

CAMILLA ELOWSON



FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden's largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors.

Camilla Elowson

# The Joint Africa-EU Strategy

A study of the Peace and Security Partnership

Cover: Europeiska Unionens Råd

Title	The Joint EU-Africa Strategy – a study of the Peace Security Partnership
Rapportnr/Report no	FOI-R--2736--SE
Rapporttyp Report Type	Användarrapport User report
Månad/Month	Mars/March
Utgivningsår/Year	2009
Antal sidor/Pages	97 p
ISSN	ISSN 1650-1942
Kund/Customer	Försvarsdepartementet
Kompetenskloss	1 Säkerhetspolitisk omvärldsanalys

Projektnr/Project no	A12018
Godkänd av/Approved by	Maria Lignell Jakobsson

FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut	FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys	Division of Defence Analysis

164 90 Stockholm	SE-164 90 Stockholm
------------------	---------------------

## Sammanfattning

Denna rapport, skriven inom ramen för Afrikaprojektet vid FOI, analyserar området *fred och säkerhet* i den gemensamma EU-Afrikastrategin från 2007. Rapporten är indelad i två delar, där den första behandlar bakgrund, innehåll och nuvarande status avseende partnerskapet mellan EU och Afrika på området. Utgångspunkten är den handlingsplan som finns för att implementera strategin, särskilt för de tre prioriterade aktivitetsområdena

1. förbättrad dialog när det gäller utmaningar avseende fred och säkerhet,
2. operationalisering av den afrikanska arkitekturen för fred och säkerhet (APSA), samt
3. förutsägbar finansiering av afrikanska fredsfrämjande insatser

Den andra delen analyserar några av de centrala initiativen i handlingsplanen, såsom *Amani Africa* och stöd till afrikanska utbildningscentra samt olika försök att etablera finansieringsinstrument för afrikanska fredsfrämjande insatser. EU-ländernas varierande förhållningssätt till strategin - där somliga har valt att vara aktiva parter och andra passiva observatörer - har visat sig vara ett problem för dess implementering. En anledning till detta är osäkerhet och tveksamhet råder avseende de institutionella arrangemangen för partnerskapet. Därutöver finns det hos enskilda EU-länder bristande resurser, engagemang och kännedom om innehållet i och bakgrunden till strategin. Likartade problem finns på den afrikanska sidan, vilket ytterligare försvårar implementering.

Rapporten belyser viktiga områden i EU-Afrikastrategin som Sverige bör följa före och under EU-ordförandeskapet hösten 2009. Beredskap bör bli finnas för att omhänderta de prioriterade initiativ som redan har en färdig handlingsplan. Därutöver är det viktigt att Sverige utnyttjar de möjligheter som ordförandeskapet ger när det gäller svenska profilfrågor på området fred och säkerhet.

Nyckelord: EU, AU, EU-Afrikastrategin, fred och säkerhet, fredsfrämjande insatser, EU-ordförandeskapet, APSA, Amani Africa.

## Summary

This report examines the Peace and Security partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The report, commissioned by the Ministry of Defence, is divided into two distinct parts. The first part aims at introducing the reader to the partnership, by providing a factual overview of its contents, its context and its current status. A point of departure for the partnership is the Peace and Security Action Plan, and specifically its three Priority Actions:

1. Enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security
2. Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture
3. Predictable funding for African-led peace support operations.

The second part of the report analyses some key initiatives under the Peace and Security Action Plan: the Amani Africa initiative and the support to African Training Centres, as well as the efforts to establish mechanisms for funding of African peace support operations. The extent to which the EU member states take an active or passive stance towards the partnership has proved to be an issue of key concern for the implementation of these initiatives and others. This challenge stems from uncertainties about the institutional set-up of the partnership, as well as a general lack of awareness, commitment and capacities. Similar problems on the African side further hamper the implementation of the Action Plan.

The report highlights issues to be followed by Sweden ahead of and during its Presidency. Preparedness is needed to answer to those peace and security initiatives that already have a set implementation roadmap. At the same time, it is also important for Sweden to use windows of opportunities during the Presidency, e.g. profiling peace and security issues that are of specific Swedish concern.

Keyword: EU, AU, Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Peace & Security, Peace Support Operations, Peace Operatons, EU Presidency, African Peace & Security Architecture, APSA, Amani Africa.

## List of contents

<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>7</b>
The Peace and Security partnership .....	7
Stakeholders and stumbling blocks .....	7
The Swedish Presidency .....	10
<b>1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>11</b>
1.1 Background .....	11
1.2 The aim of the report .....	12
1.3 Method and outline of the study .....	12
1.4 Material and delimitations.....	13
<b>2 The road to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy</b> .....	<b>15</b>
2.1 Dialogue .....	15
2.2 Agreements, policies and strategies .....	16
2.3 Funding programmes .....	19
<b>3 The Peace and Security partnership – contents, context, current status</b> .....	<b>21</b>
3.1 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy.....	21
3.2 The Peace and Security Partnership .....	23
<b>4 Current initiatives and implementation challenges</b> .....	<b>36</b>
4.1 An operational APSA.....	36
4.2 Predictable funding for PSOs.....	45
4.3 Other peace and security initiatives .....	49
4.4 Challenges for the overall implementation .....	51
<b>5 Why engaging in African peace and security?</b> .....	<b>58</b>
5.1 The EU level.....	58
5.2 The member states .....	60

---

<b>6</b>	<b>Swedish Presidency – issues to follow</b>	<b>66</b>
6.1	Priority Action 1: Enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security	66
6.2	Priority Action 2: Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture	67
6.3	Priority Action 3: Predictable funding for Africa-led Peace Support Operations	69
6.4	Enable adequate Swedish engagement in the Peace and Security partnership	69
6.5	Possibilities for concrete Swedish input	71
6.6	Provide assistance to the PS Implementation Team	72
6.7	Agenda-setting during the Presidency	73
	<b>Annexes</b>	<b>75</b>
	Annex 1: Action Plan for the Peace and Security partnership	75
	Annex 2: The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts – Action Plan	81
	Annex 3: New APF Scope	82
	Annex 3: New APF Scope	83
	Annex 4: EPLO recommendations on the implementation of the PS Action Plan	84
	<b>Acronyms</b>	<b>91</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>93</b>

## Executive Summary

In December 2007, the EU and Africa agreed on further deepening relations by adopting a Joint Africa-EU Strategy. One of the collaboration areas of the strategy concerns efforts for peace and security. A number of ambitions are declared in this respect and will be implemented by means of a Peace and Security partnership and its Action Plan.

The aim of this report is to examine the Peace and Security Partnership, including analysing the implementation process and its challenges, with a view to draw attention to pertinent issues ahead of the Swedish Presidency.

## The Peace and Security partnership

In the first part of the report, the Peace and Security partnership and the content of its Action Plan was recounted. The Action Plan is structured around three Priority Actions: 1) *Enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security*, 2) *Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)*, 3) *Predictable funding for African-led PSOs* – these are the points of departure for the work carried out within the partnership and contain clearly specified objectives, expected outcomes and planned initiatives. Apart from the Action Plan, a number of other EU mechanisms to enhance peace and security in Africa are also worth mentioning: *the African Peace Facility (APF)*, *the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts*, *the EU Delegation to the AU* and *the Special Adviser for African Peace-Keeping Capabilities* are part of the context in which the Peace and Security partnership takes place. When examining the current state of implementation of the Peace and Security partnership, it proved crucial to consider the institutional architecture which is being set up for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Major institutional arrangements are undertaken on the EU side as well as on the African side. Several AU-EU meetings at different levels have discussed the progress of the developments in 2008.

## Stakeholders and stumbling blocks

The second part of the report focuses largely on challenges relating to important peace and security initiatives as well as on the approach of the EU member states to the partnership. Having initiated a project with the level of ambition of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, it is clear that a long term perspective and a positive approach are needed. The scale of this project means that the challenges encountered are several, but must be seen as long standing areas to work on, instead of failures.



Challenges for the implementation are found both on the European and the African side. Within the EU, the institutional arrangements set up for the Joint Strategy have caused confusion of roles and responsibilities. This has resulted in many member states taking a passive stance towards the PS partnership. Lack of awareness of the possibilities for and gains of involvement in the PS Implementation Team, as well as preference for bilateral activities in this field, are other explanations for inactivity. At the expense of more passive member states, member states such as France, Italy and the UK have seen the opportunity to use the PS partnership to go ahead with own interests. A major stumbling block for implementation is, thus, blindness to the fact that just as the Joint Strategy/PS partnership will gain from more involvement from the member states, the member states will also gain from own involvement. Hence, the future of coordinated initiatives through the EU might seem slow-started. However, if growing an understanding among the member states that they need to be in the driving seat, as well as encouraging capitals to allocate resources for them to do so, a step in the right direction towards coordination of African peace and security efforts would be taken. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership certainly provides a test to the EU institutions' and member states' commonality of interests, capacity and political will.

The imbalance in the PS Implementation Team also has consequences for the implementation of the initiatives. For instance, as concerns efforts to support training for the African side, on a continental and on a regional level, insufficient involvement and assistance by European member states in these major undertakings contributes to delays of the projects. Limited awareness for the work taking place in the PS Implementation Team, as well as ineffective work within the team spur unfruitful communication and internal coordination, for instance on projects relating to peace-keeping training for Africans. As concerns Priority Action 3, initial EU disappointment of the UN panel and its work has been noted, especially as the recommendations do not appear to go in line with the system of the APF and the PS partnership. Furthermore, no innovative ideas have yet been elaborated of how to incite states - in Europe, Africa and elsewhere - to contribute to various funding mechanisms and PSOs. Not enough has been done to mobilise financial resources from different stakeholders.

On the African side, the slow progress in the institutional build-up is to some extent caused by the African states' (and some RECs') unawareness of the Joint Strategy and its implications, but even more so by their lack of interest, willingness and commitment to engage in the PS partnership. Mobilising these key stakeholders, politically and financially, is difficult for the underdeveloped African Union Commission (AUC). Loyalties are strong between the African states and the RECs, and the benefits of committing at continental level - to incapable and weak AU bodies - as well as to a distant AU-EU/Addis Ababa-

Brussels partnership, is not evident for these stakeholders.<sup>1</sup> With this point of departure, the confusion in roles and responsibilities (that also exist on the African side) is not easily addressed. Effective African working arrangements are therefore far from in place, and communication between some of the African stakeholders is infected. This leaves the European side with few options than attempting to convince Africans about the Joint Strategy project in different forums - on an EU-AU/REC level, bilateral level and civil society level. As concerns the AUC (but also African states and certain RECs), organisational problems, insufficient capacities, as well as lack of staff and other resources, are other main reasons for not being able to move forward on the initiatives. Limited African financial management skills are a particular problem when it comes to the issue of administering funding and financing sources for PSOs. Another matter that blocks important steps forward on the PS partnership is that the African side also has to take internal political considerations into account. For instance, such factors often constitute the stumbling block for African commitment to contributing to PSO funds.

An underlying problem for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership is the prevalence of several gaps between ambition and reality. These disparities give rise to frustrations among the stakeholders. For instance, the prospect and the interest for the Joint Strategy/PS partnership felt by the European side is disproportional and unrealistic in view of what can be achieved considering the local African realities. African ownership, however, means accepting that the European pace and standards are not the measuring stick. The disconnection from reality is also manifested by the apparent ignorance and non-involvement of European and African citizens in the Joint Strategy, which remains a highly institutional project. Furthermore, cultural misunderstandings and different expectations hamper the implementation process. Not understanding the partner's political norms, working mode, and rhythm of progression, will make the partnership difficult. African ownership also implies that the EU should approach the gaps between reality and ambition in a constructive and creative manner, with emphasis on understanding. This would be the only realistic way to see if and how the various blockages can be dissolved. Forcing a list of needs assessments, or ideas of what the EU wants to achieve upon the African side will be contra-productive. The same goes for forcing the European way of doing things upon the African partners. Instead, effort should be made to appreciate,

---

<sup>1</sup> According to Gesneral Joana, one explanation is the following: while the EU is built bottom-up, from member states wanting to set up a union, the AU is built top-down: first union, then trying to fill it with commitment of members. However, African states are right now focused on building the national level, and to some extent the regional level (to overcome paranoia among neighbours which often lead to conflict). This means that the continental level is still far off from the African perception of what is the need (interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana, 18 December 2008).

encourage and optimise local systems. Meanwhile, African ownership should not be confused with African non-accountability concerning EU-funded projects.

## The Swedish Presidency

As part of an effort to advance on the long standing work areas discussed above, Swedish contributions on some of these areas would be of great use. The report discusses possible contributions and issues to be followed ahead and during the Presidency. These are mentioned in brief below, while a more in-depth examination of these can be found in chapter 6.

On the one hand, preparedness is needed to answer to those ongoing initiatives that already have a set implementation roadmap. Primarily, this concerns major AU-EU meetings to be organised within Priority Action 1, and the planned activities for Amani Africa within Priority Action 2. The expectations on the Swedish Presidency to keep the momentum of the Joint Strategy going, as well as the spirit of the PS partnership alive, are also clear. Furthermore, Sweden taking the responsibility to follow up on the panel report for a UN financial mechanism for African PSOs, as well the training of civilian and police elements - two major current initiatives - would also be presumed.

On the other hand, there are also areas relating to the PS partnership which do not oblige, but where Swedish awareness is called for. The positive effects of engaging in the PS Implementation Team, for instance by launching a mediation initiative, or by taking action in the civilian-military collaboration field, are apparent. Using windows of opportunities during the Presidency, e.g. profiling peace and security issues that are of specific Swedish concern, is one recommendation. This could very well be done by joining forces with Finland<sup>2</sup> or other potential parties. Furthermore, putting spotlights during the Presidency on the relation between the AU and the RECs, and on the participation of non-state actors in the implementation of the PS Partnership, would be key contributions. However, engaging on these issues should be done in a capable and competent manner. In order to ensure this, a clear recommendation is to make available resources for personnel to adequately follow the EU work for African peace and security. This is a prerequisite for living up to commitments of an increased and reinforced EU engagement supporting African crisis management capacities.

---

<sup>2</sup> Finland has shown interest in the funding the Italian proposal on training for civilians and police. Finland also contributes with funding to Amani Africa, and has expressed interest in filling the civilian position in the Eurorecamp team.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The EU-Africa summit held in Lisbon in December 2007 was a milestone for the relationship between the two continents. At this summit, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was adopted. This strategy is the latest expression of the new ambitious position taken by the EU towards Africa, and it is the latest document guiding the relationship between the two continents. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy can be seen as the most comprehensive and large-scale project taking place between Africa and EU up until now, covering eight different policy areas with ambitions at a strategic and an operational level. The first of these eight partnerships deals with the peace and security field, which is the focus for this study. The Peace and Security partnership<sup>3</sup> is intended to serve as one framework, or one coordinated channel for joint Africa-EU initiatives in this area. Also within the PS partnership, the scope is far-reaching, ranging from various dialogue initiatives to the building of the African Peace and Security Architecture, involving military, police and civilian actors, and with detailed objectives for all areas of the conflict cycle.

To obtain a complete overview of all the different peace and security ambitions with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is challenging. Nevertheless, attempting to gain a comprehensive understanding of the strategy and the PS partnership is a prerequisite for informed decisions on how the future implementation can be supported in a balanced way. With just little more than one year having passed since the adoption of the strategy, it is an interesting point of time to see how far this bold project has come and, in particular, to assess the implementation status of the PS partnership. What activities are planned and underway within the PS Partnership, and how successful has the collaboration been so far? Another telling question is what actors are involved in moving the process forward, and which ones are more passive. Understanding the driving forces for involvement and commitment to the PS partnership will also help identifying stumbling blocks for the joint Africa-EU collaboration, as well as ways around them. Furthermore, in the light of the coming Swedish EU Presidency, it is especially important to increase the Swedish awareness of and the preparedness for the concrete implications of the work that already has taken off in the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership.

---

<sup>3</sup> The Peace and Security partnership will be abbreviated PS partnership throughout the study.

## 1.2 The aim of the report

The aim of this report is to examine the Peace and Security Partnership, including analysing the implementation process and its challenges, with a view to draw attention to pertinent issues ahead of the Swedish Presidency. More specifically, a number of aspects of interest will be discussed: a first ambition is to describe the context, contents and current status of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, focusing on the PS partnership and the PS Action Plan. Some major PS initiatives currently undertaken in the partnership will also be more closely examined. Upcoming implementation challenges for these ongoing initiatives, as well as for the overall implementation of the strategy, are analysed. Thirdly, the motivation of the EU and its member states to engage in EU channelled peace and security work in Africa is looked at. A final intention of the study is to highlight a number of issues and initiatives to be followed up during the Swedish Presidency. This involves possible difficulties and opportunities for Sweden in the current implementation process, and recommendations of areas where Swedish action could be considered. In addition to these four topics, the study will initially give a brief orientation of some EU policies and additional EU peace and security initiatives of relevance for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership.

## 1.3 Method and outline of the study

The study is carried out through two main steps: first, a mapping of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the PS partnership is undertaken in order to provide an overview of the topic and basic facts for the reader (chapter 3). This overview also makes it possible to identify, in a second step, where further analysis could be of interest. The key issues that emerged were the following: major ongoing/upcoming initiatives, challenges for the implementation, the interest of member states in the PS partnership, and areas where Swedish awareness is needed. These issues are presented and analysed in the second part of the report (chapter 4, 5, 6). The method has further been to pay most attention to those initiatives which proved to be the most current, those challenges that are the most problematic, those member states that are the most active and those areas that are the most urgent. However, initiatives, challenges, member states and areas that were assumed to be of a specific interest of Sweden have also been given attention in the study.

In the **first part** of the study, the overview of the PS partnership, includes recounting the components of the PS Action Plan and its three Priority Actions. An account is also given of some other EU mechanisms, in order to outline the context within which the PS partnership exists. Lastly, the current state of the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the PS partnership is detailed. Relevant areas to look at here are the progress of the institutional build-up in preparing for the implementation, within the EU as well as on the African

side. An account of the key AU-EU meetings during 2008 also illuminates developments so far.

The **second part** of the report presents some key issues of interest and a further analysis of these. *First*, a few important and topical initiatives under the PS Action Plan are examined. Under Priority Action 2, the Amani Africa initiative and the support for the African Training Centres are presented. Within Priority Action 3, the efforts to establish a UN mechanism and an AU/EU mechanism to enable funding for African PSOs are introduced. A discussion of challenges for the implementation of these initiatives follows. *Secondly*, European driving forces for engaging in African peace and security are explored. This includes looking at reasons behind the EU's reinforced interest in this area. At a more detailed level, motivations for the member states to be active or passive in the PS partnership are analysed. This involves examining their interest in conducting peace and security initiatives via the EU channel, as well as their interest in pursuing certain types of initiatives within the PS partnership. France, the UK and Italy have been specifically discussed, as they are the most active member states in this respect. The approach of the Czech Republic and Spain is also examined more in detail, these states being part of the tri-presidency with Sweden. *Thirdly*, issues to be followed by Sweden ahead of and during its Presidency are considered. Possibilities for Swedish action are highlighted within each of the three Priority Actions. Furthermore, matters to address in relation to the PS partnership, as well as windows of opportunities for Sweden during the Presidency, are presented.

## 1.4 Material and delimitations

Considerable delimitations have had to be made throughout the study. Work for peace and security cannot be easily boiled down and strictly defined. Relevant concepts such as development, democratic governance, human rights etc have not been considered in this report, even if this kind of support aims at contributing to peace and security. Furthermore, not all EU undertakings in the name of peace and security in Africa are explored. For instance, ESDP operations are excluded from this study. The decision was made to examine solely those activities initiated within the PS partnership. Consequently, it has not been meaningful to attempt to define peace and security in this study, nor has there been an effort to make a specific distinction between these concepts and closely related ones. Delimitations have also been necessary within all of the specific study areas of the report. The topic Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership is too extensive to make a complete mapping of all aspects of all initiatives, or to discuss the approach of all stakeholders. Because of this, certain actors, certain initiatives and certain elements within these are selected for a more careful analysis. The criteria of selection, as indicated above, are topicality, level of activity, significance for successful implementation and Swedish relevance. A specific delimita-

tion concerns the regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU). These stakeholders obviously play a key role for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, but are not analysed in depth in this report. Specific analyses of the AU can be found in other FOI publications<sup>4</sup>, while the RECs will be explored at FOI in 2009.

The material that the study is based on consists of scientific articles and analyses, official EU documents, material accessible on EU web pages and on web sites dedicated to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, as well as interviews with the major European stakeholders to the strategy, including personnel at EU institutions, member states representations and non-state representatives. The organisation/institution, unit and position of the interviewee appear in most of the detailed references, however in some sections, the unit and the position of the interviewee is not stated as anonymity was requested in order to share the information. The focus of the report is on the EU as an external actor in Africa, and the decision was therefore made to limit the data collection to interviews with European stakeholders. The analysis is not primarily on the AU and the African side – for more far-reaching conclusions on the African context and for perspectives directly gathered from African stakeholders, FOI's publications on the African Union are referred to.

---

<sup>4</sup> See for example: 'The African Union – A Study Focusing on Conflict Management', 'Inside the African Peace and Security Architecture' (forthcoming), 'Capacity-building of AU Peace Support Operations – The Civilian Dimension', 'UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa'. FOI reports have also been published on the AU missions in Somalia, Sudan, the Comoros and Burundi.

## 2 The road to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy is obviously not an isolated occurrence on the EU-Africa sky. Its objectives are formed, strengthened and complemented by several Africa-EU dialogues, agreements and EU policies. These have developed with an increasing pace since around 2000. In order to situate the strategy in the context of EU's overall work for security and development in Africa, it is useful to present an overview of various initiatives in place, such as some of the most relevant policies, agreements, strategies, dialogues, funding programmes etc.

