Patchwork for Peace

Regional Capabilities for Peace and Security in Eastern Africa

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Sammanfattning

Östra Afrika förknippas ofta med konflikt och osäkerhet. Samtidigt finns det flera initiativ i regionen som försöker ena de östafrikanska staterna i gemensamma ansträngningar för att främja fred och säkerhet.

Denna rapport ger en översikt över dessa regionala multilaterala ansatser. Den förklarar också den politiska dynamiken som ligger till grund för förutsättningarna för fred och säkerhet i regionen, så väl som inom den bredare afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen (APSA).

Rapporten är en av delstudierna i en större serie kring de framväxande regionala mekanismerna i Afrika med fokus på fred och säkerhet.

Nyckelord: Östafrika, Östra Afrika IGAD, EAC, EASF. EASBRIG, EASBRICOM, EAPSM, Etiopien, Somalia, Kenya, ICGLR, African Standby Force, Afrikansk fred och säkerhet, Afrikanska Unionen, Fredsfrämjande insatser Afrika

Summary

Eastern Africa is a region in many ways associated with conflict and insecurities. Nonetheless, a range of efforts aiming towards getting the states in the region to join effort in promoting peace and security are currently being undertaken.

This report outlines the main multilateral peace and security initiatives that exist in the region. It also seeks to explain some of the political dynamics that affects these initiatives as well as the broader effort of establishing an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

This report is part of a series of studies on APSA and the various regional organisations and mechanisms that form part of this structure.

Keywords: Eastern Africa, East Africa, IGAD, EAC, EASF. EASBRIG, EASBRICOM, EAPSM, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, ICGLR, African Standby Force, African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA, African Union, Peacekeeping Africa

Table of contents

Executive Summary

The aim of this study is to increase knowledge about the capacity for peace and security in Eastern Africa by studying mechanisms established in the region to address such issues. In particular, the report focuses on Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the mechanisms set up to support it. The report also seeks to inform discussions about potential partnerships and support from external donors to Eastern African peace and security structures.

The Eastern African Context

The Eastern Africa states – Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Seychelles and Uganda – are a heterogeneous grouping with little progress in terms of regional integration. There is no single regional entity to take on the peace and security efforts of the overall Eastern Africa region. Due to the inherent diversity and the fact that there is no easily identified lead nation, regionalisation in Eastern Africa has been slow and cumbersome. Eastern Africa has experienced weak regional institutions and it lacks a unitary regional organisation capable of conflict prevention, management and resolution that involves all the 14 states. Instead, Eastern Africa has several overlapping regional organisations with varying mandates. There are several divides as to membership, security commonalities, and cultural affinity within the regional organisations. The main organisations include:

- the *Inter-Governmental Authority on Development* (IGAD) – which together most states on the Horn of Africa, and has objectives in the development and economic integration arena, including programmes to promote and maintain peace and security and humanitarian affairs;

- the *East African Community* (EAC) – a political and economic community in the wider Great Lakes region seeking to develop into a union, with a broad ranging security strategy, addressing issues such as cross-border crime, drug trafficking and terrorism;

- the *Common Market for East and Southern Africa* (COMESA) – an organisation with membership reaching beyond of Eastern Africa (including, e.g., Egypt and several southern Africa states), and which mainly seeks to further economic development through trade but which also recognises peace and security as essential conditions for stable economies;

- and the *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* (ICGLR) – a potential regional mechanism for peace and security with tight inter-linkages to both Eastern Africa and the eastern parts of Central Africa.

Eastern Africa in the African Peace and Security Architecture

As part of the effort of the African Union (AU) to promote peace and security in Africa, the decision has been taken to try to implement an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), consisting of numerous elements for conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction support. The architecture includes several initiatives that have a continental wide reach. Two of the central supporting structures within the APSA are the *Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)* and *the African Standby Force* (ASF). The Early Warning system aims to detect conflict, and is therefore a tool to support the prevention of conflict. The ASF is intended to be deployed swiftly on the continent to preserve peace and security in times of instability. The ASF is supposed to be constituted of five multinational standby brigades, each hosted by one of five African regions (North, South, East, West, and Central). Similarly, the Continental Early Warning System at the AU level is to be supported by eight regional early warning systems located within the five APSA regions.

The Regional Early Warning System in Eastern Africa is still under construction. As the only functioning early warning system, the IGAD *Conflict Early Warning Network* (CEWARN) has been the region's single capability in this regard. However, some of the other organisations, such as COMESA and EAC, seem to have recently initiated development of their own early warning systems and IGAD CEWARN has been asked to advice in this development.

The standby force of Eastern Africa has been named the East African Standby-Force (EASF) and the actual standby-brigade the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). Due to disagreement within the region as to which regional organisation should host the coordination of the establishment of the EASF a special mechanism – EASBRICOM– was set up for that specific purpose only. The initial responsibility to coordinate EASBRIG had initially been put on IGAD but disagreement from non-IGAD member states led to the creation of an independent EASBRICOM to alleviate the problems coming out of the absence of a single regional body being able to represent all states in the region. In early 2011, a framework aimed at replacing EASBRICOM with the EASF Coordination Mechanism – EASFCOM – to reflect the multifunctional (civil-military) nature of the EASF project – was adopted.

Today EASFCOM consists of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. For most

of the time Eritrea, due to regional disagreements, has been little more than a nominal member of the EASF project. Eritrea objected to the establishment of EASBRICOM and therefore suspended its membership. With the transformation of EASBRICOM to EASFCOM, Eritrea is once again included in the initiative but whether this will result in any more than a return to nominal membership remains to be seen. Madagascar was also suspended from the project in 2009 because of the unconstitutional change of government that took place within the country. Like Eritrea, Madagascar is now yet again considered included in the project.

Conclusions

The slow progress in the field of peace and security integration in Eastern Africa is linked to the prerequisites for regional integration. The Eastern Africa region is very unstable, impacting on prospects for enhanced regional security. The region is burdened by several security concerns, including the situation in Somalia, Sudan, border conflicts, trans-border pastoralist conflicts, piracy, terrorism, proxy wars, and inter-state rivalry. With several ongoing, dormant or latent conflicts, including internal political strife, impacting on the national security agendas of the various member states, overarching regionalisation of security is of less importance than national posturing and manoeuvring. While it could be natural to assume that member states have conscious strategies as to how to best use the various regional mechanisms to complement and further their own foreign and security policy agendas, this seems not the case.

Member state support of multilateral approaches to peace and security is varying. While several Eastern African states are supporters of multilateral cooperation, others fear loosing control. The many weak, elitist, ethnically affiliated governments have little interest in regional cooperation unless it is controlled and beneficial to their own group. The success or failure of Eastern Africa broader cooperation in peace and security seem in many ways to hinge on the key relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya.

Economic incentives seem to have higher priority in regionalisation than peace and security issues. Many member states tend to emphasise the several ongoing economic integration projects under way in the region, such as common markets, customs unions, and free flow of goods and services over cooperation in peace and security.

The Peace and Security efforts within the regional instruments are currently going through revisions and revivals. IGAD, EAC and ICGLR are all observed to have launched new ambitions and plans in the field of peace and security.

While most of these have yet to pass formal decision-making procedures in the respective organisation, it may signify that discussion on peace and security issues will be revitalised in the region, albeit in different forums.

The envisioned Eastern Africa APSA elements are not yet fully in place even though some initial structures exist. Following the overall roadmap for the ASF, the efforts are closing in on some important nominal target dates. EASF has already passed the original deadline of full operational capability by 2010; instead this deadline has been pushed forwards to 2015. There is a mixed assessment of the current state of operationalisation of EASBRIG. This mixed assessment arises partly out of the questionable availability of troops pledged for EASBRIG, as the original pledging lists are considered out-dated.

There is no early warning system encompassing the whole region in place. IGAD CEWARN functions as the region's principal early-warning system but does not include the capacity to monitor conflict indicators across the entire region. Furthermore, CEWARN is so far restricted to monitor pastoral conflicts only. Even though efforts are underway to seek to lift this restriction, IGAD member states have not yet agreed to expand the mandate of CEWARN. In addition, IGAD reportedly still lacks the mandate to force member states to take appropriate action to address the outbreak of a violent conflict or humanitarian emergency.

Some of EASFs key challenges include lack of political will in the member states, competing regional efforts, regional ownership, interoperability, and an over-ambitious timeline. For some key member states, such as Ethiopia, EASF is far from a priority in terms of national foreign and security policy. More pressuring, conflict-related issues naturally dominate the national agenda. Hence, the timing of the EASF project may be off-track with the realities in the region. In addition, some member states such as Kenya and Uganda seem to move towards prioritising the *East African Community,* in essence decreasing support for the EASF. Concerns have also been raised that EASBRICOM had troubles in displaying the EASF venture as regionally owned. Rather there are some current perceptions that it in essence is an effort driven and sustained by international partners. It is still too early to tell whether this sentiment will change at all with the replacement of EASBRICOM by EASFCOM.

There is not yet a consensus amongst members on the future direction of the EASF endeavour. There is no firmly established common opinion amongst all the Eastern African states regarding the political role that EASF will play in the region in the future. The Secretariat, previously named EASBRICOM, has opted for an ambitious attitude, seeking to drive the EASF venture beyond the limited mandate of merely being responsible for troop generation and potential deployment of one of the ASF brigades. Some member states have openly rejected the development of the EASF into a broader political organisation.

9

Within the AU there is also a concern that moving the EASF beyond its initial mandate, the organisation could become a competitor to the AU in the region, rather than playing a complementary role. As a result there has also been a lack of a coherent strategy for the EASF project amongst its member states. A revised Policy Framework was produced in January 2011 along with an MoU between the EASF member states. So far, the required ratification by two thirds of the EASF member states that would allow the MoU and strategy to enter into force has not been acheived. During the drafting of the harmonised policy framework, concerns were voiced that the framework's ambition represented only the aspirations of certain states and elements within EASBRICOM as well as some of its international partners. If and how soon the policy framework will enter into force remains to be seen.

Donors need to be cautious in ensuring local ownership of the EASF project. One way to do so is to support the capacity-building of EASFCOM itself. Until the EASF member states have themselves decided on a common strategy for where the project is headed it is difficult for donors to adopt appropriate support strategies. Until the harmonised policy framework has been fully adopted, donors may wish to be cautious in supporting the new venture so as to avoid the EASF effort being increasingly donor driven and ensure that there is sufficient local ownership to sustain the process. Partners might rather wish to direct their efforts in support of assisting the development of such frameworks and policies. Needs-based possibilities for partner support include strengthening EASFCOM itself regarding, e.g. administrative issues, process-training, and build-up of logistics capability.

1 Introduction

The structures for peace and security in Africa are currently at a stage of development. International partners seeking to cooperatively engage with these structures benefit from a thorough understanding of the context, challenges and opportunities that surrounds this evolution. A comprehensive grasp of the African political context, and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in particular, cannot be obtained without understanding the regional mechanisms which constitute it. This report has been conducted to obtain and promote knowledge about these structures and focuses on the regional mechanisms for peace and security in Eastern Africa, including the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the development of the Eastern Africa Standby Force. This study is part of a series of studies conducted within the FOI Studies in African Security programme on commission from the Swedish Ministry of Defence. The study series focuses on exploring existing and emerging capabilities and structures for peace and security, as well as the dynamics affecting these, throughout the African regions. Previous studies have explored the Southern African Development Community (SADC), its region and the effort to build a SADC standby brigade (SADCBRIG); the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS) and its standby force (ESF); as well as the North African Regional Capability (NARC) and the development of NARC's equivalent to SADCBRIG and ESF – NASBRIG.

1.1 Aim and Method

The aim of the study is to increase knowledge about the capacity for peace and security in Eastern Africa by studying mechanisms established in the region to address such issues. In particular, the report focuses on IGAD, the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the mechanisms set up to support it. The report also seeks to inform discussions about potential partnerships and support from external donors to Eastern African peace and security structures.

The study is partly descriptive as it contains a general overview of the background and organisational structures of regional initiatives. The report also seeks to analyse the context in which these initiatives are undertaken to provide an assessment of the status and prospects of undertaken endeavours, such as the development of the EASF

The research for this study was conducted using a range of both primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources are scholarly books and articles, and the primary sources include official documents such as treaties and doctrines,

amongst others. In addition, several interviews with stakeholders in Eastern African security – organisations, think tanks, partners, donors, member states – have been carried out. The interviews were conducted during two research trips to Ethiopia and Kenya in November 2009 and April 2010.

1.2   Outline of the Report

The report begins with describing the Eastern African context, looking at dynamics in the region, as well as outlining the main regional organisations in existence. The following, third chapter, then discusses APSA and begins to describe the structures of this architecture that the Eastern African states are jointly contributing to. The regional organisation IGAD is explored in the fourth chapter, outlining its range of peace and security initiatives. IGAD is given special attention over other regional organisations because it has a more tangible track record in peace and security than the other organisations. It also hosts the CEWARN – the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism – which is an element of APSA. The fifth chapter describes the development of the Eastern Africa Standby Force, which is another of the region's primary contributions to the overall African security architecture. The functions and structures of the standby force are outlined along with the current status, key challenges and possible future directions of the venture. In addition, the chapter is concluded with a section describing the role of international partners in supporting the development of the standby force. Some issues that might be of concern to donors are also discussed.

In the final chapter the report is concluded by a summary of the key conclusions made throughout the report.

