Coordination and Coherence in the Peace Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Sammanfattning

Dagens multidimensionella fredsfrämjande operationer kräver att många olika organisationer bidrar med sina respektive kompetenser. Detta skapar ett behov av koordinering för att säkerställa att olika delinsatser är ömsesidigt koherenta. Denna rapport analyserar hur sådan samordning har fungerat i fredsoperation i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo. Rapporten har skrivits för att komplettera den konceptuella forskningen inom FOI:s projekt Ledning i multifunktionella insatser. Detta projekt syftar till att stödja Försvarsmaktens Konceptutvecklingsenhet och särskilt dess arbete inför Multinational Experiment 6.

Rapportens fokus ligger på FN-missionen i Kongo, MONUC. Det viktigaste instrumentet för att koordinera missionens arbete har varit Integrated Missionskonceptet. Kortfattat kan Integrated Missions gå ut på att ge Generalsekreterarens särskilda sändebud ansvar för att koordinera alla FN-organs verksamhet i ett givet land. I rapporten undersöks hur detta har fungerat i praktiken, särskilt på den lokala nivån.

Utöver koordinering och samverkan inom MONUC diskuteras även koordinering mellan MONUC och viktiga aktörer: EU, kongolesiska myndigheter samt organisationer verksamma inom bistånd och humanitär hjälp. I ett separat avsnitt avhandlas koordinering inom säkerhetssektorreform (SSR). Fredsoperationen i Kongo har präglats av dåligt säkerhetsläge, närmast obefintlig infrastruktur och andra försvårande omständigheter. En genomgående frågeställning är hur dessa yttre förhållanden har påverkat samordning och arbetsfördelning mellan olika organisationer.

Nyckelord: Fredsoperationer, samordning, ledning, Demokratiska Republiken Kongo, MONUC, Integrated Missions

Summary

Contemporary multidimensional peace operations typically require the participation of several organizational entities. As a result, it is necessary to coordinate their respective activities, in order to ensure the coherence of the operation as a whole. This report analyzes the issue of coherence in the context of the peace operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It has been undertaken to provide empirical data for the FOI project *Command and Control in Multifunctional Operations*, which aims to support the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre with conceptual development in preparation for Multinational Experiment 6.

The focal point of the report is the United Nations Mission in the DRC, MONUC. The primary instrument employed to ensure coherence within MONUC has been the Integrated Missions concept. The report analyzes the effectiveness of the version of this concept employed in the DRC, with particular reference to internal MONUC coordination at the local level.

In addition to discussing coordination mechanisms within MONUC, the report covers attempts to coordinate MONUC's work with that of three sets of actors: the European Union, the Congolese authorities, and the development and humanitarian community. A separate section is devoted to coordination and coherence in Security Sector Reform initiatives in the DRC. An issue of particular concern is the impact of the non-permissive environment in the DRC on coordination efforts and the division of labor between different actors.

Keywords: Peace operations, Coordination, Command and Control, Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC, Integrated Missions

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the study

At the time of writing, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) is the largest and most expensive active UN peace operation. In addition to MONUC, several other UN agencies, international organizations, international humanitarian NGO's, and Congolese organizations are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While ostensibly working together promoting sustainable peace and development in the DRC, these organizations are to various degrees independent, and have different priorities, organizational cultures, and working methods. However, to achieve peace in the DRC, it is necessary to ensure, when possible, that the relevant actors are working coherently and collaboratively towards common goals. At the very least, it is necessary to make certain that their respective activities are not counteracting each other. To address this issue, a number of formal and informal mechanisms for coordination between different actors have been created. This study aims to investigate these coordination mechanisms, and evaluate their efficiency and overall impact on the effectiveness of the peace efforts.

The report is a case study conducted within the FOI project *Command and Control in Multifunctional Operations*. This project aims to support the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre (JCDEC) in their work on developing concepts for harmonizing the efforts of various actors in a given conflict area. Within the FOI project, the purpose of this study is to provide empirical data to complement the conceptual research.

1.2 Scope, limitations and methodology

The focal point of this study is MONUC. While other approaches to studying coordination issues in the DRC are conceivable, its primacy among external actors in the DRC, especially in the security arena and its long-lasting presence on the ground makes MONUC a natural point of departure. Based on the assumption of the centrality of MONUC, the study analyzes four relationships:

- Coordination and coherence issues *within* MONUC.
- Coordination between MONUC and the European Union's missions in the DRC
- MONUC's cooperation with Congolese authorities
- MONUC's coordination with UN agencies and humanitarian NGO's

Due to the centrality of the efforts at reforming the Congolese security sector for achieving peace in the DRC, a thematic section looks at coordination attempts in Security Sector Reform (SSR), an area in which all of the four groups of actors have been involved.

With regards to each of these four relationships, three dimensions are covered. First, the organizational structures and operational activities are accounted for. Second, the structures and strategies for achieving coordination and coherence are discussed and evaluated. Both formal mechanisms such as hierarchical organization arrangements and institutionalized cooperation, and informal mechanisms such as interpersonal relations are discussed. A third dimension of interest is the impact of the operating environment on the choice whether to coordinate and cooperate and on the type of coordination used. Given the non-permissive environment of the DRC, it is noteworthy to look into what impact these difficult conditions have had on coordination attempts.

The study briefly covers the period from MONUC's creation in 1999 up until present day. However, the emphasis is on the period from 2003 to 2006. This period is of particular interest for two reasons. First, the DRC once again suffered from an outbreak of extensive fighting and abuses against civilians. Thus, MONUC, as well as other actors, had to work in a very difficult environment, which influenced the division of labour between actors involved in the peace effort. Secondly, MONUC underwent significant reform and expansion during this period. While engaging in some of the heaviest battles ever fought by a UN force, MONUC was reorganized and the Integrated Missions concept was introduced.

Geographically, the eastern parts of the DRC is the main area of attention. This focus follows from the fact that most of the unrest has taken place in the east, and that the bulk of MONUC's forces have been deployed there since 2003. However, the geographical emphasis is also partly due to limited availability of sources covering activities in the western parts of the country.

This study is largely a synthesis of secondary sources. There exists a fair amount of academic writing on the conflict in the DRC and on various aspects of the international peace effort. To supplement the secondary sources, a limited number of interviews have been conducted. The interviewees include former MONUC officials and a former humanitarian worker.

2 Coordination and coherence in multi-dimensional peace operations

When the concept of peace operations was created shortly after World War II, the tools employed were largely military. Typically, lightly armed troops were deployed following a peace agreement and positioned in between the parties to act as a buffer and to monitor the parties' observance of the agreement. After the end of the Cold War, peace operations changed character. One element of this change was that the intervening actor, be it the UN or some regional security organization, tried to address issues beyond the military realm. By engaging in the holding of elections, delivery of humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction, peace operations became multi-dimensional. This change accentuated the problem of coordination. Since no single organizational entity was equipped to handle all of these dimensions, several independent agencies had to become involved. These agencies included among others the military forces seconded by their respective capitals to the operation, various branches of the UN family and international humanitarian organizations.

A second element of the transformation of peace operations was that interventions were frequently launched before hostilities had ended. When encountering resistance from spoilers, the intervening forces increasingly employed force to fulfil their mandate. Thus, the interveners were faced with the challenge of engaging in reconstruction and state-building while occasionally engaging in offensive military operations. Such non-permissive environments clearly influence the prospects of coordinating the different branches involved in the operation, for instance by limiting the freedom of movement of non-military personnel.

The peace operation in the DRC exhibits both these new elements. In addition to MONUC, a wide range of actors has been involved in the peace effort, making coordination a complex issue. Furthermore, the peace operation in the DRC has been conducted in the absence of a credible peace agreement, and fighting has continued throughout the operation's existence. Add to this the sheer size of the country in question and its very limited physical infrastructure, and it is clear that the DRC should be considered a particularly difficult case when it comes to making all the relevant actors work effectively towards creating peace.

The growth in the number of actors involved in contemporary peace operations has accentuated the problem of coordinating their respective efforts towards a common goal. One fundamental driver of the need to strive for coherence is the fact that the key organizational entities are independent. As de Coning notes, they are "legally constituted in their own right, have their own organizational

goals and objectives, have their own access to resources, and are in control of these resources…".[1] At the same time, the actors are interdependent, in that no single agency can reach the common objective – building peace – on their own. De Coning distinguishes between four elements of coherence:

- Agency coherence – consistency among the various policies, actions, and programmes of an individual agency
- Whole-of-government coherence – consistency among the policies and actions of an individual government involved in the peace operation
- External coherence – consistency among the policies employed by all the external actors involved in a peace operation in a certain country
- Internal-external coherence – consistency between the policies of the internal/local actors and the external/international actors

In de Coning's model, the coherence of the peace effort as a whole is a function of the degree of coherence in each of these four elements. Complex system theorists argue that it is not possible to reach perfect coherence in a system involving the multitude of actors and uncertainties of a major contemporary peace operation. However, it is possible to judge the overall coherence of a particular peace operation by approximating the level of coherence in each element. To achieve coherence, it is necessary to coordinate the activities of the different actors. In this sense, *coordination is the instrument used for achieving coherence*. In de Coning's model, there are six tools that can be used for coordination:

1. developing common strategies;
2. determining objectives;
3. joint planning;
4. information sharing;
5. division of roles and responsibilities;
6. mobilising resources.

Among these tools, de Coning identifies two areas where improvement could significantly increase the overall coherence. The first area is the articulation of a common overall strategic framework. A good common framework should meet the following criteria: it should reflect a common understanding of the conflict's causes and triggers, it should be tied to a shared long-term vision of the desired future path of the country in conflict; and it should contain a clear multi-

[1] de Coning, Cedric. "Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions. A Norwegian Perspective". Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Security in Practice Report No. 5 (2007), p. 10

dimensional and integrated strategy for the short to medium term. Furthermore, the strategic framework needs to be transparent, available to all agencies, and regularly updated. Lastly, it is necessary that the effect of the strategy is monitored in relation to established benchmarks.[2]

The second area is a particular division of roles and responsibilities: the operationalization of the principle of local ownership. The principle of local ownership has received much attention in connection with peace operations as well as in the development community. From the development perspective, one piece of evidence of this is the importance attributed to local ownership in a series of high-level summits on development aid held in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), and Accra (2008).[3] However, it has been difficult to realize the principle in practice. One important reason for this is that it is often difficult to find credible local actors for the external actors to engage in partnerships with.[4] In the volatile political situation in the DRC, this has most probably been the case. Still, the success rate of attempts at establishing local ownership will be an important element of this study.