### 2.1 Dialogue

Trade and aid agreements between the EU/the European Community and the ACP countries, such as the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, have been in place since the mid-1960s. These were replaced by the Cotonou agreement<sup>5</sup> in 2000. The same year, at a summit in Cairo, African and European Heads of State and Heads of Governments met for the first time. This meant a fresh start to the political dialogue outside the regular Cotonou framework. The year 2000 can be seen as a symbolic starting point for the revived, present relationship between Africa and the EU. The Cairo Summit launched a comprehensive framework for political dialogue between EU and Africa. Plans of action were developed in several areas, including peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution.<sup>6</sup> The Cairo agenda thus set the priorities along which the EU-Africa dialogue and partnership would develop. Over the years, this summit has been followed up by several meetings at minister level, where new aspects such as terrorism have been added to the agenda. However, a second EU-Africa summit did not take place until the Lisbon summit in 2007.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, for the Northern African countries neighbouring Europe, a dialogue with the EU has been in place since 1995 through the Barcelona process<sup>8,9</sup>.

The prospects for dialogue between EU and African leaders were further facilitated in the early 2000s, with the African countries positioning themselves through the creation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in

---

<sup>5</sup> The Cotonou agreement is briefly discussed in section 2.2.

<sup>6</sup> The focus on peace issues was mainly emphasised by the Europeans, while the Africans more stressed economic and trade aspects of the partnership.

<sup>7</sup> A planned summit for 2003 was cancelled due to diverging view points on the situation in Zimbabwe.

<sup>8</sup> The Barcelona process aims at enhancing regional dialogue on issues such as peace, security and prosperity. All EU member states and 12 Mediterranean states are part of the process.

<sup>9</sup> ECDPM, 2006, Issue paper 1, p..2



2001 and, most importantly, the creation of the African Union (the AU) in 2000-2002. This has provided the EU with a platform for more systemic engagement with African states. In 2002, the notion of the AU's 'African Peace and Security Architecture' (APSA) emerged, creating even clearer channels for dialogue about peace and security issues. With the formation of the AU, it has also been possible to pursue the dialogue in other forums. Various AU and EU institutions such as the Commissions (College of Commissioners), the Ministerial Troikas, the parliamentary assemblies, working groups and others have in the last few years been brought together to discuss issues such as governance, security and democracy. Bi-Annual Joint Task Force meetings between the AU and the EU are also held. In 2007, the European Commission President and the EU Presidency attended the AU's annual summit. A major step in facilitating dialogue was made by the appointment of an EU Special Representative to the AU the same year.<sup>10</sup>

## 2.2 Agreements, policies and strategies

The *Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, the fundamental framework for ACP-EU relations, is concluded for a 20-year period from 2000<sup>11</sup> to 2020. Various aspects of the relationship are defined in the agreement, including development cooperation, political and trade dimensions. Under the political dimension, the issues of peace building, conflict prevention, management and resolution are included. The agreement is to be revised every five years, with the next upcoming revision taking place in 2010. All sub-Saharan countries, including in some respect South Africa, are party to the Cotonou agreement.<sup>12</sup>

Several EU policies have had implications for the EU-Africa relations. The *Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP)* and the *European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*, born in the 1990s, are important examples. The initiatives in the PS Action Plan takes place within the CSFP and ESDP frameworks. Furthermore, the rapidly developing CSFP and ESDP have had an increasing impact on the EU's peace and security work in Africa. In 2003, the first ESDP operation took place in this continent, so far followed by several other military and civilian EU missions in African conflict countries.<sup>13</sup> The same year, the *European Security Strategy (ESS)* was finalised. The ESS was an important step towards achieving greater coherence in the views guiding EU foreign policy. The strategy underlines that global challenges, such as state failures and regional

---

<sup>10</sup> Kotsopoulos, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> After a transitional period during the ratification process, the agreement entered into force in 2003.

<sup>12</sup> ECDPM website: Africa-EU dialogue. ECDPM, 2006, Issue paper 1. ECDPM, 2006, Issue paper 2.

<sup>13</sup> ARTEMIS/DRC 2003, EUSEC/DRC since 2005, EUPOL Kinshasa/DRC 2005-2007, Support to AMIS II/Sudan 2005-2006, EUFOR Congo/DRC 2006, EUPOL/DRC 2007, EUFOR/Tchad-CAR 2008-2009, EU SSR/Guinea Bissau 2008.

conflicts, affects Europe and thereby needs the EU's active attention. The concept of development as a precondition for security is stressed. The EU's need to work with international partners, including Africa is also stated in the ESS.<sup>14</sup>

A number of development policies have played an important role in specifying the EU's approach towards Africa. The *UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)* from 2000 serve as a point of departure for the EU's own policies. The same year, the *European Community Development Policy* was elaborated, and conflict prevention and crisis management were addressed as a horizontal aspect. Five years later, in 2005, a new development policy was issued; the *European Consensus on Development*. This policy is drawn up as a code of conduct in applying the *Paris Declaration*, which give directions on donor coordination and aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration was signed earlier in 2005, under the auspices of the OECD/DAC.<sup>15</sup> One of the focal areas of the European Consensus on Development is prevention of conflicts and of state fragility. The EU, which in 2005 committed to increasing its development assistance, pleaded that half of the additional aid would go to Africa. The same year the *Cotonou agreement* was revised, among other things, new security related provisions were inserted (on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the International Criminal Court, the fight against terrorism and the prevention of mercenary related activities).<sup>16</sup>

In 2005, the EU's specific approach on Africa was increasingly taking shape.<sup>17</sup> In order to further confirm Africa's development as an EU top political priority, the *EU Strategy for Africa* was adopted in December 2005. The purpose of the strategy is to give the EU one comprehensive, integrated and long-term policy framework that reflects its priorities in its relationship with the whole African continent. The strategy launch indicated a growing European consensus on many aspects of development policy – including the need for the EU to be coherent, complementary and coordinated in its efforts towards Africa. It also provided guidelines for coordination in international fora (UN, G8) and with other players (China etc). The strategy took account of the changing environment in Africa, specifically the AU's enhanced role. Its principal objective is to promote the achievement of the UN MDGs in Africa and “to give people in less advanced

---

<sup>14</sup> Kotsopoulos, 2007. The European Security Strategy (2003).

<sup>15</sup> In September 2008, a follow up conference on aid efficiency was held in Accra, Ghana.

<sup>16</sup> Statement by the EU Council and the EC on the development policy of the European Community, 20 November 2000. Joint statement by the EU Council, member states, the EP, the EC: on the European Consensus on Development. EC information note: on the revision of the Cotonou agreement.

<sup>17</sup> 2005 was indeed a year where more spotlights were put on Africa - the British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared 2005 “the year of Africa” and focused the G8 summit on putting Africa “back” on the international agenda (the resolve to implement the commitments made were reiterated at the following G8 summit in 2007). Blair's suggestion was debt relief and increased aid to Africa, for which he had French and German support.

countries control over their own development”. The strategy is built around three themes, one of which largely focuses on ‘Peace and Security’<sup>18</sup>. Within this theme, the following peace and security issues are elaborated on: Conflict prevention (institutional capacity support to Early Warning Systems, support to address structural causes of conflict etc), Common security threats (work to ensure full compliance with international obligations concerning terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms export etc), African peace-support operations (the setting up of a comprehensive approach complementing the restricted African Peace Facility<sup>19</sup>, developing organisational capacities of African institutions, including the AU etc), Disarmament (support to regional and national strategies for DDRR, support of non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons etc), Post-conflict situations (development of transition strategies – for instance through the Stability Instrument - and development of capacities to foster SSR etc), and Conflict resources (promoting and carrying out implementation of various schemes protecting natural resources). In comparison to the ESS – which is a more general outline – the EU Strategy for Africa has set goals which are to be implemented, assessed and verified.<sup>20</sup> In many ways, the EU Strategy for Africa provides a basis for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.<sup>21</sup>

In May 2007, the Council and the European Commission adopted an ‘*EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts*’. The concept is intended to provide an EU framework for the implementation of key aspects of the Peace and Security cluster of the EU Strategy for Africa. Section 3.2.2 contains a further discussion of this concept.<sup>22</sup>

Apart from the recent EU-Africa strategies and the policies referred to above – which cover all African countries – certain policies and partnerships exist between the EU and specific African regions. For South Africa, the *Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement* was signed in 1999 and came fully in to force in 2004. Relations came to a further level with the extensive *EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership* in 2006-2007, which reinforces the political collaboration and details trade relations and cooperation between the two parties. A first EU-SA summit was also held in mid-2008, where the intention was stated to increase the cooperation between the AU and the EU in the work for peace,

---

<sup>18</sup> The three themes are 1) “Areas considered as prerequisites for attaining the MDGs”, 2) “Areas that create the economic environment for achieving the MDGs” and 3) “Areas directly targeting the MDGs”. Within theme one, peace and security is listed as the priority (together with good governance). EU Strategy.

<sup>19</sup> For a further description of the African Peace Facility, see 3.2.2.

<sup>20</sup> The European Council is to review the strategy every two years.

<sup>21</sup> The EU Strategy for Africa, October 2005. Kotsopoulos, 2007. ECDPM 2006, Issue paper 1, p.3, EC web site: EU-Africa relations.

<sup>22</sup> The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, 7 May 2007.

security and stability. The EU-South Africa strategy was emphasised as an instrument to promote peace and security in Africa. For the Northern African countries<sup>23</sup>, these are included in the *European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)*, elaborated in 2004. The ENP's objective is to avoid the emergence of dividing lines between the EU and its neighbours. It has a bilateral focus and aims at strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of the countries concerned, by working for political and economic reforms, by reinforcing political dialogue on security threats and conflict prevention, and by strengthening commitment to values such as democracy, human rights, sustainable development etc. The Northern African states are also parties to the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* (which is based in the Barcelona process). This regional framework for integration and cooperation, which is complemented by a network of Association Agreements, is merged into the ENP.<sup>24</sup>

## 2.3 Funding programmes

An important dimension to understand the EU's support for African peace and security is the various funding programmes that Africa can access. The programmes that are directed more specifically to African countries have in the last years fallen under three areas: the *European Development Fund (EDF)*, the *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)*<sup>25</sup>, and, for South Africa, the *Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)*<sup>26</sup>. The EDF - which makes up the great majority of Africa funding<sup>27</sup> - consists of member states' contributions on a five year basis. For the EDF regional/REC support, the focal sector is peace and security. For the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF (2000-2013), an approximate Eur 234 Million was set aside for this sector. Early warning mechanisms, political dialogue initiatives, preventive diplomacy, DDR, SSR<sup>28</sup> and small arms, are some areas where the EDF is used. On a national level, the extent to which the EDF addresses peace and security issues depends on the various country contexts, as the EDF allocates a certain amount for the development priorities in each country. The ENPI (which falls under the EC budget) can be accessed by North African countries and contains, among other things, conflict prevention

<sup>23</sup> Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya. The ENP also covers other countries neighbouring the EU.

<sup>24</sup> ECDPM 2006, Issue paper 1. Chevalier 2007. ECDPM web site : African-EU dialogue, Europa nu/Montesquieu web site : First EU-South Africa summit. Cooperation between the EU and South Africa, Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. European Neighbourhood Policy, 12 May 2004. EC web site: What is the ENP?

<sup>25</sup> The ENPI also covers other countries neighbouring the EU.

<sup>26</sup> Apart from providing funding for South Africa, the DCI is the main EU source for countries outside Africa.

<sup>27</sup> Between 2008-2013, the EDF earmarked Eur 20 billion for sub-Saharan Africa (Kotsopoulos, 2007). The EDF as a whole covers ACP countries.

<sup>28</sup> EU Concepts for DDR and SSR exist.

and peace building programmes – on a regional and national level. The DCI (also EC budget) addresses a wide range of issues, including the development of South Africa's stabilising role in the region. However, the funding mechanism of key interest in this paper is the *African Peace Facility (APF)*, as this is a major financing source for the initiatives under the PS Action Plan.<sup>29</sup> The APF has, since 2003, mainly financed African PSOs as well as capacity building projects for the APSA. The present APF runs from 2008 to 2010 and has been allocated Eur 300 million<sup>30, 31</sup>

Instruments that relate specifically to peace and security issues also exist, mainly in the European Commission budget. This concerns primarily the *Instrument for Stability (IfS)*, but also the *Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)*, and the *Thematic Budget lines (which fall under the DCI)* have funds that can be used to sponsor programs that address peace and security concerns or related aspects.<sup>32</sup> The IfS is a crisis management and peace building instrument in place since 2007. It is intended as a complement specifically to the APF and the EDF, either to kick-start an initiative, or as an extra support when APF/EDF funds have temporarily run out. The IfS consists of both urgent intervention and long term programmes.<sup>33</sup> For the urgent intervention dimension, the budget for 2007 and 2008 amounted to Eur 64 Million for Africa<sup>34</sup>. Just as the IfS, the EIDHR has a worldwide coverage. In the years 2000-2006, sub-Saharan Africa was the region receiving most funding at Eur 162.9 Million. The DCI Thematic Budget lines is available for Africa (as opposed to the DCI geographic programme<sup>35</sup>) and include, for instance, funds that enhances collaboration between non-state actors and local authorities.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> The APF is intended for the continental/AU and the regional/REC level, not for the national/state level.

<sup>30</sup> The APF is further discussed in section 3.2.2.

<sup>31</sup> Interview European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008. Kotsopoulos, 2007.

<sup>32</sup> Humanitarian aid is covered by the ECHO instrument.

<sup>33</sup> In Africa, the urgent intervention entails support with recruitment of staff to the Strategic Planning Management Unit of AMISOM, as well as support to peace building initiatives in Chad, Darfur, the DRC, Zimbabwe, the CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Long term programmes support the CEWS/the AU Situation Room, builds capacities in the fight against terrorism and against SALW, as well as builds capacities in combatting drug trafficking and organised crime. No budget figures could be obtained for the long-term programmes. The IfS programmes covers maximum 18-24 months support.

<sup>34</sup> Interview EC, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008.

<sup>35</sup> With the exception of South Africa.

<sup>36</sup> Interview EC, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008.

### 3 The Peace and Security partnership – contents, context, current status

In this chapter, a brief introduction to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy will be given. After this, the components, contents are current status of the PS partnership will be recounted.

#### 3.1 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy

As depicted in the previous section, substantial efforts have taken place in the 2000s to determine the EU's framework for relating with Africa. Parallel to this, further integration and institutional developments have occurred in both organisations/continents. In 2007, the time was ripe for the EU and the AU to take yet a greater leap in their relationship. During the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was adopted<sup>37</sup>. This strategy emphasises a genuine partnership among equals, moving away from the previous strategy *by the EU for Africa* and thus going beyond the traditional north-south development relationship. The new joint strategy is based on consensus among African and European leaders about the interconnectedness of several policy areas, such as peace, security, development, trade, human rights and governance challenges. The strategy is unique not only because of this large policy scope but also by its continent-wide outreach. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy will act as a reference framework for continent-to-continent relations over the next decade and shape the future joint policy priorities for EU-Africa cooperation.<sup>38</sup>

*Four principles* will guide the Joint Africa-EU Strategy:

1. dealing with Africa as a single entity
2. acknowledging the interdependence between the EU and Africa
3. reflecting ownership and joint responsibility of the processes
4. prioritising human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and the right to development.

In addition to this, the Joint Strategy builds on *four pillars*:

---

<sup>37</sup> The adoption of the JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY was the culmination of a year of consultations in both continents.

<sup>38</sup> Chevalier, 2007, p.2, Kotsopoulos, 2007.

- i. Peace and Security
- ii. Democratic Governance and Human Rights
- iii. Trade and Regional Integration
- iv. Key Development Issues.

In a further specification, these four pillars are accompanied by an *Action Plan*, which translate the pillar commitments into *eight priority areas/partnerships*:

- a) Peace and Security
- b) Democratic Governance and Human Rights
- c) Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure
- d) Millennium Development Goals
- e) Energy
- f) Climate Change
- g) Migration, Mobility and Employment
- h) Science, Information Society and Space.

The Action Plan is the operational agenda, listing detailed commitments and initiatives to be undertaken within the eight partnerships. The first Action Plan stretches from 2008-2010.<sup>39</sup>

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy implementation will be supported by the existing EU financial instruments<sup>40</sup>, such as the EDF, the DCI, the ENPI, the IfS and the Thematic Programmes.<sup>41</sup> The APF plays a particular role, however a specific financial instrument for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy does not exist. Contributions from EU financial institutions (such as the European Investment Bank, EIB), bilateral contributions from member states, contributions from interested international financial institutions, international organisations, private sector investment will also be called upon. Whenever possible, African financial instruments and AU member states should contribute, and involvement of African financial institutions (such as the African Development Bank, ADB) will be ensured as appropriate.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Chevalier, 2007, p.2

<sup>40</sup> In accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to the objectives and activities concerned (Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008).

<sup>41</sup> The current financing instruments have not been initially established with reference to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Thus, the EU might face synergy problems in the future. Current financial and operative instruments are not prepared for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

<sup>42</sup> Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008.

## 3.2 The Peace and Security Partnership

### 3.2.1 The contents

As mentioned initially, the PS partnership has a wide scope, addressing all aspects of the conflict cycle: prevention, peace-keeping, post-conflict relief, rehabilitation and development, with a special emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict and instability. In this section, an overview is given of the contents and the specific components of the PS partnership (the detailed Action Plan is found in Annex 1).

The PS partnership is structured around three Priority Actions:

1. Enhance *dialogue on challenges* to peace and security
2. Full *operationalisation* of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
3. Predictable *funding* for African-led peace support operations (PSO)

#### **Priority action 1: Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security**

The objective for this priority action is to “*reach common positions and implement common approaches* on challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally”. More specifically, four outcomes are expected:

- Deepened *common understanding* on the causes of conflicts and their resolution
- Strengthened *cooperation* on conflict prevention, management and resolution, including long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace building
- Improved *coordination* of continent-wide and regional approaches and initiatives
- Increased EU and African cooperation and *influence* in international and global fora

Among the activities outlined, there are suggestions of different measures to improve and facilitate the dialogue, as well as of enhancement of cooperation on specific areas such as terrorism and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Another activity is the undertaking of joint assessment missions in conflict areas, and addressing issues such as human rights, gender and children in conflict.



**Priority action 2: Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture**

For the second priority action, the objective is “*the effective functioning of the APSA to address peace and security challenges in Africa*”. Also here, four outcomes are expected:

- Full operationalisation of the various components of the APSA, in particular the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (POW), and the African Standby Force (ASF)
- Enhanced capacities of the AU and the regional mechanisms
- Concrete progress in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts
- Strengthened African capabilities through the implementation of relevant proposals in the Action Plan of the related EU Concept adopted in May 2007

Activities in this field are to a great extent orientated towards exercise, training courses, exchanges and logistics to make the ASF and its regional brigades/national partners operational. Another key activity includes cooperation between EU and the AU to operationalise the CEWS. To improve coordination and coherence between different policies, initiatives, financial instruments and actors are also an important activity. Among the activities suggested are also initiatives to strengthen other mechanisms and stakeholders relevant in the preventive and post-conflict phases.

**Priority action 3: Predictable funding for Africa-led Peace Support Operations**

The objective for priority action 3 is “to financially enable the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct Peace Support Operations”. Two outcomes are expected:

- *Reduction of funding gaps* and of the prejudicial *uncertainty* for African-led peace support operations
- *More effective deployment* of these operations

The activities for this priority action include the establishment of a new EU/AU funding mechanism, to work to ensure the contributions of other international community members, and to work together to achieve a UN mechanism for financial support for AU peace-keeping operations.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, June 2008.

### 3.2.2 The context

To a great extent, the contents of the three priority actions departs from the peace and security priorities set out in the EU Strategy for Africa (Conflict prevention, Common security threats, Support to African peace support operations, Disarmament, Post-conflict situations, and Conflict resources). In addition to this framework, a number of mechanisms of key importance for the PS partnership are in place. These are *the African Peace Facility (APF)*, *the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts*, *the EU Delegation to the AU* and *the Special Adviser for African Peace-Keeping Capabilities*. The APF and the Concept were elaborated before the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and provides a basis for the implementation of the PS partnership. The EU Delegation to the AU and the Special Adviser were launched around the same time as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, and, thus, formed after and set up in line with the strategy. These four key mechanisms are described below.

#### African Peace Facility

The African Peace Facility was created by the EU in 2003. This funding instrument is intended as a resource for the AU and the RECs in their work for peace and security, with a focus on AU peace-keeping capacities. The APF was born after a request by African leaders, and the funds were allocated from the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF budget. The first APF covered the time period 2004-2007 and had a final envelope of Euro 440 M.<sup>44</sup> It was intended to support two key elements: African-led PSO and capacity building programmes for the emerging APSA security structure of the AU (including the RECs). The second APF lies under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF and runs from 2008-2010, with a contribution set to Euro 300 M. In 2007, it was decided that additional voluntary contributions by member states to the APF are accepted.<sup>45</sup> The facility is also co-funded by African countries.<sup>46</sup> Today, the APF is at the centre of the PS partnership Priority Action 3, with discussions ongoing to find ways to improve the funding mechanism.

The dominating part of the support has been extended towards PSOs launched and implemented by the AU and/or by the RECs, such as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, over Euro 300M), the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, Euro 15,5M), the FOMUC mission in the CAR (Euro 23,4M) and the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMISEC, Euro 5M). The APF can be used to finance costs incurred by African countries deploying their peace-keeping forces in other

<sup>44</sup> The initial allocation was Euro 250 M in 2004.

<sup>45</sup> In 2007, the EC called for member states' voluntary contributions to support AMIS. Eight member states responded: mainly Germany (biggest contributor) and France, but also Ireland, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Czech Republic and Estonia. Belgium also contributed with a small amount to AMISOM (Interview EC, DG EuropeAid, 28 November 2008).

<sup>46</sup> South Africa (although not an EDF-ACP country), also contributes to some extent to the APF.

African countries (cost of carrying troops, soldiers' living expenses, development of capabilities, etc.) but under no circumstances cover military and arms expenditure.