2   The Eastern African Context

2.1   Regional Dynamics

Even though varying opinions exist of what actually constitutes Eastern Africa, the region is usually ascribed to consist of 14 states – Burundi, the Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eastern Africa can also be

divided into four, somewhat overlapping, sub-regions: The *Horn of Africa* (Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda),[1] *East Africa* (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi); the *Great Lakes region* (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Tanzania); and the *Indian Ocean Islands* (the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles).[2] East Africa and the Horn of Africa are the two major and most influential sub-regions in Eastern Africa. Kenya, sitting in-between, has often functioned as an insulator separating the Horn and its security concerns from the more southern East Africa region. In general, political and security dynamics in Eastern Africa are permeated by the differences between the northern and southern regions, as well as the lack of streamlined visions regarding security cooperation amongst the member states.

2.1.1   East Africa

Kenya is today the most influential state in East Africa and has also played an important role in peace and security throughout the entire Eastern African region, engaging in the peace processes in both Sudan and Somalia. Kenya has traditionally been one of Africa's most stable states and despite some internal disturbances in terms of criminality has managed to develop a comparatively large economy. During the elections of December 2007, Kenya unfortunately showed the world that also relatively stable states can fall victim to ethnic, political and economic violence. The disturbances arising from political antagonism escalated to violence between ethnic groups, and resulted in thousands of casualties and displacements as well as a substantial damage on Kenyan infrastructure and economy.

Despite having reached the category of medium development, Kenya and Tanzania are both relatively poor states making parts of their populations targets for recruitment by Islamist groups.

2.1.2   The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has long been associated with famine, drought, poverty and starvation. Natural disasters such as floods and droughts are common in the region and there is a high degree of dependence on scarce natural resources both

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[1] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 216
[2] Ibid

at the individual level and at the national level. The majority of the populations on the Horn earn their livelihood from subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. In fact, the region encompasses the world's largest pastoralist populations.[3]

The Horn has been described as the deadliest conflict cluster in the world. It is a region plagued by political instability as well as civil and interstate wars, which exist as both a cause of and a reaction to humanitarian emergencies in the region. A common cause of both interstate and intra-state conflict in the region is the access to precious natural resources.[4] Environmental degradation such as desertification, deforestation and water scarcity, has often led to armed pastoralist groups clashing over access to water resources. Armed conflict has in its turn had further negative consequences on agricultural, economic and commercial activities by, for example, leaving landmines inhibiting the use of arable soil.[5]

Having hosted some of the longest running civil wars, resulting in some 2.5 million causalities as well as massive refuge flows, the Horn is also home to the largest Internally Displaced Person (IDP) population in the world. The situation has caused several observers to declare the region a "permanent emergency".[6] It is the dynamics on the Horn of Africa that primarily affects the preconditions for peace and security in Eastern Africa. In particular, the situation in Somalia has had a severely negative impact on the region. Even though the peace and security context on the Horn greatly varies from country to country certain dynamics are distinguishing features of the region as a whole. This includes the geographical location and the ensuing effects on political developments in the region. Situated as a gateway to the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean the Horn is of strategic importance.[7] The repeated acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden over the past years have brought much attention to the region. During the last decade, the proximity to the Middle East and the regional dimension of radical Islamic groups with links to terrorist networks has also drawn attention to the Horn.

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[3] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 217
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid, p 215
[7] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 220

2.1.3   The Indian Ocean Islands

The Indian Ocean Islands are relatively well of from a socio-economic development perspective. Comoros and Madagascar rank as of medium development on the UN Human Development Index while Mauritius and the Seychelles are considered highly developed.[8] All the states were once French colonies although Mauritius and the Seychelles were ceded to the British in the early 19th century.

The Comoros has endured more than 20 coups or attempted coups since gaining independence from France in 1975. Between 2007 and 2008 the AU had a smaller peacekeeping presence in the country aimed at providing governance assistance and electoral assistance after a former president on the Comorian Island of Anjouan had refused to step down after loosing an election.[9]

Madagascar has also had a history of political turmoil. In 2009 a coup forced the sitting president to resign. The AU has a policy of non-tolerance towards so-called unconstitutional changes of government and the events in Madagascar stirred up different opinions of how to deal with the situation. Madagascar, as most of the Indian Ocean Islands, is located in the south-east part of the continent and is a member of regional organisations in both Southern and Eastern Africa. Rather than any Eastern African or continental security mechanism it was the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which sought to take the lead on handling the matter.[10]

2.1.4   The Great Lakes

The Great Lakes region is today most commonly associated with the spill-over conflict that arose as a result of ethnic conflict in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in the early 1990's. The conflict culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and afterwards spread into the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It caused massive casualties, displaced even more and has at times involved a number of states, destabilising not only the western parts of the Great Lakes region but also large areas of Central Africa. Over the years a number of

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[8] UNDP. 2009. *Human Development Report*. United Nations Development Program

[9] For more information on the Comoros and the African Unions Operations in the Comoros see Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Unions's Operations in the Comoros: MAES and Operation Democracy*. User report FOI-R--2659--SE

[10] Maunganidze, Otilla. 2009. 'Madagascar: Anatomy of a Recurrent Crisis'. *Institute for Security Studies, Situational Report*, 16 October 2009

peacekeeping missions have been deployed throughout the region.[11] Peace and security efforts in the region are currently still mainly aimed at peace-building, including rebuilding political institutions and reducing tensions. Advancements have been made in relation to peace talks with the rebel movement *Lord's Resistance Army* in Uganda. Nonetheless, the situation is still fragile and any deterioration in the Central African Republic, Chad or Sudan is a risk also to the security in the Great Lakes region.

2.2   Regional organisations

Due to the diversity in the region and lack of an easily identified lead nation, regionalisation in Eastern Africa has been cumbersome. In general and throughout history, Eastern Africa has experienced weak regional institutions[12] and the region does not have one regional organisation responsible for conflict management that involves all the 14 states.[13] Instead, Eastern Africa has several overlapping regional organisations with varying mandates and memberships. As set out figure 1 below, these include the *Common Market for East and Southern Africa* (COMESA); the *East African Community* (EAC); the *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* (ICGLR); and IGAD. In addition, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia are also members of the *Arab League*.

The overlapping mandates and membership of the regional organisations weaken the ability of a harmonised approach towards peace and security for the Eastern African states. The split amongst several Eastern African states of various forms of power has also prevented one nation to take lead in peace and security efforts: Ethiopia is the region's main military power while Kenya is the biggest economy; Sudan is the largest country and has great oil reserves at its advantage and even Djibouti, despite being a small country, has great advantages in its strategic location between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, just miles away from the Middle East.[14] In addition to this split in potential hegemony, most states in the entire Eastern Africa region have been too preoccupied with dealing

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[11] For example the African Union in Burundi, for more information see Svensson, Emma. 2009. *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learnt from the African Union's first Peace Operation.* Base data report FOI-R--2561--SE

[12] Khadiagala, Gilbert M., 2008. 'Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility', *Africa Program Working Paper Series*, International Peace Institute, October 2008, p.11

[13] Cilliers, Jackie and Malan, Mark. 2005. 'Progress with the African Standby Force', *ISS Paper 98* May 2005, p.10

[14] 'A nascent peace and security architecture', *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, March 2010.

with their respective national problems and conflicts to be able to sufficiently address these at the regional level.

IGAD is the most developed organisation in the region in terms of peace and security efforts. It was also the Regional Economic Community (REC) that was originally given the responsibility to host the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASF.

COMESA, ICGLR and EAC are further explored below. IGAD is presented in a separate chapter later in the report.

Figure 1. Overlapping regional organisations in Eastern Africa

2.2.1 The Common Market for East and Southern Africa

COMESA was established in 1994 with the aim to create a common market for Eastern and Southern African countries.[15] Today the organisation includes a range of states from northern, eastern and southern Africa.[16] The main objective of the organisation is to "achieve sustainable economic and social progress in all Member States through increased co-operation and integration in all fields of development, particularly in trade, customs and monetary affairs; transport, communication and information; technology, industry and energy; gender; agriculture; environment and natural resources".[17] As such, COMESA remains a predominantly trade and economic development-oriented community.

The original plan of COMESA was to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2000, a customs union by 2004 and a monetary union by 2025. However, this has proven to be a far too ambitious goal and the dates have had to be postponed.[18]

Peace and Security
Even though the main focus of COMESA has been on economic and trade issues, member states have recognised the potentially positive effects that peace and security may have on economic development. One of the objectives of the organisation is to "co-operate in the promotion of peace, security and stability amongst the Member States in order to enhance economic development in the region".[19] To this aim, COMESA has established a range of structures for the promotion of peace and security, even though most of these so far only exist on paper. It has developed programmes for peace and security, along principles such as non-aggression, human rights, rule of law, democracy and peaceful settlement of disputes. Several measures are advertised, such as conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. aspects related to early warning, preventative diplomacy, good governance and trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)). In 2000, a legal framework structure for peace and

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[15] COMESA consists of Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, http://about.comesa.int/

[16] COMESA members are: Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

[17] COMESA, 'Vision and Mission', http://about.comesa.int/lang-en/overview/vision

[18] Fanta, Emmanuel, 2008. 'Dynamics of Regional (non-) integration in Eastern Africa', *UNU-CRIS Working Papers*, W-2008/2

[19] COMESA. 1993. *Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa* , article 3d

security was agreed upon, constituting of the Heads of State and Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and a Committee on Peace and Security. An Inter-Parliamentarian Forum handling issues of peace and security has also been established.

Similar to the AU *Panel of the Wise*[20], COMESA has a committee of five elders available for appointment to preventative peace-building assignments, including as mediators. In addition, the COMESA Secretariat has been tasked with setting up an early warning and response mechanism focusing on economic-related issues. The COMESA conflict early warning system (COMWARN) has been under construction since 2000 but was only established in 2009 through means channelled to COMESA by the AU from the African Peace Facility, which is funded by the EU.[21] COMWARN will assist COMESA in early conflict prevention by collecting data on conditions, processes and actors that may lead to an eruption or escalation of conflict. COMWARN is intended to include means of analysis to systematically examine available data. At the moment, COMESA is in the process of developing the list of indicators and structural factors of conflict that will guide COMWARN and be used in structural vulnerability assessments needed to get the system operational.[22]

Working both with the EAC and IGAD, COMESA is engaged in addressing war-economies in Eastern and Southern Africa as well as a joint programme to promote good governance and human security.[23]

COMESA has a limited track record in peace and security. Due to the predominant orientation towards trade and economic development, the organisation has little experience in conflict management among its member states. Nonetheless, in its endeavour to promote democracy and good governance, COMESA has observed elections and referenda in several member states such as the DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia and

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[20] The AU Panel of the Wise is a panel composed of five highly respected African personalities. Its role is to advise the AU Peace and Security Council on issues related to peace, security and development, and to serve as a mediation instrument.

[21] COMESA. 'Programmes on Conflict Prevention' http://programmes.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13&Itemid=21&lang=en&limitstart=3; COMESA is one of eight African regional organisations that have been officially recognised as forming part of the so-called *African Peace and Security Architecture* (APSA) and therefore qualifies for funding aimed at supporting APSA, e.g funding from the African Peace Facility

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

Zimbabwe.[24] In 2009, for example, when COMESA sent an Electoral Observer Mission to Malawi. contributing countries included Egypt, the DRC, Kenya, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. [25] The main objective of the mission was to monitor the elections to provide legitimacy and credibility to the electoral process. The mission concluded that the elections took place in an "environment, which was transparent and secure enough to guarantee the freedom of the vote and respect the will of the voters".[26]

COMESA's main potential comparative advantage over other RECs is the economically oriented early warning system. Its ever expanding membership is also considered a strong point. At the same time, though, the large number of member states also leads COMESA to being associated with potential inefficiency. A main challenge facing COMESA is the relatively low priority for regional peace and security issues amongst its member states. Few observers view COMESA as having any greater impact on peace and security matters specific to the eastern Africa**.**[27]

2.2.2   East African Community

After a dormant period in the 1970's and 1980's EAC, which has its roots in the 1967 common market agreement between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, was revived in 1999 with the signing of a new treaty.[28] Its headquarters are located in Arusha, Tanzania. The aim of the organisation is to enhance cooperation in the political, economic and social areas. The vision is to ultimately create a political federation headed by a single president. Several steps are envisaged to reach that goal: the establishment of a customs union – which has already taken place, the creation of a common market, and the forming of a monetary union by 2012.[29] A Memorandum on Foreign Policy Coordination was signed in 1999, and in 2004 a committee on Fast Tracking the East African

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[24] COMESA, 'Programmes - Peace and Secruity
http://programmes.comesa.int/index.php?view=article&id=13%3Apeace-and-security&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=21&lang=en
[25] COMESA. 2009. 'Press Statement by the COMESA Electoral Observer Mission to the Malawi 2009 General Elections'
[26] COMESA. 2009. 'Official Preliminary Statement by the COMESA Electoral Observer Mission on the 2009 Malawi Presidential and Parliamentary Elections'
[27] Interviews Addis Ababa and Nairobi, October 27-November 4 2009
[28] Fanta, Emmanuel, 2008. 'Dynamics of Regional (non-) integration in Eastern Africa', *UNU-CRIS Working Papers*, W-2008/2, p 11
[29] East African Community, http://www.eac.int/about-eac.html

Federation was established. Uganda is regarded as the key proponent for pushing the establishment of a federation.[30]

Since 2007 Burundi and Rwanda are also part of EAC. Being landlocked between the other member states, and hence dependent on them for imports and exports, the two countries decided to join the organisation to ensure that their interests were taken into account.[31] The expansion of the EAC to include Burundi and Rwanda has opened up new opportunities for the EAC to function also as a regional peace and security organisation.[32]

Peace and Security
Strategies for peace and security are considered important as the EAC move along on the establishment of a common market. Primary security concerns in the organisation involve preventing cross border crime and ensuring the unhindered and safe movement of people and goods within the region. To enhance cooperation within the security sector, the EAC adopted a *Regional Strategy for Peace and Security* in 2006. The member states have also signed a *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Defence.*

