Popular Uprisings that Never Came

Algeria and Morocco in the Light of the Arab Revolts

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Synopsis

Denna studie analyserar Algeriets och Marockos säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar. Analysen görs mot bakgrund av de senaste årens omvälvande politiska händelser i Nordafrika. Studien undersöker dels respektive lands nuvarande säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar, dels den regionala dynamik som påverkar båda ländernas säkerhet.

Studien består av fyra delar. I den första delen presenteras en regional översikt. Syftet är att sätta Algeriet och Marocko i kontexten av den s.k. arabiska våren. Därefter söks i avsnitt två en förklaring till de båda staternas beteende genom en analys av den säkerhetspolitiska identitet som båda länder skapat sig sedan självständigheten. I avsnitt tre sker en teoretisk diskussion, där teorin om regional rivalitet diskuteras. I avslutningen av studien diskuteras slutsatser och implikationer av den regionala rivalitet som råder. De fyra delarna i studien kan läsas förhållandevis fristående.

Studiens viktigaste slutsats är att rivaliteten mellan de två länderna fortsätter att vara politiskt, ekonomiskt och socialt kostsamt för respektive stat, för integrationen av Nordafrika för den afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen (APSA), samt för EU:s grannskapspolitik.

Nyckelord: Algeriet, Marocko, rivalitet, afrikansk säkerhet, Sahel, arabiska våren, Nordafrika, kontraterrorism, EU:s grannskapspolitik, gasexport, fred, stabilitet, transition, Afrika, Europa, jihadism, USA, regional integration, ENP.

Abstract

The focus of this study is the contemporary security postures of Algeria and Morocco. The analysis is conducted in the light of the recent Arab revolts in the region. The study examines key security challenges for Algeria and Morocco, as well as the regional outlooks of both states.

The study consists of four main parts: the first part situates Algeria and Morocco in the context of the so-called Arab Spring; the second part presents explanations for each state's security posture and a historical analysis of their security identity formation; the third part uses a theoretical lens to examine the theory of regional rivalry. Finally, the study presents a number of recommendations on what do to about the existing security situation in the region.

The main finding is that the ongoing rivalry between the two countries continues to be politically, economically and socially costly not only for both states, but also for the integration of North Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture and the stability of the EU's southern neighbourhood as a whole.

Keywords: Algeria, Morocco, rivalry, Arab Spring, African security, Sahel, North Africa, counterterrorism, European Neighbourhood Policy, gas, peace, stability, transition, Africa, Europe, Jihadism, US, regional integration, ENP.

Preface

This study was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence to the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).[1] The project *Studies in African Security* was tasked with carrying out the research assignment. Since it was established in 2007, the Africa project at FOI has closely monitored security developments on the African continent. Over the years, much attention has been paid to the *African Peace and Security Architecture* as well as various peacekeeping missions – not least those in which Sweden or the European Union has been an actor. In addition to thematic studies, the Africa project has studied many complex security clusters, such as those in North Africa.[2] The project will continue to monitor developments in the region.

This study has benefitted from a number of insightful comments. First, I would like to thank Niklas Bremberg (PhD) at the Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs; Laurence Aïda Ammour, Bordeaux Institute for Political Sciences and Fundacion CIDOB (Barcelona); and Yahia H. Zoubir, Professor of International Studies and International Management, and Director of Research in Geopolitics at Euromed Management, Marseille School of Management, France. Second, I would like to thank members of the EU External Action Service as well as associates at the European Parliament for taking time to meet with me to discuss EU-North Africa relations. Third, I am indebted to the in-house reviewers at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, who made a number of proposals for clarifying the overall findings of the study. Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Andrew Mash for adding a number of editorial corrections. As always, all errors remain with the author.

[1] The Swedish Defence Research Agency is a government agency operating under the Ministry of Defence. It conducts research on an independent basis.

[2] Additional studies and further information are available at: www.foi.se/africa

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1 Introduction

The legacy of the so-called *Arab Spring* has cast a long shadow over the Middle East and North Africa. The epic political momentum initiated by the death of Mohammed Boazizi on 18 December 2010, which ignited the revolt in Tunisia, has 40 months on turned into political despair in several corners of the Arab world. This has been covered in several scholarly studies as well as popular analyses.[3]

The events that followed the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt early in 2011 took many by surprise. Yet, as events developed in North Africa and beyond (e.g. Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria), the inertia that many states displayed in their response began to shift towards more active engagement during the late spring and summer of 2011 – the military intervention in Libya being a case in point. Increased political and security posturing also began to take root among regional and international stakeholders and has continued to the present day. For example, there were political, economic and strategic responses from outside actors such as the United States, the European Union (EU), Iran, China, Turkey and Israel.

Regionally, the longer the Arab revolts lingered, the more entrenched the political positions became. This in turn has given rise to new stalemates and proxy engagements (e.g. Iran-Saudi Arabia over Syria), conflict spillover implications (e.g. Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Mali, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights); as well as systemic challenges (Russia and China deadlocking the UN Security Council on Syria). All these forms of processes are also reflected on in a number of recent books on the Arab revolts.[4]

In the light of political developments it is particularly puzzling to note that some regional states were *less* affected by the social and political turmoil. A particular point of interest for this study is why neither Algeria nor Morocco experienced a popular uprising in any fundamental way.[5] Although there were many riots, demonstrations and protests during the period, opposition forces did not manage to overthrow the regimes. For instance, in Algeria, violent opposition was seen in Algiers, and in the north and in the south of the country – organised by various human rights NGOs, trade unions, ethnic groups, youths movements and opposition parties (see for example the National Coordination for Change and Democracy). However, as critics argue, some of leaders of these opposition groups were in many situations 'systemically' dependent on the regime and as a

[3] See Golia, Maria. "Taking in the Arab Spring", *Times Literary Supplement*, located at: http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/article1108763.ece (accessed: 2013-12-02)
[4] El-Din Haseeb; Howard and Hussain; Larémont-René; Henry and Ji-Hyang (ed.); and Haas and Lesch (2013).
[5] Angrist 2013: pp. 25-26.

result did not challenge the system in any significant way (thereby also loosing public confident). In Morocco, the so called 20th Youth Movement was actively questioning the legitimacy of the rulers.[6] This movement was the main organiser of protests, which at times gathered nearly 60,000 participants. Nonetheless, the opposition could not be compared to the strength of the opposition seen in Tunisia, Libya and Algeria at the time. What was there in their current political posture or post-colonial legacy that left them insulated in this regard? What are the implications of these deviant processes in the context of a changing security landscape in North Africa? This conundrum is important from a scholarly point of view, but equally so for practitioners and stakeholders in Sweden and the EU. Although much has been written about Algerian-Moroccan relations as such[7], few studies have yet made an examination of respective states behaviour in light of the Arab revolts.

Before specifying the methodological and theoretical aspects of tackling this puzzle, it is useful to situate Algeria and Morocco in the context of what became known as the Arab Spring.

1.1 The remnants of the Arab revolts

As of early 2014 the direction of the political transition in North Africa is still being much debated among scholars and practitioners alike. Overall, political and social tensions are still present while most economies face an uncertain future.[8] Moreover, it could be noted that the states of North Africa have embarked on a series of different political reform tracks. In the period 2011–2013, the region of North Africa underwent many political and security developments. These rapid processes have not yet slowed, but they have changed character.

