coordination of information activities in the field.

6.4 Enhanced Capacity Building

Capacity building promotes inter-organisational coordination between the UN, EU and AU. It is important because it constitutes an area where all the three organisations can work together, which makes the need for coordination apparent. Support to capacity building may also increase the level of understanding of the processes of another organisation and can, therefore, foster coordination in the longer term.

The great interest from partners to support AU efforts when it comes to peace and security increases the need for coordination. Today, partners are offering more resources than the AU can absorb. It is, therefore, important for partners to further develop current coordination mechanisms, which could include a joint partner fund for the PSD Implementation Plan for 2008–2009. Support to capacity building must also be based on the needs of the AU. It is, therefore, crucial to base partner support on regular needs assessments and evaluations of the support given.

The AU PSOD is the key structure in the AU when it comes to planning and management of peace support operations at continental level. However, the PSOD currently employs little more than a handful of staff, which has led to the development of ad-hoc planning and support structures for each new peace operation. The strengthening of the PSOD and the development of permanent structures for planning, management and evaluation of peace support operations is, therefore, a key area for future capacity-building support. These structures should preferably build on the former ad-hoc structures. It is equally important to develop the administrative capacity to handle recruitment of personnel, logistics, financial reporting and reimbursement to TCCs in peace support operations.

Much of the partner support given to the AU has been directed at continental level. However, in order to support the build-up of the AU peacekeeping capability, it is important to direct support also to the regional and member state levels. The RECs/RMs play an important role in the build-up of the ASF, and the individual member states provide the troops for the ASF and the current operations carried out by the AU.

Training of the ASF is an area where the UN, EU and AU are involved side by side. In the EU training programme Euro RECAMP, UN expertise will also be involved. Since much of the efforts, to date, have focused on the military components of the ASF, the UN and EU should, in particular, support the development and training of the police and civilian components of the ASF. Support to these components is also important due to the fact that civilian and police resources are often lacking in peace support operations in Africa today.

Finally, the AU dependence on outside funding inhibits the ability to plan for long-term and sustained missions. In addition, earmarked funding from donors leads to the use of scarce headquarter resources for donor reporting. In order to increase the predictability of funding, partners could consider contributing to a peace fund with joint reporting procedures to ease the burden of the AU structures.

7 Conclusions and Recommendations

This study treats coordination between the UN, EU and AU in multinational and multifunctional peace operations in Africa. The aim of the report is to analyse factors affecting inter-organisational coordination between the UN, EU and AU in peace support operations and to present ideas for enhanced coordination.

Below, some of the key conclusions are presented, followed by recommendations. The conclusions are based on the observations from fact-finding trips and other documentation, and the analysis made in the study. The recommendations aim at highlighting areas that require attention in efforts to enhance UN-EU-AU coordination. In accordance with the guidance from the project sponsors, the broad set of recommendations is presented without in-depth assessment of cost implications or of challenges to their implementation. They are not listed in order of priority.

Every operation is unique, and field-level pragmatism significantly influences inter-organisational coordination. The nature of coordination arrangement tends to include a high degree of ad-hoc arrangements. While not always desirable, it is important to acknowledge that this can also be a positive thing. Such arrangements are generally designed to meet field-level needs, therefore, being more in tune with the situation at hand. The project has, however, sought to identify and recommend structural and procedural enhancements that may be of generic value in more than one mission.

Based on the findings, and inspired by other fields of study concerning coordination, this report deals with the prospects for enhanced coordination through attention to three main areas: *Enhanced Strategic Direction*, *Enhanced Coordination Arrangements* and *Enhanced Capacity Building*. These are all important to build mutual knowledge and trust in inter-organisational coordination arrangements.