In 2009, the first EAC conference on peace and security recommended that the organisation should go ahead and develop its own standby force.[33] In addition, a Sectoral Council on Interstate Security has been established to oversee the implementation of interstate security cooperation according to the regional strategy. In particular, cooperation in this area focuses on the following issues: implementation of the protocol on illicit drug trafficking; a SALW management programme; and cooperation in police matters.[34]

The aim of the regional strategy is "to provide security within the region through enhanced co-operation".[35] The strategy includes 14 goals and strategic objectives:

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[30] Fanta, Emmanuel, 2008. 'Dynamics of Regional (non-) integration in Eastern Africa', *UNU-CRIS Working Papers,* W-2008/2, p 11.
[31] Ibid, p 20.
[32] Chiwanka, Annie Barbara. 2007. 'The Anatomy of Conflicts in the East African Community (EAC): Linking Security With Development' , Keynote speech to Development Policy Review Network-African Studies Institute, Leiden University, The Netherlands
[33] Barigababa, J. 2009. 'EA force to end conflict', *the East African* 12 october 2009, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/670830/-/qxs6gjz/-/index.html
[34] East African Community, 'Peace and Security: Sector Priorities', http://www.eac.int/security/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=117
[35] Ibid

- Enhance the exchange of criminal intelligence and other security information between partner states;
- Enhance joint operations and patrols, install common communication facilities for border and interstate security;
- Adopt the UN model law on mutual assistance on criminal matters
- Implement the protocol on combating illicit drug trafficking;
- Exchange visits by security authorities;
- Exchange training programmes for security personnel;
- Establish common mechanisms for the management of refugees;
- Establish regional disaster management mechanisms;
- Formulate security measures to combat terrorism;
- Establish measures to combat cattle rustling;
- Establish measures to combat proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons;
- Develop mechanisms to combat security challenges on Lake Victoria;
- Develop a mechanism for conflict management and resolution; and
- Develop a conflict early warning mechanism.[36]

A *protocol on an early warning and response mechanism* has been drafted. Furthermore, a *regional framework for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution* is to be developed. EAC has the ambition to conduct research on themes related to conflict resolution, resource-based conflicts and conflict early warning systems. A centre for peace research was launched in 2007 and has, among other things, conducted training on conflict resolution. Other than that, the EAC does not seem to have much of a track-record in peace and security. The EAC has, for example, not acted in the conflict that exists between Kenya and Uganda over the Migingo Islands in Lake Victoria.[37] Member states note that not much work under the peace and security agenda has been undertaken, but state the intention to pick up the pace.[38] The capability to conduct joint peace support operations is being particularly prioritised within the EAC. In late 2009, the EAC conducted number ten out of a series of joint peace support operations training exercises. The exercise, called Natural Fires, was supported on a bilateral basis to the member states by the US through its Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA).[39] The exercise allegedly had good results, displaying the

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[36] East African Community. 2006. *Strategy for Regional Peace and Security in East Africa*
[37] Okumu, Wafula. 'Migingo Dispute Needs an African Solution', *ISS Today*, 28 May 2009
[38] Interview, Kenya Ministry of State and Defence 2 November 2009
[39] Interview US Army. Nairobi 8 April 2009

ability of EAC states to work together.[40] The ability to cooperate is also evidenced by the development of an EAC common concept for peace operations.[41]

The EAC, as COMESA, is one of the eight recognised regional organisations forming part of APSA but not one of the five regional organisations and mechanism that were appointed to contribute to the development of the African Standby Force (ASF). Of lately, the EAC has expanded its role within APSA through the announcement that the organisation intends to build its own EAC peace support operations standby force.[42] The EAC member states are all contributors to the East African Standby Force (EASF) feeding in to the ASF and it is so far unclear whether the EAC standby force should be regarded as complementary to the EASF, or rather as one of its competitors.[43] The EAC has itself stated that its standby force should be considered distinct from the EASF and rather be regarded as the nucleus of a future EAC federated armed force. In that context it does not conflict with the EASF.[44] (For a more in-depth discussion on ASF and the EASF, see later chapters).

The EAC's comparative advantage over other RECs is a viable platform for economic and cultural integration among its member states. Most observers note that the EAC is the most mature and advanced REC in terms of progress in regional integration, at least regarding 'non-peace and security' related issues. A sense of a relatively higher degree of shared language, culture, education standards and other commonalties facilitates multilateral cooperation among the member states. They have also shown that they can generate political consensus amongst themselves. Some argue that the organisation is emerging as a serious actor also in the peace and security field, with *inter alia* the conduct of joint exercises and operations, mechanisms for information and personnel exchange, dialogue on migration issues, provisions for regional disaster management, SALW and common positions on drug trafficking.[45] At the same time, representatives from member states note that EAC peace and security efforts

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[40] Interview, Kenya Ministry of State and Defence 2 November 2009
[41] Ibid
[42] East Africa Community, Press Release: 'EAC Popularises its Peace and Security Programme,' 14 September 2009
[43] East African Community, *Peace and Security Conference 5-7 October 2009, Kampala Uganda*
[44] Mpysi, Kenneth, 'EASBRIG and security dynamics in East Africa: An improbable dream?', Power point presentation Institute for Security Studies, Nairobi
[45] Interviews US DAtt 30 Oct 2009, ISPTC 2 November 209, Kenya Ministry for Foreign Affairs 3 November 2009, UK Embassy 28 October 2009

must be assessed with a long-term view and through incremental progress.[46] Many observers are sceptical of the realism of developing an EAC standby force, yet recognising that such ambitions show that the EAC is at least aiming high. On the other hand, an EAC standby force might be a much more cohesive force than the EASF: in addition to already having an established common identity within the EAC, the EAC states have a history of several joint exercises and joint training that gives it an advantage vis-à-vis the EASF.

EAC challenges include member state disagreement on how to prioritise between 'peace and security', and 'economic integration' in the years to come. There is a perception that Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi want to speed ahead in the area of peace and security, while Tanzania somewhat holds back. In future, issues of member state expansion will be actualised. There are indications that EAC's ambitious regional programme has attracted the interest of south Sudan.[47] News reports from the region indicate that Rwanda and Kenya have already invited the new state of Southern Sudan to join the EAC upon its declaration of independence, expected in July 2011.[48]

2.2.3   The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The ICGLR is emerging as a potential regional actor for peace and security issues in Eastern Africa. The membership includes states across the centre of Africa: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Observers have noted that the organisation, with its inclusive membership, has some potential to become an important peace and security actor.[49] Others are more sceptical about its efficiency.[50]

The Conference was formed in 2004 with assistance from the UN as well as the AU and is a result of a shared concern about the endemic conflicts and persistent insecurity in the Great Lakes Region (particularly the conflict in the DRC). The Conference has an ambitious agenda to "transform the Great Lakes Region into a space of sustainable peace and security for States and peoples, political and

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[46] Interviews Kenya Ministry of State and Defence 2 November 2009, Kenya Ministry for Foreign Affairs 3 November 2009
[47] Interviews ISS 27 October 2009, NACS 2 November 2009
[48] 'Kibaka, Kagame invite South Sudan to join EA regional block', The Citizen, 6 februari 2011
[49] Interviews Kenya Ministry for Foreign Affairs 3 November 2009, IDISS 3 November 2009
[50] Interviews German Embassy 29 October 2009

social stability, shared growth and development".[51] This declaration has been followed-up by a *Pact on peace, stability and development in the Great Lakes Region,* signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2008, with protocols, programmes and projects covering the areas of peace and security; democracy and good governance; economic development and regional integration; and humanitarian, social and environmental issues. It also includes provision for a regional follow-up mechanism to ensure implementation of the pact and a special reconstruction and development fund.[52] The regional programme of action for peace and security is split into two parts addressing joint security management of common borders and interstate cooperation on peace and security (including combating SALW and transnational crime and terrorism) respectively.[53]

Criticism of the organisation's ability to act in the area of peace and security cite the fact that the organisation has yet to form and provide physical presence on the ground. A small secretariat, consisting of staff from all member states, was established only in 2008.[54] The new organisation has so far focused its efforts mainly on establishing itself and has thus had little impact on the region so far. The agenda of the ICGLR is ambitious and the organisation risks an immediate overstretch due to its small secretariat. In addition, there is disagreement among member states, as well as the organisation's partners, as to whether the ICGLR should focus primarily on peace and security related issues, or broaden its spectra to include socio-economic development in the region. Member states reportedly aim for a broader type of organisation, while donors and partners have attempted to keep the scope more narrow.[55]

Regardless of the present challenges, observers have noted the potential of the ICGLR in relation to peace and security due to its tight inter-linkages to East African states and the agendas of other regional bodies. Even though the ICGLR may prove an important actor in its own right, its efforts are also likely to impact on peace and security development within IGAD and EAC, given overlapping memberships.

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[51] International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, *First Summit of Heads of State and Government Dar-Es-Salaam, 19-20 November 2004*

[52] International Conference of the Great Lakes Region*, Pact on Security Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region*, 14-15 December 2006

[53] International Conference on the Great Lakes, *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Programme of Action for Peace and Security*, Final Version: August 2006

[54] Bøås, Lotsberg & Ndiezeye. 2009. *The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – review of Norwegian support to the ICGLR Secretariat.* Norad, June 2009. Norad Report 17/2009

[55] Ibid

3 Eastern Africa in the African Peace and Security Architecture

As part of the effort of the AU to promote peace and security in Africa, the decision has been taken to try to implement an African Peace and Security Architecture, consisting of several elements for conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction support. Even though not specifically mentioned in the core AU policy frameworks, the AU Peace and Security Council Protocol speaks of "an overall architecture for peace and security".[56] The notion of an "architecture" supporting African peace and security has gained momentum over the last few years, at least within the AU headquarters and among international partners. Several endeavours in Eastern Africa support the evolution of APSA, including the building of a regional standby force and a regional early warning system. Unlike in some other regions, Southern Africa for example, there is no single regional economic community (REC) responsible for all these endeavours.

In 2008, the AU and the RECs adopted a Memorandum-of-Understanding (MoU) on the relationship between the AU and the RECs in relation to peace and security.[57] The MoU, together with some provisions in the AU Constitutive Act, defines the specific roles of the AU and the RECs within APSA, including outlining each organisation's powers, functions and responsibilities towards this architecture. [58] The Peace and Security Protocol of the AU states that whilst the AU carries the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs are part of the overall strategy of the Union.[59] The Protocol further asserts that the AU shall seek to make sure that the activities of the RECs are consistent with AU policy, and that the AU shall work closely with the RECs

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[56] African Union. 2002. *Peace and Security Council Protocol;* An established list of components of this structure, however, is not readily available. Some accounts point to the relation between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities as being the architecture. Others add the core institutions surrounding the AU Peace and Security Council, as stated in other articles of the PSC Protocol. Yet others include the policies and treaties constituting the platform for the security arrangements, such as the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and subsequent protocols and decisions.

[57] African Union. 2008. *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Peace and Security Between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa*

[58] Abass, Ademola. 'The African Peace and Security Architecture: The African union and Regional Economic Communitie's. FOI working paper 1Kan vi hänvisa till denna? Kommer den någonsin komma ut? NEJ Kalla det "working paper" / discussion paper el. ngt liknande.

[59] African Union. 2002. *Peace and Security Council Protocol*, Article 16 – Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention

to certify an effective partnership based on the idea that each organisation takes the lead in situations where it has a *comparative advantage* over the other. [60]

The principle of comparative advantages is based on the recognition of the fact that some of the RECs have been around much longer and are more advanced than the AU in certain areas related to conflict resolution and peace and security.[61] In regions where this is the case, the AU has stood back to let the primary regional organisations – such as SADC and ECOWAS – play a leading role. In Eastern Africa this is not the case. While none of the regional organisations in Eastern Africa has managed to take a lead for peace and security efforts in the entire region, some of these organisations do have certain comparative advantages vis-à-vis the AU, mainly as a result of being more entrenched in local compositions and dynamics. Nonetheless, the AU – with its headquarters located in the heart of Ethiopia – play an important role in Eastern African politics. As no Eastern African REC encompasses all states in the region, or the full ability to take on the needed APSA mechanisms, these have been divided amongst the regional organisations and a special mechanism.

3.1 Continental Early Warning System

One of the central supporting-structures within APSA is the *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS), established to detect and support the prevention of conflicts. This centrally located continent-wide early warning system is currently being established at AU headquarters.[62] The CEWS will be linked to *regional early warning systems (REWS)* in each of the five APSA regions.[63] There are eight officially recognised African organisations feeding into APSA and each of these can establish regional early warning systems feeding into the CEWS. Due to its already developed conflict early warning and response mechanism, IGAD was naturally identified as the main REC to help implement the Eastern African

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[60] African Union. 2002. *Peace and Security Council Protocol*, Article 16 – Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention.

[61] Abass, Ademola. 'The African Peace and Security Architecture: The African union and Regional Economic Communitie's. FOI workingpaper

[62] Bogland et all. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management.* Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475

[63] Bogland et all. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management.* Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475

early warning system that would support the CEWS.[64] IGAD and its early-warning system will be further explored in chapter 4.

3.2 The African Standby Force

As part of the APSA the AU seeks to develop an ASF ready to deploy swiftly in Africa to help preserve peace and security in times of instability. The ASF concept was formalised in 2003 with the adoption of the *ASF Policy Framework*.[65] The ASF is supposed to be constituted of five multinational brigades, each hosted by one of five African regions through their respective RECs (or in the case of Eastern and North Africa, especially set up coordination mechanisms).[66] Unlike the broader APSA, the ASF effort thus only involves five regional organisations. The standby force of Eastern Africa has been named the East African Standby-Force (EASF). Due to disagreement within the region as to which REC would be nominated to coordinate the EASF effort, a special mechanism – the EASF coordination mechansim, EASFCOM – was set up for that specific purpose only.