The capacity building activities for the AU and the RECs amounted to Euro 35 M. for 2004-2007. These programmes take place in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management. More specifically, the funds have been used to support the AU/APSA in the development of a comprehensive peace and security policy; the establishment of a relevant planning capability within the AU Peace and Security Directorate (PSD), the establishment and training of reconnaissance teams to enhance AU and REC potential for the functional preparation of peace-keeping operations, and enhance the capacity of the AU and RECs in the financial and administrative management of PSOs, either with AU backing or through donor support.<sup>47</sup>

### **The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts**

As mentioned, the EU Strategy for Africa prepared the ground for the peace and security ambitions outlined in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The “EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts” was adopted in May 2007. The concept was set up as a framework for implementing the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa.<sup>48</sup> The measures and initiatives proposed in the concept’s action plan were designed to support the AU’s establishment of the APSA, including the creation of the ASF. This same focus has been transferred to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, where it is emphasised in Priority Action 2. The concept action plan develops ten proposals<sup>49</sup>, with the implementation initiatives divided into the themes Conflict prevention; Training and Exercises; Support to operations; Post-conflict reconstruction; which are corresponding to the outlook of the PS partnership. The activities under these themes are also preparatory – or the same - for those in the scope for the PS Action Plan. Some of the activities are ongoing or have recently been initiated, often under the APF.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Decision 2003/3 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers: on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, 11 December 2003. Securing Peace and Stability for Africa – the EU-funded African Peace Facility, July 2004. EC web site: DG Development: About us.

<sup>48</sup> It has been argued that the seed of the concept was a “non-paper”/an agreement between France and the UK in 2005-2006.

<sup>49</sup> For instance, proposal 4, 6, 9 are the basis for initiatives discussed in chapter 4. For precise objectives, proposals and tentative actions, see Annex 2.

<sup>50</sup> The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, May 2007. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Adviser in General Joana’s team, 18 December 2008.

## The EU Delegation to the AU

In 2007, the Council decided that an EU Delegation exclusively dedicated to the AU would be created. The ambassador (Koen Vervaeke) was appointed as the relevant official in December the same year. His position is double-hatted and he thus represents both the Council and the Commission, holding the title EU Special Representative (EUSR) and EC Head of Delegation at the same time. On the one hand, the Delegation has a political role in strengthening the dialogue and relationship between the AU and the EU institutions and in enhancing coordination with other international partners. The AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) is the organ with which the EUSR has the most structured dialogue. On the other hand, the EU Delegation's role is also to provide direct support to the AU, in particular through backing the AU's institutional development through the programming and implementation of capacity-building programs (however, these programmes, funded by the EDF and the IFS, do not include the institutions in the PSD/APSA).<sup>51</sup> The APF, on the other hand, is not managed by the EU Delegation<sup>52</sup>. Through this arrangement, the EU Delegation plays a major role in supporting the EU's comprehensive approach of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the PS partnership included. In 2008, the EU Delegation was underway setting up and employing staff (political, military and civilian expertise). However, it already functions as a permanent operational and political interface with the AU, and deals with all issues of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. One of the five sections within the Delegation – around ten staff - manages peace and security issues. Advice and support is offered by this section to the building up of the AU crisis management capabilities.<sup>53</sup>

## Special Advisor for African Peace-keeping Capabilities

In February 2008, General Pierre-Michel Joana was appointed as Special Advisor for African Peace-Keeping Capabilities by Javier Solana. The High Representative expressed that the appointment was made in line with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its effort to strengthen the PS partnership. In short, the main objective of installing General Joana's position is to provide for decisive resources in order to implement the Peace and Security aspects of the Action Plan, and General Joana chairs the PS Implementation Team<sup>54</sup>. General Joana's roll is to "coordinate all related activities" within the Council Secretariat, and he

<sup>51</sup> Eur 55 million is committed for this purpose.

<sup>52</sup> For the APF – which largely involves PSO funding – consultations are needed at the level of the EU Political and Security Committee (EU PSC). Coordination between the EC, the Council Secretariat and the member states are also necessary. Therefore, the APF is managed from Brussels, even though implemented by the EU Delegation.

<sup>53</sup> EU Council communiqué: the tenth Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, September 2008. Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008. Report from the AU PSC-EU PSC meeting, September 2008.

<sup>54</sup> This role of body will be explained in section 3.2.3.

is assisted by three experts (military, political, civilian). Coordination is to take place in close cooperation with the EC but also with African partners – in particular the AU – as well as international stakeholders. Close liaison takes place with the EUSR to the AU.<sup>55</sup>

### **3.2.3 The current status**

Having looked at the contents and the context of the PS partnership, this section outlines the current state of affairs. Because of the actual status of the implementation process, where the progress of the PS partnership is dependent on the overall situation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, it is not meaningful to comment separately on the strategy and on the PS partnership at this stage. Therefore, the assessment below is valid for the strategy as well as for the PS partnership.

Nearly one year has passed since the Lisbon summit in December 2007. At the summit, the need for early and concrete deliverables was emphasised. The first year of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy can however to a large extent be seen as a preparatory phase, where focus has been on an institutional build-up and on realising measures that need to be in place for the implementation. This has proved to be a complicated process. Accordingly, the build up has taken longer than foreseen – as concerns the political arrangements both at the European and African levels. On the European side, the set-up has caused confusion of roles, and resulted in either passivity or strategically calculated activity, while on the African side the capacity and commitment to further the institutional architecture is missing. Nevertheless, an important move forward took place in the end of November 2008, with the latest troika as well as a first joint meeting between African and European strategy Implementation Teams. Before recounting these developments, key measures as well as challenges in the institutional build-up on the European and the African side are briefly described below.

#### **The institutional build-up – European developments**

On the European side, formation has been initiated among the EU institutions in order to ensure a structure suited for the implementation of the Action Plan. The EC exercises the leadership in organising and steering this implementation – however this leading role is shared with the member states, and under the overall coordination of the Presidency.<sup>56</sup>

The key measure for the carrying through of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action Plan is the set up of *EU Implementation Teams* for each partnership. These teams

---

<sup>55</sup> Interview Council Secretariat. DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008. EU Council press release: Solana appoints Joana as Special Advisor for African peace-keeping capabilities.

<sup>56</sup> The responsibility is naturally shared with the African side.

consist of certain member states, as well as representatives from the EC and the Council Secretariat. For the PS partnership, France, the UK and Italy are the member states that have taken the leading role. However, the PS Implementation Team meetings are open for all member states<sup>57</sup>. The teams are chaired by General Joana, and are under the coordination of the Council's Africa Working Group and under the overall responsibility of the Presidency. General Joana and the EC take the lead for Priority Action 1, Italy and France are in charge of Priority Action 2, and the UK and the EC shares the responsibility for Priority Action 3. The PS Implementation Team started their work in April 2008 and had by the end of that year met three times. Suggestions for the implementation of activities under the priority actions have been drawn up, and for certain activities early deliverables and an indicative implementation roadmap have been proposed. Because of General Joana's important function, the *Council Secretariat* also has a key role in the implementation, with staff in charge of implementation issues in their daily work.

Before the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the *Council* working structure had involved a very large number of working groups and committees in the monitoring of various components of the Africa-EU relation. In order to avoid fragmentation, a reform of the Council Africa related set-up has been carried out, with a revised mandate and working modalities for the Africa Working Group. The strengthened mandate now includes responsibility for the coordination and the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its Action Plan. In order to manage the agenda, the Africa Working Group has started to meet more frequently, as the meetings since March are based in Brussels. Policy and strategic issues for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy are regularly discussed, including at Africa Directors<sup>58</sup> level. The reform has allowed for a more well-coordinated and efficient preparation of all issues of the strategy prior to discussions in the PSC/COREPER and at ministerial level.

The *Commission* has emphasised the need of strengthening internal working methods and coordination arrangements, as well as ensuring availability and mobilisation of the necessary resources in the Directorate Generals (DGs) in charge of implementation. In order to realise these ambitions, the EC has underlined the roles and responsibilities of the different concerned bodies. This includes the Relex Commissioners Group which has been given a stronger role in the provision of political guidance, as well as the key responsibility of the different services (DG DEV, DG RELEX and DG AIDCO) to ensure policy steering, guidance and coordination of the implementation process. The existing

---

<sup>57</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland are among those member states that have participated in the meetings

<sup>58</sup> The directors in charge of Africa issues at the ministries of the different member states. The directors meet once a month in a European capital, while the Africa Working Group discusses the Joint Africa-EU Strategy on at least a weekly basis in Brussels.

Commission Africa inter-service task force has also been strengthened and its role as coordinator<sup>59</sup> further defined. Furthermore, within DG DEV, one focal point per partnership has been nominated. For the PS partnership, this position is held by Daniela Diccorado. The focal point is tasked to follow up the implementation of their respective partnership, as well as drafting the yearly Joint Africa-EU Strategy implementation report. EC Delegations in Africa has also been asked to nominate a contact point to report and follow-up on the implementation process, including coordinating with the national authorities in their respective countries.<sup>60</sup>

### **The institutional build-up – African developments**

On the African side, institutional build-up progress has also taken place since the Lisbon summit. *The AU Commission (AUC)* is the focal point and has conducted a series of consultations on the way forward, with the participation of the member states. The meetings came up with a series of recommendations. It was agreed that the AUC will play the key role of coordinating the implementation process. In order to effectively carry out this mandate, an interdepartmental Task Force has been formed within the Commission. Concerning political guidance on the implementation, this is the responsibility of the Troika. The chefs de file – Algeria for the PS partnership – have a specific role in contributing to the preparatory work for the ministerial Troika meetings.

Another key measure is the formation of the *African Experts Group*, which is the counterpart of the EU Implementation Teams. The Expert Group comprises interested African member states<sup>61</sup>, with Algeria being the coordinator/Chef de file for the PS partnership. The group is also foreseen to have representatives from the RECs, from the AUC and from specialised institutions such as the African Development Bank. Among other things, the Expert Groups will conduct an assessment of ongoing projects/programmes as well as of the existing tools/facilities that can be used in the implementation of the partnerships.

The *Pan-African Parliament (PAP)* has expressed its intention to support the AUC at the level of the national parliaments, particularly on issues that require action by national executives. The PAP has undertaken to work closely with the

---

<sup>59</sup> Specifically as concern overlaps between the programs funded by the IfS (managed by DG Relex), the EDF (managed by DG Dev) and the APF (expertise based at AidCo). (Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 27 November 2008).

<sup>60</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 27 November 2008.

Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008.

<sup>61</sup> Various interviewees claim that Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, Cameroon, and Angola have expressed interest for the PS partnership, however, this information is uncertain.

executives to ensure action on matters relating to the implementation, as well as play an active part in informing African populations regarding developments in the implementation of the action plan. The *RECs* are foreseen to be fully involved in the monitoring and implementation process. The AUC is to ensure that the eight *RECs* recognised by the AU are engaged with a view to discussing their possible role in the process. The *AU Permanent Representation in Brussels* has been assigned to include the follow-up processes as part of its mandate. The office plays an important role in enhancing communication between the EU and the AU.<sup>62</sup>

### **The institutional build-up – joint developments**

As the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is a joint venture, an Africa-EU inter-institutional structure is also under development. A key body is the informal *Joint Africa-EU Expert Groups (JEG)*, which are to ensure implementation by engaging in the concrete activities of the Priority Actions. On the EU side, the representatives come from the Implementation Teams and on the African side from the African Experts Groups. These JEGs had their first meeting on 18 November. So far, the meetings are planned to take place on a bi-annual basis, with the next one probably in April 2009. Additional joint structures are being prepared in order to further the implementation of the strategy. According to the EC, the ambition is that the agenda of the annual meetings between *the two Commissions* should become more political and operational, and act as a key building block in the Africa-EU political dialogue. The EC further emphasises that the bi-annual *Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meetings* are to be strengthened through better preparation, more substantive agendas and stronger follow-up mechanisms, and thereby be better suited to carry out their monitoring role of the action plan. It is also foreseen that *sectoral Africa-EU Ministerial meetings* on key issues in the Africa-EU dialogue will serve a role (such as the Defence Troika that took place in November 2008). On top of this, *Africa-EU summits* will be held every three years, the next one in 2010. Measures to include African and European non-state actors in the implementation process are also being discussed. A *Non-State Actor Interim Steering Group* has been set up, and brings together a broad array of non-state actors. The Steering Group has identified one contact person per partnership - for the PS partnership, it is Virginie Giarmana, who is also representative of the European Peace-Building Liaison Office (EPLO). Major European and African research institutes have created a *Europe-Africa Policy Research Network*, with the aim to provide independent policy analysis on issues relevant to the Joint Africa-EU

---

<sup>62</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 27 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/PS Partnership, 16 December 2008. Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008.



Strategy. The *Pan-African Parliament* and the *European Parliament* have established mechanisms for closer cooperation in the context of the strategy implementation. Cooperation between the *AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)* and the *European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)*, as well as *local authorities* from both the African and European sides, is also moving forward, although at a slower pace.<sup>63</sup>

In short, there is joint implementation with political steering and strategic coordination taking place both at the level of the overall strategic partnership, and at the level of each of the eight partnerships. There has been progress in terms of setting up a structure for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, however the progress has also been hampered by political and capacity problems at both European and African level. This will be further explained in section 4.4.

### **Key meetings in 2008**

In addition to the institutional build-up within the EU and the AU, the ground for the strategy implementation has been prepared through various Africa-EU meetings that have taken place throughout the year. In fact, 2008 has seen a considerable strengthening of contacts between EU institutions and their AU counterparts<sup>64</sup>. However, a great part of the discussions have concerned the delays in moving forward, in terms of funds allocation, the provision of input and resources, internal preparations, the involvement of key stakeholders and dialogue with international partners. The desire for concrete progress towards joint implementation of the partnership activities has been reiterated during these various meetings. The implementation process had momentum around March, after which it appears to have slowed down. Nevertheless, the November meetings have hopefully provided a fresh impetus for moving further.<sup>65</sup> In order to illustrate the progress and current state of the implementation process, some of the recent Africa-EU key meetings are described below.

#### **First Joint Expert Group meeting – November 2008**

The initial meetings of the various African Expert Groups and the European Implementation Teams took place on 18 November 2008. For the JEG of the PS partnership, an overall purpose of the meeting was to decide on the main priorities for the PS partnership to be carried out in the months to come.<sup>66</sup> For some aspects, the meeting was successful, as a list was established of ongoing activi-

---

<sup>63</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 27 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/PS Partnership, 16 December 2008. Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008.

<sup>64</sup> The establishment of the EU Delegation to the AU is one successful factor in this context

<sup>65</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 November 2008.

<sup>66</sup> The JEG was originally foreseen to have produced tangible results before the Troika (which should taken place in April 2008).

ties and concrete actions to undertake. Proposals for early deliverables and for an indicative implementation roadmap/timeline were given for some of these activities.<sup>67</sup> The issue of possible financing sources and mechanisms was however not discussed in detail, neither were the working arrangements<sup>68</sup> of the JEGs entirely decided upon, and the methodology and architecture of the implementation remained unclear. On a specifically negative note was the limited participation from the African side. While the AUC was represented, very few African states were present and the representation of the RECs was very poor.<sup>69</sup> Those African partners who were present were passive<sup>70</sup>, and the established list was basically a result of European propositions that the African parties agreed to without discussion – it had the character of a “suppliers’, not a demanders’ meeting”<sup>71</sup>. Furthermore, the reunion was of an initial character, with high level diplomats rather than experts being present (which explains why concrete work details were not discussed in depth). The meeting was co-chaired by General Joana and the Algerian representative to the AU PSC/chef de file. The next JEG meeting will be held around March/April 2009.<sup>72</sup>

### **11<sup>th</sup> Troika – November 2008**

On 20-21 November 2008, the 11<sup>th</sup> ministerial meeting of the African and EU Troikas took place in Addis Ababa. Ministers underlined that the implementation is a long-term project but encouraged parties to attain tangible results before the mid-term review in 2009. The need for adequate financial resources to effectively implement the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was stressed. Particular importance was attached to the work to be done by the JEGs in identifying the financing requirements, the sources of financing and the procedures for accessing these financial instruments. For the PS partnership, ministers agreed to enhance cooperation between the EU and the AU situation centres and to set up a Common Interactive Watch and Anticipation Mechanism. The joint progress report, including recommendations, was endorsed. Co-chairs of the JEG were urged to maintain contact, to ensure flow of information to all stakeholders<sup>73</sup>, to

<sup>67</sup> The content of the list is further discussed in section 4.3.

<sup>68</sup> Composition, coordination with other actors, chairmanship/secretariat etc.

<sup>69</sup> Clear information on what states were represented has not been possible to obtain. Algeria and Egypt were two of the confirmed participants. South Africa, Tunisia, Burundi, Nigeria were mentioned as possible participants. It has been argued that the RECs were not invited to the JEG meeting (interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008).

<sup>70</sup> The limited African input concerned Priority Action 1 – proposals of meeting frequencies etc. With Priority Action 2, interviewees claim there were no discussions.

<sup>71</sup> It should be noted that not all EU member states were present. Most of the member states present were represented through their embassies in Ethiopia, only a few EU Permanent Representations travelled to Addis Ababa.

<sup>72</sup> Interview European Commission and Council Secretariat desk officers, November-December 2008.

<sup>73</sup> For example, through the joint AUC-EC website: [www.africa-eu-partnership.org](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org)

encourage participation of member states and RECs, as well as to reach out to other key stakeholders<sup>74</sup>

#### **Sectoral Minister Meeting/Defence Minister Troika – November 2008**

In addition to the normal Troika, a Defence Minister Troika meeting took place on 21 November 2008. The purpose was to launch the Amani Africa Initiative, and to discuss the state of implementation of the PS partnership.

#### **College-to-College meeting – October 2008**

On 1 October 2008, the annual College-to-College meeting between the European Commission and the African Union Commission took place in Brussels. In a joint declaration, the Commissions noted the need to consolidate the progress of setting institutional mechanisms in order for full implementation to take place. Taking account of the discussions during the College meeting, the EC identified recommendations for the way ahead, including the need to ensure political commitment and concrete contributions, functioning working arrangements, and to move on to develop implementation roadmaps including priorities and early deliverables. Another recommendation was that consultative discussions should be held with key non-institutional actors to enable them to play an active role in the implementation.<sup>75</sup>

#### **10<sup>th</sup> Troika meeting – September 2008**

The 10th Troika took place in Brussels, on 16 September 2008. The Troika was originally scheduled for April, with its main purpose being to endorse the Joint Africa-EU Strategy institutional set-up (which was proposed by the European side). Ministers briefed each other on the arrangements that had been undertaken to fit the implementation process, and urged all parties to finalise any remaining technical discussions regarding the implementation of the institutional architecture. The Troika adopted the first implementation report on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Action Plan.<sup>76</sup>

#### **The AU PSC-EU PSC meeting – September 2008**

On 30 September, the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (EU PSC) had their very first joint meeting, which took place in Brussels. The meeting took place in the framework of the PS partnership. Discussions were held on current crises and operations, but the emphasis was on concrete modalities for implementation of the partnership, with the focus on the APSA. The participants agreed on the need to progress on concrete initiatives, such as the launch of the Amani Africa and the EU support to African peace-keeping training centres. The meeting was seen as a success, however, with a certain tendency of the African side preferring to discuss current

---

<sup>74</sup> Joint communiqué: 11<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, November 2008.

<sup>75</sup> EC-AUC College-to-College meeting: Joint Declaration, October 2008.

<sup>76</sup> EU Council communiqué: the tenth Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, September 2008.

---

crises rather than AU's internal capacity building.<sup>77</sup> During the meeting, it was suggested that the AU/EU PSC meetings will be held on a bi-annual or annual basis.<sup>78</sup>

**EU/AUC Joint Task Force meeting – April 2008**

On 17-18 April 2008, the EC and the AUC Joint Task Force (with representatives from the services/DGs of the respective commissions) met in Addis Ababa. The meeting aimed at preparing the ground for the October College-to-College meeting. The practical modalities for implementation and monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy were also discussed. On the agenda were also issues such as the future role of the Task Force, communication and information sharing, and the involvement of the RECs in the strategy implementation process.<sup>79</sup>

This first part of the report has provided basic facts of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, its present status and its context. The second part that follows will concentrate on some key issues of interest, starting with the presentation and analysis of a few peace and security initiatives as well as challenges for the implementation.

---

<sup>77</sup> Interview UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 26 November 2008.

<sup>78</sup> Report from the AU-PSC-EU PSC meeting, September 2008.

<sup>79</sup> African Union News Centre: Joint Task Force meeting.

## 4 Current initiatives and implementation challenges

As has appeared in the previous chapter, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the PS partnership has reached a moment in time where the implementation process is increasingly focused on the concrete initiatives. Certainly, some of the foreseen peace and security activities are already ongoing (within the framework of the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts and within EC programmes). However, the implementation is now moving towards the launch and the marketing of those initiatives as being the realisation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS Action Plan. At the same time, other initiatives of the PS Action Plan are about to take off. In this chapter, there is no scope for a detailed account of all initiatives listed under the PS Action Plan. Instead, a few major - and the most current - initiatives will be elaborated on. These can mainly be found within Priority Action 2 - the Amani-Africa Initiative and the African Training Centres/Civilian and Police training and in Priority Action 3 - the AU-UN Panel and the new EU mechanism. However, after analysing these key initiatives, a brief overview of other ongoing initiatives and their status will be given.

### 4.1 An operational APSA

At the centre of much of the EU/Africa peace and security work is the ambition to have the APSA operational by 2010. A key element here is to strengthen the African military capabilities and to ensure the full capacity and operational certification of the ASF for June 2010, including its civilian and police dimension. The ASF, with up to 25 000 personnel within five regional brigades, is designed to be a continental military intervention force of rapid reaction.<sup>80</sup> In order to achieve this goal, the main tool - and implementing initiative - is the '*Amani-Africa/Euro Recamp*', with the closely related initiative '*Support to African Training Centres*'/'*Training of the civilian and police elements*'.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> ECDPM 2006, Issue paper 2.