7.1 Enhanced Strategic Direction

Coordination in missions, both at the political and field level, is dependent on strategic direction, including frameworks, agreements within and between organisations and regulated processes. The aim is to establish predictable inter-organisational relations. Here, the term ‘strategic direction’ encompasses both

general political frameworks that deal with setting the stage for coordination[182] and the various mechanisms that come into play in connection to a specific mission, such as joint assessments, mandate, CONOPS, joint implementation planning, mission plans etc. There is significant support for postulating that the better the strategic direction sets the prerequisites for coordination, the better the coordination in the field will work.

There are structural imbalances in, and impediments to, coordination among the UN, EU and AU, primarily rooted in the fact that the three organisations are unequal entities. The UN and the EU have more experience of peacekeeping, and, therefore, have developed processes and structures for coordination. The AU, on the other hand, is a younger organisation with processes that are still under formation. There seems to be an imbalance in finding equal counterparts for dialogue at various levels. Currently, frameworks for coordination are evolving, seemingly more so for UN-EU relations, than UN-AU or EU-AU relations. The EU and UN relations with the AU are generally focused on capacity building and support for missions. However, the envisioned design of AU structures and processes for planning and management of peacekeeping missions is to match the UN equivalents, which may create prospects for better coordination in the future.

One solution to the problem of different structures is to design specific inter-organisational processes, such as the 'Guidelines for Joint UN-EU Planning Applicable to Existing UN Field Missions'. However, concerning interaction with the AU institutions, there is a difficulty in identifying established processes and structures on which to build such specific inter-organisational processes. The AU PSD is a continuously evolving structure, and suffers from lack of institutionalisation.

There may be a pattern emerging in connection to the coordination arrangements in Africa, with quick intervention (AU), co-deployment to reinforce (EU) at certain points, and transition to the UN when the situation so permits. If so, the need to develop frameworks and modus operandi for this pattern is evident.

[182] Such as Council of the European Union, Joint declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 19 September 2003 (and follow-on documents), UNSCR 1809, the Declaration enhancing UN-AU cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, Addis Ababa, 16 November 2006, and Council of the European Union, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 9 December 2007.

7.1.1 Recommendations

- **Mutual understanding**. It is advisable to create a higher degree of mutual understanding of the unique nature and procedure of each organisation (UN, EU, AU). A positive progression in this regard can be attained through joint education efforts (eg UN-EU education days), exchange of officials, participation and observatory functions in exercises and training programmes, and inclusion of this subject in training curricula within the organisations. Specific pre-mission training, conducted at the respective training facilities of the organisations, may also promote mutual understanding.
- **Expansion of organisational dialogue**. Currently, the political dialogue takes place between the UNSC, EU PSC and AU PSC. In EU-AU relations, there may be a value in expanding the organisational dialogue to also include the military committees (when operational in AU) and other strategic elements, such as the planning functions in the EU Council Secretariat and the military-strategic HQ and AU PSD.
- **Strengthened representations in capitals**. The strategic process takes place at different places (eg New York, Addis Ababa, Brussels). Strong mutual representation offices for the organisations, in the respective capitals, may prove beneficial to coordination. Currently, the offices of the AU in Brussels and New York are perceived as too limited, and should, to a greater extent, include mission planning and management competencies (with links to the AU PSD) and strengthened defence attaché offices (or equivalent). The UN should have liaison officers in both the EU Council Secretariat and in the military-strategic HQ.
- **Clear mandate for coordination**. Keeping the political nature of the mandate process in mind, the inclusion of more specific instructions for coordination arrangements in the mandate itself is desirable. Common guidelines for transition to local government should be drafted. All mandates should be matched by adequate capabilities.
- **Modus operandi for coordination arrangements**. General modus operandi for the major types of coordination arrangements, such as hybrids, co-deployments and transitions should be developed collaboratively and included in relevant frameworks for coordination. Such measures will highlight coordination as an important factor early on in a strategic process, and facilitate the set-up of operations.
- **Joint fact-finding and collaborative analysis**. Coordination is enhanced through the early inclusion of the organisations that are to coordinate. Experiences indicate that where, eg, joint fact-finding has taken place, this has, overall, been positive and beneficial to the subsequent relations.