In Egypt, the military coup against the democratically elected Muhammad Morsi in July 2013 showed worrying signs of democratic decay and human rights abuses.[9] Backed politically and economically by Saudi Arabia, and as a consequence of the *laissez-faire* policy of the US, Egypt's incumbent military backed leadership has not provided democratic comfort since the ousting of the Muhammad Morsi. More positively, Egypt is honouring its commitments to Israel over the Camp David Accords. This Agreement is an important cornerstone of the current US security architecture in the Middle East. In early 2014, a constitutional referendum was held in the midst of fear among a large

[6] Rahman (2011).
[7] For a good introduction of Algerian-Moroccan relations, see Zoubir (2000) and Boukhars Rousselier (2013).
[8] *IMF: Regional Economic Outlook 2013, North Africa and the Middle East.*
[9] In reference to Morsi's election victory democratic leaders in the EU and the US congratulated him by the victory, arguing that the election was peaceful and competitive (see statement by the European Union/Ashton June 24, 2012; *Voice of America* June 24, 2012).

part of the Egyptian community. A process of selecting a new President is in hand.

In Libya, polarisation and fragmentation continue. There are many militias operating outside of government control.[10] The security challenges can largely be explained by historical territorial rivalries between east, west and northern Libya. Dissatisfied militia groups continue to rebel against the government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, calling for greater power-sharing. Principal demands include political representation, a fairer distribution of government revenues and prohibition of former government officials from taking part in post-Gadhafi power-structures. In addition to these challenges there are the presence of armed jihadist groups (the Libya Islamic Fighting Group, LIFG, and Ansar al-Sharia) and the problems of open borders, the circulation of arms, a high degree of organised crime (drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, people smuggling/trafficking), and so on. This situation is likely to continue. As noted by some scholars the challenges in the Maghreb and Sahel boil down to the volatility of open borders. In fact, the role of porous borders impede on all prospects for regional unity and cooperation.[11]

In Tunisia, the social polarisation since the fall of Ben Ali has been marked. This has led to considerable political and social frustration, which in turn has had implications for the economic outlook. Tensions have been mounting between the democratically elected Ennahda Movement (Renaissance Party) and the opposition National Salvation Front (as well as actors such as the Tunisian General Labour Union, or UGTT). However, as symbolic as the popular revolt in Tunisia was at the start of the Arab revolts, as symbolic was also the reconciliation process (the national dialogue) that ended in an agreement between the government and the opposition on power-sharing arrangements. Tunisia in this sense is a scene of inspiration, at least for the time being. That is not to say that security challenges do not remain, not least from Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia.

The developments outlined above are treated differently analytically. Scholars and practitioner tend to depict North Africa in two ways: one negative and one optimistic.

1.1.1 "A region on fire"

For some security analysts, Europe's southern neighbourhood is ablaze. Instability rages in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The challenges

[10] There are at least seven key militias active: Al-Zintan Revolutionaries' Military Council, Al-Qaqa Brigade, Al-Sawaiq Brigade, Misrata Brigades, 17 February Martyrs Brigade, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, Ansar al-Sharia Brigade (See *BBC Africa*, 28 November 2013).

[11] Ammour 2013c: 1-3.

of post-authoritarian governance have given rise to societal tensions, which in turn have inspired radicalism. The threat posed by Jihadist movements has increased, most notably from Al-Qaida in Maghreb (AQIM) and various local militias. In Egypt, instability in the Sinai has led to confrontations between the Israeli Defence Forces and Egyptian soldiers, Bedouins and Jihadists.[12] Claims are being made that Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula is seeking a presence in Egypt. Meanwhile, militiamen in Libya are engaged in daily attacks on the government, including kidnapping of elected officials. In the southern part of the country, armed groups regularly cross the Libyan border in a tit-for-tat game that allegedly includes al-Qaida-linked Jihadist groups such as AQIM, Tuareg-groups, and others. In late 2013, the US administration stated that emerging and already present threats from Jihadist groups posed the "…greatest near-term threat to US and Western interests in the Sahel region of Africa".[13] The groups operating and finding temporary shelter inside southern Libya, in its vicinity or in the immediate Sahel region include: the Al Mulathameen Battalion, Mujao, Al Murabitoun (allegedly formed in late 2013) and Ansar Al-din. Similar security challenges can also be found in Tunisia. The armed opposition that challenged Ben Ali has now recalibrated its goals towards the new Islamist government, accusing it of being too moderate. Meanwhile, in Algeria and Morocco counterterrorism efforts continue as before.

1.1.2 The "arch of stability"

There is another perspective on how to view developments in North Africa. From this perspective, the region is well-woven into various security arrangements: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Camp David Accords, the EU neighbourhood policy and bilateral external support. This makes states in the region relatively fixed and stable in terms of regional power dynamics. Even where domestic turmoil prevails, there are no major intra-regional frictions. Aside from the enduring rivalry over Western Sahara, as is demonstrated in chapter 3, no armed conflicts have taken place between Morocco and Algeria (or with any other country in the region) for a long time.

On the African continent, the APSA structure is meant to stabilise regional friction through a number of political, security and defence mechanisms.[14] In fact it has been a long-term goal of the AU to set up an African Standby Force based on Africa's regional economic communities (RECs). In North Africa this Force would be realised by the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the North African

[12] Hoppe, Shafy, and Steinvorth (2013).
[13] Gordon (December 2013).
[14] Morocco is not part of this arrangement. Morocco withdrew from the then OAU in 1984, following the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a full member of the organisation.

Regional Standby Brigade (comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and Western Sahara). However, for reasons that are explained below, Morocco is currently outside the arrangement following a dispute over legal perceptions of Western Sahara. As a consequence, a North African Regional Capability (NARC) mechanism has been created to overcome the lack of integration. The NARC structure, for its part, is still far from complete. Clearly, this is a security cost for Algeria and Morocco. Given their enduring rivalry, both countries have missed an opportunity to build broader regional stability. After all, with such a mechanism in place the high political and military price that is currently being paid for security could be significantly reduced.

Another security architecture in place is the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Peace Treaty of 1979, which tie the eastern part of the North Africa region into an arrangement that works towards defusing regional frictions.[15] The agreement has been a cornerstone of US Middle East policy based on a close relationship with a stable Egyptian-Israeli axis.[16] Importantly, the Camp David Accords laid the ground for a US hegemonic engagement in the region. This in turn also brings some stability for states such as Algeria and Morocco as they come under the US strategic umbrella.

Towards its "north", North Africa falls under the soft power projection of EU neighbourhood policies. Although there is no outspoken security architecture, the EU's goal of a stable neighbourhood has securitising implications. Through the Sahel strategy, the EU also promotes stability in North Africa's south. This is coupled with bilateral defence agreements, most notably with France, whose military forces stand by for any military arrangements necessary to preserve stability in the region.

On top of these arrangements, there is also the role of NATO and AFRICOM. AFRICOM has existed for nearly six years and mainly concentrates its efforts in western and eastern Africa. However, the Libya engagement, the various attacks on US diplomatic missions and the instability of the Sahel have led it to take on an increased role in this part of Africa.[17]

In sum, over the past three years the security situation has shifted from politically intense to highly intense and back again. The insecurity and uncertainty have not been constant, but have affected various actors, sectors and regions differently (groups, states, regimes, areas, etc.). In the analytically different narratives described above, that is, between chaos and stability, Algeria and Morocco have

[15] The border between Egypt and Israel is monitored by a 1500-strong multinational observer force, see http://mfo.org/. The force is mainly sponsored by the US, Israel and Egypt.

[16] This is a security arrangement in which the US has invested heavily. The US has provided Egypt with USD 64 billion in economic and military aid since 1979, or nearly USD 2 billion per annum. USD 1.3 billion has tended to be in military grants. See *Inter Press Service* (2012-01-16).