2.1 The Integrated Missions concept and alternative approaches

The UN has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve coherence within and outside the UN family. One important outcome of these initiatives is the Integrated Missions (IM) concept, which was developed in 2004 and 2005. The IM concept is designed to achieve two main goals. First, it entails a set of processes, mechanisms, and structures aimed at formulating and sustaining a common strategic objective for the entire mission. Second, it includes a comprehensive approach, designed to align the work of political, security, development, human rights and humanitarian actors involved in the mission.[5]

The integration of the mission's components is supposed to work on two levels. At the UN Headquarters level, the various departments of the UN are brought together through the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP). In the IM concept, all new UN peace operations are supposed to use the IMPP process for mission planning. This process is dependent on two physical entities. At the strategic level, the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) is a group of representatives drawn from the relevant bodies of the UN system. The IMTF is responsible for preparing key planning documents. Once a mission is deployed,

[2] de Coning 2007, p. 5-16
[3] "Accra Agenda for Action", closing statement of the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, September 2-4, 2008, Accra, Ghana, para. 12-15
[4] Ibid.
[5] de Coning 2007, p. 4-5

the IMTF shall also monitor the mission's progress and provide advice. At the country level, planning should be carried out by the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT).[6]

At the field level, the main instrument of integration is unified command under a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The SRSG is in command of both the civilian and the military components of the mission. Typically, there will be two deputy SRSGs. One of these deputies will, among other things, be responsible for rule of law programs. The other deputy is referred to as the Deputy SRSG/Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/HC/RC). This position represents a merger of three different roles. First, the DSRSG/HC/RC is responsible for the humanitarian work done within the UN mission. Secondly, the DSRSG/HC/RC is at the same time the Humanitarian Coordinator, the senior representative of the UN Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Third, the DSRSG/HC/RC is also the Resident Coordinator for the UN Development Group, which is the coordination body for all UN development efforts in a given country. The merging of the hierarchies for the political and military activities, on the one hand, and the humanitarian and developmental activities on the other hand, is a central aspect of the Integrated Missions concept.[7]

It should be noted that the IM concept is still being debated and developed within the UN. Critics have, among other things, argued that the IM concept has not resolved the dilemma that occurs when humanitarian work is integrated into a political mission, as this might endanger the impartiality sought by humanitarians.[8] Moreover, the development of the IM concept happened in parallel to the launching of MONUC. Indeed, for the first years of MONUC's existence, the IM concept was not yet formally adopted by the UN.

From this brief overview of the IM approach, it appears that the methods employed for achieving coherence are focused on changing formal command structures, with particular emphasis on the top levels of the relevant organizations. The IM concept shares these characteristics with several other concepts seeking to achieve greater coherence in peace operations, such as the *Comprehensive Approach*.[9] In addition, there are alternative suggestions for how

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[6] Hull, Cecilia. "Integrated Missions – A Liberia Case Study". User Report, Swedish Defence Research Agency (August 2008), p. 12-17

[7] Ibid.

[8] Eide, Espen Barth – Kaspersen, Anja Therese – Kent, Randolph – von Hippel, Karin. "Report on Integrated Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations", Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (2005), p. 3

[9] For conceptual background on the Comprehensive Approach**,** see "The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5", chapter III in *Multinational Experiment 5 - Key Elements of a Comprehensive Approach: A Compendium of Solutions* (April 2009). http://www.defmin.fi/files/1433/MNE5_Compendium_Mar2009_PUBLIC.pdf, accessed August 4, 2009.

to solve the problem of achieving coherence. These involve less emphasis on formal hierarchical arrangements and do not necessarily assume that all the actors share a common overarching goal. One such alternative approach has been formulated by Herrhausen, who argues that networks, rather than hierarchical bureaucracies, is the most appropriate form of organization for UN peace building missions[10]. A similar idea has been articulated by the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre (JCDEC) in preparation for Multi-National Experiment 6, an international experiment aimed at conceptual development. In a JCDEC concept note, it is suggested that a 'harmonization marketplace' could be a useful metaphor for describing the condition under which network-based coordination takes place. In this metaphor, harmonization (the equivalent of coherence) is to be achieved through an informal process where actors offer their specific competencies based on what they expect to receive in return. Indeed, according to this line of thought, efforts to achieve formal unity of command might even be harmful, as they attempt to create inappropriate command structures.[11]

Given the existence of two (at least partly) conflicting views on how to achieve coherence in multi-dimensional peace operations, it is of interest to see how these theories correspond to events on the ground in the DRC. While the scope of this report is far too limited to validate or dismiss either theory, the empirical findings might be useful for continued conceptual refinement.

The above-mentioned ideas and concepts related to coordination and coherence in peace operations are fairly general, in so far that they do not consider the impact of the operating environment on the coordination between various actors. However, peace operations have been undertaken in vastly different environments. Somewhat simplified, these environments can be categorized as permissive or non-permissive. A major component of this distinction is the prevailing security situation. Non-permissive environments are categorized by high levels of violence and insecurity, whereas in permissive environments the security situation is satisfactory. It is reasonable to expect that the division of labour between different actors, and the choice and efficiency of coordination mechanisms will be dependent on the operational environment. Examples of such dependencies could include that civilian actors are unable to move without armed escorts, or that civilians will withdraw entirely due to the security situation. However, security is not the only relevant characteristic of the operating environment. The availability of transportation infrastructure, communications networks, size of the area of operations, climate, and levels of

[10] Herrhausen, Anna. "Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding - A Theory-Guided Approach". Discussion Paper, Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (2007).
[11] MNE 6 Objective 1.3 Food for thoughts [v1] "The metaphor of a 'Harmonization marketplace", 27 February 2009

economic and social development are also important factors that determine the ease of coordinating in a particular mission.

On most counts, the DRC should be labelled a non-permissive environment, especially the eastern parts of the country. Violence, in the form of fighting between rebel groups and the Congolese army as well as large-scale abuses against the civilian population, continues to this day. Moreover, the territory of the DRC is comparable in size to Western Europe, and its road infrastructure severely limits mobility on the ground. Given these challenges, one aim of this study is to estimate the impact of these adverse conditions on coordination between actors involved in the peace operation.

3 Overview of the conflict in the DRC

The wars in the DRC have been fought, at various level of intensity, for well over a decade. During its most intense phase, armies from six different countries were involved in what came to be the bloodiest war since World War II. Due to space constraints and the complex nature of the conflict, it is not possible to provide more than a minimal overview.

Figure 1. Map of the DRC. Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The conflict in the DRC is closely tied to the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Following the 1994 genocide, around two million Hutus, including many of the perpetrators of the genocide, fled across the border to the DRC. Soon, Hutu rebels hiding in the refugee camps in eastern DRC started receiving support from the Mobutu regime to carry out cross-border raids into Rwanda. As a response, Rwanda provided backing to Congolese rebel groups, unified under the leadership of Laurent Kabila. In 1996, Kabila launched an offensive across the vast territory of the DRC. On May 16, the rebels took control over Kinshasa. As Mobutu fled the country, Kabila was installed as president and subsequently changed the name of the country from Zaire to the DRC.

Unhappy with Kabila's performance, his former sponsor Rwanda instigated a rebellion against the Kabila regime. These rebel groups, notably the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), also received support from Uganda. As the rebels advanced towards Kinshasa in 1998, Kabila managed to get help from Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Namibia, and the war took on the regional character that would earn it the label Africa's World War.[12]

Soon, a range of outsiders became involved in various mediation attempts. Eventually, a yearlong series of negotiations presided over by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) resulted in an agreement labelled the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. This agreement, signed on July 10, 1999, became the starting point for the UN peace operation. The original signatories included only the state parties to the conflict. The main stipulations were:

- The creation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the parties to the agreement, and an OAU/UN Observer Group, which were to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement
- A request for a UN peacekeeping force, to be deployed in the DRC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- Disarmament of militia groups
- A national reconciliation process in the DRC

However, the agreement did not have much immediate impact on the situation in the DRC, as the hostilities continued and the rebel groups remained outside the deal.[13] The main rebel groups signed the agreements a few months later, but the war raged on along the agreed ceasefire line through the year 2000.[14]

In 2001, Laurent Kabila was murdered, and his son Joseph took his place. In December 2002, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, often referred to as the Pretoria Accords, was signed by all the Congolese actors in Sun City, South Africa. As a result of this agreement, a transitional government led by Joseph Kabila was installed in the summer of 2003. At the same time, violence continued in Ituri and in the Kivus, however the Ituri was temporarily stabilized after the three-month EU-led Operation Artemis. Starting in 2003, MONUC took a more aggressive stance and actively engaged the rebel movements in the eastern DRC, together with the recently formed Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). In 2005, the military situation was complicated as

[12] Cilliers, Jackie and Malan, Mark (eds.). *Peacekeeping in the DRC. MONUC and the Road to Peace.* Pretoria: South African Institute for Security Studies (2001).
[13] International Crisis Group. "The Agreement on a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo. An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace", ICG DRC Report No. 5 (August 20, 1999), p. 1-2, 18
[14] International Crisis Group. "Scramble for the Congo. Anatomy of an Ugly War". ICG Africa Report No. 26 (December 20, 2000), p. 3

Ugandan rebel movement Lord's Resistance Army settled in northeastern DRC. Politically, apparent progress was made as a new constitution was accepted by referendum. The 2006 elections resulted in Kabila Jr. being installed as the country's first democratically elected president. However, security deteriorated once again in North Kivu in late 2006, as Laurent Nkunda's Rwanda-supported rebel movement, CNDP, continued their armed struggle.[15]

In March 2007, heavy fighting erupted in Kinshasa between Congolese government forces and the personal security detail of former vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba, resulting in several hundred fatalities. Bemba subsequently left the DRC.[16]

In early 2009, Rwanda turned against its former protégé, and launched a joint offensive with the Congolese army against Nkunda and the rebel group composed of Tutsi genocidaires, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). As a consequence of the largely failed offensive, over 800,000 people fled their homes during the first half of 2009.[17]

[15] International Crisis Group. "Conflict Background: DR Congo". http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=37, accessed July 15, 2009.
[16] United Nations Security Council. "Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", UN Document S/2007/671, November 14, 2007, p. 1, 6
[17] Financial Times. "Congo Violence Displaces 800,000". July 14, 2009.