- **Joint planning**. The translation of top-level strategic guidance to concrete plans for action is attained through various forms of implementation planning. Joint planning based on inclusiveness has proved to be an enhancer for coordinated action, eg the UN-EU preparations for the missions in Chad and the CAR. Joint planning should include 'planning for evaluation', with a design to support joint evaluation in later stages of the mission. Standard Operating Procedures for Joint Planning can be developed further.
- **Joint assessment missions**. Coordinated assessment of progress, such as the mid-mandate review for the operations in Chad and the CAR, provide the basis for joint decisions on subsequent enhancements to the mission structure, coordination arrangements and review of plans.
- **Joint information and communication strategy**. Inter-organisational coordination arrangement entails challenges when it comes to the formulation and distribution of joint messages to support the overall objectives of the mission. In addition, in complex environments, the public perception of the nature and efficiency of the coordination arrangement is highly sensitive to allegations of deficiencies. Significant attention must be put on crafting joint information and communication strategies in support of the mandate, the strategic objectives and the nature and quality of the coordination arrangement.
- **Professional planning experts**. The strategy process, including implementation planning, may benefit from a reinforcing capacity to support critical stages of the planning process with personnel trained and experienced in joint planning and with fair knowledge of the processes, structures and capabilities of each organisation.
- **Planning and management support to the African Union**. Since the AU institutions are currently dependent on the few individuals filling the positions, and, therefore, suffering from insufficient institutionalisation, temporary reinforcements are needed in times of coordination. Professional joint planners (as referred to above) may constitute such a capacity, eg the UN planning support for AMISOM. If possible, such individuals should also have facilitation skills, to be able to reduce friction in multi-actor environments.
- **Promote organisational learning**. Despite dissatisfaction in the UN with the hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and in the EU with its support mission to AMIS, coordination arrangements that promote organisational learning may have positive consequences. Since the AU attaches high importance to African primacy in its undertakings, such arrangements could have long-term effects and benefits for peacekeeping in Africa. External advisors and liaisons in AU mission structures may promote organisational learning.

7.2 Enhanced Coordination Arrangements in the Field

As part of the mandate, deliberations, structures and processes for coordination in the field should be considered. Clear UNSC mandates or other strategic guidance are prerequisites for successful cooperation in the field. For EUFOR-MINURCAT relations, directions for field-level consultations are included in the EU Joint Action, and in the form of EU-UN 'exchange of letters'.

With regard to coordination in the field, the most important factor is for the different executives and HoMs to agree on common operational procedures for cooperation and information exchange. The mechanisms for cooperation vary from ad-hoc telephone calls to regular meetings in a formalised forum with a stipulated agenda. In the latter case, the forum may benefit from being convened around an overall implementation plan. The use of empowered liaisons is normally appreciated. Cooperation, however, is always dependent on personalities.

7.2.1 Recommendations

- **Harmonised political direction for transitions and co-deployments**. Prospects of field-level coordination are enhanced if political direction comes from one office. In inter-organisational coordination arrangements, such as co-deployments or transitions, the number of potential sources of direction increases. In such arrangements, significant efforts to harmonise direction from different offices must be undertaken. Of course, where connections may be politically sensitive, higher (eg capital) level coordination must be promoted.
- **Facilitating transition**. To facilitate potential transitions from the AU to the UN, the early promotion of UN standards on basic functions (HQ, communications, force protection, medical evacuation etc) may be an enhancer. Allowing such standards to affect capability requirements, as done by the AU, for example for the ASF, is also beneficial.
- **Delegated authority**. It is necessary for the strategic level, ie capitals, to delegate political authority to the field level to conduct coordination and take the necessary decisions. In Chad, the SRSG, EUSR and EU Force Commander, should have decision-making powers, within the mandate, to match the need for coordinated action.
- **Co-location of HQ**. Co-location of field HQ, such as the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and MINURCAT HQ in N'djamena, facilitates regular consultations, and should be considered in coordination arrangements.