[17] http://www.africom.mil/

gone their own way in tackling domestic and regional challenges. Chapter 2 addresses Algeria's and Morocco's contemporary security concerns in order to distil explanations for why the revolt did not take root in either country.

1.2 Objective

There are many entry points to explain Algeria's and Morocco's behaviour in the context of the Arab revolts. A brief overview of this study's rationale is set out below.

1.2.1 Aim

The overall aim of this study is to contribute to a deeper understanding of contemporary security developments in North Africa by examining the security postures of Algeria and Morocco. The study seeks to identify and explain the key security challenges currently affecting both states, and how they are set to tackle these. In so doing, the overall aim is to better understand the implications these challenges have for both states, the region as a whole, and actors such as the European Union.

1.2.2 Research question

The research question that guides this study is: *Which key features help explain the absence of a popular revolt?* To answer this research question, this study seeks to identify both contemporary security features and the *historical conditions* that have shaped each state's security posture. The historical examination is made as it seems unlikely that the absence of any fundamental revolts in these states, and the way each regime has responded to the regional turbulence, can be explained by contemporary political and security conditions alone. The response today is likely to have been shaped by each state's post-independence security identity.

To operationalise these questions, security features are defined as those major factors which made each state/society respond to specific types of threats. In essence, the expected role, and traditional behaviour, of each state could be considered here as part of its security identity. Moreover, security features should be seen in contrast to political features (e.g. regime features such as power relations, and political and military institutions). Security in turn is defined as state security. Finally, the Arab revolt is regarded as the social force in North Africa that, since late 2010, has challenged incumbent regimes politically.

1.2.3 Scope

In this study an examination is made of the contemporary and historical factors that help us to understand the absence of a far-reaching social upheaval in Algeria and Morocco. An important delimitation of this study is that it does not cover structural domestic explanations in both countries, such as the role of Algeria's important military complex, that is, the military state-within-the-state; or Morocco's royal family. That is not to say that such factors are unimportant. On the contrary, an important aspect of explaining contemporary security behaviour involves looking at regime structures and formal/informal power relations domestically. This, however, would be an important study in itself. Moreover, this study does not cover strict hard defence and military capabilities, that is, the military's role domestically or vis-à-vis its neighbours.

1.2.4 Relevance

Northern Africa form part of EU's southern neighbourhood. The proximity has led to numerous political and economic relations over the years. This nearness, including the open seabed of the Mediterranean, has also opened up for various strategic links over the years. Today, a number of strategic flows neatly tie Europe, Algeria and Morocco together. These flows, which are of both a legal and an illicit character, include migration, energy distribution, cargo trade and regular tourism.

Aside from EU's interest and links with North Africa, various member states have enjoyed close relations with the states in this region. For example, from a Swedish perspective North Africa matters for several reasons: historical, economic, and political and security. In fact, Sweden's diplomatic relations with North Africa are among its oldest. Consular missions were opened in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco in the 18th century. Sweden celebrated a diplomatic anniversary with Morocco in 2013, 250 years since an agreement on peace, trade and maritime navigation was signed in 1763. The agreement helped inter alia to secure maritime trade routes for Swedish ships and enlist support for the fight against pirates. By coincidence, it was *HMS Carlskrona*, which was to fight modern-day piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa in 2013, that commemorated this diplomatic anniversary when it docked in Morocco on 19–21 March 2013. In addition to the longstanding diplomatic relationship there are considerable trading links with the region.

Aside from historical relations, there are cultural affiliations. Most notably, there is a considerable diaspora of North African origin in Sweden. In 2011 there were an estimated 2660 Algerians and 7779 Moroccans living in Sweden.[18] Moreover, Sweden's exports to North Africa in 2012 were valued at SEK 8 billion, and in

[18] Statistics Sweden (2011).

2013 SEK 6.4 billion – of which SEK 1.9 billion went to Algeria and SEK 1.3 billion to Morocco.[19] Sweden currently has no bilateral development assistance agreement with either Algeria or Morocco, but they are part of Sida's regional strategy for the Middle East and North Africa. This involves democracy, human rights, water development support, and trade promotion, among other things. Sweden also provides support through other channels that indirectly benefit both Algeria and Morocco, such as the Euro Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN).[20]

Finally, it is worth emphasising EU's and Sweden's policy interests in having a secure and stable southern Europe neighbourhood. Only with stability can flows to and from the region be maintained and secured, such as trade, formal migration and strategic logistics.

1.3 Research process

This study takes a qualitative and explorative methodological approach. Key sources identified as relevant to explaining Algeria's and Morocco's security postures have been analysed. Rather than being literature-driven, which is the more conventional form, the research puzzle outlined below follows from empirical observation.

1.3.1 Method

This study has used different methods. Most notably, conventional methods of process tracing have been used to tease out important turning points in both countries' post-colonial security policies. The study also involved several interviews. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their expertise. All interviews were open-ended and semi-structured, allowing the interviewees to dwell on areas they considered most relevant to the overall context of security and stability. The use of a combination of content analysis, process-tracing and interviews ensured the validity of the key findings.

The study had little or no room for case selection. Because the study was commissioned, no selection criteria could be applied. However, it is worth noting that previous studies have been made of the Arab revolts, analysing the main reasons why revolts broke out in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Looking at "non-cases" is therefore interesting.

[19] National Board of Trade (2013).
[20] See http://www.euromedrights.org.

1.3.2 Theory

This study examines Algeria's and Morocco's dealings with Arab revolts by looking at historical as well as contemporary security behaviours. In terms of theory, a part of the literature dealing with enduring rivalries has been used. This theoretical approach provides a suitable lens through which a more informed understanding of Algeria's and Morocco's security postures can be gained (as opposed to using it to test a hypothesis). The lens was intended to serve as a starting point for how to think of rivalry in general and the situation more specifically involving Algeria and Morocco. The theoretical discussion may also help to link the specifics of the Algeria-Morocco rivalry to more general observations.

1.3.3 Sources

This study has relied on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were speeches and official documents as well as interviews with a number of des-officers at the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Parliament and the Council, while the secondary sources were newspapers, books and reviews. Standard literatures such as journal articles and think-tank studies have also been used. One important source for the historical section was *Keesing's Contemporary Archive*. Although the information contained there is biased in terms of its over representation of Western sources, it does give a good sense of the key issues of relevance to the puzzle outlined above.

1.4 Outline of the study

The study consists of six chapters. While this chapter has provided an overview of the current state of play in terms of political and security dynamics in the wider region, it has also sought to situate Algeria and Morocco in the remains of the Arab revolts and examined how the different processes can be understood analytically. Chapter 2 presents the main contemporary security concerns faced by Algeria and Morocco. The aim is to distil factors that may help explain both countries' security postures. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse key security features of Algeria's and Morocco's post-independence formation process. The objective is to get a better sense of why each state tackled the Arab revolts in 2011 in the way they did. Chapter 5 takes note of the empirical insights gained but seeks to lift the level of analysis to a more theoretical discussion on the role of regional rivalries. This chapter can be read as a stand-alone discussion with regard to Algeria and Morocco. The aim is to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of an interstate rivalry and the security costs associated with it. Finally, in chapter 7, the study concludes with final reflections, implications and a suggested way forward.

2 Algeria's and Morocco's contemporary security concerns

Unlike the situation for its regional neighbours, no far-reaching revolts spread to Algeria and Morocco. Although there were riots, demonstrations and general opposition to the regimes in both states, these did not gather the momentum seen in Tunis, Tripoli and Cairo: Why?