EASF, as the other regional standby capabilities in the ASF, is supposed to be equipped and ready for rapid deployment of six types of missions (scenarios), ranging from observation missions to peace-enforcement as set out in table 1 below. The mandate for these missions shall be obtained from the AU PSC or the UN Security Council.[67]

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[64] Fanta, Emmanuel, 2008. 'Dynamics of Regional (non-) integration in Eastern Africa', *UNU-CRIS Working Papers*, W-2008/2, p.12.

[65] African Union. 2003. *ASF Policy Framework for the establishment of the African Standby Force.* May 2003, adopted by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defence Staff on 15-16 May 2003 and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Maputo Summit in July 2003

[66] Bogland et all. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management.* Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475, p 26

[67] Ibid

	Scenarios	
	Description:	Deploy in:
1	Military advice to a political mission	30 days
2	Observer mission co-deployed with UN mission	30 days
3	Stand alone observer mission	30 days
4	Chapter VI peacekeeping and preventative deployments	30 days
5	Complex multidimensional peacekeeping	90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days
6	Interventions (e.g against genocide)	14 days with a robust military force

Table 1: The six scenarios for the ASF and regional standby capabilities in the ASF.

The establishment of the ASF is undertaken in two stages. Phase one, which ran until 30 June 2005, was intended to result in the AU having sufficient capacity to enable strategic level management for scenarios 1 and 2 missions. The five regional organisations (RECs) were during the same period also to establish standby forces, up to brigade size, with capacity to conduct missions as advanced as scenario 4.[68]

During phase two, 1 July 2005 until 30 June 2010, the AU was to have developed capacity to undertake missions in accordance with the first five scenarios, including complex 'Chapter VII' peacekeeping missions.[69] By 30 June 2010, the RECs were also expected to have developed capacity to establish a mission HQ for scenario 4 and continue to develop the brigades and support elements for these.[70] In most regions, these deadlines have not been met. Instead, as is the case in Eastern Africa, most regions have aimed for so called *Initial Operational Capability* for 2010 only expecting to reach *Full Operational Capability* in 2015.

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[68] Bogland et all. 2008. The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management. Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475, p 26
[69] Ibid, p 27
[70] Ibid

4 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

In an attempt to regionally address drought, famine, and desertification on the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was formed in 1986. IGADD also became a forum for political discussions concerning peace and security between its member states. However, increasing threats to human security in the area and the member states' inability or unwillingness to deal with this problem undermined the organisation and these responsibilities were taken over by international humanitarian organisations.[71]

During the 1990's regionalism grew stronger in world politics and the IGADD member states realised that they needed to increase their cooperation to be able to cope with the region's problems. Food security was, and had been an important issue for all member-states but as the organisation grew, over-all development was increasingly considered a more appropriate framework to address this issue rather than merely looking to drought and decertification. In 1995 it was therefore decided to revitalise and expand the cooperation under the new name of IGAD and the organisation was formally launched in 1996.[72] Today IGAD consists of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.[73] Eritrea is formally a member, but has chosen to suspend itself due to regional disagreements.[74]

IGAD has three overarching aims:[75]

- Food security and environmental protection;

- Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and,

- Economic cooperation and integration.[76]

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[71] Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2008. 'Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility', Africa Program Working Paper Series, International Peace Institute, October 2008. p.11

[72] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 222.

[73] Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, www.igad.int

[74] Interview IGAD 29 October 2009

[75] Even though all these three areas are of great importance, the focus in this report is on IGAD's work in the area of peace and security, in accordance with the aims and objectives of the study.

[76] Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 'Mission and Vision', http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=153&limitstart=1

4.1   Structure

IGAD is comprised of four organs as set out in figure 2 below: The Assembly of Heads of States and Government; The Council of Ministers; a Committee of Ambassadors; and a Secretariat, based in Djibouti. The Assembly is the supreme policy organ of IGAD and, apart from making policy, it directs and controls the organisation. It is specifically pointed out in the agreement establishing IGAD that the Assembly should monitor the question of conflict prevention, management and resolution.[77]

Figure 2. The structure of IGAD

The Council of Ministers is composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs and another appointed minister. It formulates the policy of the organisation, approves the budget and oversees the work of the Secretariat. It is also to promote peace and security in the region, as well as "follow up political and security affairs which include conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as post

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[77] IGAD, *Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, Nairobi 21 March 1996, article 9

conflict peace building".[78] The Committee of Ambassadors is to guide and advise the Executive Secretary.[79]

The Secretariat, headed by the Executive Secretary, is the executive body of the organisation and is divided into four divisions: Economic Cooperation and Social Development; Agriculture and Environment; Peace and Security; and Administration and Finance.[80] The division of Peace and Security is itself divided into three 'programmes':

- Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR);
- Political Affairs;
- Humanitarian Affairs.[81]

The CPMR programme includes the following components: an assessment of the capacities of CPMR in the region; capacity building training in CPMR for the Secretariat and IGAD focal ministries; control of illicit trafficking of small arms; the development of the CEWARN; the Sudan peace process; and the Somalia peace process. The division is also responsible for the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT).[82]

There are also other institutions within the IGAD framework, such as the IGAD Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the IGAD Forum for Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organisations (NGO/CSO). The latter was established in 2003 with the idea that the members of the forum would work as a consultancy service for the IGAD Secretariat in the areas of Peace and Security, Agriculture and Environment and Economic Cooperation and Integration.[83]

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[78] IGAD, *Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, Nairobi 21 March 1996, article 9
[79] ibid
[80] IGAD, 'About Us – Operational structure of IGAD, http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93%3Aabout-us&catid=49%3Aabout-us&Itemid=153&limitstart=2
[81] IGAD, 'About peace and security division', http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97&Itemid=148
[82] African Capacity Building Foundation, 2008. *A Survey of the Capacity Needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[83] IGAD, 'About Us – Inter Parliamentary Union, NGO and Civil Society Forum, http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93%3Aabout-us&catid=49%3Aabout-us&Itemid=153&limitstart=4

4.2   Peace and security

IGAD's vision within the area of peace and security is ambitious; the organisation aims to "be the premier regional organisation for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region"[84] and to "promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms […]for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue".[85]

In 2003, the member states agreed on a Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and made this area a priority of IGAD. The Peace and Security Division of the IGAD Secretariat was also tasked with developing and coordinating an IGAD *peace and security strategy*. At a launching conference held in October 2005, IGAD hosted consultations on the strategy which resulted in a working plan preparing for the development of the strategy. The objective of the strategy was established as "to develop, implement and sustain a mechanism in order to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts in the IGAD region".[86] The objectives included:

- facilitation of the development of appropriate nation-level mechanisms to promote national peace and security within the context of common core values;

- appraisal of structures and mechanism for conflict early warning, management and resolution within the region and across its boundaries;

- achievement of consensus on aims, principles and benchmarks for the promotion of regional peace and security; and

- monitoring and supporting post-conflict transition.[87]

IGAD is currently considering a new peace and security strategy, expanding and reinforcing the organisation's mandate. This was discussed during the November 2009 ministerial meeting and set to include higher ambitions in inter alia preventive diplomacy, mediation, election monitoring and observation, post-conflict reconstruction, disaster management, sea access for land-locked states, and natural resource issues.[88] The new IGAD peace and security strategy has

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[84] IGAD. 2003. *IGAD strategy*, p 5
[85] IGAD. 1996. Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
[86] IGAD. 2005. *Conference to launch an IGAD Strategy on Peace and Security, Consensus document and way ahead, Khartoum 1-3 October 2005*
[87] Ibid
[88] Interview IGAD 29 October 2009

basically been agreed upon by member states at a technical level but is still pending approval at Council of ministers' level and is not yet formally endorsed.[89] The new strategy is a potential area of support from IGAD partners. According to the IGAD secretariat, sustainable funding is key to the future evolution of its peace and security ambitions, but there is also a need to secure the human and physical resources needed to fulfil these. So far, partners have been forthcoming when it comes to financial support.[90] The EU is considering itself a potential partner in support of the new peace and security strategy once it has been fully ratified.[91]

Some of the key sources of funding to IGAD are the European Development Fund (EDF), bilateral partners, NEPAD, and the recently established *Joint Funding Mechanism* for member state contributions.[92] In 1997, an IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) was established to formalize the previously existing "friends of IGAD" group.[93] Sweden as well as Denmark, Norway and a range of organisations, including the European Union, are included in the IPF.[94]

4.2.1   Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy - Sudan and Somalia

IGAD has been involved in mediation efforts in several of its member states. Most notable are its engagements in Sudan and Somalia, but the organisation has also to a lesser extent attempted mediation in the Ethiopia-Eritrea war.[95] Often, IGAD member states have not been in agreement on the chosen strategy to engage in conflict resolution on the Horn; many member states have supported

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[89] Interview EU delegation to Kenya, Nairobi 9 April 2010
[90] Interview IGAD 29 October 2009
[91] Interview EU delegation to Kenya, Nairobi 9 April 2010
[92] Interview IGAD 29 October 2009
[93] IGAD, 'About Us- iGAD Partners Forum,
   http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93%3Aabout-us&catid=49%3Aabout-us&Itemid=153&limitstart=5; Members of the IGAD partners forum are:
   Austria. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
   Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, European
   Commission, International organization for Migration, United Nations Development Programme
   and the World Bank.
[94] IGAD, 'About Us- IGAD Partners Forum',
   http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93%3Aabout-us&catid=49%3Aabout-us&Itemid=153&limitstart=5
[95] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.*
   Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited , p 226

individual warring factions while at the same time seeking to engage in seemingly "neutral" mediation efforts.[96]

Due to a lack of resources and expertise, in general, IGAD's mediation initiatives have been made possible only by the political and financial support of organisations like the AU, UN and EU but also through support from individual states like the US. Within IGAD, Kenya has been particularly pivotal in diplomatic interventions. Kenya has in the past taken on the role as the natural peace broker in the region, holding a lead position in relation to both the Somali and the Sudanese peace process. [97]

Sudan

The predecessor IGADD got involved in the Sudanese peace process in 1993 and IGAD continued this engagement during two mediation phases (1993-1995 and 1997-2005), culminating in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In the case of Sudan, the relationship between Khartoum and its neighbours was relatively positive. Since some neighbouring states had nonetheless supported the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) against Khartoum, mediation efforts by IGAD were perceived as appealing to both SPLM/A and Sudanese president al-Bashir. In addition, al-Bashir felt that engaging IGAD would avoid a foreign intervention on Sudanese soil and that IGAD, as a representative of likeminded states, could better provide neutrality and sensitivity than other foreign entities.[98] SPLM/A initially had reservations regarding IGAD's role as a mediator given that as an interstate organisation it might be biased towards the interests of its member states and neglecting the interests of their, non-state, organisation and thus prioritising state security over human security. Nonetheless, an IGAD Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan was formed by ministers form Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda and began proximity talks.

In 1994 IGAD halted its efforts. Sudan had requested that Eritrea and Uganda withdraw from the Standing Committee on the basis of a perceived bias towards the SPLM/A. Sudan in its turn had begun supporting rebel groups in Uganda and Eritrea, causing these states to break off all diplomatic relations with Khartoum.[99] Kenya which had stayed neutral was eventually accepted to lead the

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[96] Ibid, p 234

[97] Ibid, p 235

[98] Murithi, Tim. 2009. 'Inter-governmental authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia'. *African Security*, 2:136

[99] Ibid

mediation process. The peace talk led to the signing of a Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 1994, which among other things recognized the right to self-determination of the southern parts of the country. However, the Khartoum government soon withdrew from the agreement.[100]

IGAD negotiations were only resumed in 1998 when SPLM/A had, with backing from various IGAD states, grown large enough to effectively threaten the Sudanese government.[101] A permanent secretariat dealing with the Sudan peace process was established in Nairobi and a Special Envoy was appointed. Between 2000 and 2005, several peace talks were held resulting in different protocols and declarations. In 2002, a MoU on cessation of hostilities was signed and the year after IGAD partook in a verification and monitoring team to ensure that the MoU was upheld.[102] In 2005, the IGAD peacemaking initiative was brought to a close with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in which IGAD, along with other organisations, had been instrumental.

Somalia

IGAD member states have all harboured individual agendas in relation to the situation in Somalia. These agendas have complicated the involvement of the organisation in the peace processes. IGAD and the predecessor to the AU, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), jointly mandated Ethiopia to lead the peace process in the late 1990's. However, the question of Ethiopia's neutrality and impartiality hampered the effort. Nevertheless, IGAD gained the political, diplomatic and financial support from the international community to lead the peace process. In 2000, the Transitional National Government was established under the auspices of IGAD.