- **Joint coordination body**. As a principle, a joint coordination body, inclusive of the respective executives of the missions (eg SRSG, EUSR, HoM, Force Commander and Police Commissioner etc), should be established. This body should meet on a regular basis, as often as the situation requires, to exchange information and to coordinate actions.
- **Common implementation plan**. A plan to encompass all of the mandated tasks in a mission should be jointly agreed upon by the different stakeholders in the field. It will help to delineate the areas of responsibility and avoid overlap. The plan should be inclusive of all international actors and have local buy-in, and, if possible, have strong links to initial planning at strategic level. As the situation on the ground can change rapidly, the plan must be adaptable and flexible to the mission environment.
- **Joint periodic evaluation and review of plans**. The in-mission joint evaluation of progress and assessment of the situation on the ground enhances coordination, as it requires information exchange and discussions on analysis and interpretation. However, there are challenges involved. Evaluation must be set against accepted, preferably joint, objectives, and this is rarely the case. If a joint evaluation becomes instrumental to a significant change in coordination arrangements, as, eg for the potential transition in Chad post-EUFOR, there may be a risk for bias in the evaluation due to political considerations.
- **Use of liaisons**. There is continued support for the use of mutual liaisons to facilitate information exchange and field-level contacts. These should be empowered individuals, with quick access to the appropriate level of command in the organisation they represent.
- **Harmonisation of administrative borders**. Coordination is facilitated by an increased harmonisation of administrative borders, including the use of common geographical references.
- **Joint press coordination and information activities**. Inter-organisational coordination arrangements entail challenges when it comes to formulation and distribution of joint messages to support the overall objectives of the mission. In addition, in complex environments, public perception of the nature and efficiency of the coordination arrangement is highly sensitive to allegations of deficiencies. Based on a Joint Information and Communication Strategy, significant attention must be paid to designing forms for joint press coordination and coordination of information activities in the field.
- **Regional cooperation**. A regional perspective on conflicts is advisable (see the EUSR for Sudan and Chad). However, regional cooperation has to be sensitive to the political implications of action on two sides of a border. For example, cooperation between MINURCAT, EUFOR Tchad/RCA and UNAMID would be beneficial for the peacekeeping missions, but official

cooperation across the border may be sensitive with regard to the host governments.
- **Pooling of resources**. If several organisations are active in the same conflict area, they might consider pooling of resources, eg for some administrative functions, medical services etc.

7.3 Enhanced Capacity Building

This report devotes significant attention to various capacity-building arrangements in which the three organisations are involved. The reason is twofold: First, cooperative efforts to build capacity entail coordination challenges in itself, and this is a central element of the research conducted in this project. Second, such efforts build mutual knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of the processes and structures in each organisation. Therefore, cooperative capacity building is a potential enhancer for coordination in missions.

Being three unequal entities, the AU is the actor in most significant need of support for capacity building. As previously noted, the AU is a young organisation with scarce resources. The results of AU audits and assessments are an important starting point for institutional development of the APSA. It is important that partners coordinate their support to the AU in its build-up process.

7.3.1 Recommendations

- **Internal harmonisation**. Increased harmonisation within AU partner organisations (the UN and EU) is advisable, to increase cost-efficiency, synergies and to facilitate political dialogue between the organisations. The new EU delegation to the AU is a positive progression in this regard.
- **Partner coordination**. The current partner group in Addis Ababa is a venue for the three organisations to meet and discuss harmonisation of support. A joint partner fund could be considered as a means to achieve harmonisation, eg for coordinated support to the PSD Implementation Plan for 2008–2009.
- **Regular needs assessment**. The AU is a continuously evolving organisation. To ensure precision in matching AU needs to partner contributions, mechanisms for regular needs assessment should be developed, together with tools for evaluation.
- **Partner support to AU PSOD restructuring**. The 2008 UN-facilitated TAM to the AU focused on the needs of the AU PSOD and how it should be presented to partners (including the EU) to open up for third-party financing and implementation.