This chapter makes a close examination of both states' contemporary security concerns. The argument made below is that the security challenges both countries currently face make a strong case for why the revolts did not take root. This in turn is linked to the prominence of the security apparatus in respective country that has been built over the years. An apparatus that has become an effective instrument in preserving the regime while countering the challenges posed by opposition forces. The aim is to set out Algeria's and Morocco's key contemporary security challenges and, in so doing, to distil those factors which might explain why both governments responded in the way they did, that is, by refraining from engaging in conflict escalation situations.

2.1 Algeria and its regional security challenges

In Algeria attempts were made by the opposition to persuade people to rally against the government, but without much success. While some segments of the opposition knew that a government change would not imply a *regime* change, other opposition parties saw parallels with events in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt that had far-reaching implications. Those demonstrations which did take place were closely monitored by the security services and rapidly countered by reform proposals.

Why then did the revolt in Tunisia in 2011 not spread to Algeria? An important explanation lies in the legacy of the civil war that Algeria went through in the 1990s (see below); another important factor is that there was a general sense among protestors that various opposition leaders were close to the regime. As such opposition leaders were not able to gain the confidence of the population. Aside from the domestic reasons, there are also explanations to be found in the regional security challenges which Algeria faced at the time.

In addition to its domestic challenges, Algeria faces most of its security challenges from the volatile south. While traditionally the rivalry with Morocco has forced Algiers to keep its eyes on the western border, the Sahel and the southern states have increasingly required attention. As events unfolded in the region (especially after the In Amneas attack), Algeria's western borders were less in focus, while increased attention was paid to the borders with Mali, Libya and Tunisia.

The regional situation in the Sahel continues to be unstable and unpredictable. Its open borders, low level of state control and harsh environmental conditions mean that shadow actors can move freely. Consequently, the Sahara has become a region in which various rebel groups can hide, organise and survive. This in turn undermines the security situation of Algeria.

The main security concerns Algeria faces are those posed by armed groups, such as AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), Tuareg rebels (the MNLA) and Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia.[21] With the fall of Gadhafi and conflict diffusion into northern Mali, the situation has deteriorated considerably. The stated goals of some radical groups operating in the Maghreb and the Sahel may also have changed as a result of the Arab revolts. The traditional narrative of some groups in the region has long been to depose Western government "puppets", but radical groups may have to change this narrative given the increasingly democratic governance style being adopted.

Aside from threats of various armed groups in the south, the Sahel also enables other forms of threat that constantly challenge Algeria. Notably, illicit flows such as human trafficking, the drug trade, small-arms smuggling, the smuggling of counterfeit goods, and so on, undermine governance structures in Algeria's southern neighbourhood.[22] What then has Algeria done to tackle is rough neighbourhood?

According to Zoubir, Algeria has been a staunch defender of two foreign policy principles: the inviolability of the border inherited from the colonial era and non-interference by any member state in domestic affairs.[23] Although there may have been policy steps leading away from this, Zoubir suggests that these principles remain:

> Today, they still refuse to contravene these two principles, which are inscribed in the Algerian Constitution, even when national security warrants otherwise, as in the Libyan crisis of 2011 or the Malian crisis of 2012–13. In both cases, Algeria opposed foreign interference and in the second rejected the National

[21] Algeria has a long tradition of counterterrorism analysis and operations: In 2004, Bouteflika announced that Algiers would be the seat of the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorisms (ACSRT). The goal has since been the production of research and policy reports on African terrorism. These have been presented to the AU Peace and Security Council. In 2010 the Common Operational Joint-Chiefs of Staff Committee (CEMOC) and joint intelligence cooperation were set up as another way to tackle regional challenges (In which Algeria, Mali, Mauritainia, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad participate) They play an active role in the *Global Counter Terrorism Forum*, which was set up in September 2011 (US State Department, 2011).

[22] This was also the topic of a seminar arranged by the Swedish Defence Research Agency in collaboration with the Nordic Africa Institute (see: *Illicit Flows and African Security*, FOI-NAI 2014).

[23] Zoubir 2013: 43, see also Ammour 2013b: 3.

Movement of the Liberation of the Azawad's (MNLA) proclamation in April 2012 of an independent state in northern Mali.[24]

In the light of the volatile security situation in the Sahel, Algeria's primary current security goals are to protect its borders and to contain sources of threat from outside its territory.[25] While a strong regional involvement in the Sahel could once have been expected, Algeria is sticking to its foreign policy principles and has mainly reverted to an isolationist policy. Although some commentators would argue that Algeria has conducted a dynamic policy on security in the Sahel, by allowing the French Air Force to fly over its territory to intervene in Mali and engaging itself in various counterterrorism arrangements with other states, official policy has still been low in profile. Rather than deploying forces to stabilise the region beyond its southern borders, it has provided counterterrorism advice and targeted counterterrorism operations around its borders.

With regard to the crisis in Mali, Algiers has pursued a strategy in which it has sought to disconnect the Tuareg question from the Jihadi rebels (given the strong linkage between the two). Essentially, it has sought to push the southern threat from its borders (e.g. pushing GSCP members and AQIM supporters into northern Mali).[26] Despite the principle of non-intervention, Algeria provided support to the Malian Army for counterterrorism purposes.[27] Algeria has sought to persuade Mali's government to enter into a dialogue with both Islamist and "secular" Tuareg fractions which called for Azawad independence in the spring of 2012.[28] What is important in the context of the Malian crisis and the Tuareg uprisings is that Algeria has had a long history of active mediation between Bamako and the Tuareg communities. A mediation role also played in the Mali crisis.

The growing Jihadist threat has also led to various military missions along Algeria's borders with Tunisia.[29] For example, in May 2013 Algeria and Tunisia identified nearly 80 crossing points along their 1000-km border that they would monitor to prevent cross-border movements of armed groups such as Al Ansar Tunisia.[30] In May 2013, Algeria deployed 60,000 troops in the region. Algeria has nearly 7000 gendarmes along the Libyan border and 20,000 troops in the Ouargla and Tamanrasset military regions.[31]

[24] Zoubir 2013: 43.
[25] Zoubir 2013: 53.
[26] See *Africa Research Bulletin* Feb 1st -28th 2013: 19597.
[27] Ammour (August 2013).
[28] Zoubir 2013: 54-55.
[29] *Africa Research Bulletin August* 1st-31st 2013: 19829.
[30] *Ibid.* June 1st-30th 2013: 19757.
[31] Figures provided by Ammour (August 2013).

Aside from preserving its social and political order, Algiers also sees a threat to its economic stability. Most notably, it has been anxious to secure its critical energy infrastructure. The In Anemas attack in January 2013 against a joint British-Algerian-Norwegian gas complex posed a significant challenge to Algeria's economic interests and sovereignty. This is why the military operations against the perpetrators, "Les signataires par le sang", were harsh and unconditional and explains Algeria's policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorist groups. The group had allegedly crossed from Libya via Niger.