4 Coordination and coherence in the peace operation in the DRC

4.1 MONUC

4.1.1 Force structure and operations

During its ten-year existence, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has undergone significant change and expansion. First established as a small monitoring force in 1999, MONUC is now the largest and most expensive active UN peace operation. This transformation can be divided into six phases.

The first phase began in 1999, when the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement called for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, and lasted until late 2002. The Lusaka Agreement envisioned an ambitious set of tasks for this force, including monitoring compliance with the agreement, providing humanitarian assistance, and tracking down and disarming armed groups.[18] The initial response from the UN was more modest. The UN Secretary-General, in his report of July 15, 1999, recommended proceeding in three steps. First, military liaison officers were to be deployed to the regional capitals and to the head-quarters of the rebel groups. Secondly, a force of up to 500 military observers was to be deployed, and only then would the third phase, the deployment of a peacekeeping force, be launched. The UN Security Council (UNSC) approved the deployment of up to 90 military liaison officers on August 6, 1999. This mission established its headquarters in Kinshasa, and sent liaison officers to the countries that had been involved in the war.[19] According to Roessler and Prendergast, one reason for the UN's modest initial involvement at this point was reluctance in the U.S. Congress to devote UN resources to the DRC, as this was seen as potentially harmful for the ongoing peace operations in Kosovo and East Timor.[20]

In late 1999, the second phase of MONUC's operations began as the Security Council approved the expansion of MONUC to include 500 military observers and a protection force of 5,037 soldiers. However, the effectiveness of the

[18] Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Chapter 8. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII-65HB37?OpenDocument, accessed July 21, 2009

[19] Cilliers & Malan 2001

[20] Roessler, Philip and Prendergast, John. "Democratic Republic of the Congo", pp. 229-318 in Durch, William (ed.). *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: United Institute of Peace (2006), p. 251

mission was reduced by obstruction from Kabila Sr, who feared that political reform would mean the end of his regime. When Kabila Jr. had been installed as the new president in 2001, he quickly reversed his father's policies and endorsed MONUC.[21]

This paved the way for the third phase, during which MONUC attempted to shift its operation away from the ceasefire line towards the east of the country. Once Rwanda and Uganda had agreed to withdraw their forces from the DRC, in the fall of 2002, the authorized strength of MONUC was raised to 8,700 soldiers. Simultaneously, the mandate was expanded to include supporting Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Resettlement and Repatriation (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. The actual troop levels stayed well below the authorised numbers. For instance, in October 2002, there were around 4,000 MONUC soldiers and military observers in the DRC. Still, the mission was deemed by observers to be reasonably effective in monitoring ceasefire violations.

The fourth phase, 2003-2004, started in the wake of the 2002 Pretoria Accords. Once the transitional government had been installed in Kinshasa, MONUC shifted significant resources to protect the new government. Around 1,000 troops were deployed to the capital for this purpose. At the same time, violence erupted in eastern DRC. As the Ugandan army left Ituri, several militias started fighting over control over the town of Bunia. The MONUC forces present in Bunia were unable to deal with the militias. In June 2003, the EU-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force deployed to Bunia and succeeded in restoring order temporarily (see the section on the EU below). The Ituri crisis made the UN Security Council realize that the structure and mandate of MONUC was not suitable for the current situation. This realization brought about a shift in posture towards much more robust peacekeeping.[22]

In July 2003, the Security Council approved another expansion of MONUC, this time to 10,800 troops, and provided it with a Chapter VII mandate for Ituri and the Kivus. When Laurent Nkunda started fighting in Bukavu in 2004, MONUC received a Chapter VII mandate for the entire country, and the force ceiling was raised by another 5,900 troops (even though the Secretary-General had asked for an increase of 13,100). During the same period, MONUC shifted its resources towards eastern DRC. This shift included the formation of an eastern division headquarters, whose commander was given operational and tactical control over his forces. Some of MONUC's best troops, including one Indian brigade and one

[21] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 267
[22] Ibid., p. 231

Pakistani brigade, were made available to the eastern division commander.[23] Some 900 troops remained in Kinshasa to protect the transitional government.[24]

During the fifth phase, lasting from October 2004 to December 2006, one major task for MONUC was organizing and protecting national elections. MONUC was given responsibility for the enormous logistical operation required to hold elections. During the election period, another EU force was sent to bolster security in Kinshasa.[25]

The sixth phase started after the elections in 2006 and is still ongoing. Fighting and violence against civilians has continued to date, especially in North Kivu. As MONUC's build-up progressed, the mission had reached a total strength of 18,000, whereof 16,000 soldiers, as of May 31, 2009.[26] MONUC's responsibilities were expanded in UNSC Resolution 1856 (2008), which among other things instructed MONUC to make the protection of civilians its most prioritized task.[27]

4.1.2 MONUC command structures at the mission headquarters Level

The senior official in MONUC is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). To date, MONUC has had four SRSG's. In 1999, Tunisian diplomat Kamel Morjane became the first. He was succeeded by Cameroon's Amos Namanga Ngongi, formerly a senior official with the World Food Programme (WFP), in 2001. In 2003, American diplomat William L. Swing took up the post. He was replaced by the current SRSG, British UN career diplomat Alan Doss, in 2007.[28] Given the extensive powers entrusted to the SRSG, the recruitment of this position is obviously important for the effectiveness of the mission. For instance, Swing has been credited with effectively implementing MONUC's change in force posture starting in 2003. As a former U.S.

[23] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 294-297

[24] United Nations Security Council. "Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". UN Document S/2004/1034 (December 31, 2004), p. 10

[25] Tull, Denis M. "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War", pp. 215-230 in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), p. 217-218

[26] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. "Democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUC – Facts and Figures". http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html, accessed August 18, 2009.

[27] United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1258 (2008)". UN Document S/RES/1856 (2008), paragraph 6

[28] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. "Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUC - Facts and Figures". http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html, accessed August 18, 2009, and United Nations Secretary General. "Secretary-General Appoints William Lacy Swing as new Special Representative for Democratic Republic of Congo", UN Document SG/A/836 (May 22, 2003).

ambassador to the DRC, he brought good local knowledge and contacts in Washington.[29]

MONUC's headquarters (HQ) has grown as the size of the mission has increased. Currently, there are two deputy SRSG's. The Force Commander and Police Commissioner are also directly subordinate to the SRSG. MONUC HQ contains a number of substantive sections, including Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Civil Police, Human Rights, Child Protection, Election Division, Mine Action Centre, and DDR/SSR. In addition, there are a number of supporting functions, including a Conduct and Discipline Team, a Security and Safety Section, and a Division of Administration.

The incorporation of so many functional offices in the MONUC HQ is a requisite for allowing the mission to act multi-dimensionally. At the same time, it creates a management challenge, as a range of activities need to be harmonized. MONUC military officers report that this diversity has sometimes caused problems, as the sheer number of attendants at senior management meetings made it difficult to maintain focus on the most pressing issues of the day.[30]

4.1.3 The Integrated Missions concept: impact on internal MONUC coherence

At the outset, MONUC was not a multi-dimensional peace operation, but an observer mission. Therefore, the need for integration and coordination within MONUC was limited. Figure 2 illustrates MONUC-OCHA organizational relations as of 2003, before the integration process started.

[29] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 287
[30] Interview with former MONUC military commander, August 6, 2009



Figure 2. Outline of MONUC-OCHA organizational relations in October 2003. Based on Zeebroek 2008, p. 11

As MONUC was given more and more responsibilities through a series of UNSC resolutions, the mission became more complex, and thus the need to ensure internal coherence – agency coherence – grew. Von Pottelbergh describes the integration process in MONUC as ad hoc: "In Congo, integration is more about cooperation. It can be described as a dynamic bottom-up trend, where coordination between agencies is central".[31]

The Integrated Missions concept was first introduced in MONUC around 2004. It had a number of concrete consequences, including giving one of the Deputy SRSG's the additional responsibilities of being the senior representative for OCHA and UNDP in the DRC.[32] Lotze et al concludes, based on interviews with UN personnel in the DRC, that the process of turning MONUC into an integrated mission had not been completed by 2007. By then, much cooperation still happened on an ad hoc basis. In general, information sharing worked well at the headquarters level, while in the lower echelons ambiguity about the division of

[31] von Pottelbergh, Gudrun. "An examination of the coherence debate on the sustainability of integrated peacekeeping missions: The Cases of UNTAC in Cambodia and MONUC in the DRC". Master's thesis, University College Dublin (2006), p.54

[32] This aspect of the integration process is discussed in more detail in the section on coordination with the humanitarian and development community, see below

labour persisted.[33] Figure 3 shows MONUC's organization after the reforms had been implemented.



Figure 3. MONUC's organization as of 2007. Source: adapted from Dahrendorrf 2007, p. 24

A number of reforms included in the IM concept were not applied to the case of MONUC. For instance, as of 2008, there was still no Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) in the UN Secretariat. As mentioned above, the IMTF, composed

[33] Lotze, Walter – Barros de Carvalho, Gustavo – Kasumba, Yvonne. "Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict. Case Studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan". ACCORD Occasional Paper, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2008), p. 26

of representatives from all relevant branches of the UN, is supposed to prepare strategic planning documents and operational guidance for UN missions. In the case of MONUC, such support was instead provided by DPKO.[34]

Despite these deviations from the textbook version of integration, there is evidence that the partial integration employed in the DRC resulted in improved coordination between the different branches of MONUC. For instance, Zeebroek argues that the integration reforms are part of the explanation for why MONUC managed to conduct comparatively successful national elections in the DRC in 2006. Because of the integrated command structure, Zeebroek argues, it was possible to avoid conflicts between MONUC and UNDP, the two main external actors involved in organizing the elections. Also, the work of the MONUC Human Rights (HR) section was facilitated by the integration reforms, as HR officers' access to transportation resources improved and information sharing on human rights abuses developed.[35]

4.1.4 MONUC at the regional level: command and coherence

MONUC's regional organization is largely aligned with the administrative division of the DRC. There are six MONUC sectors, each comprising one to three of the DRC's provinces. Among the notable regional headquarters are brigade headquarters in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi (Katanga province). Located in Goma, the Eastern Division Headquarters is responsible for MONUC operations in the four eastern provinces Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema. This division, commanded by a two-star general, includes three infantry brigades and various independent units. The three brigades have their own headquarters in Goma, Bukavu, and Bunia. In addition, there are a number of sector headquarters with smaller attached military units in the western parts of the country (see map in Annex 1).