<sup>81</sup> Within the ESDP, the Euro Recamp also falls - in addition to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy - within the framework of the EU concept/action plan to strengthen African peace-keeping capabilities, in line with proposal number 6: Provide and facilitate training activities, including European training and exercises. Furthermore, the Euro Recamp/Amani Africa Initiative is inscribed as the main vehicle to develop the ASF Training Plan, which was adopted by the AU in March 2008. On top of this, the Euro Recamp is also evolving in the framework of Africa Clearing House (G8++), which is the instance for general coordination for activities undertaken by African partners (Amani Africa-Euro Recamp web site).

#### 4.1.1 The Amani-Africa Initiative/Euro Recamp<sup>82</sup>

The Amani Africa training cycle is one of the key benchmark processes of the ASF. It is a two year programme (2008-2010) of political-strategic level training activities for African partners, with focus on developing a capacity for decision-making and planning in crisis management, at the African continental level. The specific attention lies on developing the chain of command from the AU to the regional level, through implementing procedures for the level of political decision making (creating strategic planning documents) all the way through to force deployment. The training cycle culminates in an AU continental exercise which will be used to test the decision making process, the command and control structures, and confirm operational certification for the ASF. The programme targets all aspects of crisis management; military, police and civilian. The point of departure is the ASF Training Plan and the ASF/the AU PSO doctrine adopted in March 2008. The 'Euro Recamp' is the tool for conducting the training cycle – the European strategic level training assistance - to the whole capacity building and exercise/validation project Amani Africa. The launch of the Amani Africa/Euro Recamp cycle – the Initiating Conference - took place 21 November 2008 in Addis Ababa.<sup>83</sup> Work with the Euro Recamp, however, has been ongoing since October 2007, within the framework of the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities, under the theme 'Training and Exercises'.<sup>84</sup>

The overall objectives of the Amani Africa cycle is to: a) test and evaluate the capacities and procedures for engagement of the ASF in PSOs, b) practice the establishment of a mission headquarters for an ASF deployment, including the production of an Integrated Mission Plan, c) increase awareness of ASF capabilities, procedures and requirements with the senior personnel of the AUC and member states. The Amani Africa development will rely on a scenario allowing the conduct of crisis management from the diplomatic phase up to the deployment of an integrated (military, police and civil) intervention force. The scenario is entirely fictional, using an invented island as the setting for the training and exercise.

---

<sup>82</sup> The information in this section builds on the following sources: Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership: General Joana, 18 December 2008, Military Staff Officer in General Joana's team, 26 November 2008, Political Adviser in General Joana's team, 18 December 2008. Interview French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 17 December 2008). The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, May 2007. Amani Africa-Eurorecamp website. Schmidt 2008, p.16.

<sup>83</sup> Euro Recamp was initially a French programme which, since 1997, has carried out training of African forces in peace-keeping. When transferring it to an EU initiative, the programme was redesigned. More emphasis was put on civilian actors in the peace-keeping as well as on the participation of the sub-regional organisations.

<sup>84</sup> In December 2007, the europeanisation of the Recamp was officially launched

The training cycle is meant to be conducted in two phases:

*Phase 1 (2008-2009):* Dealing with *diplomatic aspects, initial planning directive*, elaboration of a *mandate* and a concept of operation (*CONOPS*), as well as development of agreement of rules of engagement (*ROE*) and a *deployment plan* to fulfil the mandate. This training/education should be conducted through seminars and workshops during 2009.

*Phase 2 (2010):* Dealing with the execution of the deployment plan and the conduct of the mission, in order to evaluate the decision making process. This phase will consist of the final exercise (CPX) in the first quarter of 2010, where the scenario is deployment within 30 days of a continental or regional Africa force under UN chapter VI<sup>85</sup>.

On a more detailed level, the main activities are planned as follows:

1. Contributors' conference (6 February 2009)
2. Initial Planning Conference; preparation (March 2009)
3. Strategic Decision Making Seminar, 3 days (March/Apr 2009)
4. Main Planning Conference; preparation (May 2009)
5. AU Mission HQ MAPEX, 5 days (June/July 2009)
6. Political Strategic Seminar, 5-7 days (Nov 2009)
7. Strategic Conference, 5-7 days (Nov/Dec 2009)
8. Final Planning Conference; preparation (Dec 2009)
9. Command Post Exercise (March/Apr 2010)
10. Evaluation/Report to the Council, Validation (Apr/June 2010)

*Contributors' conference* – This pledging conference, held on a diplomatic level, will take place in Brussels, to provide partners with detailed requests for support and to give the opportunity to announce support in this respect. There are three ways of contributing: direct support and/or funding of an identified action, technical support (donation of equipment, provision of expertise etc) and participation in the Trust fund. Apart from European partners and member states, contributions are expected from the United States (with logistical and tactical training for the ASF, through their programme ACOTA) and from Canada (provision of peace-keeping trainings). The UN has helped designing the training programmes and the AU has specifically requested training on the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process.

*Strategic Decision-Making Seminar* – This seminar will serve as an opportunity for informal team-building and communication between senior people. The focus will be on increased awareness of the cycle scenario and familiarisation of the ASF doctrine. Lectures will be held by high level NATO or US militaries, as a way of engaging AU decision makers. The purpose of the seminar is also to

---

<sup>85</sup> This equals a type 4 scenario as defined in the ASF policy framework.

practice procedures for initiating mandate development and for mandate agreement. The target audience includes the AU PSC, commissioners, the Military Staff Committee, potential Heads of Mission and regional leaders. Preparations for the seminar will take place in the *Initial Planning Conference*, scheduled in March.

*AU Mission HQ MAPEX/Consolidation Strategic Decision-Making* – The training will be on Integrated Mission Planning, including mandate development. The mission plan will be exercised on a map, where scenario/crises outcomes will be developed. The target audience is AU staff from Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) and Conflict Management Division (CMD), regional staff for Mission HQ and representatives from AU states for Mission HQ. The MAPEX will be prepared in the *Main Planning Conference*, scheduled around May.

*Political Strategic Seminar* – The focus will be on developing and gaining agreement for a planning directive and for a mandate (including CONOPS). The target audience is the AU PSC (for decisions), AU staff (PSOD, CMD, Finance, Logistics) and various specialists (civilians, police, militaries, Mission HQ). By the end of the seminar, a directive followed by mandate for the CPX is to be produced.

*Strategic Conference* - This conference is linked together with the Political Strategic Seminar (there is one week in between these two activities). The objectives are to develop an OPLAN, ROE, and a deployment plan. A budget will be prepared and funding identified. The target audience is the AU PSC (for high level decisions/ROE), AU staff (same as above), and Mission HQ staff. The conference is to produce an Integrated Mission Plan for the CPX.

*Command Post Exercise* - The CPX will take place for about two weeks, during which mission staff will be involved under authority of an AU mandated mission.<sup>86</sup> Possible themes for the exercise are human rights, protection of refugees/IDPs, political changes requiring AU intervention, reintroduction of police/rule of law, riot control, security sector reform, DDRR, control of a zone, to mention a few. The CPX will most likely use EASBRIG as the response cell; the regional player needed to carry out the exercise. Other RECs might participate as observers. The concluding preparations for the CPX will take place in the *Final Planning Conference*, schedule around December 2009.

The lead for the training cycle and the CPX is taken jointly by an integrated AU-EU planning team. On the EU side, the implementation takes place through the

---

<sup>86</sup> For the final exercise, the officer conducting the exercise will be the AU Amani Africa Director (Major General Samaila Iliya). The EU has designated the European Cre Planning Team Director (General Francois Gonnet) to assist.



European Core Planning Team<sup>87</sup>, a member state project team supported by France in its capacity as the EU framework nation. France is in charge of conception and coordination of activities related to this first training phase. The European Core Planning Team team is under Major General Francois Gonnet's authority. Its initial core consists of three military personnel, one police expert and one civilian expert (not yet recruited).<sup>88</sup> The African counterpart team, which is under the AU's authority, has recently filled all its positions.<sup>89</sup>

The APF is likely to be a main financing source for the Euro Recamp with approximately Eur 300 000 at the continental level (and the same amount in each sub-region). Voluntary contributions by the member states also play a role. So far, the UK has been the biggest contributor, having put in 400 000£ in the trust fund that has been created by the Eurorecamp team. France, Finland and Slovenia have also contributed. Donations can be given for specific aspects of the Euro Recamp. Possibilities to use the IfS to fund the Euro Recamp are being discussed.

#### **4.1.2 Support to African training centres - the emphasis on training the civilian and police elements**

The focus of Euro Recamp is the training of African military, police and civilian staff on the strategic continental level. In other words, Euro Recamp does not carry out operational capacity development or tactical training for regional brigades. These interlinked areas are targeted in parallel within Priority Action 2, with assistance being planned for training of the ASF regional brigades (or other components). The major current training initiative concerns support to African training centres dedicated to the maintenance of peace.<sup>90</sup> Examples of these are Le Centre de Maintien de la Paix de Bamako (Mali), the Kofi Annan International Peace-keeping Training Centre (Ghana) and the International Peace Support Training Centre in Karen (Kenya). Support will be given to these training centres through a programme under the new APF. Largely, the initiative

---

<sup>87</sup> The European Core Planning Team is sometimes referred to as the Eurorecamp Team.

<sup>88</sup> Director: Brigadier General Francois Gonnet (French), Deputy Director: Colonel George Kilburn (British), Coordination officer: Lieutenant-colonel Cyrille Frayer (French), Police Expert: Lieutenant-colonel Giorgio Romano (Italian), Civilian Expert (vacant).

<sup>89</sup> Director: Major General Samaila Iliya (Nigerian), Deputy Director: Brigadier General Mathabe (origin not known), Coordination officer: Charles Debrah (Ghanaian). Three police experts (from Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal) and one civilian expert (name and origin not known) are also recruited.

<sup>90</sup> Apart from the African training centres, training for the ASF brigades will also be offered at European training institutions. Examples of these training centres are The Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Vicenza, Italy (COESPU), the HDF Peace Support Training Centre in Szolnok, Hungary (HDF PSTC), L'Institut des Hautes Etudes pour la Defense Nationale in Paris, France (IHEDN) and Joint Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham, the UK (JSCSC). Training of the African partners at these centres has not yet been initiated.

is about identifying training needs for the regional brigades and the centres, as well as the provision/facilitation of training activities at the ASF level. Networking of these centres is a crucial component for the implementation. An adequate support programme will be developed. Presently, efforts are underway to establish a list of centres that are to benefit from the support. The initiative focuses on supporting training centres which address the training needs of military, civilian and police elements. The current work emphasises the civilian dimension. Moving forward on the civilian and police elements is seen as important, as these aspects are underdeveloped in relation to the military ones.<sup>91</sup> Even though the civilian/police elements so far have not been attended to by the RECs, European desk officers' claim that there now appears to be a sincere commitment and perceived need from the African side for developing these aspects further.

Italy has elaborated a proposal which emphasises the training of civilian and police aspects of the ASF, such as capacity-building for dealing with humanitarian needs, peace building tasks/restoration of the rule of law/civil administration, reconstruction needs, etc.<sup>92</sup> The proposal stresses the civil-military coordination and aims at building strategic management capacity. At the JEG meeting in November 2008, Italy and the EC presented the proposal and an accompanying "action plan", which were endorsed<sup>93</sup> and, accordingly, will be advanced in the coming work. The proposal takes place with a 'Mapping-Matching' approach. In a first phase, a mapping is being done in order to establish a list of suitable training institutes in Africa, which have civilian, police *and* military orientation as well as a regional capacity. The mapping will determine what has been done so far in terms of civilian, police and military training. It also includes the formulation of needs assessments for the listed training institutes, including their needs to develop capacities on the civil/police dimension.<sup>94</sup> The mapping exercise is presently being worked on jointly by African and European partners. The mapping is the point of departure for the operationalisation of civilian and police training aspects together with the military training schedule.

In March, a workshop will be held in Addis Ababa to discuss the mapping results (the list of training centres and their needs), to take first steps towards a matching between African training needs and European capabilities, as well as discuss

---

<sup>91</sup> ECOWAS is the only REC which has a training centre with civilian courses. (Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Military Staff Officer in General Joana's team, 26 November 2008).

<sup>92</sup> Issues on which the ASF civilian and police elements would work could be disarmament, DDR, trafficking of SALW, mine action, SSR, gender mainstreaming, protection and promotion of human rights, electoral assistance.

<sup>93</sup> However, the endorsement came without any discussion.

<sup>94</sup> Work to advance skills on civilian issues has already begun. For instance, a Training for Peace Programme has been undertaken on behalf of the AU PSOD, in order to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF (Schmidt 2008, p.18-21).

support modalities of the AU, the EU and the member states. The matching process will be substantiated by a joint field study stretching from around February to June 2009. The study will also aim at preparing a support programme including mapping/suggesting training activities of the ASF (civilian and police components). A validation seminar will then take place, establishing a roadmap to address the needs. The study and the seminar will be financed by the APF and by Italy.

By July 2009, the Mapping-Matching exercise should have come to an end, having produced a support program, a list of suitable training centres in need as well as European resources with a profile corresponding to these needs. At this stage, the issue will be how to move the initiative forward, how to concretely go about in implementing the training support and the structural assistance. Political considerations will be important to take into account, for instance what member states should send trainers to what African states.<sup>95</sup> Funding sources will also have to be discussed.<sup>96</sup>

#### **4.1.3 Challenges**

The two initiatives presented above are where most effort is currently invested in the PS Implementation Team. However, a number of challenges for this work complicate the advancement of both of the initiatives.

On the African side, competition among the training centres makes it difficult to establish a list of training centres/schools to benefit from support. For several months now, the EU and the AU have been unable to putting together one joint list of collaboration partners. Internal “political interests” between AU staff with different preferences adds to this picture. Meanwhile, the unsuccessful communication between the RECs and the AU has been spurred by AU staff expressing the opinion that there should only be one major training centre per region. The location of the Amani Africa/Eurorecamp seminars is also a source of conflict between the RECs, with some competition taking place as for the hosting these activities. Many within the EU and the AU prefer to have all activities held in Addis Ababa, largely for reasons of comfort. However, others argue that in order

---

<sup>95</sup> Interview UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 26 November 2008.

<sup>96</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008.. The Italian proposal. Interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana, 18 December 2008.

to reach out to and involve the RECs, it would be good to let each of them host the seminars.<sup>97</sup>

When it comes to moving further with the Amani Africa/Euro Recamp initiative, it appears as if the AU is 'onboard'.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, concerns are raised that the Europeans have pushed too hard and are too impatient to move on with this dimension of the APSA. The African side risks feeling drawn into a process going with full speed – perceiving that the Euro-Recamp initiative is being imposed on them - before having had time to digest the content and to disseminate its implications. Insights about and commitment to Amani Africa will also be needed among African decision makers at lower levels. The mobilisation of local leaders will take time, as they are likely to perceive a loss of control caused by the European projects that the higher level African officials are engaging in. Concerning the African states, their representation at the Amani Africa Initiating Conference was poor. This may partly also be due to limited awareness of the project, as their communication with the AU is limited. However, clear is also that the interest of the member states in the AU is low – even among big ones such as South Africa and Nigeria - as they have more loyalties to and better dialogue with the RECs. In practical terms, African states representatives are not tempted to travel to/work in the Ethiopian capital, as the city is seen as expensive; for French speaking Africa, the fact that the English language is used in the AU and Addis Ababa contributes to their low interest.

With regard to the ASF's regional structures, the AU is expected to have a key leadership role in ensuring coherence, harmonisation and uniformity, as specified, for instance, in the subsidiary principle in the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs on peace and security. However, in practice, the definition of tasks, as well as the division of responsibilities and of political control between the AU and the RECs remains unclear. Illustrative of the problems is the fact that the AU chose not to accompany the EU during its briefing tour for the RECs on Amani Africa. Concerning the RECs, their interest of the Amani Africa varies.

On the AU side, another challenge is obviously the serious understaffing in combination with a bureaucracy that is ill-equipped to handle the massive EU administrative apparatus. African desk officers have too limited time and capacities to get familiar with their own ASF documents.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, as for the team-spirit and inner communication within the PSOD, there is room for improvement. Language is also an issue, in the sense that a division between

---

<sup>97</sup> One suggestion is: Strategic Decision Making Seminar in Abuja, Mapex in Karen, Political Strategic Seminar and Strategic Conference in Johannesburg (interview Military Staff Officer in General Joana's team, 26 November 2008).

<sup>98</sup> The AUC claimed at the AU PSC-EU PSC meeting that the Euro Recamp was a step in the right direction to achieve the priority of operationalising the ASF.

<sup>99</sup> It should be taken into account that the AU also deals with US and NATO programmes.

French and English speaking Africans exists. This prevents development within the PSOD (as well as between different RECs). These factors have consequences for the proceeding of the work. For instance, for the initiative for the African training centres, needs assessments are presently being drafted and prepared by the European side. However, advancing from this stage is slow, as a result of the limited input and feedback from the African side. Due to the African ownership, the EU finds itself in a situation where it can basically only wait to assist the African side further, once the African states take on a lead and continues to move the initiative forward. The ball is also in the RECs' court when it comes to establishing an oversight of training needs.<sup>100</sup>

On the European side, a difficulty for both the military and civilian/police training is that few member states show interest for these initiatives. One specific dilemma is the difficulties in filling the position of the civilian in the Eurorecamp team. Another issue concerns the training sessions the regional brigades. Originally, training was foreseen before each of the Amani Africa seminars, in order for the African actors to be more synchronised (the continental/strategic and the regional/operational levels trained around the same time). However, because of work delays during the past year, potential trainers – in the few interested member states - are already booked up for 2009. Apart from Italy, which is ready to train civilians and police on quick deliverables, it will be difficult to find capable and interested member states that will offer to carry out Integrated Mission trainings. A further challenge is that to the extent the member states are interested in supporting training centres, this concerns successful examples, such as the Kofi Annan centre in Ghana. The tendency, thus, is that all member state support goes to the same few centres. This gives rise to donor driven training centres and an unhealthy competition for funds. A consequence is that centres tend to claim that they can offer all sorts of training – strategic, operational and tactical – instead of specialising and developing the quality of their existing programmes. Another effect is that few resources are poured into other less known African training centres, which means they fall even further behind.

The above situation means that more coordination among bilateral and EU-initiatives is needed.<sup>101</sup> In order to achieve better coordination (on initiatives relating to training as well as other issues), a number of parallel mapping efforts have been initiated on the European side. As mentioned, work is ongoing within General Joana's team; the Italian proposal also involves a mapping process. Meanwhile, France has launched its own mapping focusing primarily on APSA. Furthermore, the EC has undertaken a mapping with the purpose to establish

---

<sup>100</sup> EU/EC desk officers note a reluctance to work on the civilian/police proposal, both within the EU and the AU PSOD (interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008).

<sup>101</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008.

what activities member states pursue in line with each of the Priority Actions.<sup>102</sup> A striking problem is the frustration between the various parties carrying out these separate mapping processes, caused by their very limited communication and understanding for each other's work.<sup>103</sup> This does not only imply a difficult work climate, but as described above, unsuccessful coordination can have a negative effect for the outcome of the initiative, that is the development of training centres and their work.

## 4.2 Predictable funding for PSOs

Two current initiatives that deserve attention are the efforts carried out within Priority Action 3. The financial aspect of ensuring future African peace and security is vital. Accordingly, the ambition to financially enable PSOs has been declared a priority action of its own.<sup>104</sup> The need to involve the international community in providing for sustainable financial sources for the planning and conduct of African PSOs is evident. To obtain this objective, the efforts of '*establishing a UN mechanism*' are currently the main initiative that is being worked on. Another initiative is to '*create a new EU/AU mechanism*'.<sup>105</sup>

### 4.2.1 A UN mechanism

Up until now, the APF has been a major source for the undertaking of African PSOs. However, as this financial instrument is neither a long term nor a flexible resource, the PSOs have been conducted in a context of uncertainty and inefficiency. For a predictable and sustainable funding solution, which would

---

<sup>102</sup> The mapping was meant to identify areas where the member states could possibly commit to coordinate via the EU; to identify common bilateral interests and provide for synergies, and to get an idea of what financial instruments could be used. The mapping received very little input from the member states and a second attempt will be made in the near future (interview European Commission, DG Development, Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008).

<sup>103</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008. Interview French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 17 December 2008. Interview European Commission, DG Development, Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership, General Joana, 18 December 2008.

<sup>104</sup> The African side requested to have the funding aspect - Priority Action 3 - as part of the PS Action Plan.

<sup>105</sup> The third initiative within Priority Action 3 is "to work with G8 and other members of the international community to contribute to the funding to African PSOs. Within the framework of the G8++ Africa Clearing House, commitment has been expressed for working together to support African PSOs. However, it remains unclear to what extent any concrete plans about how to proceed have been agreed on. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the G8 Africa Clearing House and the UN Steering Committee are important forums for deciding on how to collaborate on issues such as providing financing support to the RECs and to the APSA. Concrete cooperation with these international parties should be initiated at the level of the JEG (interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008).

complement the APF, it is necessary to establish a mechanism within the framework of the UN Charter, chapter VIII.

In September 2008, an AU-UN panel was set up<sup>106</sup> to explore a more long term solution to the financing issue. The six member panel, headed by Romani Prodi, considers lessons from past and current AU PSOs and explores possible options to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of resources for AU PSOs established by a UN mandate.<sup>107</sup> Since the panel started its work in September, it has been consulting with various stakeholders. The EU has contributed by advising and sharing experiences from its financial support to AU PSOs. The UK has been especially active, feeding ideas to the panel about the set up of a trust fund, outlining different options of international voluntary or compulsory contribution to such a fund.

The panel submitted its report with recommendations to the UNSG in December 2008, outlining two financial mechanisms. The first mechanism would be based on the current UN system, where operations up to six months are financed by member states contributions. The authorisation of a PSO would be assessed on a case to case basis, with a decision by the UNSC and the General Assembly. A precondition would be that the AU PSO would only last for 6 months, after which there would be a guarantee of the UN taking over the lead of the PSO. The guarantee would be agreed on before the launch of AU PSO. The second mechanism suggests that capacity-building funds for PSOs are deposited in a trust fund, to be managed by an experienced agency.