2.1.1 Implications

As a result of this shifting regional dynamic, Algeria has sought to maintain close cooperation with Western powers, notably actors such as France, the US and the EU. Algeria has also worked with the EU to support the *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*,[32] which seeks to create local and national development in the Sahel that would prevent the activities of AQIM and criminal networks.[33] Since the Malian crisis and the intensification of the activities of AQIM and other groups, US-Algerian counterterrorism efforts have increased considerably. The security interests of the US and Algeria converge. In late 2013, the US State Department stated that jihadist groups in the region posed a considerable threat to US and Western interests. In particular the Al Mulathameen Battalion (Belmokhtar's faction of AQIM) was singled out.[34]

The implications of the current security developments are likely to lead to an increasing presence of Algeria in regional affairs. External recognition of Algeria is also likely to increase, notably in areas of counterterrorism. This is in line with Algeria's post-Cold War identity. In the past decade, Algeria has cooperated with various actors in the region, as well as the EU and the US to tackle challenges from radical Islamist groups. Its experience of a decade-long civil war in which the Algerian intelligence community was preoccupied with countering terrorism has given Algiers the knowledge and capacity to tackle terrorist threats. In this context it is also worth noting that since 11 September 2001, Algeria and the US have intensified their cooperation in the fields of security and counterterrorism. As Ammour (2013) notes, this entails cooperation among military advisers, and patrols, exercises and operations with NATO.[35] What then are the main challenges Algeria faces in the short- to medium- and the long-term?

In the short run, Algeria's domestic challenges are likely to stem from those related to its current political and economic reform initiatives. Some analysts describe Algeria's political economy as a time bomb, or that the country's

[32] European Union External Action Service (March 2012).
[33] Jakobsson och Eriksson (2012), Skeppström och Wiklund 2013: 14.
[34] Gordon 2013.
[35] Ammour (August 2013).

leaders have left it in tatters.[36] Without significant political and economic reform, social tensions may begin to grow. Hence, with an unemployment rate at 10% (nearly 21% among youth, who account for nearly 70% of the population), in order to fend off social unrest it needs to place the country on a good economic footing. Attracting foreign investment is key, but a challenge given the volatile security environment. Most likely this would mean political liberalisation and economic reform,[37] although it should be noted in this context that critics of the 1990s so-called liberal structural adjustment agenda argue that more economic power ended up in the hands of the political and military elite of the country.

Another short-term challenge may follow from the presidential elections to be held in 2014. Many countries face increasing electoral violence and Algeria not likely to be an exception. The growing regional challenge from jihadist radicals in the north and south of Algeria could take the opportunity of elections to assert themselves by attacking government targets and public officials. Algeria will need to take further measures to counter jihadist movements. Protecting borders and economic and political infrastructure will be the key.

In the medium term, Algeria will need to tackle the problem of Jihadists returning from Syria. North African governments are already actively seeking to prevent citizens from travelling to Syria, fearful of later blowback.[38] Hence, the magnitude of returning jihadists will pose a challenge.

Moreover, Algeria will have to make significant investment in producing a more stable environment. For example, further revitalisation and cooperation will be needed with CEMOC. Algeria has been criticised for not engaging the Sahel Common Operational Joint-Chiefs of Staff Committee (CEMOC) enough during the Mali crisis. Instead, it acted on the basis of its own principles.

Finally, in the medium term, Algeria will also face increasing interest in the Sahel from foreign actors. Foreign actors with an interest in the region, most notably the US, the UK, France and Spain, will promote various security stabilisation initiatives. As a consequence, Algeria may lose some of its influence if it accepts further French and US involvement in the Sahel. During the crisis in Mali, Algeria allowed the French air force to use its airspace to facilitate French operations. Changing dynamics in the neighbourhood may actively demand further regional engagement by Algeria. This would entail cross-border engagements such as counterterrorism operations and border surveillance programmes. In fact, several Western politicians have promoted the idea that Algeria should shoulder more of a role in North Africa, using its enormous economic and military strength to engage in the region (North Africa and the

[36] Daragahi (April 2013).
[37] Algeria currently has 2.5% of GNP in foreign debt, 40% GNP in currency reserves and 3.5% growth.
[38] Daragahi (April 2013).

Sahel).[39] This may mean Algeria increasingly having to depart from the non-intervention principles it has sought to uphold as an integral part of its foreign policy discourse. Some critics suggest that Algeria has lost its traditional hegemonic role and therefore cannot play the role that is expected.[40]

In the *long-term*, Algeria will have to engage in economic diversification to remain competitive. The state-within-the-state economic exceptionalism, where many resources are vested among the political and military elite, as well as the so-called 'unaccounted parallel economy' will have to be tackled. Such features clearly undermine the economic performance of the country.

Moreover, at the moment nearly 98% of Algeria's exports are based on its hydrocarbons. Reform is essential, but balance will be needed regarding how quickly such reform should take place to avoid causing social tension. A related issue is regional equalisation programmes. At the moment there is a growing north-south divide in Algeria. Despite the fact that most natural resources are located in the south, it is mainly the northern part of Algeria that is being developed. In the context of growing unrest in the south, the distance from Algiers could support further radicalisation.

Last but not least, there are several other security challenges looming. Like many North African states, Algeria will have to suffer the consequences of a changing climate. Water and food security are likely to move up the security agenda. This could contribute to growing societal tensions.

In sum, it is worth remembering that in midst of the Arab revolt unleashed in Tunisia, Algeria was just coming out of its civil war trauma. Domestic terrorism is still a current threat. Regionally, the fall of Ben Ali, Gadhafi and Mubarak therefore presented a fundamentally different security challenge for Algeria. Without a strong government presence, radical groups would more easily unite, and pose a more significant threat to Algeria. In connection to the prospect of an increased threat from armed jihadist groups, security challenges have also emanated from the region, such as the Tuareg rebellion in Mali, the political crisis in Mali and the prospect of increasing illicit flows of arms and people smuggling. These factors together may well explain why neither the government of Algeria, nor its people were prepared to challenge the existing domestic order in a profound way. In addition, the government of Algeria had and still has the financial muscle and security apparatus to swiftly counter any opposition.

[39] See Daraghahi (2013).
[40] Ammour 2013b: 1.

2.2 Morocco and its regional security challenges

Morocco tackled the Arab revolt in a different way. Unlike many of its Arab neighbours, it favoured dialogue with the opposition. In so doing, some commentators on the Arab Spring suggest that Morocco could even be a model for how to tackle social demands.[41] But what factors in Morocco's security posture then help us to understand why there was no far-reaching opposition capable of fundamentally challenging the existing political order?

As indicated at the outset, Morocco has a number of regional challenges it needs to tackle. In particular three main challenges are worth highlighting as explanations as for why the Arab revolts did not occur: Western Sahara, regional instability and growing radicalisation.

2.2.1 Western Sahara

Western Sahara is a source of conflict in north-western Africa and a point of conflict between Morocco and Algeria.[42] According to the *International Crisis Group's* director for North Africa: "Both Morocco's and Algeria's nationhood is built around the Western Sahara issue. It goes deep into the DNA of both sides".[43]

The conflict between Algeria and Morocco had begun to take shape in 1960. Important for the ensuing rivalry was the so-called Sand War of 1963 and the impact it had on both Morocco's and Algeria's political and security establishment. The Sand War broke out along the Algerian-Moroccan border in the autumn of 1963. The war concerned the not yet fully determined borders in which Tindouf and the Béchar provinces are located. The background to this conflict, which laid the ground for the conflict in "Spanish Sahara" (Western Sahara) is said to be: (a). Algeria's and Morocco's claim of the territory due to important mineral resources; (b) the ideology of the Istiqlal Party (nationalist, monarchist and Islamist); (c) the demarcated borders. Algeria claims that Morocco uses unwarranted irredentist arguments, that is, the advocacy of annexation of territory under the administration of another state on the grounds

[41] Daragahi (2013).
[42] Officially, Morocco calls Western Sahara its "Southern Provinces", meaning Río de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra.
[43] *Africa Research Bulletin* July 2013: 19769.

of common ethnicity or previous possession.[44] However, it was not really until the mid-1970s that the conflict between Algeria and Morocco escalated.[45]

Western Sahara was administered by Spain until 1976. When it withdrew, both Mauritania and Morocco made claims to the territory.[46] Meanwhile, the Sahrawi Arab Democraci Republic (SADR) declared its independence. Thus, as Morocco sought to reintegrate the territory, the armed group Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO), supported by Algeria, fought a liberation struggle.[47] Claims over the territory led many Sahrawis to flee to the province of Tindouf in western Algeria.