In the eastern DRC, there are regional MONUC offices in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, which house the civilian branches of MONUC. These are lead by a Head of Office, and include five substantive sections: Political Affairs, Human Rights, Civilian Affairs, Child Protection, and Public Information, as well as an administrative branch. There is also a Civilian Police presence in the regional offices, however these report directly to the Police Commissioner in Kinshasa rather than to the Head of Office.[36]

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[34] Rasmussen, Dan. "Brahimi-rapporten – teori i praktiken?". Bachelor's thesis, Swedish National Defence College (2008), p. 32

[35] Zeebroek, Xavier. "The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Searching for the missing peace". Working Paper No. 66, Fundación par alas relaciones internacionales y el diálogo Exterior/FRIDE (July 2008), p. 5, 8

[36] Interview with former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, August 7, 2009

Overall, it appears that the civilian and military branches of MONUC in eastern DRC have been able to harmonize their respective efforts, due to a combination of efficient organizational design and good interpersonal relations. Generally, brigade and division commanders have sought advice from the relevant civilian sections before launching operations, at least when those operations were initiated at the regional level. When brigade and division commanders received orders to undertake certain military actions directly from the Force Commander, they would still inform the civilians in advance, so that they could adapt their activities accordingly.[37]

A number of formal coordination mechanisms have been created to facilitate cooperation within MONUC. The main coordination mechanism is a daily Senior Management Team (SMT) meeting. In addition, there is a weekly CIMIC meeting, with military staff sections G1 through G6 in attendance as well as the civilian substantive sections. Another formal coordination mechanism was created in March 2008: the Eastern Coordination Office. This office is led a by the Eastern Coordinator, a D-2 level UN official, and is responsible for coordinating MONUC's activities in eastern DRC (Maniema, Oriental, Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces).[38] The Eastern Coordinator is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of the UN Stabilization Plan, which is a joint MONUC/Congolese government initiative for stabilizing the eastern DRC.[39]

Another organizational innovation, introduced in January 2009, is Joint Protection Teams (JPT's). JPT's are delegations of MONUC Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, and Child Protection Officers that are dispatched to MONUC company operating bases to help the military identify protection needs, and to understand protection issues. Given the conventional training of most MONUC military contingents, the JPT's are seen as useful to allow them to adapt to the new task of protecting civilians.[40]

However, informal coordination instruments appear to have been just as important, especially in North Kivu and Ituri. Such informal cooperation was especially well-developed between the military staff sections G2 (intelligence) and G3 (operations) and the Political Affairs and Civil Affairs sections. Personnel in these sections shared information on a daily basis. Such close cooperation was enabled by the physical proximity of the relevant offices, and driven by the high operational tempo in North Kivu and Ituri. The scope of the tasks facing MONUC in these provinces, and the crisis-like operating environ-

[37] Ibid.
[38] D-2 is the UN professional category below Assistant Secretary-General
[39] Interview with former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, August 7, 2009
[40] Ibid. and Reliefweb. "DR Congo: MONUC Joint Protection Teams making a difference in the field", July 20, 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-7U5S74?OpenDocument, accessed August 19, 2009.

ment, meant that there was often no time to use formal mechanism such as the Senior Management Team meeting for coordination.[41]

Conversely, in other parts of the DRC, where the military tasks for MONUC were more focused on protecting MONUC personnel and installations, coordination was handled through formal mechanisms to a higher extent. For instance, in Kindu, the SMT meeting was the primary coordination mechanism.[42]

While overall coordination appears to have functioned well, there are examples of shortcomings. One such weakness is the presence of national caveats. National caveats are rules imposed by the troop-contributing countries regarding how their troops can be used by the UN Force Commander. Such caveats are commonplace in multinational operations, and have recently been the object of much controversy in Afghanistan. In the DRC, caveats did occasionally have a significant negative impact on MONUC's effectiveness. In May 2004, when Nkunda's troops were advancing towards Bukavu, the MONUC contingent guarding the Bukavu airport gave the airport up to Nkunda's troops without a fight, despite having received orders to defend the airport.[43] In October 2004, riots broke out in Uvira, South Kivu. Even though the mob was about to enter the local UN office, the MONUC troops present did not respond. In both these instances, the MONUC troops were from the same country. They had received instructions from their government not to take risks, as casualties could have threatened the president's re-election.[44]

4.1.5 The impact of logistical and terrain challenges on internal MONUC coordination

The DRC is an enormous country, encompassing over 2 million square kilometres, comparable to the size of Western Europe. At the same time, its transportation infrastructure is extremely poor. Only 2,250 kilometres of paved roads exist. The remaining 171,000 kilometres are unpaved, meaning that their condition varies greatly with the season.[45] This creates challenges for exercising command and control. Notably, MONUC's headquarters are located in Kinshasa, in the western part of the DRC, while the bulk of its military personnel are based in the eastern parts. It takes well over three hours to fly from Kinshasa to either Bunia or Lubumbashi (Katanga province).[46] Such a considerable physical

[41] Interview with former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, August 7, 2009
[42] Ibid.
[43] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 289
[44] Isberg, Jan-Gunnar. "Fredsstödjande operationer – exemplet Kongo", pp. 52- 74 in *Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, No. 2 (2008), p. 62-63
[45] OCHA. "Humanitarian Action Plan 2007. Democratic Republic of Congo", p. 42
[46] MONUC Public Information Division. "Briefing Materials" (August 2009). http://monuc.unmissions.org/Portals/MONUC/Document/Briefing%20Materials%20august%2009.pdf, accessed August 19, 2009, p. 17

separation of the senior mission leadership from the main area of operations meant that commanders at the tactical level frequently had a different situational understanding than did the SRSG and Force Commander. There are several accounts of how this geographical separation have impeded MONUC's military effectiveness. For instance, when Nkunda's forces were about to invade Bukavu in May 2004, the brigade commander on the ground was preparing to defend the city. However, differences in situational awareness and views regarding MONUC's role caused the senior MONUC leadership in Kinshasa and DPKO in New York to order the commander not to use force to defend Bukavu. The passivity of MONUC during the Bukavu crisis diminished the trust in MONUC among the civilian population as well as in the transitional government.[47]

The formation of an Eastern Division HQ was partly motivated by the desire to prevent such differences in situational awareness from arising by delegating more decision power to the regional level.[48]

4.2 EU and MONUC

The EU has undertaken four separate missions to support the peace effort in the DRC. Two of these have been relatively short military missions. In a 2003 operation labelled Artemis, an EU force deployed to Bunia to restore order in the city and thereby give MONUC time to establish a presence there. In 2006, another EU force, EUFOR RD Congo, was sent to bolster security in Kinshasa before and during the elections. Two non-military missions have, in contrast, been deployed for several years, and both are still active. EUPOL DR Kinshasa was established in 2005, with the purpose of training a police unit in Kinshasa. In the same year, EUSEC DR Congo was launched, tasked with supporting the Congolese government with security sector reform (SSR). EUPOL and EUSEC will be discussed in the section on Security Sector Reform below.

As the EU has chosen to launch its own missions, rather than to channel its support through the UN organization, it is highly relevant to study how well the EU and the UN has coordinated its activities. Given the temporary character of the two military missions, it is of particular interest to look into the handover process at the field level.

[47] Roessler, Philip and Prendergast, John. "Democratic Republic of the Congo", pp. 229-318 in Durch, William (ed.). *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: United Institute of Peace (2006), p. 290-291

[48] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 294

4.2.1 Operation Artemis

The EU's first military mission to the DRC, Operation Artemis, was launched as MONUC was losing control over the situation in Ituri province. In May 2003, heavy fighting erupted in the provincial capital of Bunia, resulting in significant civilian suffering. When UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked France for military help, the EU managed to authorize and deploy the force within one month. The Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), as it was called, managed to end fighting in Bunia and thereby provided MONUC with enough time to deploy its own forces to Ituri.[49] The forces deployed to Bunia consisted of a 230-strong French and Swedish Special Forces element, and around 1,000 conventional, mostly French, troops. The force included support elements providing medical, air mobility and indirect fire support. French Close Air Support was available from bases in Chad and Uganda. After landing some 100 troops at Bunia airport on June 6, the IEMF engaged in a number of skirmishes with the militias fighting over control of Bunia. On June 22, the IEMF Force Commander declared that no weapons would be allowed in Bunia and within a 10-kilometer radius of the town. Subsequently, the IEMF engaged in a series of offensive operations to enforce that decree.[50]

According to Alpha Sow, former MONUC Head of Office in Bunia, the IEMF and MONUC coordinated closely on the ground, and the cooperation between the two entities worked well.[51] Among the first components of the IEMF that arrived to Bunia was a French civil-military liaison officer, who successfully established contact with humanitarian organizations in Bunia.[52] In Bunia, the IEMF achieved effective coordination with the Uruguayan MONUC battalion stationed there, for instance through the exchange of radio frequencies and coordination of operations. This was achieved despite the differences in mandates and command chains of the two forces.[53]

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[49] Morsut, Claudia. "Effective Multilateralism? EU-UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003-2006", pp. 261-272 in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. (April 2009), p. 263

[50] Ulriksen, Ståle – Gourlay, Catriona – Mace, Catriona. "Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?", pp. 508-525 in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), p. 517-519

[51] Sow, Alpha. "Achievements of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force and Future Scenarios", pp. 209-221 in Malan, Mark and Gomes Porto, Joào (eds.), *Challenges for Peace Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the* Congo. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (2004), p. 210

[52] Homan, Kees. "Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force", pp. 151-155 in Ricci, Andrea and Kytoemaa, Eero. *European Commission: Faster and More United? The Debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacity*. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (May 2007), p. 154

[53] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. "Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force" (October 2004), p. 14

However, there appears to have been some shortcomings as well. The EU was criticized for not providing a senior civilian representative to assist the Force Commander in linking military operations to civilian activities in the Bunia area. While Operation Artemis was active, the EU was simultaneously providing support to NGO's to build up the capacity of the local police, but the IEMF did not establish contact with this program.[54]