Kenya was given the lead over the process in 2001 which resulted in the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference and a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities signed by 24 factions. Due to disagreements the talks eventually broke down.[103]

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[100] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited , p 228

[101] Murithi, Tim. 2009. 'Inter-governmental authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia'. *African Security*, 2:136

[102] ibid

[103] Khadiagala, Gilbert M., 2008. 'Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility', *Africa Program Working Paper Series*, International Peace Institute, October 2008. p.11; Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p.229

By 2004, an IGAD-led initiative had led to the election of President Yusuf and the Transitional Federal Government. In late 2004, Yusuf requested that a multinational peacemaking force be sent to Somalia to prevent the destabilisation of the country by the presence of millions of small arms and thousands of militiamen active within the state.[104] In January 2005, IGAD responded favourably to the request and volunteered to deploy a peace support mission (IGASOM) of 10,000 troops to Somalia to protect the transitional federal institutions, carry out voluntary disarmament and pave the way for an AU mission that would deploy 9 months later.[105] Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda were to partake in the mission.[106] In February, the AU endorsed the deployment of IGASOM.[107]

Capacity issues and disagreement over the composition of the force – in particular on whether neighbouring (frontline) states with stakes in the conflict, should be able to contribute troops – delayed the deployment of IGASOM. IGAD also lacked the ability to rapidly establish a peacekeeping mission and, in addition, the organisation's charter did not have a clear provision for the deployment of a peace operation.[108] IGAD eventually had to exclude the frontline states from the mission to make it acceptable to all parties. Excluding neighbouring states made sense as these were considered by many as stakeholders in the conflict but put IGAD in a difficult position since doing so left only Uganda as a possible troop contributor.[109] It soon became clear that the deployment of IGASOM would be virtually impossible. As the deployment of IGASOM was delayed, Ethiopia – backed by the US – intervened bilaterally upon the request of the TFG. With the Ethiopian intervention the idea of deploying an IGAD mission was fully abandoned in favour of an AU operation. The responsibility for deploying troops in Somalia was transferred to the AU and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established in 2007.[110] Today IGAD has signed a cooperation agreement with AMISOM as well as the

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[104] AU Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (XXII), 5 January 2005; UN Security Coucil, 'Report of the Secretary General, s/2005/89, 18 February 2005

[105] IGAD, *Communiqué on Somalia*. 31 January 2005

[106] Ibid

[107] AU Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), 7 February 2005

[108] Murithi, Tim. 2009. 'Inter-governmental authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia'. *African Security*, 2:136

[109] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited

[110] Mulugeta, Allehone, 2008. 'Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa', in *International Peacekeeping*, 15:2, p.177

UN. IGAD also partakes in the International Contact Group meetings on Somalia.[111]

4.2.2   Terrorism - ICPAT

In 2003, at the 10th IGAD summit, an IGAD plan to counter terrorism was approved. A series of common objectives was highlighted in the plan, including increased measures to establish a regional approach to respond to terrorism that could fit within international strategies; developing methods to prevent the financing of terrorist activities; enhancing the capacity to address illegal cross-border movements; enhancing the capacity to record and share information; developing strategies to ensure the protection of human rights in counter-terrorism operations; and establishing educational programmes to enhance public support; as well as establishing implementation measures.[112]

Subsequently, a study was conducted by the IGAD Secretariat and the African applied research institute, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), to look at the region's operational problems in the area of counter-terrorism. The study formed the baseline for a project concept which was developed into the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT).[113] ICPAT was established 2006 and located in Addis Ababa. It was supposed to run for four years and consists of five elements:

- enhancement of judicial measures;
- optimization of interdepartmental cooperation;
- enhancement of border control;
- training, sharing of information and best practices; and
- promotion of strategic cooperation.[114]

The ICPAT programme has been relatively successful and efforts have been undertaken to transform it into a more institutionalised part of the IGAD. As the ICPAT mandate expired in June 2010, efforts have been under way to build on the progress made within the programme's key areas.[115]   In particular, attempts have been made to broaden the scope of ICPAT to include issues such as

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[111] Presentation by Y. Okubo on IGAD's Peace and Security engagements to the United Nations in New York, 18 October 2010

[112] IGAD ICPAT, 'About US', http://www.icpat.org/index.php/about-us-mainmenu-110

[113] IGAD ICPAT, 'About US', http://www.icpat.org/index.php/about-us-mainmenu-110

[114] Institute of Security Studies, 'ICPAT Introduction', http://www.issafrica.org/cdterro/english2.htm

[115] Interviews IGAD 29 October 2009, ICPAT 30 October 2009, ISS 27 October 2009

organised crime (e.g., trafficking, drugs, small arms and light weapons), piracy, counter-terrorism, and environmental degradation. ICPAT is currently undergoing a transformation to a new programme called IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) with four pillars: terrorism, maritime security, organized crimes and security sector reforms. [116]

4.2.3   Conflict Early Warning - CEWARN

As one of the regional organisations that have been officially recognised as part of the continental early warning system, IGAD's CEWARN forms part of this central supporting structure of APSA. CEWARN was established in 2002 and is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as part of the IGAD directorate on political and humanitarian affairs.[117]

Even though the CEWARN feeds into APSA, CEWARN predates the APSA structure, as well as the AU itself, and was originally established only as an IGAD tool to monitor cross-border pastoral conflicts within the IGAD region.[118] The pastoral lifestyle in the region had become more mobile due to resource depletion and the increased movement of livestock and people had become a source of conflict. The movement of livestock to new places was also resulting in an increased spread of diseases, causing concerns in the IGAD region. The pastoral system was thus considered an important focal point for issues regarding CEWARN.[119] Another reason for why CEWARN came to be limited to pastoral movements was, reportedly, the member states being apprehensive about signing protocols to surrender national intelligence. Thus, the CEWARN protocols needed to be toned down and focused on specific issues.[120] Almost since its inception, discussions have taken place on whether to expand the role of CEWARN to not only cover pastoralist conflicts.[121] Two geographic clusters were chosen as pilot project areas for the CEWARN focus, the Karamoja region in the cross-border area of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan and the Somali

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[116] Presentation by Y. Okubo on IGAD's Peace and Security engagements to the United Nations in New York, 18 October 2010

[117] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 223

[118] Khadiagala, Gilbert M., 2008. 'Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility', Africa Program Working Paper Series, International Peace Institute, October 2008. p.12. See also http://www.cewarn.org/index_files/Page355.htm#mechanism

[119] Presentation on IGAD by M.Mallim, 3June 2009 at Sida, Stockholm

[120] Presentation on IGAD by M.Mallim 3June 2009 at Sida, Stockholm

[121] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 225

cluster, including the cross-border area of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. These have now been expanded to include a third region: Afar-Issa in the cross-border regions of Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, but is planned to be extend to all member states.[122]

Due to the already developed CEWARN structures, IGAD was naturally identified as the region to help implement the Eastern African part of the CEWS even though at the moment both COMESA and the EAC are constructing similar systems. In addition to IGAD, two more of the APSA regions already have such early warning systems in place. These are implemented by ECOWAS in West Africa and SADC in Southern Africa.[123] Similar to ECOWAS' early warning system, the CEWARN is externally funded.[124] The European Union is a main partner to the entire continental conflict early warning system, which includes assisting the development of the regional mechanisms in support of APSA.[125]

Today CEWARN is to:

- receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region;
- undertake and share analyses of that information;
- develop case scenarios and formulate options for response;
- share and communicate information, analyses and response options; and
- carry out studies on specific types and areas of conflict in the IGAD region.[126]

The mechanism is both an early warning instrument and an early response unit and operates at three levels: local, national and regional.[127] At the local level an information collection network composed of several Field Monitors are supposed to gather and sort out relevant information. Local Committees should also be established to encourage response activities within the member states.[128]

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[122] IGAD. *CEWARN Strategy 2007-2011*. CEWARN UNIT, Addis Ababa November 2006
[123] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2007. *Southern Africa: Building and Effective Security and Governamce Architecture for the 21st Century*. Policy advisory group seminar report. 29-30 may 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, p 22
[124] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited , p 224
[125] Interview EU elegation to AU, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010
[126] IGAD, *Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States*, Annex: Operating Guidelines for CEWARN
[127] IGAD CEWARN, 'The Conflict and Early Warning Mechanism of IGAD, http://www.cewarn.org/gendoc/Strucewarn.htm
[128] Ibid

At the national level, National Research Institutes (NRIs) have been contracted to assist in the management of the information collection networks. Together with a Country Coordinator, the NRIs coordinate and analyse the data collected by the Field Monitors. At the national level there are also Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) that are to work as coordinating units and have responsibility for response activities at a national level.[129]

At the regional level, the 'CEWARN unit' is the centre for collecting data, conducting conflict analyses, sharing information and communicating response options. This unit supports CEWARN stakeholders in capacity-building and training. It also coordinates the different CEWARN organs, assists in developing regional cooperation structures and is the driving force for the political process behind the Mechanism.[130] On the whole, it acts as a clearing house and quality controller. The regional CEWARN unit consists of eight staff.[131] There are also two regional coordination mechanisms, the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS). The TCEW consists of the heads of the CEWERUs and focuses on technical consultations. The TCEW reports to the CPS which is the policy-making organ of CEWARN.[132]

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[129] Ibid. There are regional differences in the operational status of the CEWERUs. The Kenyan CEWERU has been said to function well. Presentation on IGAD by M.Malim, 3June 2009 at Sida, Stockholm
[130] IGAD CEWARN, 'About', http://www.cewarn.org/index_files/Page355.htm
[131] African Capacity Building Foundation, 2008. *A Survey of the Capacity Needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers
[132] IGAD CEWARN, 'About', http://www.cewarn.org/index_files/Page355.htm; IGAD CEWARN, 'The Conflict and Early Warning Mechanism of IGAD, http://www.cewarn.org/gendoc/Strucewarn.htm

IGAD - CEWARN

Figure 3 CEWARN structure[133]

Over all, IGAD has managed to develop quite a complex structure, as set out in figure 3 above. The CEWARN is, however, still hampered by the restriction to pastoralist conflicts[134] as well as the fact that it is so far only operational in three areas. In addition, while CEWARN has been developed into a primary source for early warning, IGAD has so far not managed to effectively link early warning to any prevention or early response activities and has thus not managed to avert or mitigate any conflicts.[135]

The organisation still lacks the mandate to force member states to take appropriate action to address the outbreak of a violent conflict or humanitarian emergency, essentially undermining the effectiveness of CEWARN.[136] The CEWARN unit has recognised that to be effective it needs much more cooperation and input of stakeholders at local, national and regional levels both

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[133] ISS - http://www.cewarn.org/documents/CEWARNStrategy.pdf; IGAD, CEWARN Strategy 2007-2011, CEWARN UNIT, Addis Ababa November 2006

[134] Presentation on IGAD by M.Mallim, 3June 2009 at Sida, Stockholm

[135] Interviews IGAD CEWARN 29 October 2009, IDISS 3 November 2009

[136] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 224.

in terms of information-sharing and implementation of responses.[137] IGAD has nonetheless been able to act in some of the conflicts in the region as well as establishing a mechanism for early warning.

4.3   Internal disputes

Even though being quite active, the lack of resources has hampered IGAD's ability when it comes to conflict management. The organisation has been dependent on financial support from the international community to carry out its agenda.[138] In addition, political obstructions to further regional integration within IGAD on peace and security exist. For example, the member states have not been in an agreement on what strategy to choose for conflict management on the horn.[139] In addition the impartiality and neutrality of the member states in relation to the issue has been questioned.

In particular, it is the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that has paralysed the organisation. The two member states have frequently been in disagreement, and from time to time also at war with each other. This has limited IGAD's ability to act in the field of conflict management. In April 2007, Eritrea suspended its membership due to indifferences over the conflict in Somalia. IGAD has also been hampered by the fact that Uganda and Kenya have focused more on the cooperation within the EAC and has thus not been paying enough attention to IGAD-related issues.[140]

4.4   Analysis

IGAD's track record in peace and security can be questioned. Many observers note that its efforts in the peace and security arena have left few sustainable impacts.[141] The experience from Sudan and Somalia shows that IGAD lacks both

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[137] IGAD. *CEWARN Strategy 2007-2011*. CEWARN UNIT, Addis Ababa November 2006; Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited , p 223

[138] Francis, David J., 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 232.

[139] Ibid, p 234.

[140] Khadiagala, Gilbert M., 2008. 'Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility', *Africa Program Working Paper Series*, International Peace Institute, October 2008. p.12; International Peace Academy, 2003. 'The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention', IPA Seminar Report, p.6

[141] Interviews Addis Ababa and Nairobi, October 27-November 4 2009

the political leverage and resources needed to induce commitment to a peace process as well as to reduce the incentives for war.[142]

Some successful peace and security efforts have been made. However, few experts attribute the progress made to the IGAD institution itself. Rather, IGAD has served as a legitimising vehicle for influential member states.

There are mixed assessments of IGAD's comparative advantages. While the organisation emphasises its potential as a conflict resolution mechanism, external observers make mixed assessments, with some seeming sceptical about the organisation's future[143] and others being more hopeful.[144] IGAD challenges include member state disagreement on its role and evolution, lack of financial and human resources, inter-state rivalry in the region, and the seemingly perpetual strain caused by the situations in Somalia and Sudan. When key member states such as Ethiopia and Kenya are in agreement on a specific issue, IGAD has displayed efficient progress. This also suggests that IGAD's strengths have very little to do with its own institution but rather lies within its individual member states. Nonetheless, IGAD can be an important forum that allows its member states to cooperate and reach agreement on important issues. It is one of very few forums that can gather the troubled states of the Horn of Africa for dialogue and it has a tradition of peace and security work.[145]

The renewed ambition and transformational efforts is in many ways a great contrast to its initial platform of dealing with pastoral, trans-border issues, and development efforts. As peace and security is not the primary mandate of the organisation, the move towards broadening this scope may be questioned. IGAD may have had a great potential in the region, but it has so far failed to realise this potential.

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[142] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 234

[143] Interviews US DAtt 30 October 2009, ISS 27 October 2009, UK 28 October 2009

[144] Interviews German Embassy 29 October 2009, IDISS 3 November 2009

[145] Interviews IDISS 3 November 2009, ISS 27 October 2009

5 The development of the Eastern African Standby Force

As already mentioned, Eastern Africa is one of the five regions designated to contribute to the African Standby Force (ASF). The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) constitutes this contribution and is to include military, police and civilian elements. Originally this standby force was simply referred to as EASBRIG, but a decision was taken move away from the denominator 'brigade' in favour of the less military 'standby force' to accommodate the fact that the force contains civilian and police components, and that capability, rather than size, should be guiding.[146] In this report, EASF is used to refer to the multidimensional force, including civilian elements and EASBRIG to refer only to the military component of the EASF.