As a result of a Moroccan demands, Western Sahara has been on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories since 1963. While Morocco wants to negotiate the future of Western Sahara on the basis of its autonomy proposal of 2007, POLISARIO and Algeria support the notion that there should be a UN-administered referendum on self-determination.

The United Nations has been engaged in seeking a settlement to the conflict since the withdrawal of Spain in 1976, and the Green March the year before in which Morocco annexed Western Sahara. Since 1991, the UN has deployed the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to monitor the ceasefire in place. MINURSO was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 690 of 1991 as part of the Settlement Plan. MINURSO's mission is to monitor the ceasefire and to organise and conduct a referendum in accordance with the Settlement Plan.[48] According to the UN, "…the transitional period, however, has not begun, given the parties' divergent views on some key elements of the Plan [for implementing the settlement proposals]".[49]

Western Sahara is currently divided by a 2700-km earth berm, built mainly during the 1980s, which is 80% on the Moroccan side and 20% under the control of POLISARIO.[50] Along this demarcation, there are several landmines. The UN is actively engaged in demining.

In 2014, Morocco continues to enjoy the support of the US for its autonomy plan for Western Sahara, despite recent tensions as a result of Washington's decision

[44] The irredentist argument entails in this context to advocate an annexation of territories under the administration by another state on the grounds of common ethnicity or previous possession.
[45] This further complicated Algeria's plans for a pipeline, which it had envisaged would cross Moroccan territory to the Atlantic coast.
[46] Which were opposed by POLISARIO (a force currently made up of 6000–15000 troops). POLISARIO has a government-in-exile in Tindouf, Algeria (see inter alia Ammour August 2013).
[47] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml:
[48] Morocco has nearly 100 000 soldiers in its army, POLISARIO is estimated to have 10-15 000.
[49] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml:
[50] POLISARIO together with Algeria also governs the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. The camps were set up in 1975.

to include a human rights clause in MINUSO's mandate. This initiative had to be dropped as it was unable to garner support from the Security Council and because it wanted to avoid a greater crisis in its relations with Morocco.

Morocco's policy position over disputed territory is that it should be resolved on its own terms. To achieve this, both domestic and foreign policy support are important. Domestically, Morocco is pushing for a general decentralisation plan (a regionalisation reform act), as well as regional investment and development plans. Central to its foreign policy is to continue to seek support for its position in key Western states, the depiction of Algeria as a rival that is undermining a durable resolution to the conflict, and continued support for the UN and its envoy, Christopher Ross. In contrast to Algeria, which is currently seeking to mobilise pivotal African states in the AU to push for a solution, Morocco has no influence on the African Union to mobilise support for its cause.

In terms of the Arab revolts, Morocco was at the time (and is still currently is), deeply embroiled in a regional rivalry. This has made it sensitive to domestic challenges and rebellions, most notably when political opponents challenge issues touching on sovereignty, political legitimacy, the monarchy and the government.

2.2.2 Instability in the Sahel

Beyond the rivalry over Western Sahara, Morocco's security posture is shaped by the instability in the Sahel. Morocco, like Algeria, is affected by a number of different illicit flows, of migrants, drugs and arms. Such flows may have historical roots (i.e. in trans-Saharan trade routes), but the challenges have implications for Moroccan society, adding social, economic and political pressures, and for Morocco's foreign and defence policy (e.g. aligning Morocco's policies with the EU and the US). The mounting instability following the turbulence in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt was not something that either the government of Morocco or its people were particularly attracted to.

2.2.3 Radicalisation

By the time of the Arab Spring, Morocco had experienced a long history of terrorism. A number of attacks had struck the country and the monarchy had witnessed various jihadist threats against its political system. Coupled with other domestic threats, the government was highly sensitive to challenges to the social order. This in turn may also explain why it went so far in reconciling demands from the opposition, rather than entering a negative process of escalation.

Morocco takes the threat of radical Jihadism seriously and it has instigated outreach and training programmes for *moderate* Imams in Sahel (including Mali) and Western Africa. In the context of growing radicalisation, Morocco has taken

note of a growing Wahhabi influence in Morocco, and the Moroccan king is attempting to tackle this. Morocco's role in countering growing Jihadism has also increased following the unrest in Mali.[51] Part of this is explained by Rabat's fear of POLISARIO associates becoming part of the complex conflict. In either case, Morocco's increasing engagement has been noted in Brussels, thereby setting a good ground for continued negotiations.[52]

In sum, it is worth noting that Morocco at the time of the Arab Spring was deeply entrenched in a historical rivalry with Algeria. This may be an important factor in explaining why it was so sensitive to any social upheaval that could challenge the monarchy and the existing political order. Moreover, unlike Algeria, the Moroccan authorities have their eyes on Europe. Tackling social demands by reform rather than through repression would in the long run prove to be a better course of action, not least when seeking closer dialogue with the EU.

2.3 Comparative analysis and conclusions

Although the revolts taking place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in early 2011 would not be expected automatically to follow the same path, it would not have come as a surprise if similar claims for liberty had taken place in Algeria and Morocco. After all, Algeria and Morocco share many similarities with their eastern neighbours: poverty is relatively widespread, unemployment is high and there are wide differences between rich and poor. To this could be added that human rights are neglected, political representation is poor and there is a lack of opportunities for the younger generations. Aspects like these triggered the Arab Spring. While these similarities exist, there are also a number of elements that differ between Algeria and Morocco.

For Algeria, the legacy of the civil war of the 1990s and the continued threats posed by armed Islamic groups continue to pose a challenge to the state. The violence during the 1990s, which led to an estimated 150 000 deaths, a considerable number of disappearances and many displaced persons, did not impede pave the way for a spread of social tension throughout the country in early 2011. The Algerian government, experienced in various forms of domestic challenges, effectively tackled the few protests that arose. Meanwhile, the government of Bouteflika could rely on its reconciliation platform, by which reforms were to be made. Unlike Tunisia and Libya, the Algerian government continued to receive much Western support. While relations with France varied, increasing security and military cooperation with the US followed in the late 1990s (increasing considerably after 11 September 2001). The support of some Western countries built on the need to cooperate against armed Islamist groups.

[51] Sakthivel (2014).
[52] Based on interview conducted 13th December 2013.

As the Libya situation got out of hand and spread to Mali, this cooperation and support became increasingly important.

Morocco on the other hand engaged with its political opposition through proposals for political and economic reform, including judicial reform, parliamentary reform, reform of the relationship between monarch and government, and reforms to open up civil society participation.[53] In so doing, the government was able to co-opt parts of the opposition (e.g. the PJD). In Algeria, the government had already entered a presidential alliance with members of the Islamist opposition prior to the revolts in the region. Yet, the character of this alliance did not prevent Islamist and secular protests against the Algerian regime.

Furthermore, unlike its North African neighbours, Morocco is run by a monarchy that enjoys much popular support. Its claimed Islamic roots make challenging its governance even less likely. Seen from a societal perspective, Morocco unlike Tunisia and Egypt, do not have a similar degree of educated citizenry. For example, in Algeria the literacy rate is 69.9% of the 35.4 million population,[54] while in Morocco it is 52.3%,[55] and in Tunisia 74%.[56] Female literacy rates are generally lower than the average.[57] This may be an explanatory factor in why the protests did not take root. Internet technology was also far more developed in Tunisia and Egypt.[58] In Algeria, 13.3% of the population has and Internet connection, and in Morocco 41% – compared to Tunisia where it is 33%.[59] Aspects like these may help describe why any more far-reaching opposition and violent street protest did not take root.