At the strategic level, there were also some frictions. The UN Secretariat complained that the EU did not sufficiently inform the UN about EU planning before the IEMF was deployed to the DRC. Indeed, MONUC was not made aware of the first landing of IEMF troops, since the IEMF leadership believed that such information might leak if provided to MONUC.[55]

The process of handing over responsibility from IEMF to MONUC appears to have functioned adequately. The IEMF and MONUC conducted joint patrols for about a week, and MONUC inherited some useful fortifications along the main roads going into Bunia. However, the IEMF did not pass on its intelligence database to MONUC, meaning that MONUC initially had limited situational awareness. Moreover, the IEMF lowered its operational tempo considerably towards the end of July 2003. During this period, the force's French command refused to conduct search operations to disarm militias in Bunia, as it was feared that such operations might change the balance of power between the Congolese factions and thereby make the IEMF seem less neutral.[56] At the same time, these frictions appear to have produced improvements in the formal structures for cooperation at the strategic level between the EU and UN, as the experience of Operation Artemis contributed to the signing of a 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management' in September 2003.[57]

4.2.2 EUFOR RD Congo

EUFOR RD Congo was initiated through a request from DPKO to the presidency of the EU in December 2005. With elections planned for the summer of 2006, the UN was eager to get reinforcements to make sure the elections went smoothly. Launched on June 12, 2006, EUFOR RD Congo had three components: an

[54] Ulriksen et al (2004), p. 515

[55] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. "Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force" (October 2004), p. 11

[56] Interview with former MONUC military commander, August 6, 2009.

[57] Tardy, Thierry. "EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping: a promising relationship in a constrained environment", pp. 49-68 in Ortega, Martin (ed.). *The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in Effective Multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper No. 78, EU Institute for Security Studies (June 2005), p. 56, 58. For an overview of EU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping in Africa, see Derblom, Markus – Hagström Frisell, Eva – Schmidt, Jennifer. "UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa". FOI User Report (November 2008).

advance force deployed in Kinshasa, a force reserve stationed in Gabon, and an over-the-horizon reserve in Europe.[58] The mandate of the force was strictly limited in time and space. The operation deployed for only four months. While the UN mandate did not impose geographical limitations, the German Bundestag decided that the German components could only operate in and around Kinshasa.[59] In addition, the tasks given to EUFOR DR Congo in UNSC Resolution 1671 were rather narrow. The force was to support MONUC if MONUC faced difficulties in fulfilling its mandate; protect civilians under imminent threat in the areas where EUFOR was deployed; protect the Kinshasa airport; protect own personnel, installations and freedom of movement; and conduct limited operations to extract individuals in danger.[60]

By 2006, EU had established a lengthy formal planning process to be used when launching military crisis management operations. In planning for EUFOR, EU used a somewhat shorter process. While this might have shortened the time required, in this case it also meant that EU-UN cooperation was not addressed in the Option Paper that became the basis for continued operational planning. More detailed planning documents, including the Initiating Military Directive, which gives directions to the Operational Commander, and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), had already been issued when UNSC Resolution 1671 was passed. This meant that the UN had only limited possibilities of providing feedback on EU operational planning before the resolution was passed.[61]

The particularities of EU decision-making in security and defence policy shaped the command structure of EUFOR and its relations with MONUC. As laid out in EU Council Joint Action (JA) 2006/319/CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) would exercise control over EUFOR at the political-strategic level. The JA also called for coordination with the UN at the strategic level, channelled through the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana. At the military-strategic level, the EU Operational Commander, German three-star general Karlheinz Viereck, were to coordinate with DPKO and the MONUC senior leadership. At the operational level, EUFOR Force Commander, French two-star general Christian Damay, would maintain contact with MONUC on the ground and with local authorities.[62]

[58] Hoebeke, Hans – Carette, Stéphanies – Vlassenroot, Koen. “EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Centre d’analyse stratégique, French Prime Minister’s Office (2007), p. 12
[59] Ehrhart, Hans-Georg. ”EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment”, pp. 9-12 in *European Security Review*, No. 32 (2007), p. 9
[60] Morsut 2009, p. 265
[61] Major, Claudia. “EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006”. Institute for Security Studies, Paris, Occasional Paper No. 72 (September 2008), p. 26-27
[62] Major 2008, p. 17

These command arrangements would be an important factor in explaining the quality of coordination between EUFOR and MONUC on the ground. EUFOR had three layers of headquarters: the PSC in Brussels, the Operational Headquarters in Potsdam, and the Force headquarters in Kinshasa. In contrast, the MONUC Force Headquarters in Kinshasa reported directly to its political-strategic command, DPKO in New York. This discrepancy had a number of negative consequences on EUFOR-MONUC coordination. The command structure chosen by the EU, while ensuring political control over operations, was slow in making decisions. Since EUFOR's mandate required a formal request for assistance from MONUC before EUFOR could launch operations, this rigidity was a serious weakness. In a July 2006 command post exercise, it turned out that it might take 24 hours for EUFOR to come to MONUC's assistance. Also, it has been argued that EUFOR operated mainly according to a military logic, whereas the senior military leadership of MONUC was more accustomed to take political dimensions into account. In practice, this meant that the MONUC Force Commander was accustomed to engaging in dialogue with the SRSG, while the EUFOR Force Commander had no similar close political partner on the ground in the DRC.[63] It is difficult to judge what concrete consequences this difference had. However, it seems highly probable that EUFOR would have been more capable of swiftly adapting its modus operandi to conditions on the ground, should the EU have delegated more political decision-making power from the PSC to a political representative in the DRC.

A number of circumstances counteracted the structural impediments to coordination, and allowed a fairly good cooperation between the two forces. The Force headquarters of EUFOR and MONUC were located in the same area of Kinshasa, which facilitated coordination. EUFOR liaison officers were permanently attached to MONUC Force Headquarters (FHQ) and to MONUC's Western Brigade HQ. During joint operations, temporary liaison officers were exchanged. The MONUC and EUFOR Chiefs of Staff met weekly to share situational assessments.[64]

More importantly, the two Force Commanders, Damay and Gaye, knew each other personally, as they had both attended the French military academy St-Cyr. Their personal relationship allowed them to work together in a constructive manner. As Major notes: "acting on the basis of *ad hoc* measures and arrangements on the ground, the two FCdrs acted as a corrective to the institutional shortcomings".[65]

Initially, EUFOR RD Congo faced a rather benign operational environment. The first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections was carried out in a

[63] Major 2008, p. 28-29
[64] Major 2008, p. 29
[65] Major 2008, p. 35

largely peaceful environment. EUFOR operations aimed at assuring visibility in the capital to dissuade potential attacks. However, on August 20, shortly before the election results were to be announced, violence erupted in Kinshasa. As police forces loyal to Joseph Kabila tried to shut down a TV station supporting the presidential runner-up, Jean-Pierre Bemba, heavy fighting started between Kabila's and Bemba's forces. Following diplomatic pressure and posturing by MONUC, the two adversaries agreed to stop the fighting. However, the next day, Bemba's residence was attacked by Kabila's Presidential Guard. As Bemba happened to be receiving fourteen ambassadors and the SRSG, EUFOR and MONUC troops were tasked with extracting the delegation. As a result of MONUC mediation, Kabila and Bemba agreed to garrison their troops, a process that was facilitated by MONUC and EUFOR verification patrols. The second round of the elections was carried out successfully, resulting in Kabila receiving 58 percent of the votes and being sworn in as president on December 6. Despite this apparent success, MONUC and EUFOR were criticized for not reacting quickly enough in connection with the unrest in Kinshasa during the summer of 2006. Observers also pointed out that out of the 4,000 troops in EUFOR, only 130 Spanish troops were available to counter the unrest in Kinshasa.[66]

In sum, it appears that the formal mechanism for coordination between EUFOR and MONUC had several important structural deficiencies. The EU command structure was not aligned with that of the UN, and the EU's insistence on maintaining political control over the mission meant that EUFOR was in a poor position to react swiftly. These deficiencies were partly offset by good personal relationships between senior leaders of both missions. However, it is unclear what the outcome would have been, should EUFOR have been exposed to a more demanding operating environment. As stated by former EUFOR officers, part of the explanation of the mission's success seems to have been a certain amount of luck.[67]

This observation suggests that the EU might have good reasons to reconsider its model of exercising command and control over European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions. Especially when the EU launches missions working in parallel with – or in support of – another international organization such as the UN or the African Union, it is important that the desire to maintain political control does not act as an impediment to reaching the missions' goals. In the case of supporting UN peacekeeping missions, as the EU has done not only in the DRC but also recently in Chad and the Central African Republic, it might be worth considering if EU contributions can be incorporated into the existing UN mission structure.

[66] International Crisis Group. "Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown". Africa Briefing No. 42 (October 2006), p. 1-5

[67] Major 2008, p. 36

4.3 MONUC's relations with the Congolese authorities and the FARDC

In general, relations with host country authorities constitute a dilemma for peacekeepers. On the one hand, there is widespread agreement over the importance to ensure local ownership of the peace process. As the outsiders inevitably will leave sooner or later, sustainable peace requires buy-in from local stakeholders. On the other hand, governments in post-conflict countries are often corrupt, lacking the capacity to govern, and do not devote sufficient respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. This dilemma has been painfully realized by MONUC.

The relations between MONUC and the Congolese authorities have largely been governed by the political situation. The Congolese political transition process has in itself very much influenced these relations. During the transition process, which culminated in the 2006 elections, the Congolese appears to have been more dependent on MONUC, whereas after the elections the Kabila government has increasingly emphasized its sovereign status.