The next step following the submittal of the panel report is for the UN to settle on how to move on practically with the recommendations. Possibly, some form of study will be set up to decide whether the panel's recommendations should be adopted. A UNSC decision, followed by a mandate formulation, is likely to come during the Swedish Presidency.<sup>108</sup>

#### **4.2.2 An EU-AU mechanism**

Another initiative within Priority Action 3 is the discussions ongoing within the EU on how to improve its own instruments to support African PSOs (as well as other aspects of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy). This could mean modifying the

---

<sup>106</sup> The panel was created by resolution 1809 of the UNSC, which was adopted in April 2008.

<sup>107</sup> UN News Centre: 'Former Italian Prime Minister to head African Union-UN peace-keeping panel', September 2008. The Mail and Guardian: 'UN-AU security cooperation talks take place in Pretoria, October 2008.

<sup>108</sup> Interview UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 26 November 2008. Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008. Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana's team, 18 December 2008.

APF, setting up a new instrument or using already existing ones. For instance, the possibility of using IfS for funding civilian and police elements in PSO deployment can be considered. However, for political reasons, the IfS will not be used for military components.<sup>109</sup> The EU discussions also deliberate upon ways to encourage bilateral complements to the APF/PSOs. Furthermore, the second review of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, to take place in 2010, will certainly be influenced by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Some sources predict that the EU will use the revision as an opportunity to officialise the use of the EDF to support the future implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, through pan-African programmes and facilities. This would include the financing of the African PSOs.<sup>110</sup>

Nothing concrete has yet come out from the discussions on the future of the APF or other EU mechanisms to support African PSOs. Meanwhile, the new APF of Eur 300 million was adopted<sup>111</sup> in late October. The funds, available as from March 2009, will be disbursed according to the following: Eur 200 million for PSOs, Eur 65 million for capacity building<sup>112</sup>, and Eur 15 million for the early response mechanism<sup>113</sup>. This distribution means that there is now an enlarged scope of the APF covering the whole conflict cycle.<sup>114</sup> This is following an African request to fund more conflict prevention activities. Among other novelties, there will be reactive crisis related funds accessible 10 days after request. An emphasis of the new APF is to enhance the exchange of capacity building ideas and experiences amongst RECs as well as between RECs and the AU, and to increase meetings/dialogue between them. Importance is attached for the AU and the RECs to develop their financial management capacity, and to establish standardised financial and accounting rules and procedures. The modernisation of the human resources management system is also a preference, in order to ensure in-time recruitment and to retain qualified staff, as well as keeping the balance between permanent and seconded staff. Another Eur 300 Million has already been reserved for the APF for 2011-2013, in case the EU is to continue with the present APF arrangement.<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>109</sup> Interview European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008.

<sup>110</sup> CISDE web site: EU News, October 2008.

<sup>111</sup> By the PSC, COREPER and the EDF committee.

<sup>112</sup> Full operationalisation of APSA, for instance assistance to the Peace and Security Directorate, PSOD, the Strategic Planning Management Unit, the build up of ASF, training/exercises.

<sup>113</sup> EWS, mediation, good offices, preventive diplomacy, fact-finding and reconnaissance missions, pre-planning deployment capacity.

<sup>114</sup> For the scope of the APF, see annex 3.

<sup>115</sup> Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008. Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 November 2008. Interview UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 26 November 2008.



### 4.2.3 Challenges

A number of challenges surrounds the issue of financial support to African PSOs and the initiatives that are undertaken. It is yet too early to fully assess the input of the UN panel. Clear is, however, that UN decisions on each PSO on a case to case basis would imply an arduous procedure. The latter recommendation is also not in line with the present EU system, as the APF is an integrated fund for capacity building and for PSOs, as opposed to the suggested split into two strands. A situation with two separate systems will undermine the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, as there would no longer be the same APF available to finance its implementation. Apart from this, negative reactions to the panel recommendations have been heard within the EU, as a range of different recommendations (for the JEGs to discuss on) had been hoped for. A general feeling is that the panel has based its work in a UN-AU rather than an EU-AU perspective. Other criticism against the panel is that it consists of high level technocrats, rather than experts of financial aspects of PSOs. It is also argued that the panel has too few representatives from the AU.<sup>116</sup> Furthermore, the scope for EC experts on APF financed PSOs to contribute with advice appears to have been bigger than the interest for it shown by the panel. A concern about the possible suggestions of the panel is whether states, which already put in financial support to the EDF and the DPKO, would be willing to contribute to yet another source. The issue of interest in giving financial support is also valid on the African side – for instance, there is no obvious willingness of the African states to mobilise more funds for their own AU Peace Fund.<sup>117</sup>

Supporting PSOs can be controversial, both for African, European and other parties. This is likely to be one of the reasons why the more well off states in Africa are not willing to contribute with funds to the African Peace Fund. However, in the case of Northern African countries, their motivation to contribute is naturally decreased by the fact that they are not eligible to APF funds. A major problem for the APF is the imbalance where Northern African countries as non-ACP/EDF countries are not contributing<sup>118</sup>, while at the same time, the Caribbean countries are allowing some of the EDF funding to be set aside for the purpose of African peace and security initiatives. During the JEG meeting in November 2008, Egypt expressed concern that this imbalance risks excluding them from benefiting from the peace and security work of the Joint Africa-EU

---

<sup>116</sup> The AU-UN panel is comprised by James Dobbins of the United States, Jean-Pierre Halbwachs of Mauritius, Monica Juma of Kenya, Toshi Niwa of Japan and Behrooz Sadry of Iran.

<sup>117</sup> The AU Peace Fund is a former Organisation of African Unity fund, and today it sits outside the regular AU budget. In 2007, it amounted to around 145,290 USD, with 2% consisting of African states' contributions and the remaining share coming from various donors. It is unclear to what extent the different states contribute (Audit of the African Union, 18 December 2007).

<sup>118</sup> South Africa is contributing to the APF to a limited extent.

Strategy.<sup>119</sup> EU desk officers point to the urgency for all partners to realise that APF and EDF resources will not be sufficient to fund African PSOs. A problem in this context is also that the present use of the regional and continental orientated APF/EDF diverts resources from support to African states on a national level.

However, making more funds accessible is not the entire solution to the issue – largely, it is also about using funds more efficiently, at different levels. Furthermore, even if partner support for the African PSOs would be forthcoming, a fundamental challenge is that the AU does not presently have adequate financial systems in place to manage increased donor funding. For instance, running a trust fund would require a certain level of skills. The financial management training and development of financial systems currently ongoing through the APF needs to be complemented.<sup>120</sup>

### 4.3 Other peace and security initiatives

As mentioned earlier, the discussion above has only taken into account certain key initiatives of the PS Action Plan – those assessed to be of most current interest. Below is a summary of additional initiatives that are ongoing or about to start up within Priority Action 1 (Enhance Dialogue on Challenges to Peace and Security) and Priority Action 2 (Full operationalisation of the APSA) of the Action Plan.<sup>121</sup> These initiatives have largely been formulated and planned by the European side, even if in dialogue with the African side.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008. Interview UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 26 November 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa), 25 November 2008. ECDPM 2006, Issue paper 1.

<sup>120</sup> The APF presently supports the development of financial systems through staff and through a Technical Assistant (interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008).

<sup>121</sup> Substantive road maps, implementation timelines, stakeholders are financial instruments are not completely clear for most of these initiatives.

<sup>122</sup> Ahead of the JEG meetings in November 2008, the EU/PS Implementation Team began to identify specific short and mid-term deliverables for the PS partnership/Action Plan. As mentioned above, no real discussion took place about these issues during the first JEG meeting. Yet, a list of deliverables was agreed on. In October 2008, the EC issued a Communication and a working document on the state of the implementation where main challenges were outlined, progress assessed, and input provided. In a draft document, identified ongoing or planned activities were listed through which the EU, and in particular the EC, could contribute. The document is based on the results of the College-to-College meeting of 1 October, preliminary discussions in the EU Implementation Teams, and a series of internal inter-service consultations. The EC stresses that this proposal for implementation has to be matched by input of European and African member states as well as the AUC.

Within **Priority Action 1**, run mainly by the EC, dialogue on challenges to peace and security is ongoing. For instance, the organisation of a first AU PSC-EU PSC meeting in September 2008 is seen as a major achievement.<sup>123</sup> Apart from this, capacity building/cooperation on SALW is the activity that is most on track (and the one that benefits from biggest funding). Work with African organisations will support the development and implementation of regional conventions and strategies, as well as the engagement of African experts. The funding for these activities was planned to start before end of 2008. A joint workshop on the eradication of Explosive Remnants of War will also take place in 2009. The Joint Assessment Missions – where the AU and the EU deploys a joint team, in particular in view of monitoring PSOs - are also ongoing. AMISOM is next to be monitored, however the security situation prevents actual deployment. Assessment missions for the CAR, Burundi and the Comoros are scheduled for 2009. Joint African-EU missions are also proposed to post-conflict areas in Europe to learn from European experiences. The Sahel region has been identified for a first informal joint assessment in the field of collective security and preventive diplomacy with a view to anticipating security challenges there. It has been agreed to launch a dialogue initiative on the Sahel region security challenges. The cooperation with the Centre Africain d'Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT) in the field of counter-terrorism will be reinforced. The current funding will be complemented by a new action with a planned start before the end of 2008. It will also be followed by a programme for 2009-2011 in support of the Sahel Region. However, there are negative indications of the CAERT having problems to spend funds. Another programme with a wide regional scope in support of African countries' capacities to fight organised crime/ terrorism is foreseen under the Action Plan for 2009-2011.

Plans for initiatives to take place during the first half of 2009 involve the exploration of the possibility to establish a centre in charge of the operationalisation of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy Framework in Africa, as well as the submittal of proposals to operationalise the consultation mechanisms at African-EU ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York. Other initiated or soon upcoming initiatives are the set up a structured exchange of agendas, documentation and outcomes of the respective AU and EU PSC meetings, something which is meant to intensify AU and EU desk officers' interaction. Efforts will also be intensified to share reports on crisis and conflict situations, through meetings between the AU and the EU Delegation in Addis Ababa and through enhanced cooperation between the AU and EU Situation Centres. A common interactive watch and anticipation mechanism, MIVAC, will be created. In the pipeline for 2009 is also an initiative to exchange experiences of African and European mediators.

---

<sup>123</sup> Examples of other meetings are mentioned in section 3.2.3.

Under **Priority Action 2**, specific efforts are devoted to improve financial and technical support for the AU's capacity to plan, conduct and manage PSOs which require further strengthening. The ongoing assistance to the AU Peace and Security Directorate, the PSOD, the Strategic Planning Management Unit (SPMU) and the recruitment of AU planners and experts will be further financed. Presently, efforts are focused on carrying out a needs assessment of the PSOD and, in particular, ensuring its staffing. Recently, two police personnel were employed (through German bilateral effort and financial contribution).<sup>124</sup> Recruitment of staff has been very slow. Challenges for supporting the staff recruitment include the difficulties in finding qualified people who have a stake to stay work for the AU. The African side is not willing to share the implementation roadmap for the recruitment at the PSOD, but regards it as internal affairs. Political sensitivities in the recruitment process might again be a reason for this approach. It should also be acknowledged that the recruitment procedures financed by/connected to the EU are complex and not easy to grasp quickly. As mentioned earlier, funds for the APSA capacity building have previously been used to support the development of a comprehensive peace and security policy, the establishment of a relevant planning capability within the PSD, as well as the establishment and training of reconnaissance teams to enhance AU and REC potential for the functional preparation of peace-keeping operations. Support within Priority Action 2 is also lent towards building the capacity of the CEWS and the POW. The ongoing co-operation to strengthen the CEWS will be further reinforced both at the continental and regional level, through collaboration between the AU CMD and the EC Joint Research Centre, and through a project focusing on information and communications equipment, training, exchanges of expertise and of officials (which has started in the summer of 2008). Support will also be provided to the work of the Panel of the Wise on crisis-prone elections<sup>125</sup>.

#### **4.4 Challenges for the overall implementation**

In the previous sections, challenges relating to those initiatives presented were discussed. However, problematic issues for the overall implementation process can also be noted. This section analyses some of the major concerns in this respect.

---

<sup>124</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008.

<sup>125</sup> Interview European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008. Joint Progress Report, November 2008. EC Communication 'One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU partnership at work' (including EC working document), October 2008.

#### 4.4.1 Institutional build-up on the EU side

Despite the progress in setting up the institutional architecture, the process of coming to an understanding what this set-up implies in practice is still ongoing within the EU. The EC sees itself as playing “a pivotal role as the motor, facilitator and initiator of the implementation process”, at the same time as stressing that the implementation as such is a *shared responsibility* between the EC, the member states and the Council Secretariat. This type of arrangement is a new set up for the EU and the structure is difficult to adapt to. Still a year after the signing of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the roles are unclear and in the defining, while it is uncertain who carries the main responsibility. So far, few member states have been forthcoming, standing up for the task, but the majority has stayed passive. The EC, for the above reason, is unwilling to drive the process unilaterally. However, in view of the relative - political and financial<sup>126</sup> - inactivity of the member states, and of its normal leading role in administering the APF initiatives, it is possible that the EC will fall into taking a stronger lead than what was foreseen. Another example of the ambiguous set up is General Joana - from the Council Secretariat - coordinating and chairing the PS Implementation Team. This structure creates confusion, as Joana does not actually have the mandate to lead neither the Commission nor the member states. The same difficulty exists as for the relationship between the Africa Working Group and the Implementation Teams, where the former is meant to coordinate the latter – this arrangement has not yet settled. Another dilemma is that in practice, it is difficult for the Africa Working Group to have a detailed insight into all the different activities and priority actions in all the eight partnerships. The policy guidance from this actor therefore becomes limited, which makes it difficult to advance.<sup>127</sup>

A direct consequence of the set-up is that, in the Implementation teams, it is up to the individual member state to come with input and set the agenda as to what activities should be carried out. This input is likely to be an initiative that the member state has already pursued bilaterally, in some form. This has been the case in France’s bilateral Recamp now being europeanised, and in the case of Italy’s proposal of training African capacities in the civilian and police spheres. The confusion about roles and responsibilities has tended to develop into a situation where a particularly interested member state (often a big one) are likely to “hijack” other member states by using the Implementation Team as a channel to furthering their own interest. Initiatives that one or a few member states already have been involved in are driven through, and made visible for all

---

<sup>126</sup> EU instruments, such as the APF and the IFS, are intended to fund the initiatives in the PS Action Plan, however, the member states are also expected to participate with funding.

<sup>127</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008.

Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 25 and 28 November 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008.

member states. Thus, it is about strategic timing and seizing the opportunity to act – in the PS partnership, France, Italy and the UK have taken the lead. This happens at “the expense” of those more passive member states, who are not used to/have no interest in handling African peace and security initiatives, or, those member states who not yet have figured out in what way and for what benefit they could advance their peace and security initiatives through the EU. Certain member states feel comfortable to leave the responsibility in the hands of those parties active in Implementation Team, whereas others feel that the team members act too independently, with no interest in bringing other member states into the process. Probably because of this “confusion”/lack of awareness, very few of the member states present have contributed actively at the three Implementation Team meetings. Despite some member states seeing the absence of sincere European ownership here as a problem, there is no real insight among them of the need for taking their own initiative; no perception of the PS Partnership being the empty shell that the member states must help to fill with contents. Furthermore, the number of member states showing interest in the PS partnership has gone down – in practice leaving the agenda setting and the undertaking of activities largely to France, Italy, the UK, the EC and the Council Secretariat. Meanwhile, some of the active team members express clear frustration with the low interest of the other member states.<sup>128</sup>

#### **4.4.2 Institutional build-up on the African side**

Even if commitment exists at the AU level for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the PS partnership, a major challenge for the AUC is to mobilise African states and the RECs politically and financially. Little consensus exists within the AU on ways and means to achieve the objectives, as well as on the roles, responsibilities and contributions of the different players. Symptomatic of the weak mobilisation of the African states is their limited representation at the JEG meeting in November. From the meeting, it was apparent that the African Expert Group had not yet organised itself. It was unclear whether the group set-up had been decided upon and to what extent they had met ahead of the JEG meeting. Concrete work by the JEGs on the Priority Actions will thus be seriously hampered by the ineffective African working arrangements. Partly, this lack of commitment can be explained by limited awareness among the member states about the Joint Africa-EU Strategy project. However, there is also a lack of interest, which stems from a perception of not gaining anything out of participating in the PS partnership/African Expert Groups. This is especially the

---

<sup>128</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008. Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 25 November and 18 December 2008.

case in sub-Saharan Africa, where countries have to make other priorities due to the limited capacities and few resources at hand.<sup>129</sup>

Furthermore, the poor representation of the RECs in the JEG meeting is indicative of an underlying problem in the implementation process. Documents determining the relationship between the AU and the RECs are prevalent.<sup>130</sup> However, in practice, the sharing of responsibilities between these bodies is not clear. As in the case of member states, the AU has not done enough to spread information to the regions. Possibly, this might be due to a willingness within the AUC to take the lead before inviting the RECs – also to minimise the risk for “face loss” revealing their low preparedness and capacities.<sup>131</sup> There are also many reports of the REC liaison officers to the AU not being invited to meet with the AUC, the PSC etc.<sup>132</sup> However, the interest on the REC side in the PS partnership is also low, which at this point is rather understandable. With the continental structure being underdeveloped in terms of capacity, little incentives exist for the RECs to subordinate themselves to the AU. The AU is too weak to absorb input from either the RECs or the African states, and accordingly cannot take on a leadership/coordinating role. As an example, the AU is currently not able to administer those training programmes in which the RECs are to take part. For the more developed RECs in particular, it is difficult to relate to the AU as the overarching structure. This, together with a general political unwillingness to let go of power, make the RECs unmotivated in lending their loyalties and commitment to the AU.<sup>133 134</sup>

Another difficulty is that the pace of implementation has slowed down due to delays caused by the African side. The reasons for the delays are several – fundamental is the severe lack of human resources and capacities, for instance in the PSOD<sup>135</sup>. Organisational problems also hold back the implementation. Examples are internal competition between staff and units, inefficient lines of authorisation, and confusion as for the own and other units’ roles. A real problem is the African internal political sensitivities, which are often hard to fully grasp

---

<sup>129</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa), 25 November 2008.

<sup>130</sup> Two MoU:s on the division of labour between the AU and the RECs exist, one of which details the peace and security issues.

<sup>131</sup> Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008.

<sup>132</sup> FOI publication ‘Inside the African Peace and Security Architecture’ (forthcoming). Interview European Commission desk officers, November-December 2008.

<sup>133</sup> According to some, Alpha Omar Conaré was somewhat provocative in his efforts to awaken REC participation, which rather had the effect of further resistance among them (interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa), 25 November 2008).

<sup>134</sup> FOI publication ‘Inside the African Peace and Security Architecture’ (forthcoming)

<sup>135</sup> The PSOD consists of around ten people, and should have at least 200 staff members. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana’s team, 18 December 2008.

for the impatient European side.<sup>136</sup> The African ownership however prevents the Europeans from pushing the process further, leaving the EU having to accept “a state of wait and see”. This becomes even more problematic by the fact that often the European desk officers at the Council Secretariat do not have counterparts on the African side, due to the limited human resources situation.<sup>137</sup>

#### 4.4.3 The gap between ambitions and reality

Many people involved in the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy on the European side feel that the Action Plan is far too ambitious and consists of unrealistic expectations for the short time-frame of two years.<sup>138</sup> The gap between ambitions and capacity is felt as too wide. A specific problem is the earlier mentioned understaffing of the AU. Despite a partnership which emphasise a relation between equals, the relationship is unequal. The interest from the EU for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is huge. The European side also has more resources and capacities and is therefore eager to move on with the work. These unrealistic expectations give rise to frustrations when there is a delay from the African side. This leads to a risk for the EU to “push too much” for the implementation and put too much pressure on the African partners by overdoing things, such as preparing ready “lists of things to do”. However, due to its ownership of the process, the African side controls the pace. At the same time, a gap can also be noticed the other way round – with European member states not forthcoming with support to meet the African expectations in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.<sup>139</sup>

Cultural misunderstandings and different expectations also play a role in the hampering of the implementation process. For instance, it has been argued that a tendency can be noted for the African side to view the EU collaboration solely as an opportunity to have desired projects funded. The Europeans, on the other hand, are seen as less pragmatic, wanting to discuss political understanding and basic concepts, such as working together through sharing the responsibility and

<sup>136</sup> A concrete example is the delay in the employment of more personnel to the seriously understaffed PSOD. The lack of personnel in this unit makes it difficult to move on in the collaboration between the EU and the AU. (interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008).

<sup>137</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Military Staff Officer in General Joana’s team, 26 November 2008.

<sup>138</sup> The argument is widely heard that it would have made more sense to set fewer targets and proceed with one issue – taking small, careful steps rather than creating a long “shopping list” of actions. The underlying thought is that success in fewer areas would have a greater impact.

<sup>139</sup> Communication by Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit, March 2008. EU Council communiqué: the tenth Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, September 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa), 25 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008.



co-financing. At the same time, the African side tends to agree to most ideas that the European side proposes, as funds will be forthcoming. Awareness of different approaches is crucial in order to move forward. Cultural misunderstandings present a problem, for instance, in the work with needs analyses. The European interests and perspectives here do not always match the African paradigm. Even if both sides agree that there is a need, the initiative should be designed by Africans to fit their realities. This is also one explanation to why the African side often has moved slowly, as they are expected to adapt to European systems which do not correspond to the African culture, a concrete example being the set up of financial systems. Within the EU, few people have experience of the African context and do therefore not grasp African point of views. The consequence is collaboration programs which are too detached from local realities. An issue – and reason for delays and limited commitment – is that the African side might not be inclined to adopt the “ready-made” European designed initiatives. Solutions like “on-the-job-training”, where Africans and Europeans work side by side have not been much employed. Another obstacle has to do with the AU bureaucracy: in order to proceed on implementation issues, approval is needed from the AU top level officials. The time needed for this procedure is not taken into account by the European side. The time issue also causes problems in other respects. While it is seen as possible by the Europeans to build collaboration through emailing, quick field visits and one-day meetings, this lack of closer personal connections is not the African way of building a partnership.<sup>140</sup> Another problem is that the EU is not well aware of the African informal agenda, informal structures and the local context that the African side needs to take into account. Because of this, African states’ interests are not sufficiently analysed and taken into account. At the worst, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy risks creating formal structures that are empty, without neither African states nor local populations onboard.