In sum, both states are deeply embedded in their regional rivalry over Western Sahara. This rivalry is both politically and economically costly for the respective governments, their people but also their neighbours. As further noted, both Algeria and Morocco face a number of security challenges stemming from the instability of the Sahara where armed groups and shadow actors take refuge.

The rivalry over Western Sahara, as well as the challenges posed by various armed groups and actors engaged in organised crime, have created considerable security sensitivity among Algerians and Moroccans. This alertness to domestic and regional challenges to authority may well explain why the Arab revolt did not root itself in either state. After all, both states have a contemporary history of being watchful against any popular challenges to the government and public order. In later chapters, 3-4, a further examination is made of the factors

[53] Tremlett (2011).
[54] Anderson and Anderson 2014: 92.
[55] Ibid. 152.
[56] Ibid. p 178.
[57] Angrist (2014).
[58] On Social media and the Arab Spring, see Eriksson, Franke, Granåsen and Lindahl (2013)
[59] Anderson and Anderson 2014: pp.: 92, 152, 179.

explaining the reactions of Algeria and Morocco. Chapter 5 then brings the empirical examination of this rivalry to a more theoretical analysis.

3 Algeria

In seeking to better understand why Algeria and Morocco chose different paths in dealing with the Arab revolts, it is important to identify key features of both countries' contemporary security concerns. Yet, to fully understand those factors which determine contemporary security thinking, a deeper understanding is needed of the identity formation process in terms of security, which these states have taken since independence. This chapter discusses the key security aspects of Algeria's post-independence formation process. The aim is to highlight aspects that may be relevant to explaining its contemporary thinking.

3.1 Post-independence

Algeria's security posture has mainly been influenced by three historical conditions: Ottoman rule, French colonisation and the leaning towards nationalism and socialism in the post-independence era. The historical legacy of being part of the Ottoman Empire gives Algeria a distinct cultural, political and administrative identity – an identity which Morocco, for example, does not have. Ottoman rule began in the mid-16th century and lasted until France fought and defeated it in 1830. During Ottoman rule, Algeria was a key hub in the Ottoman Empire, in particular in a strategic sense, as several maritime warfare expeditions started from there. This legacy is still present in the Algerian identity. Algeria's important role is for instance marked by Sweden's bilateral agreement with Algeria in 1729.

The second condition with a significant bearing on Algeria is the implications following the colonisation by France (1830–1962). Unlike Morocco, Algeria was treated as an integral part of the French state and given the status of one of its Departments. Algeria was one of France's longest-held overseas territories. The close integration of Algeria may also partly explain the complicated relationship between France and Algeria since independence. However, the violent break-up between the two states, which led to tens-of-thousands of deaths, produced a scar that maintains a distance between the two despite moments of support and cooperation.

3.1.1 The turn towards Socialism

Early on in Algeria's independence, partly originating from the revolt against the French, the new rulers in Algiers chose a socialist-military political course. The aim was to strengthen national sovereignty through heavy industrialisation and turn it into a social-welfare state.[60] Its socialist credentials had effects not only in

[60] Zoubir 2014: 205.

a domestic sense but also on its foreign policy stance. From its independence until the late 1970s, Algeria adopted through Boumédienne's doctrine of a New Order an anti-imperialist stance that included political, economic and military support for various liberation movements.[61] Its socialist leaning also opened the door for cooperation with other socialist states. For example, the strong support provided by socialist friends in Moscow and Beijing during the war of independence led to close political and economic cooperation. For instance, in 21 December 1963, the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, visited Algiers to meet with President Ben Bella. Chou offered a loan to Algiers to build a road across the Sahara from Al Goléa in Algeria to Timbuktu in Mali. In return for the loan, China was offered oil prospecting rights in southern Algeria. From a Chinese point of view, Algeria was seen as "Africa's Cuba", with Ben Bella playing the same vital role in the Western hemisphere as Castro.[62]

Algeria early on also began close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Given the support the Soviet Union had provided the independence movement in the war against France, relations were already very good. On various occasions, the Soviets also offered Algeria large-scale loans for infrastructure development. For example, in 1964 it gave the Algeria financial means to build a metallurgical plant. The goal was to produce 350 000 tonnes of steel per year.[63] Steel was seen as an important commodity in Moscow, needed to build its military and industry. Finally, in the years following independence the Soviet Union contributed significantly to equip the Algerian Army while at the same time inviting several hundreds of Algerians to undergo various forms of technical and military training in the Soviet Union.[64]

3.1.2 The well-preserved connection with France

Despite Algeria's friendly relations with socialist states and its anti-imperialist agenda, set out in the Tripoli Programme in June 1962, in which Algeria committed itself to work in solidarity with those struggling against imperialism,[65] Algeria continued to be tightly bound to France. Essentially, a continuing political, economic and military relationship with post-independence Algeria was stipulated in the *Évian Accords* of 1962.

The Évian Accords were signed on 18 March 1962 between France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, the government-in-exile of the

[61] ibid. 2013: 39.
[62] Keesing's (20063).
[63] Ibid. p. 20250.
[64] Trade at the time between Algeria and Soviet (French Franc): 60 000,000 (1968), 725 000 000 in 1968. On the other hand, trade with France was at 5000 000 000 (French Franc) (Keesing's, 23388).
[65] Zoubir 2013: 41.

Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). The accords ended the 1954–62 Algerian War and laid out Algeria's course for independence. The Évian Accords set out both French and Algerian political, economic and security interests, including continuing political, military, economic and industrial cooperation. For instance, de Gaulle insisted on continued access to Algeria's Sahara oil deposits, continued protection of French nationals and the presence of military bases in Algeria. Over the years, a number of additional protocols to the Evian agreement were signed on cooperation between the two states.[66]

An important part of French-Algerian cooperation was defence agreements. According to the Évian Accords, France was allowed to keep forces in Algeria. Military bases were kept to protect French interests, French citizens and French companies and energy infrastructure. The French military was also in place to protect French nuclear test sites. France and Algeria had secretly agreed that nuclear tests would be allowed to continue for five years after independence. In addition, a number of French military airfields and naval bases were allowed to remain for strategic purposes.[67] The French mission in Algeria was one of the largest it had in a foreign country. Between 1962 and the latter part of the 1970s, however, France gradually withdrew its military presence from Algeria.[68]

Over the years, the relationship between Algeria and France would be complicated by the socialist style of governance in Algiers. In particular, its policies of nationalisation and Arabisation would strain relations.[69] Many French companies and landowners were affected by this policy and similar policies, even though there were agreements in place that would compensate for this nationalisation.[70] Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s various nationalisation programmes were implemented, accentuated by the revolutionary council that

[66] For instance, on 28 August 1962 Algeria and France signed 9 protocols on economic and technical aid to regulate, inter alia, conditions for French civil servants in Algeria and reaffirm the guarantees for preference for French companies in the Sahara.

[67] Mers-El-Kébir had prior to WWII been the principal French naval base in the Mediterranean.