During the period following the Lusaka Agreement, one major instrument for coordination between MONUC and the Congolese authorities was the Joint Military Commission (JMC). The JMC, set up in 1999 to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, consisted of representatives of the parties to the agreement and representative of OAU, the Organization of African Unity. The JMC was soon incorporated into MONUC's command structure. This meant that MONUC could shape the agenda of the JMC, a power that was used to initiate the Kampala Disengagement Plan in the spring of 2000. However, the limitations of this agenda-setting power soon became clear, as the parties failed to abide by the disengagement plan and renewed hostilities followed.[68]

In 2004, another set of mechanisms for coordination between MONUC and the Congolese transitional government was created: Joint Commissions in the areas of SSR, essential legislation, and elections. These commissions became important instruments through which MONUC could provide technical assistance and influence the transitional government.[69]

With regards to military cooperation, MONUC's relations with the FARDC have been plagued by the FARDC's sustained record of human rights abuses, as well as by ambiguities in MONUC's mandate. In 2004, MONUC was authorized to

[68] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 247-248, 261, 264

[69] United Nations Security Council. "Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". UN Document S/2004/1034 (December 31, 2004), p. 9

support the FARDC in disarming foreign combatants through UNSC Resolution 1565.[70]

Over the next few years, this new task necessitated closer coordination between MONUC and the FARDC in the eastern DRC, where such disarming operations were conducted. In recent years, a number of formal coordination mechanisms have been created for this purpose. The FARDC have liaison officers stationed in MONUC regional headquarters in eastern DRC. There is also a bi-weekly Provincial Security Meeting, convened by the governor. Other participants include MONUC, the FARDC, the Congolese police, and the Congolese intelligence service. However, this meeting is dedicated to general discussions on the security situation in the province in question rather than on coordinating specific military operations.[71]

Coordination of military operations seems to have been the most problematic area of coordination between MONUC and the Congolese authorities. Typically, the FARDC would only inform MONUC about its planned operations when the FARDC wanted air support or logistical support from MONUC. When MONUC offered advice on international humanitarian law and human rights, the FARDC were less inclined to listen. This discrepancy can be traced to a fundamental difference in objectives: while MONUC's main task is to protect the civilian population, the FARDC's main objective is to defeat the rebel militias. Also, the low level of training among FARDC officers, and its deficient command and control structure have made it difficult for MONUC to conduct joint planning with the FARDC.[72]

The above account suggests that mistrust and poor coordination primarily was a problem at the tactical level. However, it would become evident that similar issues existed also at the highest levels of the Congolese government. During the fall of 2008, there was significant rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda. This led to the formation of a joint plan to disarm the FDLR, using force if necessary. Later on, this plan was expanded to include also the joint neutralization of Rwanda's former protégé Laurent Nkunda. However, the plan was never shared with MONUC. The operation, launched in January 2009, became a military failure and caused much civilian suffering.[73] This episode is illustrative of the lack of coordination and trust between MONUC and the Congolese government at the strategic level. To complicate matters further, the Security Council had in December 2008 instructed MONUC to protect civilians from violence from any of the parties engaged in the conflict –including from the

[70] United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1565 (2004)", UN Document S/RES/1565 (2004), October 1, 2004, paragraph 5(c)
[71] Interview with former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, August 7, 2009
[72] Ibid.
[73] International Crisis Group. "Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy", Africa Report No. 150, (May 11, 2009), p. 7-10

FARDC.[74] Thus, MONUC was asked to support the FARDC and at the same time to protect the civilian population – from the same army it was supporting. The existence of such contradictions underscores the importance of clarity in the mandates provided by the Security Council. To the extent that MONUC's operations became incoherent because of these ambiguities, the ultimate source of that incoherence might be found in New York rather than in Kinshasa or Goma.

Clearly, it has been tremendously difficult for MONUC to operationalize the principle of local ownership. The above account is focused on the eastern DRC, the most challenging area of the country in many regards. This means that many positive examples of initiatives by the Congolese authorities in the western parts of the country have been omitted. Still, it is all too apparent that the lack of a capable, respectable local counterpart has been a major impediment for bringing stability to the East, which is vital for creating peace in the DRC.

4.4 MONUC and the coordination of humanitarian and developmental efforts

Coordination of humanitarian efforts is often complicated, given the large number of independent actors involved, and the desire of humanitarians not to be associated with military or political actors. Also, NGOs are sometimes resistant to coordination efforts, since joint efforts make it more difficult for them to motivate before donors why their particular organization should receive funding. Ever since the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide triggered a massive refugee flow from Rwanda into eastern DRC, there has been a strong humanitarian presence in the DRC. This presence includes the UN organizations WFP, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). All of the largest international NGO's are present, including CARE, Save the Children, CARITAS, Oxfam, World Vision, and Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF – Doctors without Borders).[75] In addition, the 2009 Humanitarian Action Plan, the document OCHA uses to plan humanitarian efforts, lists no less than 275 independent NGO's as partners in its work in the DRC.[76]

[74] United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1856", UN Document S/RES/1856 (December 22, 2008), paragraph 3(a). The relevant section reads that MONUC shall have the mandate to "Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict".

[75] MacDermott, Justin. "Humanitära organisationers villkor för engagemang i civil-militär samverkan", FOI User Report, forthcoming in 2009.

[76] OCHA. "Humanitarian Action Plan 2009. Democratic Republic of Congo", p. 217-221

4.4.1 The application of the Integrated Missions concept

It took quite some time before MONUC became involved in humanitarian work. The Humanitarian Affairs Section in MONUC HQ was not formed until 2003, due to staff shortages and confusion about what role MONUC should play in the humanitarian sphere.[77] Later on, the desire to align the political and military work of MONUC with the humanitarian and developmental efforts in the DRC has been a strong reason behind applying the Integrated Missions concept. The process of integrating the mission began in late 2004, when Ross Mountain was appointed DSRSG/HC/RC.[78] This merging of responsibilities into a single official meant that Mountain simultaneously became the Deputy SRSG, the senior OCHA official in the DRC (Humanitarian Coordinator), and the senior UNDP representative (Resident Coordinator). This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Illustration of mission integration as practiced in the DRC. Source: von Pottelbergh 2006, p. 28

Compared to other UN Integrated Missions, such as UNAMA in Afghanistan and UNMIL in Liberia, the integration of humanitarian coordination into MONUC

[77] Von Pottelbergh 2006, p. 26
[78] Mowjee, Tasneem. "Humanitarian Agenda 2015. Democratic Republic of Congo Case Study". Briefing Paper, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University (October 2007), p. 16

was less far-going, as OCHA remained a separate entity outside MONUC, while its work was coordinated by the DSRSG/HC/RC. In Lipson's topology, such an arrangement is labelled "minimalist integration".[79] This was motivated partly by a desire of the humanitarian community to remain outside of the political and military work of MONUC, and partly by the realization that the humanitarian organizations would remain on the ground after MONUC had left.[80]

Mountain appears to have found creative ways to utilize his multi-faceted role. For instance, he used the authority stemming from MONUC's military power to conduct humanitarian advocacy vis-à-vis the Congolese authorities, sometimes operating jointly with the MONUC Head of Office in South Kivu. Another example of successful coordination happened in 2006, when MONUC was temporarily reinforced by a battalion from the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB). Through seeking advice from the Civil Affairs Section of MONUC, the battalion was able to receive advice on its operations from the humanitarian community. Allegedly, the battalion's adherence to this advice in its subsequent deployment to Katanga contributed to enabling the return of 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) to Katanga. Later, the MONUC Force Commander tried to institutionalize such coordination through issuing a Commander's Directive emphasizing cooperation with the UN agencies and the humanitarian community at large. Mowjee largely attributes these achievements to Mountain's experience and personality.[81] However, it is difficult to determine if these instances of successful coordination should be attributed to the DSRSG personally, or to the organizational reform that put him in that position.

The main mechanism used by the DSRSG/HC/RC for coordinating humanitarian efforts at the country level is an annual document called the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP). Based on a number of humanitarian scenarios, this document attempts to assess future humanitarian needs and divide responsibilities accordingly. The HAP divides the humanitarian work into functional clusters, such as health, shelter, early recovery et cetera. These clusters are organized both at the national and at the local level, using a decentralized approach. At the local level, the clusters are organized into Provincial Inter-Agency Committees (*Comités Provinciaux Inter-Agences*, CPIA). The work of the CPIAs varies depending on the local conditions and needs.

In the protection cluster, UNHCR share the chairmanship of the cluster with MONUC. In some locations the MONUC representative in the protection cluster is drawn from the Civil Affairs section of the regional MONUC office, and sometimes from the Human Rights section. According to UNHCR, there are

[79] Lipson, Michael. "Clash of Delegations? Coordination in UN Integrated Missions", paper presented at the annual APSA conference, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28-31, 2008, p. 7
[80] Mowjee 2007, p. 16
[81] Mowjee 2007, p. 17-18

clear advantages of this arrangement. MONUC's presence in the protection cluster enabled a dialogue between the peacekeepers and the humanitarians. That dialogue resulted in a number of concrete initiatives. For instance, MONUC was able to successfully lobby for the removal of FARDC commanders responsible for abuses. In 2006, escorts were provided for IDP's while voting in Ituri. Another innovation was the deployment of Mobile Operating Bases.[82] The concept of Mobile Operating Bases was developed to allow MONUC to better respond to protection needs identified by humanitarian actors. Based on such information, MONUC would deploy to a vulnerable location for short periods (weeks), with the purpose of pre-empting attacks on the local population.[83]

However, UNHCR also expressed a number of concerns with MONUC's participation in the cluster mechanism. In particular, MONUC's role in supporting the FARDC was seen as problematic, given the FARDC's involvement in abuses.[84]

OCHA has made attempts to improve the coordination of the humanitarian effort through centralizing the funding process. Very roughly, the pooled funding process means that each cluster identifies humanitarian needs in their localities, and OCHA then disburses funding based on requests of the clusters. According to UN personnel, this mechanism has improved humanitarian coordination, though there are differences in the degree of improvement between different clusters.[85] The positive impact of the pooled funding mechanism is verified by a former employee of an international NGO working in North Kivu. However, the same source believed that OCHA would only be able to conduct limited coordination, since the NGOs are likely to resist if they feel that their independence is curbed.[86]

4.4.2 Coordination at the local level

At the local level, coordination between MONUC and the other UN agencies is usually handled through meeting between MONUC Civil Affairs officers and the local OCHA representative. One downside of this arrangement is that the Civil Affairs officers generally have a limited knowledge of MONUC's political work and military operations. Thus, having Civil Affairs officers handle coordination

[82] Bourgeois, Claire – Diagne, Khassim – Tennant, Vicky. "Real time evaluation of UNHCR's IDP operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo". UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service (September 2007), p. 9
[83] Mowjee 2007, p. 23
[84] Bourgeois et al 2007, p. 10
[85] Lotze, Walter – Barros de Carvalho, Gustavo – Kasumba, Yvonne. "Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict. Case Studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan". ACCORD Occasional Paper, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2008), p. 23-24
[86] Interview with former humanitarian worker, July 23, 2009.

with the humanitarian and development community means less harmonization between MONUC's operations and humanitarian efforts.[87]

During the period 2006 to 2009, one of the main coordination instruments for MONUC's regional offices in eastern DRC was a daily Senior Management Team meeting. The local OCHA representative had a standing invitation to these meetings, but attended only sporadically. There was also a weekly Integrated Area Security Meeting hosted by MONUC, with OCHA, UNDP, and WFP in regular attendance. The purpose of this meeting was to share information regarding the local security situation and the consequences for staff security. Generally, coordination in the area of security worked well in eastern DRC during this period, mostly because the UN agencies had strong incentives to participate in the process.[88]

However, there is ample evidence of flawed or non-existing coordination between MONUC on the one hand and the UN agencies and humanitarian and development NGO's on the other. In general, these deficiencies appear to have been caused by a combination of differences in organizational cultures, and differences in priorities.