- **Tri-organisational training programmes**. The Euro RECAMP programme, directed towards capacity building in the ASF structure, may be a model for tri-organisational cooperation in training.
- **Continental, regional and bilateral support**. A balanced strategy of capacity building, directed at continental, regional and bilateral levels, promotes broader organisational learning and reduces the gap between central will and local/regional ability. Therefore, a gradual shift to also involve the RECs/RMs and AU member states in the dialogue is advisable, given their potential future role in developing and maintaining the ASF.
- **African Union reporting/administrative capacity**. The AU PSOD is currently dependent on external funding and demands for reporting, and accountable documentation cannot be met due to limited staff and HQ capacity. It is important for partners interested in investing in African peace operations capacity to understand that the investment in training and equipping peacekeepers will be unsustainable if it is not matched by a proportionate investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity. Capacity-building initiatives should, therefore, include support for the strengthening of the AU PSOD administrative capacity, including financial mechanisms for reimbursement of TCCs. Strengthening administrative capabilities is a critical area in order to facilitate financial transfers from sources, such as the APF.
- **Military-strategic planning, management and evaluation**. Special attention should be directed to support the AU in developing a capability for military-strategic and operational level planning, management and evaluation of missions. Previous ad-hoc structures, such as the DITF and SPMU, may constitute structural models for this.
- **Civilian crisis management capability**. A specific area in great need of support is the development of the civilian crisis management capability in the African Union Peace and Security Architecture. Until now, focus has been on developing military capacity. Military personnel can only create stability, but, in order to contribute to a lasting peace, the civilian dimension is needed. A particular problem in peacekeeping missions in Africa is the lack of Formed Police Units. Civilian experts kept on roster in the UN, EU and AU could be used by all three organisations to mutually reinforce and complement each other. Exercises and training initiatives, such as Euro RECAMP, need to emphasise the police and civilian elements.
- **Predictable funding**. The AU PSOD would benefit from predictable funding for peacekeeping operations. The EU and the UN, as well as other partners, could ease the burden of the AU by pledging non-earmarked funds to a joint peace fund.

8 Acronyms

AAR	After-Action Review
AMU	Arab-Maghreb Union
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CIVCOM	Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMCO	Civil-Military Coordination
CMD	Conflict Management Division
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPPC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
DFS	Department of Field Support
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DUF	Directive on the Use of Force
EAPSM	East African Peace and Security Mechanism
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
ECCAS	Economic Community of East African States

ECCASBRIG	ECCAS Standby Brigade
ECOBRIG	ECOWAS Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EU PSC	European Union Political and Security Committee
EUFOR DR Congo	European Union Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	European Union Forces in Chad and the Central African Republic
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FOMAC	Multinational Force of Central Africa
GoS	Government of Sudan
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IM	UN Integrated Missions
IMPT	Integrated Mission Planning Team
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
IPTF	Integrated Planning Task Force
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission

JSCM	UN-AU Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (for UNAMID)
JSR	Joint AU-UN Special Representative
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memoranda of Understanding
MSC	AU Military Staff Committee
MTF	Mission Task Force
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NASBRIG	North African Standby Brigade
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OpCdr	Operations Commander
OPLAN	Operational Plan
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PCF	Planning Consultation Forum
PLANELM	Planning Element
PSC	Peace and Security Council (AU)
PSD	Peace and Security Directorate
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PW	Panel of the Wise
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanism
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCBRIG	SADC Standby Brigade

SG/HR	Secretary General/High Representative (EU)
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Stand-by High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
SPMU	Strategic Planning and Management Unit (for AMISOM)
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UN Charter	Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VTC	Video Teleconference

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