EASBRIG formally came into being on 11 April 2005.[147] At the time of its establishment, there was great disagreement among the EASBRIG member states as to which multilateral organisation in the region should be nominated to coordinate the overall EASBRIG and EASF effort. IGAD was designated to play an interim coordinating role for the establishment of EASBRIG.[148] Despite the fact that IGADs geographical reach only included seven of the states in Eastern Africa all states were initially involved in the planning.

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[146] Interview NACS, Nairovi, 8 April 2010

[147] Fanta, Emmanuel, 2008. 'Dynamics of Regional (non-) integration in Eastern Africa', *UNU-CRIS Working Papers,* W-2008/2, p.12.

[148] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited , p 238

In February 2004, IGAD held an expert meeting on the Establishment of EASBRIG. An Eastern African Chiefs of Defence meeting also took place where representatives from Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia Sudan, Tanzania (as an observer) and Uganda participated. It was noted that apart from the participating countries, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritius and the Seychelles also were to be part of the brigade.[149] Already at this stage, Rwanda raised concerns about IGAD being the coordinator.[150] Nevertheless, at the first meeting of ministers of defence and security of the Eastern Africa region, in July 2004, it was decided that IGAD would act as a coordinator until appropriate permanent structures had been established.[151] The idea was to negotiate a protocol that would amend the IGAD Charter since defence related issues could not be addressed under the current charter. This was however not well-received among the non-IGAD member states and the idea had to be abandoned.[152] To overcome the challenges associated with IGADs limited membership a specific mechanism, called the EASBRIG Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) was eventually set up for the purpose of only coordinating the establishment of EASBRIG, and later the EASF. EASBRICOM was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2007 and was approved to take over the establishment of EASBRIG from IGAD.

In early 2011, a revised policy framework and MoU, aimed at replacing EASBRICOM with EASFCOM was adopted at an EASF Summit. The replacement of EASBRICOM is intended to reflect the multifunctional (civil-military) nature of the EASF project.[153]

Eastern Africa includes 14 states, but not all are contributing to the EASF. Eritrea, a nominal member, opposed the operationalisation of EASBRICOM and therefore abstained from partaking. Only seven of the initial EASF contributors decided to join the EASBRICOM initiative, officially pledging troops to

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[149] Alusala, Nelson, 2004. 'African Standby Force East Africa moves on, in *African Security Review*, 13:2

[150] *Proceedings of the meeting of the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),* Jinja, Uganda. 16-17 February 2004.

[151] *Report of the First Meeting of Minister of Defence and Security of the Eastern Africa Region on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),* Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 15-16 July 2004

[152] Mulugeta, Allehone, 2008. 'Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa', in *International Peacekeeping*, 15:2, p.174.

[153] EASF. 2011. *Policy framework for the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011; *Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

EASBRIG. These included Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Later Burundi, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, also decided to join in the efforts. In addition, Tanzania had special status under EASBRICOM which allowed it to participate in police activities only.

Today EASFCOM consists of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.[154] With the transformation of EASBRICOM to EASFCOM, Eritrea is once again included in the initiative but whether this will result in any more than a nominal membership remains to be seen. Madagascar was suspended from the EASF in 2009 because of the unconstitutional change of government that took place within the country. Like Eritrea, Madagascar is now, yet again, considered included in the EASF framework.[155]

Several of the EASF member states participate in more than one regional standby force. Other than supporting EASF, Madagascar and the Seychelles are also members of SADCBRIG. Burundi's dual membership also includes the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC).

5.1 EASF Structures

5.1.1 EASBRICOM / EASFCOM

The development of the EASF is at the highest level the responsibility of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the member states. Subordinate to the Assembly is the Council of Ministers, constituted by the Defence and Security Ministers of the member states.[156] EASBRICOM has been the secretariat responsible for coordinating and harmonising EASBRIG structures, policy and implementation. As mentioned above, a process to replace EASBRICOM with a new secretariat – EASFCOM – is currently under way. The revised policy framework and Memorandum of Understanding that lays the foundation for this change, as well as the general broadening of the EASF

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[154] *Memorandum* of on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011
[155] Ibid
[156] Ibid

project, was adopted at an EASF Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2011.[157] The documents are nevertheless awaiting the ratification of two thirds of the EASF member states that would make it enter into force.

As EASBRICOM coordinated EASBRIG structures, EASFCOM will coordinate EASF structures and place greater emphasis on building the policing and civilian structures that have so far been neglected.

EASFCOM is to be located within the same facilities in Nairobi, Kenya as EASBRICOM. Like EASBRICOM, EASFCOM will liaise with the AU and manage relations with other EASF partners, including donors.

Since EASFCOM is only being formed it is difficult to outline exactly how it will take shape. According to the new EASF MoU it seems, however, that it will be quite similar to its predecessor both in terms of structures and functions. The organisational chart in figure 4 below depicts the former structure of the EASF under EASBRICOM, it can nonetheless give guidance of what the EASF will look like under EASFCOM.

Figure 4 Structure of EASBRIG, www.easbrig.org

As the secretariat of the EASF, EASFCOM is subordinate to the Assembly of EASF Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers

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[157] EASF. 2011. *Policy framework for the establishment of the East*ern *Africa Standby Force (EASF)*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011; *Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the East*ern *Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

of Defence and Security and the Committee of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff.[158]

EASBRICOM was headed by a Director and supported by four department heads – Political Affairs, Liaison, Finance and Administration. The Secretariat was partly funded by its member states, contributing about 3.5 million USD annually. Member states contributions has covered approximately a little less than half of EASBRICOM's budget and covers primarily salaries, allowances and other forms of administration. Funding from the member states was channelled through the Council of Ministers.

Functions and objectives

The main purpose of EASFCOM are the same as for EASBRICOM: to provide oversight and management of EASBRIG/EASF structures and exist as a one-stop centre for related issues.

EASFCOM is to give political and policy guidance and ensure implementation of EASF policies, including developing and reviewing EASF policy documents for approval by the Council of Ministers. In addition it is to coordinate with relevant authorities; liaise with the AU, RECs and other organisations on matters related to the EASF; and perform public relations activities. An important function of EASFCOM is to mobilise resources for the EASF in collaboration with the AU, RECs and other sources.[159] EASFCOM will also manage the EASF fund.[160]

EASBRICOM was guided by ten objectives. Partnership support to EASBRICOM have most often been categorised by donors in accordance with these objectives. Even though some of the dates specified in the objectives have been passed, the objectives are still likely to be relevant to EASFCOM.

- Objective 1: Cohesive political decision making structures that can authorize mandate and oversee the employment of regional capability by the end of 2010

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[158] *Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the East*ern *Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

[159] EASBRIG. 2007. *Report of the 2nd Extra Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of EASBRIG*, Nairobi Kenya, 30 March 2007.

[160] *Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the East*ern *Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

- Objective 2: A command, control and communications (C3) structure capable of preparing, planning for and commanding the deployed EA forces by the end of 2009

- Objective 3: Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a trained force of Brigade size on standby and maintained in member states to the required readiness levels by the end of 2010. Full operational Capability (FOC) of a trained land force structure including a multinational brigade headquarters on standby by the end of 2015

- Objective 4: A trained police element on standby and maintained in member states to the required readiness criteria by the end of 2010

- Objective 5 : A roster of trained civilians within the region available for deployment by the end of 2010

- Objective 6: A logistics system capable of supporting the deployment and sustainment of regional capability, in accordance with force structures, initially by 2010

- Objective 7: An integrated training system able to provide individual and collective training for regional forces by the end of 2010

- Objective 8: Efficient administrative processes and structures including adequate resources to support EASBRIG objectives

- Objective 9: Establishment of Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a regional maritime capability

- Objective 10: Establishment of Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a regional air capability[161]

5.1.2   Other structures

Three main structures other than EASFCOM support the EASF. These include the Planning Element (PLANELM), the Brigade Headquarters (Brigade HQ) and the Logistics Base (LOGBASE). The Brigade HQ and the LOGBASE are located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia while the PLANELM and EASFCOM are situated in Nairobi, Kenya.

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[161]"International Partnership with EASF", Power Point presentation, 3rd Regional Senior Mission Leaders Course, IPSTC, February 2010.

The PLANELM is a permanent element currently composed of thirteen military, six civilian and six police staff officers. It is responsible for the force generation; harmonising resource contributions and EASF commitments; pre-deployment, operational and contingency planning; developing and updating SOPs, training policies and standards; and determining best practices and lessons learnt from previous and ongoing missions. It works as a multinational full-time planning headquarters of EASF and is empowered to enter into agreements with national and other training institutions.[162]

The Brigade HQ was initially intended to serve as the command headquarters for force preparation and operational command. It was also to be composed of staff from all of the member states.[163] At the moment the Brigade HQ is little more than a skeleton structure to be activated only once a mission is to be deployed. Today, it is constituted of the Brigade Commander and three supporting functions – an operations officer, a training officer and an administration officer. The role of the Brigade HQ is also to train and prepare a mission brigade HQ structure; participate in fact-finding missions; and conduct reconnaissance in cooperation with the PLANELM and Logistics Base. The commander of EASBRIG is to rotate annually in alphabetical order between the member states. In the case of deployment, the decision of appointing a commander is to be taken by the AU Peace and Security Council.[164]

The LOGBASE is intended to serve as the central regional base for maintenance, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of the EASF.[165]

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[162] *Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 11 April 2005; Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the East*ern *Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

[163] *Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 11 April 2005; Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

[164] *Policy Framework for the Establishment if the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)*, Addis Ababa Ethiopia 11 April 2005; *Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

[165] *Memorandum of Understanding in the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 11 April 2005; *Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

5.2 EASF Tasks and composition

The EASF is authorised to operate under the mandate of the AU Peace and Security Council and is intended to adopt the six scenarios set out for the ASF.[166]

Of the six ASF scenarios, scenario four has been identified as the most likely for EASF to become involved in, i.e. peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building).[167] The basic force requirements of EASBRIG, optimised for scenario four and in line with what the AU has identified, are as follows:

- A brigade (mission level) headquarters support unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles;

- A headquarters company and support unit of up to 120 personnel;

- 4 x light infantry battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles;

- An engineer unit of up to 505 personnel;

- A light signals unit of up to 135 personnel;

- A reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to 150 personnel;

- A helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, 10 vehicles and 4 helicopters;

- A military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles;

- A light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles;

- A level-two medical unit of up to 35 personnel and 10 vehicles;

- A military observer group of up to 120 officers; and

- A civilian support group consisting of logistical, administration and budget components.[168]

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[166] EASF. 2011. *Policy framework for the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)*, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2011

[167] *Policy Framework for the Establishment if the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),* Addis Ababa Ethiopia 11 April 2005.

[168] *Policy Framework for the Establishment if the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)*, Addis Ababa Ethiopia 11 April 2005.

5.2.1   Troop pledges

Prior to the EASF, the following pledges had been made to the EASBRIG force structure:

- **Rwanda**: Infantry Battalion, Cavalry Squadron, Engineer Company, Medical corps Company, Military police, Signals/Communications Squad, Mechanised Infantry

- **Sudan**: Infantry Battalion

- **Ethiopia**: Infantry Battalion, Signals/Communications Company, Engineer Company

- **Uganda**: Infantry Battalion

- **Kenya**: Infantry Battalion, Engineer Company, Medical corps Company, Signals/Communications Company

- **Djibouti**: Infantry Battalion, Engineer Squad

- **Somalia**: Infantry Company[169]

The troop pledges to EASBRIG were supposedly complete but have not been validated. As a consequence of this remaining insecurity there is mixed assessment of the readiness of EASBRIG. Some observers regard the original pledging lists outlined above as out-dated and with the transition into EASF these figures need to be revisited.[170]

At the moment, there is an ongoing development of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and a Force Support Concept (FSC). The CONOPS is planned to be presented at the policy organs meeting in June 2011. It is expected that harmonizing operational needs and force pledges will be made easier once these documents have been presented.

5.3   Current status of the EASF

As the ASF efforts has passed the important nominal target date of being operable by the end of 2010 it is clear that full operational capability of the EASF has not managed to meet that deadline. However, this has been the case

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[169] EASBRIG, 'A presentation on the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade – Vision and Concept', Power point presentation by EASBRICOM director
[170] Interviews Danish Embassy 28 October 2009, NACS 2 November 2009

for most of the regional brigades. Instead, 2010 was the target date for achieving so-called Initial Operational Capability, while Full Operational Capability has been pushed back for 2015.