Some of these deficiencies have been blamed on shortcomings in the integration process. For instance, when MONUC established a Joint Mission Assessment Cell (JMAC), no representatives of the UN agencies were invited to participate. Also, the World Food Program had to set up its own airlift service, since it was felt that MONUC ignored the transportation needs of the humanitarians.[89] Thus, the partial integration process was not sufficient to prevent duplication of effort.

4.4.3 Impact of the non-permissive environment

As mentioned above, one issue of particular focus in this study is how the difficult operating environment has influenced coordination and cooperation between different actors. For the civilians working in UN agencies and other humanitarian and development organizations, the DRC has proved a very challenging environment. In addition to the vast humanitarian needs and the logistical challenges, they have been operating under high threat levels. During the period 1997-2005, the DRC had the sixth highest number of major security incidents involving international aid workers, only surpassed by Somalia, Sudan,

[87] Interview with former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, August 7, 2009
[88] Ibid.
[89] Eide et al 2005, p. 27-28

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. These incidents included the kidnappings of 19 aid workers.[90]

However, these difficult circumstances appear to have had only limited impact on civil-military relations. Coordination continued to be marred by mutual suspicion. From the perspective of MONUC, humanitarians appeared unwilling to commit to preventative security cooperation, only requesting assistance when in grave danger. In one incident during the crisis in Goma in October-November 2008, some humanitarian actors refused to receive evacuation support until they were surrounded by hostile forces. During the same crisis, landlines were installed between MONUC's regional headquarters and the local WFP base – but for some reason those landlines were dismantled once the crisis was over.[91]

Some formal mechanisms were created to coordinate between MONUC and the humanitarian community. One example of this was a weekly Mission Coordination Meeting, where requests for logistical support from MONUC could be made. However, not all UN agencies would participate in these meetings, and would not inform MONUC of their planned movements, which prevented efficient use of logistics assets. Also, if those convoys ran into trouble, MONUC would have to launch reactive operations to assist them.[92]

From the perspective of the humanitarians, the desire of perceived neutrality has been a strong reason for not cooperating with MONUC. While there are differences in this regard within the humanitarian community, some organizations went as far as banning their staff from socializing with MONUC personnel.[93] In a candid draft evaluation of the relationship between MONUC and the humanitarians in the DRC, an expat employee of an international NGO pointed to a number of factors explaining the poor relations. One such factor is a lack of understanding for the counterpart's working methods. For instance, the MONUC military had difficulties understanding the humanitarian's desire for neutrality, and had a different interpretation of the concept of protection. Another factor is differences in organizational culture. While senior military officers were used to others respecting their authority and not openly question them, humanitarians are more assertive. These differences made it difficult to interact in an amicable, productive fashion. Moreover, MONUC was perceived as being hesitant when it came to sharing operational information with the humanitarians, probably since MONUC feared that such information would leak. Despite these difficulties, this NGO employee considered the meetings with MONUC useful,

[90] Stoddard, Abby – Harmer, Adele – Haver, Katherine. "Providing aid in insecure environments: trends in policy and operations", Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group Report No. 23 (September 2006), p. 14, 17
[91] Interview with former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, August 7, 2009
[92] Ibid.
[93] Interview with former humanitarian worker, July 23, 2009

as some information was indeed shared and it appeared that MONUC sometimes did take the concerns of the humanitarians into account.[94]

The above noted difficulties in achieving cooperation between MONUC and the humanitarians can be seen as evidence of the importance of organizational cultures, especially in the absence of formal authority. It is striking that the difficult operating environment and high threat level do not seem to have influenced the coordination attempts very much.

4.5 Coordination and coherence in SSR and DDR

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept that has become increasingly important in post-conflict reconstruction and peace operations. Growing out of the recognition that good governance and security are important preconditions for broader development, SSR programs are now standard components of international efforts to create peace in countries plagued by conflict. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD defines SSR as "the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework".[95]

Since SSR involves working with such a wide range of actors and organizations in the host country in question, by necessity the competencies of several external agencies are needed. Indeed, a UN study identified no less than twelve different branches of the UN that had a substantial role to play in SSR.[96] This creates a need for efficient coordination. In the DRC, studying the attempts to coordinate SSR programs is of particular interest, given that reform of the Congolese army and integration of former rebels into the national army has been crucial obstacles to resolving the conflict. Moreover, the human rights abuses committed by the FARDC have caused a major contradiction in MONUC's mandate. On the one hand, MONUC is tasked with supporting the FARDC in its fight against rebel militias. On the other hand, MONUC is tasked with protecting the civilian population. Fulfilling both these aspects of the mandate seems impossible as long as the FARDC continues to commit abuses. Thus, a successful SSR effort that

[94] Anonymous. "An exercise of Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) in Eastern DRC" (2009).
[95] OECD DAC. "Security System Reform and Governance", DAC Reference Document (2005). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf, accessed August 11, 2009, p. 20
[96] Scherrer, Vincenza. "Challenges of Integration: Cooperation on SSR within the UN System and Beyond", pp. 181-195 in Law, David M. (ed.). *Intergovernmental organisations and security sector reform.* Geneva: DCAF (2007), p. 183

would make the FARDC uphold international humanitarian law and human rights could allow MONUC to reach its goals.

During the first years of MONUC's existence, its work related to SSR was heavily influenced by the stipulations of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. The agreement called for a DDR process, integration of the armed forces, and police reform. The task of coordinating these activities was assumed partly by MONUC, and partly by the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT).[97]

When the transitional government was established in June 2003, it was estimated that there were 330,000 Congolese combatants. Given this huge number of armed militias, the initial priority in MONUC's involvement in SSR became DDR and reforming the army. In July 2003, MONUC was mandated to assist with DDR through UNSC Resolution 1493.[98] During this period, UNDP was designated the DDR lead agency.[99] The basic idea was to incorporate former militias into multiethnic integrated brigades, which would form a new national army – the FARDC. This process aimed at creating 18 integrated brigades, totalling some 150,000 soldiers, before the national elections in July 2006. However, this process has been severely delayed.[100]

In December 2003, President Kabila created a number of bodies responsible for planning and executing the DDR programme. The executive responsibility was given to the National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion, known by its French acronym CONADER.[101]

At the program's inception, CONADER set up orientation camps, where combatants were brought for sensitization training, and given the choice of being demobilized or joining the national army. Because of the low wages in the army, a majority have chosen to be demobilized. Those who chose to join the FARDC were sent to a *brassage* center, were they underwent a 45-day training program, which included education on human rights and sexual violence. Needless to say,

[97] CIAT is a group of countries engaged in dialogue with the Congolese state. The group was created in 2002, and was originally made up of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Belgium, Canada, and South Africa. Later, Angola, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia, the African Union/African Commission and the European Union/European Commission also joined CIAT.

[98] Onana, Renner and Taylor, Hannah. "MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo", pp. 501-516 in *International* Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 4 (August 2008), p. 501-504

[99] Dahrendorf, Nicola. "Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform (SSR): The Case of the DR Congo". Case Study Report, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (October 2007), p. 6

[100] Mobekk, Eirin. "Security Sector Reform and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Protecting Civilians in the East", pp. 273-286 in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 2009), p. 273, 276

[101] Onana & Taylor 2008, p. 504

45 days of training is not enough to create effective combat brigades, nor is it enough to instil lasting respect for human rights among the recruits.[102]

However, due to a political struggle between the former enemies now making up the transitional government over control over the new army, comprehensive plans for DDR and army integration materialized slowly. Only in June 2004 was a national DDR program adopted. This program – labelled PNDDR based on its French acronym- was developed in by the Congolese authorities in coordination with UNDP, MONUC, and Belgium.[103] In the meantime, the absence of functioning DDR and army integration had a direct and very negative effect on the security situation in eastern DRC. Indeed, the fighting in Ituri and the Kivus in 2003-2004 was partly triggered by the refusal of rebel units to be integrated into the national army.[104] It seems probable that the need for MONUC to engage in offensive operations against those rebels would have been less in the presence of a functioning DDR and army integration program – though this is obviously a counterfactual hypothesis.

The coordination of the SSR effort was further formalized through two seminars arranged by the Congolese Defence Ministry together with Belgium in late 2003 and early 2004. At these seminars, Belgium assumed a key role in planning the continued process. However, Belgium did not assume the financial responsibility.[105] Instead, donors chose to use a mechanism called the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). MDRP is a multi-agency effort to support demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the entire Great Lakes region. MDRP is financed partly through World Bank funds, and partly through a trust fund sponsored by 13 Western donor countries.[106]

Following further planning in early 2004, MONUC was tasked with establishing a planning and coordination structure for the SSR process. This structure consisted of a steering committee of donors, a technical advisory group made up of international experts, and a secretariat of MONUC staff. The steering committee held its first meeting in July 2004. However, this structure failed to gain acceptance from either the donor community or the Congolese government. At the same time, Ituri and the Kivus saw heavy fighting between the FARDC and Nkunda's renegade troops. After the FARDC had regained control over Bukavu, a new coordination mechanism for SSR was created in October 2004. As mandated by UNSC Resolution 1565, MONUC established three Joint Commissions to coordinate SSR, legislation, and elections. The Joint

[102] Mobekk 2009, p. 277
[103] Onana & Taylor 2008, p. 505
[104] Isberg, Jan-Gunnar. "Fredsstödjande operationer – exemplet Kongo", pp. 52- 74 in *Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, No. 2 (2008), p. 54
[105] Onana & Taylor 2008, p. 506
[106] "MDRP Fact Sheet", August 2008. http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_FS_0808.pdf, accessed August 12, 2008.