A key problem is that - despite clear political ambitions having been stated - African and European citizens remain disconnected from the work within the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which is solely ongoing at the EU and the AU institutional levels. For instance, the EPLO/Virginie Giarmana has up till present not been invited to the PS Implementation Team meetings.<sup>141</sup> Ahead of the first JEG meeting, the EPLO issued a structured list of input and ideas, however, no feedback has yet been given. According to General Joana’s team, the role of the European civil society is not to lobby the EU, but to raise awareness of the Joint

---

<sup>140</sup> Interview European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building, 27 November 2008. Interview Interview Council Secretariat, DGE IX (civilian crisis management), 25 November 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana’s team, 18 December 2008, Military Staff Officer in General Joana’s team 26 November 2008.

<sup>141</sup> The EPLO/Virginie Giarmana received its first invitation for the January 2009 meeting of the Implementation Team.

Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership among its African counterparts – through informal channels, not by participating in the JEGs or other formal meetings. However, in reality, it proves difficult for EPLO to get the interest and time from African civil society in gaining general knowledge about “the PS partnership in far off Brussels/Addis”. Rather, a concrete topic/activity to collaborate on would be needed to incite more dedicated counterparts.<sup>142</sup> Neither the representative from the Interim Steering Group, nor the EPLO nor other Non-State Actor representatives were invited to the JEG meeting in Addis Ababa. There were also no parliamentary representatives. According to General Joana, the African side does not agree of the participation of Non-State Actors or parliaments in formal meetings. However, effort has also been limited during the two previous Presidencies to receive input from the civil society sector. Suspicions of adding too critical voices and further slowing down the implementation process, or being requested to make funds accessible, could be explanations for the EU inaction.<sup>143</sup>

Some sources argue that the reality in the field also includes problems of UN-EU coordination. For instance, in order to remedy the acute lack of staff in PSOD, a number of UN officers are present within the AU. This implies, in practice, a situation that resembles a partnership rather between the UN and the EU than the AU-the EU. However, the relationship between the UN and the EU in Addis Ababa is more characterised by competition than by complementarity. On top of this, AU staff in general has a high esteem of the UN – apart from wanting employment in the UN, they see to a great extent the UN as “the standard organisation” and are inspired to model their organisation after the UN.<sup>144</sup> Coordination, and concrete cooperation with international partners – such as the UN – is in the future intended to take place at the level of the PS partnership.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> A way to engage the sub-Saharan civil society is to discuss the Cotonou Agreement. Civil society members have shown concern as for what will happen to this agreement during the next revision.

<sup>143</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana.

Interview EPLO focal point Peace and Security Partnership, 18 December 2008.

<sup>144</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana’s team, 18 December 2008.

<sup>145</sup> Joint Progress Report, November 2008.

## 5 Why engaging in African peace and security?

As accounted for in the previous chapter, several ambitious initiatives have been initiated to address peace and security issues in Africa. On top of this, activities have also been started up within the seven other partnerships of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy. The initial overview of EU's increasing engagement in Africa in this millennium (chapter 2) adds to the impression of a major European venture into the African continent in the last few years. Is it possible to make out what the driving forces are behind this zeal? In this chapter, the interests and the level of motivation of the EU and its member states to engage in the EU peace and security work/the PS partnership are analysed. As will be shown, the level of motivation among the member states has clear implications for how the implementation of the PS partnership is proceeding.

### 5.1 The EU level

Explanations for the renewed EU commitment to Africa can be found on several levels.<sup>146</sup> This section does not provide an exhaustive review of literature on the topic, but rather highlights some possible explanatory factors. Historical and geographical closeness are factors that facilitate the rebuilding of relations between the two continents today. In addition to this, the EU has had special ties with Africa since the EU/European Community inception, as the EG's early steps as external actor was directed towards Africa.<sup>147</sup> However, during the Cold War, the interest in Africa dropped within an EU that was also occupied with its own integration process. Africa stayed off the agenda of security policy the years following the Cold War, with the general belief that a new peaceful era had arrived.

After some years, however, a number of changes in the global geo-political climate gave rise to new political and economic interests of the EU. Threats in terms of terrorist attacks, climate change and migration movements became more immediate and led to the realisation that a new focus on the nexus between security and development was needed. With the insight that the EU and Africa share the same challenges, the idea that Africa cannot be ignored gained ground. The EU needed a stable Africa in order to protect itself and to address the threats in a better manner. The big scale of economic, security and governance challenges provoked the EU to take a bigger perspective. For instance, this has

---

<sup>146</sup> This section builds on Kotsopoulos 2007, Chevalier 2007, ECDPM 2006, Issue paper 1, the European Security Strategy.

<sup>147</sup> Kotsopoulos 2007.

been manifested through the attachment of conditions on democracy and good governance to the EU trade and aid development, as well as the EU readiness to share its security capacity skills with Africa as a way to assist this continent to deal with its conflicts.

Another key explanation for the EU interest in strengthening the relations with Africa is, as expected, this continent's abundance of natural resources. Europe needs security of supply; a case in point is the major issue of energy security. Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and to Europe's disadvantageous dependency on Russia. The EU's intensified work with Africa can also be seen as the result of a feeling that it could be about to "miss the boat". Major players such as China, India - and the US - are competing for influence, access to natural resources and trading benefits in Africa, often through offering advantageous development packages. Furthermore, even if the African market is marginal for the EU, the EU is Africa's biggest trading partner.<sup>148</sup> It is important for the EU to keep this position to ensure influence on the continent. A further motivation for EU's involvement is the concern that possible effects of China's approach for development assistance in Africa might in the long run be a more unstable continent, or at least a less democratic one.

Explanations for the EU's zeal to engage in Africa can also be traced in its internal development process into a full-fledged union. With the latest decade of deepening EU integration, the member states have come together and coordinated their standpoints, which include ambitions for a greater political role on the international scene. Also a general consensus on how to deal with Africa has emerged. Parallel to this, the extending EU integration has led to birth of the CSFP and the ESDP. The European Security Strategy from 2003 manifests the the member states' harmonised views – something which was a precondition for acting. Once the EU knew where it stood, there was an urge to try the ideas in practice. In other words, with the EU expanding its range of foreign policy capabilities, the willingness to use them followed. Africa is the opportunity – an ideal incubator, some argue - to develop greater EU coherence in foreign policy making and to further improve the external relations' capacity. Africa is also an arena in which the EU can fulfil its commitments under the 2003 Joint EU-UN Declaration on Crisis Management, and where the battle-groups concept could start to be implemented. The risk with internal development as a key motivational factor is that the assessment whether engagement - the implementation of initiatives - does not always put first a clear analysis of whether these initiatives are beneficial in the long run. Inherent in an integration process is a will to test itself, and to grow stronger through acting and taking on an external role.

---

<sup>148</sup> This concerns Africa South of the Sahara. The US and China are, respectively, Africa's second and third biggest trading partners (Economist Intelligence Unit web site: 'Africa Economy – Waiting for an Industrial Revolution', July 2008).

Concerning integration processes, the EU's renewed engagement in Africa stems not only from its own unification. It is also a result of the birth of the AU and the regional integration development in Africa. Thus, a proper chance for effective EU involvement is now present. Increased African engagement gives the EU a chance to play a role as a power on the international scene. When it comes to the EU's high international development commitments to Africa, these also help the EU to achieve a position of influence, through gaining credit as "the best student". This strengthens the EU in relation to other western powers, such as the US. Finally, in addition to power-based interests, it is also likely that there is a sense of responsibility among EU member states for Africa, with the EU being the largest donor and the largest trading bloc in the world.

## **5.2 The member states**

Even if the EU has common interests in Africa, as described in the previous section, a closer look at different member states reveals policy disparities within the union in relation to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the PS partnership. For the major implementation initiatives, it is possible to distinguish an individual EU member state as a driving force. The member states that are most active in the PS Partnership are France, the UK and Italy. France and Italy together lead APSA issues. Apart from Euro Recamp, France is in charge of military crisis management in general, while Italy specifically takes the lead for civilian crisis management and the police aspect. The UK heads the financing work in collaboration with the Commission. The motivation of the member states in taking the lead on certain initiatives – and for pushing for certain activities – is an interesting area to explore. It could also be of interest to trace when – and why – the member states choose to advance their initiatives through the EU, and when – and why – they prefer to pursue certain initiatives outside the EU, on a bilateral basis. This topic is too complex to examine in depth in this report, however, some initial thoughts are given below.

### **5.2.1 Member states active in the PS partnership**

Concerning motivations for the member states to run their peace and security initiatives inside the EU channels, several explanations can be found. From a general perspective, it can be assumed to be more efficient to carry out initiatives jointly between member states. It is also more cost-effective to coordinate and run initiatives jointly through EU channels, especially since funds such as the APF etc can be accessed. The key point is whether the member states feel that they have something to win from taking an initiative through the EU. One example would be when a member state is motivated to expand a specific peace and security topic of interest and to take a certain project to a higher level.

The case of Italy is illustrative. A number of reasons can be noted for this member state making major efforts in the PS Implementation Team. Having identified a space where the Italians have expertise<sup>149</sup> (military police and civilian dimension), and “discovering” the gap that needs to be filled, Italy has seized the opportunity to proceed with its project. This is a chance for Italy to profile itself and increase its status and role among the member states. Italy specifically points to its leading role in Europe concerning educational instances for the civilian and police dimensions in PSOs, one of which is the ESPU centre in Vicenza. Furthermore, carrying the proposal forward ensures that Italian educational institutions and facilities will be fully occupied – its resources at hand will be used - and be assured of incoming funds. In this particular case, the involvement of a committed project leader<sup>150</sup>, who is well connected politically in Italy and who has a personal interest in realising the initiative, is also of importance. A point of departure for the Italian engagement in the PS Implementation Team is ex-Prime Minister Prodi’s emphasis to carry out initiatives through the EU, which is still felt in Italy. Despite Italy’s multilateral emphasis, Italy also pursues bilateral efforts in the Horn of Africa, due to historical and strategic reasons.<sup>151</sup> There is a specific interest in directing extra security efforts to this African region<sup>152</sup>, and Italy is also chair of ‘Friends of IGAD’.<sup>153</sup>

The British government has clearly expressed that peace and security in Africa is one of its higher priorities, and the UK has a real interest in stability in Africa.<sup>154</sup> Among other efforts, the UK provides substantial policy development support to the AU, as well as training and capacity building support to individual ASF contributor nations and to the RECs. However, the British are also engaged multilaterally. The UK is the biggest financial contributor to the Amani Africa initiative. To some extent, this is likely to stem from a wish of the British to exercise certain control over this French driven initiative. The UK decision to take the lead for the funding mechanism in the Implementation Team can also be seen as a move to secure their control and the direction of the peace and security discussion within the EU, as well as their influence over the agenda-setting. The British involvement in the PS Implementation Team also comes from the fact that the UK was a rather obvious candidate to fill the need for a lead country for the funding aspect. The British have substantial experience in the security-development nexus, which has stimulated their thinking of ideas about how to

---

<sup>149</sup> The Italians has a long tradition of having a “tough” military police force, the Carabinieri. Italy also occupies a chief role in the European Gendarmerie Force. These are experiences that would be useful to transfer to future PSOs.

<sup>150</sup> Professor Andrea De Guttry.

<sup>151</sup> Many connections still exist between Italy and the Horn, for instance through the Somali and Ethiopian diasporas.

<sup>152</sup> An Italian Peace Fund of Eur 40 million, financing peace and security initiatives, is in place.

<sup>153</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008.

<sup>154</sup> Interview UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 26 November 2008.

support peace and security initiatives, not the least financial support for PSOs.<sup>155</sup> The UK is by some seen as more active in New York than in Brussels as concerns peace and security issues. It is often argued that the UK feels a stronger affiliation with the UN than the EU, thus rather seeing a development of the DPKO than the peace and security initiatives of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

As concerns France, it has already ensured a role both in the agenda setting and in the implementation process through the Euro Recamp initiative, for which they are framework nation. In the case of France, its strategic interest and willingness to maintain influence in Africa has for several years been clear. In many peoples' eyes, this interest has been too clear. As a consequence, France now judges it more beneficial to decrease the accent on bilateral initiatives (at least publicly). Lately, President Sarkozy has attempted to transfer some of France's foreign policy for Africa into EU channels. The key example is obviously the europeanisation of the Recamp, and it is hardly a coincidence that it has become the most advanced and elaborated initiative in the PS partnership. For France, it is perceived as necessary to have the support of other member states in their undertakings, to obtain more legitimacy and also to reduce costs that have been high for this ambitious military collaboration initiative. In addition, France has had high expenditure for their participation in PSOs, and therefore is keen to see the functioning of the ASF.<sup>156</sup>

### **5.2.2 Some explanations for member state inactivity**

The picture is even more complex when it comes to reasons for limited interest in furthering initiatives through the EU/PS partnership. The reluctance to lose autonomy over spheres of interest is an important factor. Former colonial powers - such as the UK and France (and to a smaller extent Italy) - have long relationships, historical and cultural ties with certain African states. Obviously, these European countries retain spheres of interest corresponding to their former holdings. In these spheres, the member states have low interest in using multi-lateral channels and in losing autonomy over its initiatives and its funding. Collaborating on an initiative with a bigger number of member states can also become complex and complicated. Specifically where strategic interest is prevalent, being exposed to critical opinions from several different ministries is not desired by the initiator of the initiative.

Another challenge is to break ingrained patterns. For instance, member states such as the UK and Germany already have well established channels for their bilateral initiatives – including peace and security related ones. Having these “development industries” or “aid cooperation systems” in place, well-functioning

---

<sup>155</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana's team, 18 December 2008.

<sup>156</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa), 25 November 2008.

and with a good reputation, the incentive to cut down and re-engage through the EU channel is not necessarily attractive at first sight. This would mean that their established positive visibility would be undermined. Another aspect is that among certain member states representatives in the field, there is often some extent of established coordination in place. The EU, on the other hand, is not necessarily seen as a given coordination body, but rather as an independent development assistance actor.

A hampering issue for the PS partnership is also that there is likely to be a perception among the member states that engaging on a bilateral basis is more flexible and efficient. Adapting its systems to the EU guidelines and project management system, as well as moving over bilateral projects to the PS partnership framework, is perceived to be complicated and bureaucratic.<sup>157</sup> Scepticism about slow results and a difficult project target – the AU – is also prevalent. There is a general disbelief about the EU structure being enough developed to administer peace and security initiatives. There is also a frequent view of the PS Implementation Team not being able to offer anything concrete at this stage. Thus, the member states are likely to first want to see proof of EU peace and security initiatives being implemented and monitored in an efficient and coordinated manner.

However, in addition to the above, a key reason for member state inactivity appear to be the lack of awareness of the possibilities to "market" and to run their (presently bilateral) initiatives through the EU – including the prospect to get assistance with the financing issue and to benefit from a pool of network (capacities/skills, expertise, resources). In some cases, the member states feel alienated with the present focus of the initiatives – such as Euro Recamp – not realising that it is possible to choose to emphasise more "soft" peace and security issues. At other times, poor internal communication in the member states' administration is the real obstacle. Insufficient coordination and understanding between the capital and the representations in Brussels is a frequent problem. Often, the ministry/agency staff in charge of the peace and security initiative is not aware of the possibilities to channel it through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership, while the representation, or ministry staff working on security related EU issues, are not aware of those peace and security initiatives that are undertaken by the own state. The lack of member states' human resources with direct focus on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership is an obvious problem in this respect.<sup>158</sup>

---

<sup>157</sup> For instance, when a project is to be financed through the APF or the IfS, there must first be a formal request for the project from the African side (interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008).

<sup>158</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa), 25 November 2008. Interview European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility, 28 November 2008. Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 18 December 2008. Interview Permanent Representation of



In short, the different security policies, emphasis and geographical orientation between the member states is one reason for why the PS partnership has not taken off as desired. However, if former colonial countries do not want to lose sovereignty of their initiatives, and Nordic countries - and other development assistance orientated member states<sup>159</sup> - feel alienated due to the so far “hard security” profile of the PS partnership, there are prospects of the former eastern Europe countries to become important players. These new member states do not yet have very established ambitions towards Africa, but will in the coming future potentially see interest in building a peace and security policies for this continent. Mobilising their interest in participating actively in the PS partnership could be a way forward.<sup>160</sup>

### **5.2.3 The need for tri-presidency coordination**

With the Czech Republic and Spain taking the Presidency before and after Sweden, the level of motivation and the approach of these member states towards the PS partnership merit a closer look. The current Presidency, the Czech Republic, participates in the PS Implementation Team meetings, but claims that being a small member state it does not have the ambition to take a particular role. On the other hand, the Czechs have taken steps to be informed about developments. Among other thing, the Czech Republic has requested a specific briefing by the chair of the PS Implementation Team, General Joana. Furthermore, the Czech Permanent Representation in Brussels was one of the few that participated in the JEG meeting in Addis Ababa. For upcoming seminars and meetings, for instance within the Amani Africa/Eurorecamp, the Czechs will be acting as co-chair, to stress the EU-dimension. However, the strategy will be to play a low key role with the intention to underline the African ownership. However, in order not to appear as passive, the Czech will consider offering logistical support when needed, for instance to the Council Secretariat ahead of the Amani Africa/Euro Recamp Contributors’ Conference. As concerns African ownership, the Czech Embassy in Addis Ababa will play a role in encouraging the AU PSC to take on responsibilities. However, a key Czech concern is how to balance between African ownership and to keep the Joint Africa-EU Strategy moving. To keep the momentum of the ambitious French Presidency is a specific challenge for the Czechs, especially in view of the upcoming strategy mid-term review in April. To deal with this challenge, the Czech Republic will make efforts to put spotlight

---

Spain to the EU, 15 December 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana, 18 December 2008, Political Advisor in General Joana’s team, 18 December 2008.

<sup>159</sup> Here it is referred to those countries that traditionally emphasise good governance, civil society, human rights, democracy, gender issues and similar.

<sup>160</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana’s team, 18 December 2008.

on obstacles to the proceeding of the strategy process. A specific priority for the PS Partnership will be to bring attention to the issue of low commitment/presence of the AU and the RECs. The Czechs will also consider pushing for the adoption of new declarations of commitment to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy during the Troika. The Czech Republic will to a great extent use the possibility to ask for advice from General Joana and the EC on how they can contribute.

Spain, on the other hand, presently has no specific plan for the furthering of the PS partnership. At the same time, the Spanish Representation in Brussels appears very keen on starting preparations for its Presidency and very open to dialogue with Sweden on what initiatives can/should be done or followed up by Spain. The maximum level of ambition for the PS partnership, however, appears to be to do enough just to keep the partnership alive. This approach largely stems from difficulties perceived by the Representation in awakening interest and mobilising support from the understaffed capital for Joint Africa-EU Strategy issues. The general Spanish approach is to rely on input from Joana's team and especially from the EC.<sup>161</sup> For collaboration to take place within the PS issues, it appears to be needed for Stockholm to take a first step in initiating contact with Madrid. On the other hand, mobilising funds from Madrid does not seem to be a major obstacle, and the possibility to fund Amani Africa/Euro Recamp is not excluded by the Representation. Concerning the Italian civilian-police training proposal, there is currently very little awareness – but a positive attitude - at the Spanish Representation. The issue is of clear interest for Spain and it appears suitable that they have a role in carrying this proposal further: collaboration between Italian and Spanish police forces in developing crisis management capabilities is already ongoing in another European forum (the European Gendarmerie Force). Spain disposes of the Guardia Civil, which would be a well suited resource to use.<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>161</sup> The EC is perceived as a stakeholder with much resources and power concerning Africa.

<sup>162</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU, 16 December 2008.  
Interview Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU, 15 December 2008.

## 6 Swedish Presidency – issues to follow

The previous chapters have provided an orientation of the major current initiatives in the PS partnership. Implementation challenges have been discussed, as well as the positions and the motivations of different member states. The difficulties in the start up of the PS Action Plan have thereby emerged. Against this background, this chapter will underline some issues and initiatives to be followed up during the Swedish Presidency. Comments in this respect will first be provided separately for each of the Priority Actions, after which issues of general relevance will be considered.

### 6.1 Priority Action 1: Enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security

During the Swedish Presidency, a number of meetings will take place with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership in focus, for instance the JEG meeting (autumn 2009), the AU PSC-EU PSC meeting (before September 2009), the College-to-College meeting (around October 2009) and the Ministerial Troika (around November 2009). Furthermore, agenda planning for the new Action Plan and the summit in Libya in 2010 would start during the Presidency. It appears as a good strategy to follow the Czech decision to organise the JEG meetings before the Troika – and if possible, before the College-to-College and the PSC-PSC meetings. In this way, substance can be timely fed into these meetings. An important point is to work to ensure the involvement of the RECs in the JEG meeting<sup>163</sup>, in particular through contacts with the REC liaison officers.<sup>164</sup>

As has been mentioned, delays and other difficulties are hindering the smooth moving forward of the implementation for all the different initiatives. In this context, the need for time and patience should be recalled. Specifically, it should be reminded that the partnership does not only include advancing all the technical initiatives and activities listed under Priority Action 2. When being unable to move forward on a concrete initiative, it can be useful to somewhat take a step back and instead *put more emphasis on the spirit of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership*. Sweden should draw on the prevalence of a political

---

<sup>163</sup> Another vital issue is for the JEG to establish an implementation roadmap, specifying how and when initiatives are to take place, who are the driving actors, what are the financial contributions, expected outcomes, and benchmarks used to measure progress – a clarification of these matters is a critical input to the Troika.