There are mixed assessments of the current state of operationalisation of the EASF, in particular of EASBRIG. Initial Operational Capability was announced after a field training exercise in Djibouti and at the recent EASF summit, the Heads of State and Government declared that it had the capacity to undertake operations up to Observer Mission and be co-deployed with a UN Mission.[171]

The EASBRIG structure was allegedly originally modelled upon the SHIRBRIG concept, with a standing high-readiness multinational brigade force and augmentable HQ, but various partner initiatives have led to other competing models based on national rapid deployment capabilities (RDC) as key components. Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda are reported to be currently developing such a Rapid Deployment Capability, in support of EASBRIG.[172]

Important components such as the PLANELM are in place, encompassing a multidimensional and multinational design. The PLANELM is, however, suffering some human resource challenges due to short rotation times and unclear requirements. In addition, the shortage of capacity at the Brigade HQ and logistics base also puts unnecessary strain on the PLANELM.[173] Some member states have questioned the location of the logistics base in Addis Ababa, as there may be benefits in placing such depots closer to key infrastructure nodes (such as maritime ports).[174] A state-of-the art logistic concept exists, created with support from the United Kingdom, but most observers note that it is too advanced for the current realities in the region.[175]

Due to the unique nature of the EASF, its single-programme mandate, and the fact that it is in its early stages of development, it essentially lacks any track record in peace and security. However, many observers note the fact that the process of building a multinational, regional force is in fact potentially conflict preventive and peace-building in itself, bringing together some of the most troubled states in the region in confidence-building projects.[176]

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[171] *President Kibaki attends Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 29, 2011*, http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/jan2011/2011290102.htm
[172] Interview Kenya Ministry of State and Defence, Nairobi 2 November 2009
[173] Interview Danish Embassy 28 October 2009
[174] Interview Kenya Ministry of State and Defence, Nairobi 2 November 2009
[175] Interview NACS 2 November 2009
[176] Interviews Addis Ababa and Nairobi, October 27-November 4 2009

5.4   EASF key challenges

Some of EASF's key challenges include lack of political will among the member states, competing regional efforts, regional ownership, interoperability, and an over-ambitious timeline. For some key member states, such as Ethiopia, the EASF is far from a priority in terms of national foreign and security policy. More pressuring, conflict-related issues naturally dominate the national agenda. Hence, the timing of the EASF project may be off-track with the realities in the region. In addition, some member states, e.g. Kenya and Uganda, seem to currently move towards prioritising other regional bodies such as the EAC, in essence decreasing support for the EASF. Concerns raised over its predecessors – EASBRICOM and EASBRIG which are likely to persist under the new EASFCOM and EASF setup. These concerns included that the EASBRICOM and EASBRIG-project had troubles in displaying itself as regionally owned. Concerns were voiced that the project in essence was driven and sustained by international partners. Some partners also perceived EASBRICOM as very centralised in its decision-making, particularly at the minister level, leaving little room for bottom-up approaches and solutions in the development. In addition, the militaries in the region have different traditions, doctrines, standards and equipment, which will continue to cause interoperability challenges.

Eastern Africa is in many ways divided between the IGAD states in the north: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and the East African states of the East African Community in the south: Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya Burundi and Rwanda, with Kenya and Uganda holding membership in both structures. The internal disputes in the region, causing a difficulty to align all EASF member states in support of one of the established organisations, were also reflected in the EASBRICOM management. Incoherence in the region is a main challenge for the establishment of the EASF.

5.5   The future of EASF

5.5.1   Broadening the EASF scope?

Being a purpose-specific organisation, the EASF has had to build its structures from scratch. The young organisation is facing several challenges due to the differing views among member states regarding the exact role of its secretariat – EASFCOM/EASBRICOM and the purpose of the wider EASF. There is no

firmly established common opinion amongst all the Eastern African states regarding the political role that EASF will play in the region in the future.[177] Because there have been different opinions amongst member states of how the EASF endeavour should be executed, EASBRICOM itself has been a main driver in establishing an ambition for the organisation. The opinion from within EASBRICOM seems to have been that the organisation should be ambitious, aspiring to develop a broad range of political and security functions far beyond the limited mandate of merely being responsible for troop generation and potential deployment of one of the ASF brigades.[178]

How the replacement of EASBRICOM by EASFCOM plays in to these sentiments and will affect these dynamics remain to be seen.

Before the decision was taken to establish EASFCOM, EASBRICOM had suggested another structure be formed. The proposed *East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM),* would work as the entire region's conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism. In line with this suggestion, EASBRICOM would be transformed into an *Eastern Africa Peace and Security Secretariat* (EAPSS) working as the coordinator of EAPSM as well as for conflict prevention through early warning detection and mediation etc, and coordination of humanitarian activities. [179] The EAPSM would also consist of a standing brigade headquarters element, an integrated logistic system, an integrated training system and personnel on standby in the member states.[180] The suggestion has nonetheless not gained much momentum as support from the member states has been varying.[181] The main dividing line is that there are two differing views of what EASF is and what it is for: the first one interprets the EASF as little more than a multidimensional brigade, the other portrays it as a broader regional peace and security actor, including conflict prevention and election monitoring, etc. The main issue is whether the EASF should be taking a broader political role, similar to many other RECs, or not.

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[177] Interview Dutch Defence Attaché, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010; Interview UK Defence Attaché, Addis Ababa 12 April 2010

[178] EASBRICOM. 2008. Proposed revised policy framework for the establishment of the Eastern Africa peace and Security Mechanism. 3rd Extra Ordinary Council of 14th March 2008

[179] Cilliers, Jackie, 2008. 'The African Standby Force- An update on progress', *ISS Paper* 160 March 2008, pp.14

[180] EASBRICOM, *Proposed Revised Policy Framework for the Establishment of the Eastern Africa peace and Security Mechanism*

[181] Interview Dutch Defence Attaché, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010

Some member states, like Ethiopia, have made it clear that they want the EASF to remain a more limited coordination mechanism and have strongly rejected the development of EASF into a broader political organisation, arguing that EASBRICOM has embarked on a "disastrous and ultimately hopeless course that openly ignores and violates the fundamental rules governing the organisation."[182] In many ways, this opinion is also shared by the AU which sees the more recent course of EASBRICOM as deviating somewhat from its purpose of contributing a multidimensional brigade to the ASF. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) sets out that the AU should have the lead in the African Peace and Security Architecture and the RECs exist as sole force providers and respond only to AU needs. The general sentiment being that if EASBRICOM expands its mandate it might in some ways become a competing force rather than a complimentary one to the AU.[183] There is also a concern that a broader mandate will inevitably collide with some of the efforts of other organisations in the region. Member states may adopt a 'wait-and-see' approach, where any tangible progress must be evaluated before major changes are made.[184]

5.5.2   Development of EASF maritime component?

EASF is currently working on developing a maritime capacity for the standby-force. This endeavour is also a source of disagreement, both among donors and member states, and exemplifies the differing view of what the EASF is and what it is for. The rationale amongst those wishing to developing maritime capacity is evident: Somalia is a major concern in the region and given the maritime operations outside the Somali coast, EASF should have maritime capacity to be able to function as a major peace and security actor in the region. On the other hand, commentators argue that maritime security is not coherent with the ASF project that EASF is meant to support since the ASF is only supposed to deal with land-based conflict.[185] EASF needs only to concern itself with maritime capability regarding logistics and ability to move troops and goods to their area of deployment by way of the sea. Others question the timing of commencing efforts to build maritime capacity at the moment when EASBRICOM/ EASFCOM staff are already overworked, its land forces are not yet fully

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[182] Statement by the Ethiopian delegation to the Policy Organs Meeting of Eastern Africa chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) and the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). 25 August, 2008, Kigali.
[183] Interview EU delegation to AU, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010
[184] Interview Kenya Ministry of State and Defence, Nairobi 2 November 2009
[185] Interview EU delegation to AU, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010

operational and its civilian and police elements still have some way to go.[186] Fears that the development of maritime capability might hamper the development of the other aspects of EASF, which must be considered primary, are prevalent.

Many of the Eastern African states seem also hesitant in providing support to a maritime component since the majority of them are land-locked. In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the effectiveness of developing maritime security by developing enforcement capabilities and not by building it on safety rather than security.[187]

5.5.3   EASBRIG support to AMISOM?

In 2010 the AU sent a request to EASBRICOM for the deployment of an engineer battalion to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). EASBRIG member states sent a preliminary response in favour of such an EASF contribution and decided to send a fact-finding mission to Somalia to explore the needs for such a deployment.[188] Those in favour of an EASF deployment have argued that it would strengthen the link between the EASF and AMISOM, promoting a view of EASF as taking responsibility in the region in a way that is both symbolic and actual. A deployment to AMISOM in this view could be an opportunity for the EASF to learn on the job and develop greater professionalism. Others argue that the organisation is not ready for such activities and that a deployment to Somalia severely risks hampering the development of the organisation, perhaps even strain it beyond the limit of repair.[189] In addition, both representatives from donor states, EASF member states and EASBRICOM staff have questioned which EASF countries would actually be able to deploy to Somalia.[190] The adjacent states have previously agreed not to send troops to Somalia. Djibouti is at present the only neighbouring state that have volunteered to provide troops for AMISOM, but some observers question the ability of Djibouti to provide the stated number of troops. Other than Burundi and Uganda, which already participate in AMISOM since its inception in 2007, most member states seem unlikely to commit troops. Since both Burundi and Uganda already contribute troops to AMISOM, the conditions under which they would both have

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[186] Roundtable discussion with EASBRICOM donor and partners, Nairobi 8 April 2010
[187] Interview US Embassy, Nairobi 3 November 2009
[188] Interview EASBRICOM, Nairobi 8 April 2010
[189] Roundtable discussion with EASBRICOM donor and partners, Nairobi 8 April 2010
[190] Interview EASBRICOM, Nairobi 8 April 2010

troops in Somalia under AU flag, as well as under auspice of EASF, seem unclear.

The discussions about a potential EASF deployment to Somalia has also caused some stir in EASF relations with the AU. Reportedly, the request was sent to EASBRICOM from the AU without the approval of the head of the AU Peace Support Operations Division, who later declared the request null and void. Regardless of this, discussions about an EASF contribution have continued.[191] The decision of EASBRIG to set up a fact-finding mission instead of relying simply on information provided by the AU shows that EASBRICOM do not accept merely responding to AU requests and sees itself having a role also at the politico-strategic level. At the EASF Summit in January 2011, the participating Heads of State and Government reiterated that EASF could be deployed to reinforce AMISOM in stabilising the situation in Somalia.[192]

5.6　Partnership and Support

Financial problems have been a main challenge for establishing the EASF since the inception of EASBRIG.[193] Only a few of the member states have regularly paid their membership fees to the organisation and due to a lack of internal funding EASBRICOM has been heavily dependent on funding from partner organisations such as the AU and EU as well as from bilateral donors. This section outlines the main structures for partner dialogue and support and provides a list of the main international donors to the EASF. Finally, the chapter ends by highlighting some issues that might be of concern to donors as they engage in partnership with EASFCOM.

5.6.1　Partners and Donors

The partner support to EASF is mainly channelled in two ways: directly to the EASBRICOM/EASFCOM and EASF budgets or by bilateral partner support, guided by MoUs, directed to certain programmes managed by EASBRICOM/ EASFCOM. Other than funding, partnership also includes technical advice. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and

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[191] Interview EU delegation to AU, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010
[192] *President Kibaki attends Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 29, 2011*, http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/jan2011/2011290102.htm
[193] EASBRIG, *Assembly Decision*, 11 April 2005, Doc. EASBRIG/AHG/1/05

the US are donors who support EASBRICOM/EASFCOM by the provision of military advisors.

The total amount of external funds made available to the EASF structure was estimated by EASBRICOM to be somewhere in between 3,500,000-5,000,000 USD annually.[194] However, several of the donors, especially those who contribute military advisors, entertain a dynamic structure which allows an increase of the funding if a particular project is estimated as prioritised and unfunded.

Friends of EASF
The 'Friends of EASBRIG' group was formed in 2007 and has recently changed its name to the 'Friends of EASF' to reflect the changes within the EASF. The group consists of Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK and the US. China and Russia are not considered part of the group but they, in particular China, have expressed interest in membership.[195] In addition, organisations like the EU occasionally partake in Friends of EASF meetings.[196]

The Friends of EASF is a platform for interaction between the different donors and EASFCOM. It came into existence as a way to facilitate the need for coordination and harmonisation of the support provided to EASBRICOM but has so far not worked ideally. The Friends, represented by diplomats, are supposed to meet with EASBRICOM/EASFCOM Management and representatives of the EASF policy organs two-three times annually. At these meetings issues are discussed regarding funding; funding principles; promotion of peace and security partnerships; and the identification and definition of joint interests.[197]

The Nordic Advisory Coordination Staff (NACS)
In late 2008, the Defence Ministers from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden agreed to improve the coordination of their support given to EASF capacity building.[198] As a result, the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS) was established in 2009. NACS is a multinational element deployed to

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[194] Interview EASBRICOM, Nairobi 8 April 2010
[195] Interview Danish Defence Attaché, Addis Ababa 12 April 2010
[196] Interview EU delegation to AU, Addis Ababa 13 April 2010
[197] Interview Danish Defence Attaché, Addis Ababa 12 April 2010
[198] Press release, *Nordic Defence Ministers meeting at Bornholm 11 November 2008.* Danish Ministry of Defence

EASFCOM in Nairobi to support planning and implementation of Nordic projects related to EASFCOM and the wider EASF.[199]

NACS consist of one military advisor each from Finland, Norway and Sweden. Denmark provides two military advisors, including a strategic advisor on a bilateral basis to the former acting EASBRICOM director, who is now the EASFCOM political advisor. In addition, NACS has hired three local staff: a cleaner, a driver and a secretary.[200]

NACS works under the direction of the Nordic Military Coordination Group (NMCG) which exists within the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).