Commission on SSR was co-chaired by MONUC and the transitional government, and proved to be a more efficient mechanism for coordination.[107] Within MONUC HQ, a dedicated SSR/DDR section was created in June 2006.

In 2004, another actor got involved in SSR: the European Union. EU had been supporting the build-up of the Congolese National Police since 2002. When this project reached the stage where actual training was to be started, the police mission EUPOL Kinshasa was created. Officially launched in April 2005, the mission initially comprised 29 international staff and police officers. The main task was to train a police unit specialized in crowd control, the Integrated Police Unit (IPU).[108] In addition to training and mentoring the IPU, EUPOL provided operational advice when the IPU was deployed during the 2006 elections. The IPU has been credited with carrying out successful anti-riot operations during the unrest in Kinshasa in August 2006, as well as effectively contributing to creating a secure environment during the second round of elections.[109]

As evident from the account above, the attempts to reform the Congolese security sector, especially the army, have been far from successful. One contributing factor to this shortcoming appears to be deficient coordination mechanisms. In order to allow a coherent process, four actors would have had to come up with a working division of labour. First, participation of the Congolese state would have been necessary to ensure local ownership. Secondly, the UN agencies, possessing technical and programming expertise, would have had to be at the table. Third, donors would have had to agree to provide adequate, long-term funding. Fourth, MONUC would have had to participate productively, given its large presence on the ground and military capabilities. The lack of an effective coordination structure appears to have prevented the effective participation of these four key actors.

However, the shortcomings in the SSR/DDR arena cannot be explained predominantly by faulty coordination structures. A major part of the explanation lies with resistance from the Congolese authorities and the rebel groups to reforming the army and other security institutions. Rwanda is also partly to blame, especially with regards to the attempts to disarm the non-Congolese militias in the eastern DRC. By ensuring that fighting continued through providing support to the militias, Rwanda made sure that there would be no orderly return of the ex-Interhamwe forces to Rwanda, where they could have threatened Kagame's rule.[110]

[107] Onana & Taylor 2008, p. 507-508
[108] Hoebeke et al 2007, p. 9
[109] Morsut 2009, p. 266
[110] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 231
[110] Roessler & Prendergast 2006, p. 277

5 Concluding remarks

Having discussed coherence and coordination attempts in and between four important sets of actors involved in the peace operation in the DRC, some tentative remarks about the coherence of the operation as a whole are appropriate.

Imperfect coherence has been a problem but should not be seen as the primary explanation for the absence of peace in the DRC. Broadly speaking, the impression from the discussion above is that it is not so much a lack of coherence in the overall peace effort that is the explanation for the absence of peace in the DRC. The continuation of interference by regional actors, the absence of a viable political settlement, spill-over effects from the conflict in Uganda, and the economic interests of the rebel groups to maintain control over regions with valuable natural resources are all fundamental drivers of the conflict. While greater coherence might have counteracted some of these factors, it is unreasonable to expect that even perfectly functioning coordination would have meant success, given the level of resources devoted to the peace process. Still, some instances of incoherence can be deemed have had a significant negative effect on the effectiveness of the mission. Perhaps most importantly, there has been no capable local actor for the external actors to partner with.

The absence of credible, capable Congolese authorities has been the most serious obstacle to achieving coherence. In de Coning's typology, the weakness of the Congolese state would count as poor external-internal coherence. This weakness is worrisome in the sense that it is difficult to conceive of any reforms that could be undertaken by external actors to alleviate this issue in future operations. An increased emphasis on providing technical support and capacity building programs might make a difference on the margin.

The shortage of credible local partners is not only a problem from the perspective of achieving coherence and creating appropriate coordination mechanisms. Rather, it is a fundamental weakness of contemporary peace operations. Intervenors are regularly faced with the dilemma of how to act in the absence of responsible host-country political elites. If they choose to remedy this weakness by assuming greater responsibility for running the country in question, as was done in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, it is difficult to create the local governing capacity necessary for leaving. In addition, such approaches might cause the intervenors to be seen as imperialists.[111] On the other hand, if they support local ownership, as happened in the DRC, the outsiders will have to find

[111] For an in-depth discussion of the analogy between contemporary stability operations and imperialism, see Marten, Kimberly Zisk. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past.* New York: Columbia University Press (2004).

ways to work with local governments that might be responsible for human rights abuses. The observations in this study do not hint towards any solution to the dilemma, but rather underscores its continued importance.

The second most serious shortcoming has been the confusions over responsibilities and resulting delays in setting up a comprehensive DDR program. It took years before functioning procedures for coordinating this effort could be created. This has been especially problematic since effective DDR could have reduced the need for offensive military operations significantly, thus making the overall mission much easier. Due to the limited time available for researching this study, it has not been possible to reach an exhaustive explanation for the poor performance in DDR. However, tentative evidence suggests that resistance from within the Congolese government was an important factor. Also, differences in working methodology between the external actors involved in DDR contributed. UNDP's long-term development approach and funding disbursement procedures appear to have clashed with the political culture in MONUC, where quick results were desired.

There is evidence of incoherence and poor coordination also in other areas, but these do not seem to have had strong negative impact on the effectiveness of the mission. Nevertheless, it is important to consider these weaknesses, so that they can be avoided in future operations.

One area in which weaknesses have been observed is the process of applying the Integrated Missions concept. **The version of integration that was applied in the DRC has not been sufficient to ensure smooth cooperation between MONUC and the UN agencies, nor between MONUC and the humanitarian community.** This appears to have been the case especially at the local level, where communication problems persisted and the relations between MONUC and the humanitarians was often plagued by mutual suspicion.

How does this observation square with the idea of a 'harmonization marketplace'? One might argue that the lack of coordination is a consequence of the relevant local actors lacking incentives for cooperation, which would fit well with the notion of a marketplace. However, this metaphor does not seem to fully account for what happened on the ground in the DRC. The metaphor of a marketplace suggests that actors engage in harmonization based on rational calculations involving cost-benefit analysis. However, several sources indicate that shortcomings in coordination at the local level in the DRC to a high degree have been driven by cultural factors. Such cultural factors appear to have prevented actors from acting 'rationally', for instance when NGO's refused MONUC escorts even when operating under direct threat of violence (see section 4.4.3 above). Building on the language of economics of the metaphor of a marketplace for harmonization, it appears that organizational cultures sometimes cause 'market failures', that is produce a sub-optimal level of coordination.

One possible interpretation of the shortcomings of the integration process is that integration is a flawed concept as such; that the differences in organizational cultures are too deep to be overcome. This line of thought resonates well with the idea of using networks rather than hierarchies as coordination instruments.

However, another interpretation seems more plausible in the light of the above account: that the integration reforms have not been introduced with enough vigour. As noted by Lipson, the Integrated Missions concept does not actually move that much decision-making authority into the office of the SRSG. The official UN guidelines determine that the SRSG is responsible for ensuring coordination and coherence, but does not give the SRSG much authority over other UN agencies. For instance, the SRSG may only *request* – not dictate or instruct – that UN agencies align their work with the strategic objective of the mission.[112] Thus, achieving coherence becomes dependent on the SRSG's ability to persuade the UN agencies to cooperate. In the case of the DRC, the personal qualities of Alan Doss and Ross Mountain, among others, made this possible at the country level. However, further down the chain of command things worked differently.

One single case study of limited scope is obviously insufficient evidence for determining whether integration or networking is the appropriate organizational principle for multidimensional peace operations. However, bearing this reservation in mind, the overall impression from this analysis is that in order to alleviate the lack of coordination between the peacekeeping mission and the UN agencies, deeper integration is needed. **Integration needs to be introduced also at the local or regional level.** Senior UN mission officers at the regional level, such as Heads of Offices, should be given greater imperative authority over other UN agencies. Such reforms must be delicately weighed against the risk of preventing the UN agencies from effectively utilizing all their expertise.

However, it should be underlined that this conclusion would need to be validated by additional research. Ideally, a large-sample comparative study of coordination and coherence, covering peace operations with different approaches to integration, should be conducted. While a substantial body of research covering coordination attempts at the strategic level already exist, such a study should pay particular attention to coordination attempts at the field level.

While continued development of institutional command and control mechanisms are merited, another conclusion of this study is that **the personal qualities of individual senior officials are crucial for the overall effectiveness of the mission**. This applies not only to a number of senior MONUC officials, but also to EUFOR commanders. In a way, the considerable impact of individuals is a problematic conclusion, as it is difficult to systematically ensure that such

[112] Lipson 2008, p. 21

individuals are selected for future missions. However, this finding can serve as reminder to keep improving recruitment and training procedures. Individual bureaucracies and national militaries could take some steps to institutionalize the provision of quality commanders and senior officials to peace operations by reforming their career structures. By attributing greater rewards in terms of promotions and other types of recognition for successful service in peace operations, competent personnel can be incentivized to accept positions in peace operations.

Another noticeable observation is that **the non-permissive environment does not seem to have had a strong impact on coordination mechanisms and the division of labour between different actors**. With the exception of internal coordination within MONUC in eastern DRC, the traditional patterns of organizational cultures seem to have dominated over the high threat level and difficult logistical situation. Should this observation apply also to other conflict areas, it suggests that planners of peace operations will have to accept the cultural differences as givens, and find ways to accommodate them. However, improved training could be useful. Military contingents should receive pre-deployment training covering the working methods of humanitarian organizations, and vice versa.

Annex 1. Deployment of MONUC forces, May 2009



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Interviews

Former humanitarian worker in eastern DRC, interviewed July 23, 2009

Former MONUC Political Affairs Officer, interviewed August 7, 2009

Former MONUC military commander, interviewed August 6, 2009

Abbreviations

CIAT	International Committee in Support of the Transition
CONADER	National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
CPIA	Provincial Inter-Agency Committee
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Resettlement and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FLDR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
HAC	Humanitarian Action Plan
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HR	Human Rights
IM	Integrated Missions
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMPT	Integrated Missions Planning Team
JCDEC	Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JPT	Joint Protection Team
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMT	Senior Management Team
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WFP	World Food Program