<sup>164</sup> More information about the JEGs can be found in the Guidelines for Joint Expert Groups, November 2008.

commitment to collaborate, and set this ball in motion. In practice, this means making the European and African sides work together, address common concerns and agree on common positions. In this context, it could be of use for the EU to show a willingness to learn from its African partners, for instance in meetings between European and African mediators, or to receive African input on post-conflict situations in Europe. This could create a goodwill and respect that the EU might need after pushing specific initiatives too hard. At the same time, it would give Europeans insights on how to work along African systems. These general issues mentioned under Priority Action 1 are also less controversial, and advancing on them can blow new energy into the other parts of the implementation process. Thus, to suggest concrete areas to work on within Priority Action 1 can be a task for the Swedish presidency. Sweden should also stress the need for patience and reducing expectations – to encourage the understanding that not having implemented all initiatives by 2010 is not a failure. The initial urge to get the implementation to kick off is likely to slow down from the French to the Czech Presidency. Furthermore, the input for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership will most probably be limited also during the Spanish Presidency. It is thus an important and well-timed contribution for Sweden to keep the perception among the stakeholders that the PS partnership is still alive.

## **6.2 Priority Action 2: Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture**

During the Swedish Presidency, at least two activities of high importance<sup>165</sup> will take place within the Amani Africa initiative: the Political-Strategic Seminar and the Strategic Conference. There is also a possibility that the AU Mission HQ MAPEX will fall in the beginning of the Swedish Presidency. Sweden will be holding opening talks at these seminars/conferences, summarising the progress so far, highlighting challenges ahead, outlining the future agenda etc.<sup>166</sup> High level people will be present and adequate Swedish ministerial representation and Swedish EU representatives will be expected. Apart from this, the role of Sweden will be to take care of the protocol and to monitor the developments. Nothing is expected in terms of logistical responsibilities, however, apparently support with practical arrangements could be offered. Also depending on priorities and interest in Amani Africa, Sweden could consider whether a sectoral Troika should be organised between ministers relevant for the Amani Africa initiative. A topic of discussion would be how to take the Euro Recamp further

---

<sup>165</sup> These activities are important, as concrete outputs will have to be produced as a preparation for the CPX.

<sup>166</sup> Possibly, Sweden could push for these seminars to be held in the regions, instead of in Addis Ababa.

after the CPX in 2010. However, there has previously been reluctance from the African side for the sectoral troikas<sup>167</sup>; the success of any such initiative will be largely dependent on who the current AU President is. If wanting to highlight the importance of Amani Africa, offering direct support of an identified activity, funding, or technical support is a possibility. This could also be a way to spur further interest from other member states. Joana's team has expressed the opinion that concrete action would be an even more interesting contribution from Sweden than funding.<sup>168</sup> The specific need for support will be detailed at the Contributors' Conference in early February,<sup>169</sup> where Sweden will need to have adequate representation. The preparation conference and the actual CPX do not require any input from Sweden. A distinct need within the Amani Africa is for a member state to step in to fill the vacant position civilian expert in the Eurorecamp Team.<sup>170</sup>

As concerns the other initiatives discussed in this report within Priority Action 2, there is a great need for member states to assist as trainers at African training centres.<sup>171</sup> This is an opportunity for the Swedish military to play a role and to gain useful experience of working with African partners in the field. Sweden has the capacity to carry out Integrated Mission trainings at African training centres. Concerning Italy's proposal of training of the civilian and police elements of the ASF, the matching phase should just be finalised at the time when Sweden takes over the Presidency. The next issue following will be to decide upon the elaboration of the actual EU training support programme, considering the findings of the field study. Discussions will concern what kind of support is the most relevant and efficient for the selected training centres, what the best method is for delivering the EU support, as well as identify a programme budget and time frame for implementation. A role for Sweden would be to drive the discussions further and make sure the project does not stall.<sup>172</sup> Liaison with Spain to explore its interest in continuing work on this initiative would be beneficial. It could also be appropriate for Sweden to come with input on the political considerations for the implementation, giving views on how to implement the proposal in practice, including the funding possibilities. Concrete suggestions from General Joana

---

<sup>167</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU, 15 December 2008.

<sup>168</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana's team, 18 December 2008.

<sup>169</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana, 18 December 2008, Political Advisor in General Joana's team, 18 December 2008. French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 17 December 2008.

<sup>170</sup> This person would be detached to Creil, France, at least a few days a week.

<sup>171</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Military Staff Officer in General Joana's team, 26 November 2008.

<sup>172</sup> There are several reasons for this risk: lack of interest and commitment by member states, little involvement in the PS Implementation Team, delays on the African side caused by political sensitivities or lack of capacity, the issue not being sufficiently addressed and discussed during the JEG meetings etc.

include Sweden putting spotlight on topics of concern for the implementation of the Italian initiative, such as the absence of a humanitarian aid coordination body<sup>173</sup> in the AU, or ways of merging different African judicial systems (French and British tradition). General Joana also expressed interest in Sweden organising a seminar on priorities for police officers.<sup>174</sup> After the support programme has been decided upon, the next step will be concrete training preparation. This phase will probably require less contribution from Sweden. Regarding the funding of this initiative, Finland has shown interest.<sup>175</sup> A possible Nordic collaboration on this issue could be explored.

### **6.3 Priority Action 3: Predictable funding for Africa-led Peace Support Operations**

Priority Action 3, the funding mechanism for future PSOs, will be of current interest by the time of the Swedish Presidency. During summer 2009, the UNSC is likely to decide on the recommendations of the panel. The timing would thus be good for Sweden to put spotlight on the issue and lift the debate. A concrete suggestion could be to invite somebody from the panel, as well as representatives from the PS Implementation Team (the UK at the minimum) and from the African side in order to further a discussion on the different recommendations. The debate could also be a good opportunity for Sweden to share its thoughts on the future of the APF and the EU's own mechanisms for supporting PSOs. Within Priority Action 3, the great need to support the development of financial systems and capacities of the administrative staff should be continued by Swedish partners. Side by side "on the job training" is a method worth emphasising.

### **6.4 Enable adequate Swedish engagement in the Peace and Security partnership**

A key recommendation is for Sweden to take concrete steps to make possible an active following of the Africa Peace and Security work. Presently, Sweden does not have the human resources needed to follow the PS partnership implementation sufficiently, neither Amani Africa nor other initiatives. Nobody at the Swedish representation in Brussels has the field Peace and Security in Africa as its specific mandate. With the issues Africa, security and development falling on different desk officers, gaps are created. The very few personnel charged with

---

<sup>173</sup> Corresponding to ECHO or OCHA.

<sup>174</sup> Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana, 18 December 2008.

<sup>175</sup> Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 25 November 2008.

this specific responsibility are based in Stockholm, which makes it difficult to have an updated overview over the ongoing activities within the EU. In Addis Ababa, the Swedish Embassy has recently reinforced its staff to make possible an active following of peace and security issues on the African regional level. However, no corresponding position exists in Brussels for the vital coordinating EU perspective. Therefore, a proposal would be to provide for personnel dealing solely with Africa/Peace and Security within the Joint Africa-EU Strategy framework. These posts would include an ambassador who would sit in the Implementation Team and participate in the JEG meetings, and preferably be travelling between Brussels, Addis Ababa and Stockholm with a certain freedom to engage on concrete implementation issues. The timing for employing specific staff following the PS partnership is right. There is a need to keep up to date with – and prepare Sweden for - what is upcoming especially within the major Amani Africa initiative. Engaging Africa/PS staff would also make it easier to identify possibilities for Swedish input to the PS partnership, and facilitate the matching of Swedish resources and interest with the EU-Africa need.

Involvement in the PS Implementation Team is a window of opportunity to profile Sweden, while putting existing Swedish capacities/resources to use. Active engagement is an occasion to define the PS partnership after what Sweden is already doing – for instance, emphasising the more “soft” issues in Priority Action 1 as a complement to the so far focus on the operationalisation of APSA/Priority Action 2. In other words, this means promoting what Sweden sees as peace and security priorities, and to market those initiatives where Sweden has a good track record. Taking advantage of the – so far, little used - EU coordination channel is Sweden’s concrete chance to influence and participate in setting the agenda as to what the Africa peace and security initiatives should consist of. The PS Implementation Team is, thus, a channel that Sweden can use to further political dialogue within the EU and with Africa. According to the Swedish official rhetoric, both Africa and Peace and Security are priorities. Moreover, Sweden has good reputation abroad for – and could be argued to identify itself with – its emphasis on peace and security work, through the UN and other organisations. At the same time, there is a long tradition of engaging in African development. However, the sincere intention of policies and rhetoric need to be shown in action at the EU level, something which can be achieved if ensuring human resources and if reviving the political will for acting on peace and security. The scope and the size of a pursued initiative is not key in this context – ambitions for Sweden cannot be the same as those of the big member states, and a small concrete intervention would be sufficient – but rather the timing for intervention is crucial. The spotlights will be on Sweden during the Presidency. Thus, taking the upcoming opportunity to (continue to) be a role model for other countries is prudent, also considering the benefits of maintaining the goodwill achieved due to earlier peace and security action. Remaining passive about the Africa/PS topic means risking to lose some important credibility for the future,

also in other forums. However, as there is still room in the PS Implementation Team<sup>176</sup>, and there is still time before the Swedish Presidency begins, the timing is most favourable for taking a specific peace and security topic of our concern further. If this is not considered doable, employing PS/Africa staff would still be useful, in order to keep Sweden more informed and take on a clearer profile for the future as concerns this field. To start with, Sweden should increase its involvement in the PS Implementation Team as soon as possible, as this is a prerequisite to be up to date with the developments.<sup>177</sup>

## 6.5 Possibilities for concrete Swedish input

The AU's peace and security work suffers from underdevelopment of the civilian aspects. Sweden has experience on the civil-military collaboration that should be put to use. For instance, Sweden could (through FOI, the Folke Bernadotte Academy/FBA etc) offer to do a follow-up to the ongoing civilian/police training needs assessment - a further mapping -, a desire which has been expressed by EU desk officers. Another concrete area to work on would be a bilateral effort to ensure some of the much needed civilian staff for the PSOD.<sup>178</sup> The potential of the Swedish Armed Forces in training the African side on integrated missions has already been mentioned, as has the vacancy of the civilian post in the Eurorecamp team. In short, there is scope for Sweden to take a role in civilian-military collaboration issues; to carve out this area as one of our specialities. As Finland appears to have shown interest in taking action on civilian-military issues, the possibility to take joint action through the Nordic defence cooperation should be considered.

As mentioned previously, there are activity areas within Priority Action 1 which are in line with the Swedish profile. A small scope, clearly definable and doable initiative is the facilitation of exchange of experience between African and EU high level mediators.<sup>179</sup> This kind of initiative would be symbolic and give much visibility – for Sweden as a country, for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and for EU-Africa relations, as well as in illustrating the possibilities to fund new peace and security initiatives through the PS partnership. Plans are in the pipeline for a joint Africa-EU workshop for mediators in the second half of 2009. The planning (by the EC) of this workshop is still at the early stages; funding has not been secured,

---

<sup>176</sup> The implementation structure and the positions are still not written in stone.

<sup>177</sup> An increased involvement in the PS Implementation Team does not mean that Sweden has to take a presiding role – the chair function is carried out by General Joana.

<sup>178</sup> See the recent German funding of PSOD police staff.

<sup>179</sup> An alternative would be to also arrange some activities for local Africans mediators in connection to the focus on high level mediators. This would serve to strengthen and underline the vital bottom-up approach/mobilisation of local leaders in the mediation of African conflicts (interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/General Joana, 18 December 2008).



there is so far no African request and a task team has not yet been set up. Apart from providing funding, Sweden can explore ways to cooperate on this initiative with the EC, which is keen to provide support; General Joana's team also has a supportive approach.<sup>180</sup> Various proposals for mediation seem to be available among the member states, which could be put together as a comprehensive suggestion by Sweden/the EU to the African side. Furthermore, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Peace and Conflict Department/Uppsala University and the Crisis Management Initiative are some of the nearby institutions with mediation expertise, which could be the structure used as a basis for Swedish input into the mediation initiative.<sup>181</sup> Apart from being EU-channelled (and partly EU-funded) such a mediation initiative would in the future also need to be part of some sort of EU mediation structure, in order to be a lasting contribution. Presently, a proposal to strengthen the EUSR role in mediation is being looked at – possibly, this could be a relevant structure.

Currently, Sweden is funding the AUC with a grant that is used to organise meetings of the Steering Committee for a SALW project, which works on elaborating a SALW strategy. However, this project – which fits in under Priority Action 1 activities - is administered solely by the EC. More Swedish input, such as sharing of relevant project experiences and opinions, is welcomed by the EC. This could be a way to strengthen the EU connection/channelling of a project that is already initiated by Sweden.<sup>182</sup> Other suggestions of Swedish prioritised peace and security initiatives for the AU and the RECs, to be channelled through the EU, could be identified through dialogue with SIDA.

## **6.6 Provide assistance to the PS Implementation Team**

An area of key concern for the implementation of the PS Action Plan is the lack of coordination of activities carried out by different partners. To 'strengthen coherence between...all relevant actors' is an initiative listed under Priority Action 2. As mentioned previously, the present efforts to map what is being done by who in what fields is marred by a general confusion and poor communication between the parties involved. A real contribution by Sweden would be a clear, systematic overview of partners' peace and security interventions. The practical approach in establishing such an overview could be to focus on those partners

---

<sup>180</sup> A somewhat noted tendency is that General Joana is more focused on Priority Action 2/the APISA, while Daniela Diccorado at the EC more emphasises Priority Action 1. However, in the specific case of mediation, General Joana is also positive towards Sweden taking a role.

<sup>181</sup> Other resources recommended by General Joana is <http://www.essec-irene.com> and <http://www.wilsoncenter.org>

<sup>182</sup> Interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008.

interested in the PS partnership – mainly France, Italy, the UK, Finland, Austria, the EC and Sweden. A study which maps the different systems for peace and security interventions in these countries and produces a realistic assessment of the possibilities for coordination - including the identification of political sensitivities for coordination - would facilitate communication and be a much needed contribution. Another Swedish contribution, welcomed by the EC, would be to focus the mapping on a specific area of interest for Sweden, such as mediation, early warning, gender etc. It could also be valuable to focus the mapping on assistance to training centres, as this is a current priority area for the EU and an area where member states have been very active. Assistance in this process could be offered to the ongoing efforts of General Joana's team.<sup>183</sup> Such an overview would help spreading the support to different training centres and ensure different target areas, and thereby prevent them from developing into donor driven institutions. With coordinated training assistance, the expertise and money can be used more effectively. Having identified gaps where complementary support is needed, the involvement of member states not traditionally active in Africa could be fostered through the means of the EU coordination channel. Donors' local coordination mechanisms, such as Friends of EASBRIG, could be brought to the PS Implementation Team to make the support visible to all EU member states and thereby achieve further donor harmonisation. A specific dilemma is that too many donors approach the AU to offer assistance. As has been shown, the AU does not have the capacity to absorb these individual offers, rather, it takes the staff's concentration away from the current work. Another dilemma is that too much bilateral funding from EU member states to African states – ex training of troops – will undermine the building of the continental level. An overview would help establish the balance between the complementary roles of the bilateral and the AU/REC directed support.

## 6.7 Agenda-setting during the Presidency

A few issues would merit specific attention during the Swedish Presidency. As a point of departure, Sweden should encourage regular PS Implementation Team meetings and emphasise the need for better communication and information exchange between the present PS Implementation Team members and other member states.

A key issue to put on the agenda is the relation between the AU, the RECs and the African states, being crucial for the survival of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy project. The AU is no more than its member states, and needs more support from them to be able to strengthen its capacity. Furthermore, the new AUC needs to rapidly achieve concrete results in order to gain the trust among the African

---

<sup>183</sup> Desk officers at the Council Secretariat expressed the need for a complement to General Joana's overview of training centres.

stakeholders. An important contribution during the Presidency would be to put lights on how these critical issues can be furthered, and to follow up the Czech agenda-setting in this respect. Examples of topics to explore could be information campaigns for RECs and African states, or the support to AU (PSO) salary systems to make the AU attractive for its members. In practical terms, Sweden should upgrade its current development cooperation in order to support the relations between the AU, the RECs and African states. In the dialogue with those African states and RECs that Sweden has good cooperation with, Sweden should strongly encourage them to join up in small teams - for instance, two to three countries, or two RECs - and work together on specific issues within the JEG. This kind of motivating/convincing bottom-up approach complements the top-down approach of calling attention to the issue during Troikas.<sup>184</sup>

Another role for the Swedish presidency could be to suggest creative ways and means to involve African and European citizens (civil society, parliaments) in the implementation process. To 'establish and empower an EU-African civil society network capable of supporting peace and security initiatives' is one of the initiatives listed under Priority Action 2. However, the involvement of the citizens is one of the areas of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy where very little progress has been achieved. African and European ministers have stated that first consultative discussions should be held with key Non-State Actors (NSAs) before spring 2009.<sup>185</sup> Sweden, having an active civil society, has legitimacy in this area. For instance, the EPLO, which has a pool of credible NGOs with a peace and security profile, should be encouraged to come with concrete suggestions on how they can contribute in the implementation process. The EPLO has two Swedish members; The Life and Peace Institute and Kvinna to Kvinna, which can be used as start up channels for this kind of initiative. One concrete suggestion would be to organise a seminar together with the EPLO on any of the Swedish activities of concern in Priority Action 1 (mediation, conflict prevention etc).<sup>186</sup> This would be a way to engage civil society in the implementation (while gaining visibility for a possible Swedish intervention within Priority Action 1). Sweden should also point out the need to the EU to fund collaboration between African and European civil society on concrete peace and security topics as a way to raise awareness of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy/PS partnership. Furthermore, it would be useful to follow the initiative of the French and the Czech Presidencies to invite the EPLO (and other civil society members) to the Africa Working Group for discussions.<sup>187</sup>

---

<sup>184</sup> Interview European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership, 16 December 2008. Interview Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Advisor in General Joana's team, 18 December 2008.

<sup>185</sup> Joint Progress Report, November 2008.

<sup>186</sup> Other areas where the EPLO has competence to contribute is the sharing of conflict analyses, SALW and the security/development nexus. See Annex 4 for a more complete picture of the possible contribution and input of the EPLO.

<sup>187</sup> Interview EPLO focal point Peace and Security Partnership, 18 December 2008.

---

## Annexes

### Annex 1: Action Plan for the Peace and Security partnership

#### AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP ON PEACE AND SECURITY

##### RATIONALE

Peace and security lie at the foundation of progress and sustainable development. The objective of the Joint Strategy is to cooperate in enhancing the capacity of Africa and EU to respond timely and adequately to security threats, and also to join efforts in addressing global challenges.

#### PRIORITY ACTION 1: ENHANCE DIALOGUE ON CHALLENGES TO PEACE AND SECURITY

##### Objective

- Reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally.

##### Expected outcomes

- Deepened common understanding on the causes of conflicts and their resolution;
- Strengthened cooperation on conflict prevention, management and resolution, including long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace building;
- Improved coordination of continent-wide and regional approaches and initiatives;
- Increased EU and African cooperation and influence in international and global fora.

##### Activities

- Hold a systematic and regular dialogue on all issues related to peace and security, at technical, senior official and political levels in the most effective

format. This dialogue could also include innovative tools such as conflict sensitivity analysis;

- Hold consultations, in an appropriate format, between the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC);
- Facilitate ad hoc consultations for exchange and coordination at the highest political level;
- Coordinate efforts in relevant international fora on global issues of common concern;
- Set up mechanisms for consultation at ambassadorial level, in particular in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York;
- Enhance capacity building and cooperation in the fight against terrorism;
- Enhance capacity building, networking, cooperation and exchange of information on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APM), as well as fight against illicit trafficking;
- Enhance the sharing of analyses and reports on crisis and conflict situations, including on their root causes, and put in place the required security arrangements for the exchange of sensitive information;
- Address the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the role of women in conflict and post-conflict situations and of UN Security Council Resolution 1612 on Children in Armed Conflicts;
- Raise awareness through campaigning involving African and European NGOs on mainstreaming human rights, gender issues, and children affected by armed conflict;
- Undertake joint assessment missions to conflict and post-conflict areas, and launch joint initiatives when appropriate;
- Facilitate exchange of experience and lessons learned between EU and African mediators.
- Strengthen cooperation and enhance dialogue on issues relating to the security/development nexus, including on the identification and the use of best practices.

### **Actors**

- AU Commission, African States, AU PSC, Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Pan-African Parliament, ECOSOCC, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT);

- 
- European Commission, HR/Council Secretariat and EU Member States;
  - African and EU Heads of Mission in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York;
  - Research centres, training centres, think tanks and relevant civil society actors;
  - African and European local authorities.

### **Finance**

- AU Peace Fund;
- Appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their specificity and eligibility criteria, such as 10th EDF, Africa Peace Facility (APF), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Instrument for Stability (IfS), CFSP-Budget;
- Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African states.

### **PRIORITY ACTION 2: FULL OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA)**

#### **Objective**

- Effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture to address peace and security challenges in Africa.

#### **Expected outcomes**

- Full operationalization of the various components of the APSA, in particular the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, and the African Standby Force;
- Enhanced capacities of AU and the regional mechanisms;
- Concrete progress in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts;
- Strengthened African capabilities through the implementation of relevant proposals in the Action Plan of the related EU Concept adopted in May 2007.

**Activities**

- Work towards the operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, and facilitate cooperation between the AU Situation Room and corresponding structures in the EU;
- Work towards the operationalization of the African Standby Force and its civilian dimension, including through EU support for regional brigades training, exercises, validation and logistics (such as Euro-RECAMP);
- Facilitate training courses, exchanges of experts and of information, joint seminars and initiatives at continental, sub-regional and national levels;
- Strengthen coherence between different policies, initiatives, financial instruments and all relevant actors;
- Organize specific and regular co-ordination meetings;
- Establish and empower an EU-African civil society network capable of supporting peace and security initiatives;
- Strengthen conflict prevention mechanisms and effective post-conflict reconstruction, including through a reinforcement of the role of women;
- Enhance capacity-building, networking and collaboration between the AU and the EU regarding the implementation of the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

**Actors**

- AU Commission, African States, AU PSC, Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;
- EU Commission, Council Secretariat and EU Member States;
- Research centres, think tanks and relevant civil society actors;
- UN, G-8 and other relevant international actors.