The main purpose of NACS is to:

- Provide strategic level military advice to EASFCOM;

- Coordinate and support the Nordic projects in support of capacity-building for the EASF;

- Interact with and provide advice to the regional strategic/operational HQs of the EASF, and its subordinate structures;

- Interact with the national military authorities and PSO training facilities in EASF member states;

- Conduct other tasks as directed by the NMCG.[201]

In 2008 it was also decided that "framework nations" be established for each project to ensure sufficient implementation. Denmark took on the support for capacity-building of the land forces; Norway the support to maritime capacity-building; and Finland for Peace Support Operation (PSO) training and courses. Whilst not a framework nation, Sweden contributes support to the general capacity-building of EASFCOM but also has a special responsibility regarding logistics. In addition, Sweden provides some support to staff-training.[202] Although NACS constitutes a coordination structure it does not act as a coherent block, there is no requirement for a consensus within the NACS to approve of a

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[199] Presentation, Lt Col Jaakkola, "Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff Eastern Africa", 15 December 2009
[200] Roundtable discussion with EASBRICOM donor and partners, Nairobi 8 April 2010
[201] Presentation, Lt Col Jaakkola, "Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff Eastern Africa", 15 December 2009
[202] Presentation, Lt Col Jaakkola, "Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff Eastern Africa", 15 December 2009

certain project and each NACS state is free to sponsor any project run by EASFCOM as it pleases.[203]

Objective 1: Cohesive political decision making structures	EU UK Denmark
Objective 2: Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence structure	Netherlands
Objective 3: Full operational capability (FOC) of a trained land force structure and standby HQ	Denmark France US UK (Bilateral)
Objective 4: A trained police element on standby and maintained in member states	Norway Germany Japan Netherlands
Objective 5: A trained civilian component on standby and maintained in member states	Germany Norway Japan
Objective 6: A logistic system to support the deployment and sustainment of regional capability	Sweden UK
Objective 7: An integrated training system able to provide individual and collective training	Finland US (Bilateral)
Objective 8: Efficient administrative processes and structures including adequate resources	Germany Netherlands UK
Objective 9: Establishment of Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a regional maritime capability	Norway
Objective 10: Establishment of Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a regional air capability	**Pending**

Table 2 International donor support to EASF objectives[204]

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[203] Roundtable discussion with EASBRICOM donor and partners, Nairobi 8 April 2010

[204] 'International Partnership with EASF'. Power point presentation, 3rd Regional Senior Mission Leaders Course IPSTC, February 2010

5.6.2 Thoughts on partnership

There is not yet a consensus amongst members on the future direction of the EASF endeavour. As a result there is also a lack of a coherent strategy for the EASF amongst its member states. Discussions are being undertaken whether to widen the EASF to a broader political organisation but this has not been agreed upon amongst the member states. The MoU on the EASF only mandates the organisation to prepare the EASF. It is important for partners to remember that broader ambitions may only represent the aspirations of certain member states and EASF elements. While donors can act to support any initiatives they feel are appropriate, it is only the more narrow interpretation of EASFCOM's mandate that has been agreed upon by the EASF member states, as well as the AU. Partners therefore need to take care when assisting with the development of EASF structures so that they do not involuntarily create something that collides with the broader African initiative and cause instability in the African peace and security architecture.

There has been a real lack of a transparent budget within EASBRICOM. In many ways, this has been regarded within EASBRICOM as positive for the organisation. EASBRICOM has many external partners and donors and a major concern of the organisation is that donors might want to dominate the development of the EASF. Having donors coordinate their financial support before communicating to EASBRICOM has been considered by EASBRICOM leadership as endangering regional ownership, and as increasing the possibility of a donor driven evolution of the EASF.[205] Amongst donors, on the other hand, not sharing a transparent budget with its partners is seen as a way for EASBRICOM to hamper the development of the EASF since it enables EASBRICOM to pitch donors against each other. One concern is that since DAC criteria prevents many partners from providing support to military efforts, a lack of transparency in who supports what might enable EASBRICOM to collect funding for civilian initiatives but spend it on military ones. The lack of an overarching strategy also exacerbates the problem since many donor supported initiatives are ad hoc programmes. Many donor concerns, in relation to both the lack of a harmonised policy and non-transparent budgets might be mitigated even by resolving either one of the issues as doing so is likely to have effect also on the other.

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[205] EASBRICOM, Nairobi 8 April 2010

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The disparity in funding to the various EASF structures exacerbates tensions between the member states. The EASF has four main structures. EASFCOM and the Planning Element are both located in Nairobi, while the standby brigade HQ and the logistics base are located in Addis Ababa. The Nairobi structures receive the vast amounts of donor support in relation to the ones in Addis Ababa. There may be rational reasons for this, but it has still exacerbated the sentiment in Ethiopia that the donors are biased towards Kenya as well has having a distorted view of EASFCOM, giving it more credence than it should have according to protocols. The debate mainly concerns the Brigade HQ, which at the moment is little more than a skeleton structure with only three staff in addition to the Commander. In the opinion of EASBRICOM, having a strong Brigade HQ has not been necessary until an actual EASBRIG mission is to be deployed. Since the EASF is a standby, not standing, force, there is no rationale to keep an expansive standing brigade. [206] In disagreement regarding the status of the Brigade HQ, a mid-way position of keeping a minimum sized HQ was chosen. The decision has caused a lot of disappointment in Ethiopia, urging donors to remember that they are Friends of *EASBRIG/EASF*, not *EASBRICOM/EASFCOM*.

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[206] EASBRICOM, Nairobi 8 April 2010

6   Conclusion

The aim of this report has been to increase knowledge about the capacity for peace and security in Eastern Africa. To this end, it has outlined the main regional organisations for peace and security in the region, exploring their structures, ambitions and track records. The report has also sought to inform discussions about potential support from external partners to Eastern African capabilities.

Below, some of the main conclusions from the study are repeated and highlighted.

Regional dynamics

The slow progress in the field of peace and security integration in Eastern Africa is linked to the prerequisites for regional integration. The Eastern Africa region is very unstable, impacting on prospects for enhanced regional security. The region is burdened by several security concerns, including the situation in Somalia, Sudan, border conflicts, trans-border pastoralist conflicts, piracy, terrorism, proxy wars, and inter-state rivalry. With several ongoing, dormant or latent conflicts, including internal political strife, impacting on the national security agendas of the various member states, overarching regionalisation of security is of less importance than national posturing and manoeuvring. While it could be natural to assume that member states have conscious strategies as to how to best use the various regional mechanisms to complement and further their own foreign and security policy agendas, this seems not the case.

Member state support of multilateral approaches to peace and security is varying. While several Eastern African states are supporters of multilateral cooperation, others fear loosing control. The many weak, elitist, ethnically affiliated governments have little interest in regional cooperation unless it is controlled and beneficial to their own group. The success or failure of Eastern Africa broader cooperation in peace and security seem in many ways to hinge on the key relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya.

Economic incentives seem to have higher priority in regionalisation than peace and security issues. Many member states tend to emphasise the several ongoing economic integration projects under way in the region, such as common markets, customs unions, and free flow of goods and services over cooperation in peace and security.

The Peace and Security efforts within the regional instruments are currently going through revisions and revivals. IGAD, EAC and ICGLR are all observed to have launched new ambitions and plans in the field of peace and security. While most of these have yet to pass formal decision-making procedures in the respective organisation, it may signify that discussion on peace and security issues will be revitalised in the region, albeit in different forums.

Regional organisations

IGAD challenges include member state disagreement on its role and evolution, lack of financial and human resources, inter-state rivalry in the region, and the seemingly perpetual strain caused by the situations in Somalia and Sudan. Even though IGAD has been active in the field of peace and security, the lack of resources has hampered its ability when it comes to conflict management. Some observers note that it has a 'firefighting' capacity at best, with no prospects for long-term strategic efforts. The organisation has been dependent on financial support from the international community to be able to carry out its agenda. Other than economic issues, there have also been political obstructions to further regional integration within IGAD on peace and security due to member state disagreement on what strategy to choose for conflict management on the Horn. In particular, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has paralysed the organisation. The two member states have frequently been in disagreement, and from time to time also at war with each other, limiting IGADs ability to act in the field of conflict management. In April 2007, Eritrea suspended its membership due to disagreement over the conflict in Somalia. Reports of Eritrean border aggressions against Djibouti in 2008 have further fuelled regional discontent. IGAD has also been hampered by the fact that Uganda and Kenya have focused more on the cooperation within the EAC, paying less attention to IGAD-related issues. There is reportedly also some Kenya-Ethiopia rivalry playing out in IGAD, where both countries would like to control the organisation, leading to outside perceptions that the organisation is either an Ethiopian or Kenyan instrument for national interests.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is potentially emerging as a regional actor for peace and security issues in East Africa. The organisation aims primarily at addressing issues related to peace, stability and development and has a wide membership reaching into both Eastern, Central and Southern parts of Africa. Nonetheless, the ICGLR has so far little presence on the ground and is in many senses not fully formed.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) remains a predominantly trade and economic development oriented community. As

COMESA member states have recognised the effect that peace and security have on economic development the organisation has nevertheless adopted a peace and security agenda. COMESA has a very limited track record in peace and security other than having engaged in election monitoring in a few of its member states. A comparative advantage of the organisation is that it includes an economically oriented early warning system. It is currently also experiencing an expanding membership. Challenges on the other hand include a sense of inefficiency due to the largeness of the organisations as well as the relatively low priority for peace and security issues within the organisation. COMESA is not regarded as having any greater impact on peace and security matters in Eastern Africa.

Other than IGAD, **the East Africa Community (EAC) is one of the main peace and security organisations in the region.** The priority aim of the organisation is to enhance cooperation in the political, economic and social areas – with ambitious objectives in terms of a future political federation – but steps have also been taken in foreign policy coordination. The EAC does not have much of a track record on peace and security either but has recently adopted its own peace and security agenda. Its endeavours seem to mainly focus on conducting research on conflict related themes and establish its own conflict early warning system. In practice, the EAC seems to have done little to address issues of peace and security in the region and has not acted to mediate in territorial conflicts between its member states. The EAC comparative advantage is a viable platform for economic and cultural integration among its member states. The EAC is the most mature and advanced REC in terms of progress in regional integration, albeit not in peace and security matters. The organisation has shown that it can generate political consensus among its member states. Even though through an incremental process, the organisation might be emerging as a serious peace and security actor, with *inter alia* conduct of joint exercises and operations, mechanisms for information and personnel exchange, refugees, some provisions for regional disaster management, SALW and common positions on drug trafficking. Recently, the EAC conducted the joint military exercise 'Natural Fire X', supported on a bilateral basis to the member states by the US through CJTF-HoA, allegedly with good results. EAC challenges include member state disagreement on the priorities between peace & security and economic integration in the years to come. There is a perception that Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi want to speed ahead, while Tanzania holds back some.

Eastern Africa in APSA

The envisioned Eastern Africa APSA elements are not yet fully in place even though some initial structures exist.

There is no region-encompassing early warning system in place. IGAD CEWARN functions as the region's principal early-warning system but does not include the capacity to monitor conflict indicators across the entire region. Furthermore, CEWARN is so far restricted to monitor pastoral conflict only. Even though efforts are underway to seek to lift this restriction, IGAD member states have not yet agreed to expand the mandate of CEWARN. In addition, IGAD reportedly still lacks the mandate to force member states to take appropriate action to address the outbreak of a violent conflict or humanitarian emergency.

The EASF did not meet the original ASF deadline of full operational capability by 2010; rather this deadline has been pushed forwards to 2015. There is a mixed assessment of the current state of operationalisation of the EASF. This mixed assessment arises partly out of an insecurity regarding the availability of the troop pledged for the standby force as the original pledging lists are considered out-dated. The EASF is declared to have achieved "initial operational capability", a status which has not been previously defined and seems to describe little more than the status quo, whichever it may be.

Some of EASFCOMs key challenges include lack of political will in the member states, competing regional efforts, regional ownership, interoperability, and an over-ambitious timeline. For some key member states, such as Ethiopia, the EASF is far from a priority in terms of national foreign and security policy. More pressuring, conflict-related issues naturally dominate the national agenda. Hence, the timing of the EASF project may be off-track with the realities in the region. In addition, some member states such as Kenya and Uganda seem to currently move towards prioritising the *East African Community,* in essence decreasing support for EASFCOM. Concerns have also been raised that EASFCOM have troubles in displaying the EASF venture as regionally owned. Rather there are some current perceptions that it in essence is an effort driven and sustained by international partners.

There is not yet a consensus amongst members on the future direction of the EASF endeavour. There is no firmly established common opinion amongst all the Eastern African states regarding the political role that EASF will play in the region in the future. The Secretariat – EASFCOM/EASBRIGCOM – has opted for an ambitious attitude, seeking to drive the EASF venture beyond the limited mandate of merely being responsible for troop generation and potential deployment of one of the African Standby Force brigades. Some member states have openly rejected the development of EASFCOM into a broader political organisation. Within the AU there is also a concern that moving beyond its initial mandate, the EASF could become a competitor to the AU rather than playing a

complimentary role. As a result there is also a lack of a coherent strategy for the EASF amongst its member states.

Donors need to be cautious in ensuring local ownership of the EASF project. One way to do so is to support the capacity-building of EASFCOM itself. Until the EASF member states have themselves decided on a common strategy for where the project is headed it is difficult for donors to adopt appropriate support strategies. Until a harmonised policy framework has been agreed upon donors may wish to be cautious in supporting new venture so as to avoid the EASF effort being increasingly donor driven and ensure that there is sufficient local ownership to sustain the process. Rather partners might wish to direct their efforts in support of assisting the development of such frameworks and policies. Needs-based possibilities for partner support include strengthening EASFCOM itself, regarding, e.g., administrative issues, process-training, and build-up of logistics capability.

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Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWARN	IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CJTF-HoA	Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States
EAC	East African Community
EASF	East African Standby Force
EASFCOM	EASF Coordination Mechanis,
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
EASBRICOM	EASBRIG Coordination Mechanism
EAPSM	East African Peace and Security Mechanism
EAPSS	Eastern Africa Peace and Security Secretariat
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FOMAC	Multinational Force of Central Africa
HPF	Harmonized Policy Framework
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IGASOM	IGAD Mission in Somalia
LOGBASE	Logistics Base
NARC	North African Regional Capability

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
PLANELM	Planning Element
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	SADC Standby Brigade
REC	Regional Economic Community
REWS	Regional Early Warning System