**Finance**

- AU Peace Fund;
- Appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their specificity and eligibility criteria, such as the 10th EDF, African Peace Facility (APF), ENPI, DCI, Instrument for Stability, CFSP-Budget;
- Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African states.

---

**PRIORITY ACTION 3: PREDICTABLE FUNDING FOR AFRICA-LED PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS****Objective**

- To financially enable the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct Peace Support Operations.

**Expected outcome**

- Reduction of funding gaps and of the prejudicial uncertainty for African-led peace support operations;
- More effective deployment of these operations.

**Activities**

- Take steps towards the establishment of a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism, building on the experience of the African Peace Facility (APF) and EU and AU Member States' bilateral contributions;
- Work with G-8 and other members of the international community to contribute to the funding of African-led peace support operations;
- Work together to achieve, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, a UN mechanism to provide sustainable, flexible and predictable financial support for peace-keeping operations undertaken by the AU, or under its authority and with the consent of the UN Security Council.

**Actors**

- AU Commission, African States;
- European Commission, EU Council, EU Member States;
- Interested actors, such as UN, G-8, and other partners.



## **Finance**

- AU Peace Fund;
- Appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their specificity and eligibility criteria, such as the 10th EDF, African Peace Facility (APF), ENPI, DCI, Instrument for Stability, CFSP-Budget.
- Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African states, as well as from other partners.

## Annex 2: The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts – Action Plan

Annex - Action Plan for the implementation of proposals relative to the EU concept for Strengthening African Capabilities


	Objectives	Proposals	Tentative Actions	Priority	Comments
CONFLICT PREVENTION	Support AU/SRO conflict prevention structures. Enhance the functioning of AU/SRO structures, particularly their resources management and financial capacities, their planning and conduct capacities. Support African efforts to rationalize AU SRO relationship.	1.- Enhance AU and SROs capacities and interaction.	Enhance AU PSOD and SROs Planning Elements, in particular through the recruitment of African staff and the provision of training and equipment.	P	Ongoing under African Peace Facility (APF)
			Enhance political dialogue, and if required, provide technical support for the rationalisation of AU-SROs relationship		
			Facilitate AU-SROs interaction through the establishment of SRO Liaison Offices in Addis Ababa	P	Ongoing under EC budget
		2.- Establish Liaison Mechanisms between EU and AU/SROs	Use EU personnel to coordinate with the SROs liaison offices (once activated and operational) and AU in Addis		
			Assess willingness of SROs to accept EU Liaison Officers. If affirmative, second and/or use the already existing EU liaison officers		
			(New) -Enhance African Conflict Prevention structures	Support the establishment of the Panel of the Wise and its structures, in particular the Secretariat. Provide technical advice.	
TRAINING AND EXERCISES	Enhance training of AU/SRO personnel. ASF operational certification. Support the integration of ASF brigades at continental level. Support the development of APSTA.	3.- Help define AU and SRO Training Needs and implement a Training Evaluation Mechanism.	Support the AU and SROs to define their training needs, including funding workshops.	P	Ongoing under APF
			Provide assistance to the AU for the design and implementation of a training evaluation mechanism allowing the assessment of international support effectiveness.		
			- Produce a database of Africans trained in African and European Training Centers. - Produce a list of EU Training Centres available courses and syllabuses. - Provide advice and/or facilitate civilian software, consultants to assist the AU.		In September
		4.- Support the African Training Centers.	Identify the needs of the African Training Centres and Centres of Excellence.	P	To be initiated in the coming weeks/months
			Provide EU support to tackle the identified needs		
		5.- Support Training Activities through European training institutions and support programmes	Complete a European training catalogue	P	To be initiated in the coming weeks/months
Identify European trainers available to support African training institutions or to assist during pre-deployment training of African troops.					
6.- Provide and facilitate Training Activities, including European training and exercises.	Europeanize RECAMP including supporting the operational certification ASF at continental level - Define the Strategic Objectives for Cycle VI. - Planning Training activities. - Conduct of different Training activities	P	To be initiated in the coming weeks/months		

Annex - Action Plan for the implementation of proposals relative to the EU concept for Strengthening African Capabilities

			<p>Support International Exercises and training activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Encourage the European contribution to the UN Senior Mission Management Course.</li> <li>- Support the Participation of Africans In UN courses, including Senior Mission Management Course and MAPEX</li> <li>- Support the Participation of Africans In EU Member States training and exercises programmes.</li> </ul>	P	Contribution for financing African participation in training exercises for PSOs foreseen under the APF.
			<p>Invite AU, SROs and ASF Brigades personnel to take part in EU exercises and operations as observers</p>		
			<p>Support the African Peace Support Training Association (APSTA).</p>	P	Ongoing under APF
SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS	ASF logistic capabilities development. Enhance ASF deployment capabilities. Support AUISRO PSO planning and conduct capabilities.	7- Support the implementation of ASF logistic capabilities.	<p>Help define ASF Logistic Needs</p>		
			<p>Help define and implement the ASF Logistic Depots Concept.</p>		
			<p>Define the European policy for the provision of equipment for ASF.</p>		
			<p>Support the AU in the definition of the ASF Rapid Deployment Concept and its implementation</p> <p>Support African deployments for operations and exercises</p>		
		8- Provision of immediate EU planning support to the AUISROs.	<p>Endow the planned EU representation in Addis Ababa with permanent personnel allowing for immediate planning support to the AUISROs.</p> <p>Develop a Concept for an <i>ad hoc</i> rapid reinforcement of the EU representation in Addis Ababa with initial planning support capacity.</p>		
9- Develop more flexible and sustainable financial mechanisms for African-led efforts, in particular for Peace Support Operations	<p>Provide experts to evaluation and assessment missions</p> <p>Establish and operationalize the mechanism<sup>1</sup> allowing Member States to complement bilaterally the APF funding for AMIS on a voluntary basis. Examine possible options to ensure coherent and sustainable funding for African Peace Support Operations in general</p>	P	To be developed in the coming weeks/months 7-10-2007 12/20/2007 ? / 27 2007		
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION	Implementation of Policy framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCR/D). Support the development of AU SSR, DDR, SALW Doctrines	10- Share EU experience on post-conflict reconstruction with the AUISROs.	<p>Help identify AUISROs needs in post-conflict reconstruction</p>		
		(New to be discussed with African Partners)- "Mainstreaming" crosscutting issues (HR, gender issues and children and armed conflicts.	<p>Encourage the exchange of expertise with the AUISROs through seminars with the EU ISS support.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provide information and expertise on ESDP DDR/SSR Concepts.</li> <li>- Exchange of information on LL from previous EU SSR missions in Africa</li> </ul> <p>Awareness campaign involving European and African NGOs.</p>		Seminar foreseen under Portuguese Presidency (October 2007)

<sup>1</sup> ACP-EC Council decision concerning the administration by the Commission of voluntary Member States contributions for the APF.

# Annex 3: New APF Scope



## **Annex 4: EPLO recommendations on the implementation of the PS Action Plan**



### **First joint EU–AU Experts Group meeting on the implementation of the Partnership on Peace and Security under the EU – Africa Joint Strategy**

#### **Civil Society Recommendations**

We would like to draw your attention to the following priority actions and activities for the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, agreed by EU and AU Member States at the Lisbon Summit and contained in the First Action Plan (2008-2010) attached to the Africa –EU Strategy.

<b>PRIORITY 1</b>
-------------------

<b>Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security</b>
---

#### **AGREED ACTIVITIES:**

*Hold a systematic and regular dialogue on all issues related to peace and security at technical, senior official and political levels in the most effective format. This dialogue could also include innovative tools such as conflict sensitivity analysis*

&

*Enhance the sharing of analyses and reports on crisis and conflict situations, including on their root causes and put in place the required security arrangements for the exchange of sensitive information*

---

## **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- ⇒ We would like to **emphasise the need to understand the root causes and drivers of conflict** prior to any actions or interventions. Undertaking a systematic conflict analysis could help the EU to better understand the profile, actors and dynamics of a conflict and adapt its intervention accordingly. Part of this conflict analysis could be an assessment of the impact of all EU policies and aid on existing or latent conflicts. Whenever possible joint assessment should be carried by the EU and the AU; it is also important to use the expertise of local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), think-tanks and research institutes in assessments. The EC choice of the Sahel Region for “a first joint assessment in the field of collective security and preventive diplomacy with a view to anticipating security challenges there” is a good opportunity. This assessment should take into account previous conflict analyses in the Sahel and building on the existing knowledge base.
- ⇒ We strongly call on **donors to improve their coordination** in the spirit of the Accra Summit Conclusions, and develop common goals and definitions of peacebuilding and nation building, and common strategic frameworks, i.e. common approaches and agendas.

## ***AGREED ACTIVITIES***

*Strengthen cooperation and enhance dialogue on issues relating to the security/development nexus, including on the identification and the use of best practices*

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- ⇒ We call on the European Union to develop **peace and security funding mechanisms that are more effectively attuned to contributing to sustainable development**. The first step would be to provide predictable funding within a long-term framework i.e. 4 to 6 years rather than 1 to 2 years. A second step would be to mainstream peacebuilding and conflict prevention into existing financial assistance mechanisms and programmes

focusing on development. Any new funding mechanism must be structured so as to provide assistance not only to military peace operations, but also to the civil society interventions upon which the overall success and sustainability of peace efforts ultimately depend. It is also important to implement the existing agreement to work together on identification of best practices, which could in turn lead to development of joint, or at the very least, compatible policy guidelines (drawing on the joint assessments described in the recommendations above).

### **AGREED ACTIVITIES**

*Enhance capacity building, networking, cooperation and exchange of information on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Explosive Remnants of War and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APM) as well as fight against illicit trafficking.*

### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- ⇒ We welcome **the announcements made by the European Commission that it will work with African mandated organisations and regional mechanisms** to continue to support the implementation of regional conventions and strategies.
- ⇒ We would further suggest that the EC ensure that its support to SALW programs focuses on creating and maintaining **high level political buy-in from governments and decision makers in Africa** on issues related to trafficking. Making SALW part of political dialogue is therefore key. Written commitments, such as national action plans on SALW, have already been made and constitute a solid base for implementing activities; the will to act on those commitments, however, is lacking. The EU should maintain pressure and regularly raise the issue when EU officials are meeting their African counterparts within the context of the Partnership.
- ⇒ **We call on the European Union to recognise the highly destabilising impact of arms supplies to conflict zones.** Where cases involving governments supplying arms to conflict zones are known and in breach of international commitments, the EU should raise such cases in political

dialogue with involved governments and consider reviewing and possibly reducing its development assistance in response.

**PRIORITY 2****Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture****AGREED ACTIVITIES**

*Establish and empower an EU-African civil society network capable of supporting peace and security initiative*

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- ⇒ We fully **support initiatives aiming at strengthen African civil society** – this can be done by funding African civil society directly, or by supporting European NGOs working to strengthen their African counterparts. Efficient lines of communication between African and European CSOs should be promoted. Particularly relevant for this Partnership is the need to create links between specialized organisations in the two continents. CSOs should be encouraged to develop common goals and objectives, with structures established to facilitate this, including a coordination mechanism to foster cooperation and concrete follow up to meetings of expert groups.
- ⇒ We encourage the EU **to support the participation of European civil society in the implementation of the partnership**. We call on the EU to invite representatives of EU NGOs to take part in meeting of the European expert groups, to share the views of non governmental organisations and contribute to the debates
- ⇒ We request that funding should be specifically earmarked and allocated to civil-society led initiatives



**AGREED ACTIVITIES**

*Work towards the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and its civilian dimension, including EU support for regional brigades training, exercises, validation and logistics.*

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- ⇒ We strongly **call on the EU to ensure that all military and security capacity support to the ASF complies with international best practice on democratic and accountable security sector reform (SSR)**, as embodied in the OECD DAC guidelines on SSR.
- ⇒ We demand that **the EU do not over-emphasise building the operational capacities of the military aspects of the ASF to the detriment of its civilian dimensions**. Greater support for 'Centres of expertise for Peace Support Operations training', as called for in the AU Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF, would be a key contribution towards rectifying the current imbalance between support to the military and civilian aspects of the ASF and in mainstreaming civilian conflict prevention and peace building capacities across the African Peace and Security Architecture. Both African and European civil society actors should be further empowered and resourced to support such centres and training.

**AGREED ACTIVITIES**

*Strengthen conflict prevention mechanisms and effective post-conflict reconstruction, including through a reinforcement of the role of women.*

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- ⇒ We feel that this crucial component of the Action Plan requires significant development if civilian aspects of peace and security are to play their requisite central role in the Partnership. We **encourage the EU to support greater opportunities for African and European civil society actors to develop concrete proposals for**

**strengthening existing mechanisms and policies**, as well as for new and innovative approaches.

### ***AGREED ACTIVITIES***

*Enhance capacity-building, networking and collaboration between the AU and the EU, regarding the implementation of the AU Policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development*

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- ⇒ We would like to recall that early warning analysis, peacebuilding activities, good offices missions, and coordination of security and development policies need to be carried out **by professional permanent African Union Personnel** and the EU's support should be aimed at building this capacity.
- ⇒ We would like **to emphasise the need for training** as we consider it crucial in this context. European and African CSOs have acquired extensive experience and knowledge in developing, organizing and leading training exercises, including conferences and seminars, to the benefit of both non-governmental and governmental agencies. Several initiatives are currently taking place on training that combine the expertise of CSOs and the resources of institutions, including the African Union and several economic regions. These workshops constitute excellent examples of how CSOs can support the Partnership by involving all relevant non-governmental and governmental actors from Europe, Africa and also the UN. They are key resources and could, on occasion, be easily integrated in the framework of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, specifically in connection with envisaged EU support of AU training activities.

**PRIORITY 3**

**Predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations**

***AGREED ACTIVITIES***

*Take steps towards the establishment of a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism, building on the experience of the APF and EU and AU Member States' bilateral contributions.*

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- ⇒ While we welcome the foreseen approval of a second APF, covering the period 2008-2010, **we believe more has to be done to ensure the predictability of funding**, which was argued for in the Action Plan as well as at the Accra Summit on Aid Effectiveness. Nonetheless, we would like to stress that we find it regrettable that the focus of the first APF was on military interventions with little or no room for the deployment or training of civilians to undertake either peacekeeping or peacebuilding work. Therefore we would welcome an increased allocation to building the AU's capacity to work on civilian alternatives. This would be in line with the purpose of the EDF; funding for military operations should be taken from other sources.
- ⇒ In implementation of activities the Partnership should also take advantage of the work done by the UN, and particularly the creation of a Panel of the Wise under the leadership of former EC President Romano Prodi to consider lessons from past and current AU peacekeeping efforts and explore possible options to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of resources for AU peacekeeping operations. The Partnership should build on what the UN Panel is doing, inform and integrate the recommendations that

## Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Forces
AUC	African Union Commission
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
CAERT	African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CMD	Conflict Management Division
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSFP	Common Security and Foreign Policy
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
DPKO	UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations
EAPSM	East Africa Peace and Security Mechanism
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EP	European Parliament
EPLO	European Peace Building Liaison Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority for Development
JEG	Joint Expert Groups
MDG	Millenium Development Goals
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NSA	Non State Actors

OPLAN	Operations Plan
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PCRD	Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development
PS	Peace and Security
PSD	AU Peace and Security Directorate
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
REC	Regional Economic Communities
Recamp	Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capabilities
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SALW	Small Arms Light Weapons
SPMU	Strategic Planning Management Unit
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General

## References

### Articles

John Kotsopoulos. 'The EU and Africa: coming together at last?'. July 2007. European Policy Centre.

Romy Chevalier, 'The EU-Africa Summit: strategy and partnership'. December 2007. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior.

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The EU-Africa partnership in historical perspective. December 2006. Issue paper 1. [http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/historical\\_perspective.pdf](http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/historical_perspective.pdf)

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). Setting the agenda. December 2006. Issue paper 2 [http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/02/setting\\_the\\_agenda.pdf](http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2007/02/setting_the_agenda.pdf)

Jennifer Schmidt. Capacity-building of AU Peace Support Operations – The Civilian Dimension. July 2008. Swedish Defence Research Agency.

### EU documents

The EU Council, Council Secretariat. The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership, June 2008.

Statement by the EU Council and the European Commission: on the development policy of the European Community. 20 November 2000. <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm>

Joint statement by the EU Council and the representatives of the governments of the member states meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission: on the European Consensus on Development. 14820/05 [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/eu\\_consensus\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/eu_consensus_en.pdf)

European Commission information note: on the revision of the Cotonou Agreement. [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/negotiation\\_20050407\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/negotiation_20050407_en.pdf)

The European Security Strategy - A secure Europe in a better world. 12 December 2003. <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

Communication from the European Commission. The EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development. 489. 12 October 2005.

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/04\\_eu\\_strategy\\_for\\_africa\\_12\\_10\\_2005\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/04_eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf)

Cooperation between the EU and South Africa. Joint Country Strategy paper 2007-2013

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/print\\_csp07\\_za\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/print_csp07_za_en.pdf)

Communication from the European Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper. 373. 12 May 2004.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf)

The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts. 8551/2/07. 7 May 2007

Press release by the EU Council: Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, appoints General Pierre-Michel Joana as Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities. S091/08. 29 February 2008.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/99145.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/99145.pdf)

The European Commission, DG Development, 'Securing Peace and Stability for Africa – the EU-Funded African Peace Facility'. Information folder. July 2004.

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/flyer\\_peace\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/flyer_peace_en.pdf)

Decision 2003/3 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers: on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa. 11 December 2003.

<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12529.htm>

Guidelines for Joint Expert Groups. Endorsed by the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, 20-21 November 2008.

[http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/20081121\\_final\\_jeg\\_guidelines\\_and\\_mandate.doc](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/20081121_final_jeg_guidelines_and_mandate.doc)

Communication by Commissioners Michel and Ferrero-Waldner to the European Commission: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon summit: engaging the Commission in a partnership of results. 353. March 2008.

Communiqué by the EU Council. The tenth Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting. 13121/08. 16 September 2008.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/102801.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/102801.pdf)

European Commission - African Union Commission. College-to-College meeting. Joint Declaration. 1 October 2008.

[http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/joint\\_declaration\\_signed.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/joint_declaration_signed.pdf)

Communication from the European Commission to the EU Council and the European Parliament: 'One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU partnership at work' (including EC working document). 617. 17 October 2008.

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM\\_EU\\_africa\\_partnership\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_EU_africa_partnership_en.pdf)

Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010). 20-21 November 2008.

Joint communiqué: 11<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting. 20-21 November 2008.

### **EU web sites**

European Commission web site. EU-Africa relations.

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/euafrika\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/euafrika_en.cfm)

European Commission web site. DG Development – About us.

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/peace-and-security/africa-eu-peace-security-partnership\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/peace-and-security/africa-eu-peace-security-partnership_en.cfm)

European Commission web site. What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm)

Amani Africa-Euro Recamp web site. [www.eurorecamp.org](http://www.eurorecamp.org)

### **Other web sites**

UN News Centre. 'Former Italian Prime Minister to head African Union-UN peace-keeping panel. 12 September 2008.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28037&Cr=african+union&Cr1>

African Union News Centre. 'Joint Task Force meeting'.

<http://www.africa-union.org/root/UA/index/Archives%20Avr08.htm>

The Mail and Guardian. 'UN-AU security cooperation talks in Pretoria'. 27 October 2008.

<http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-10-27-un-au-security-cooperation-talks-in-pretoria>

Cooperation Internationale pour la Développement et la Solidarité (CISDE) web site. EU News N.7. October 2008.

<http://www.cidse.org/uploadedFiles/Newsletter/EU%20News%207%20Oct%2008.pdf?n=7561>



Europa nu/Montesquieu Institute web site. First EU-South Africa summit, Bordeaux 25 July 2008.

<http://www.montesquieu-institute.eu/9353000/1/j9vvh6nf08temv0/vhx0co84c5uy?ctx=vhpelt0brvso>

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) web site. Africa-EU dialogue

<http://europafrica.org/africa-eu-dialogue/#history>

Economist Intelligence Unit web site: 'Africa Economy – Waiting for an Industrial Revolution'. 30 July 2008.

[http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article\\_id=293621214&region\\_id=&rf=0](http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=293621214&region_id=&rf=0)

### **Miscellaneous**

Audit of the African Union, 18 December 2007

FOI publication 'Inside the African Peace and Security Architecture' (forthcoming)

Report from AU PSC-EU PSC meeting 30 September 2008. Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU.

Quickly implementable capacity building strategy for the training aspects of the ASF with a special focus on the civilian and police components under the umbrella of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership – PSP priority action 2 (the Italian proposal). November 2008.

Strategie Conjointe UE/Afrique – Partenariat "PAix et Sécurité » - Roadmap 2008-2010.

### **Interviews**

European Commission, DG Relex/Crisis Response and Peace Building. 27 November 2008.

European Commission, DG EuropeAid/African Peace Facility. 28 November 2008.

European Commission, DG Development/Peace and Security Partnership. 16 December 2008.

Council Secretariat, DGE V (Africa). 25 November 2008.

Council Secretariat, DGE IX (Civilian crisis management). 25 November 2008.

Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Political Adviser in General Joana's team. 18 December 2008.

Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership/Military Staff Officer in General Joana's team. 26 November 2008.

Council Secretariat, Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership, Special Adviser and Liaison Officer for the Development of African Peace-keeping Capabilities (Pierre-Michel Joana). 18 December 2008.

European Peace-building Liaison Office (EPLO), focal point Peace and Security partnership. 18 December 2008.

Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU. 24 November 2008.

Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU. 28 November 2008.

Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU. 18 December 2008.

Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU. 16 December 2008.

Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU. 15 December 2008.

Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU. 25 November 2008.

UK Permanent Representation to the EU. 26 November 2008.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes/French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Military and Defence Cooperation/Multilateral Actions. 17 December 2008.