[68] As described in Keesing's (25089). "French forces completed the evacuation of the Mers-El-Kébir naval and military base at Oran on Jan 31 [1968], the installations being taken over by the Algerian armed forces the following day, some nine years before the withdrawal date originally laid down in the 1962 Evian agreements. The French Air Force, however, retained the neighbouring Bou-Sfer airfield as a staging post [a base kept until 1977], in addition to the other French staging post at Reggane which had been retained after the earlier French withdrawal from the Sahara nuclear test base" Keesing (22567). In December 1970, the Bou-Sfer air base, the last French military base, was handed over to Algeria

[69] For instance, on 22 March 1963, a decree was issued that "…ordered all industrial, agricultural, and commercial enterprises… to be handed over to workers' management committees…" *Keesing's* (19498).

[70] For instance, on 1-2 May 1963 France and Algeria agreed that one-fifth of French financial aid to Algeria would be used to compensate French landowners whose land had been nationalised, see Keesing's (19499).

ousted President Ben Bella on 19 Jun 1966. Additional nationalisation programmes followed in the 1970s.

In sum, Algeria sought to create a socialist identity early on. At the same time, however, it is clear that it sought to balance Western relations, notably with France. The bonds between the two were strong and early agreements tied them together for decades. In fact, the decisions Algeria made in the early days of independence would set the course it would pursue for years to come. Another important factor shaping Algeria's security posture was its revolutionary identity. The regime, built in large part on a pre-independence liberation movement, came to take security challenges very seriously. In practice, during the first decade of independence, this meant setting up a pervasive security infrastructure to tackle threats to the regime.

3.1.3 Algeria, energy and the Cold War, 1960–1980

In the first 20 years of its independence, Algeria sought to define its political and security posture with the international community. As noted above, much of its early identity formation was shaped by its rivalry with Morocco.[71] Early on, Algeria was embroiled in an open armed conflict with Morocco over the mineral rich province of Tindouf. Subsequently, both states defined the border in an agreement in which Morocco was allowed joint mineral exploitation rights.[72]

The post-colonial regime, mainly created out of the liberation struggle with France, came to adopt the role of a liberation supporter. According to Zoubir, this led it to seek the roles of "regional leader", and "active independent", "developer" and "mediator".[73] In Africa it mainly navigated its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist policies within the *Organisation for African Unity* (OAU).[74]

Another important factor in Algeria's political and military clout was its economic success since independence, which should be credited to its vast natural gas and oil reserves.[75] Energy income has made the Algerian economy relatively strong in comparison to its neighbours. The large scale energy reserves were used to build the country after independence and to buy off social tensions. They also ensured Algeria's relevance on the international stage. As noted above, Algeria, despite its friendliness with its socialist backers and aggressive rhetoric on the practices of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, maintained a

[71] For an introduction and critical appraisal of Algeria's political and security turns since post-independence, see Ammour (2013c).
[72] The Uppsala Conflict Database. (www.ucdp.uu.se)
[73] Zoubir 2013: pp. 39-40.
[74] Ibid. p. 40.
[75] Zoubir 2014: pp.205-209.

close relationship with the West.[76] It also had energy to export and capital to invest in foreign military equipment and on liberation movements across Africa. Because of its large energy reserves, Algiers also managed to manoeuvre well during the Cold War.[77]

For most of the time, Algeria's energy policies worked well. Being in a strong position, it could negotiate good terms. However, Algeria was not an easy player to deal with. In 1967, when the Arab-Israel war began, Algeria sided with the Arab bloc and stopped energy exports to those countries which sided with Israel (e.g., the US and the UK).[78] This also included breaking off diplomatic relations.[79]

Moreover, Algeria became a source of concern for Western powers during the Cold War because of its socialist leanings. Its revolutionary identity and regular nationalisation programmes made energy deals vulnerable in the eyes of Western states. For example, following the OPEC energy crisis of 1973, Algeria wanted to increase the price of its gas exports by 100% in order to adjust to the new oil price. Deals had to be renegotiated with France, the US and the UK. In this context it is worth noting that early in early 1980s, Algeria was expected to be the source of nearly 75% of gas exports to Europe, by expanding its pipeline exports through Tunisia and Italy.[80]

3.1.4 The changing character of unrest, 1980–1990

Aside from seeking to recalibrate its position towards France and define its post-independence identity, Algeria's security posture was early on shaped by domestic challenges. The Western Sahara issue grew increasingly complicated during the 1980s (see the chapter on Morocco), and Algeria's foreign policy outlook was to a large extent formed by its rivalry with Morocco. Following the Algerian government's policy of national identity making, the Berber question became increasingly sensitive. The Berber community played an important role during the liberation war against France, notably in 1954–62, but had not yet

[76] Algiers Revolutionary agenda was reaffirmed in several policy postures, including the 1976 Constitution and the National Charter of 1976.

[77] Several major deals have been signed over the years. For example, in the spring of 1972, the US Federal Power Commissions approved large-scale imports from Algeria, of over 540 billion cubic feet of gas each year, worth USD 10 billion over 25 years. Meanwhile, European states imported Algerian gas throughout the 1970s. The largest export contract concluded at that time was signed in Algiers, and provided for the supply of: "… about 260,000 million cubic meters of Algerian natural gas over a 20-year period to a consortium of European gas distribution companies". Moreover, on 20 October 1973 an agreement was made between Algeria and Italy to lay the foundations for a pipeline for the export of 11 million cubic meters of gas a year for 25 years. (Keesing's (25422, 25748, 2677).

[78] On 5 June 1967, Algeria declared itself to be at war with Israel.

[79] Algeria did not reopen diplomatic relations with the US until November 1974.

[80] Keesing's (31122)

gained the recognition it had expected. The so-called *Berber spring* took place during the early 1980s and was marked by a period of political protest in which calls were made by the Berber community for the FLN leadership to recognise the Berber identity and language in Algeria. Much violence and killing took place, most notably in the Kabylie region and in Algiers.

Following decades of socialism, increasing nationalism and growing mismanagement of state affairs, the death of Boumédienne in 1978 gave ground for rising social tensions in Algeria and many people's deaths. Growing economic hardship for the general population linked to the rentier economy, in stark contrast with the increasingly rich elite, led to societal tensions. Islamic groups mobilised, encouraged by the success of similar movements in other countries.

To come to terms with the social tensions, considerable economic and political reforms were made to open up the country for liberalisation and democratic progress. In December 1991, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won the first round of parliamentary elections. FIS was banned in March 1992, leading to a full-scale civil war that lasted nearly ten years. In 1992, a number of radical Islamic parties joined forces, most notably the Groupe islamique armée/Armed Islamic Group (GIA).[81] A splinter group of the GIA became the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, GSPC) in 1998. The al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was born out of the GSPC in 2007.

3.1.5 The tragedy of the 1990s

During the 1980s Algeria continued its navigation in a Cold War context. Algiers managed to use its financial clout to buy itself influence on the international stage. It signed several arms deals with both Western (e.g. US) and socialist countries. One of the strategic goals behind the pursuit of its trade strategy was to increase its leverage on the Western Sahara issue. Trade with both the US and the Soviet Union became important. Relations with the US peaked in the mid-1980s with a visit to Washington by Algeria's President Chadli in April 1985, the first such visit since independence.

In the 1980s, Algeria experienced increasing domestic challenges from radical segments of society. Lacking any means for public political participation, and with a sense of marginalisation and frustration towards the government, some groups opted for an armed insurrection. The 1988 social turbulence, albeit separate, laid ground for the turbulence that would follow in the 1990s. The increasing opposition to the Algerian regime led by Chadli Bendjedid and

[81] According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, GIA portrayed its struggle as "Muslims fighting an apostate state" (www.ucdp.uu.se).

various Islamist parties, notably the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), led to various electoral victories in 1990 and 1991. This in turn led the Algerian military on 11 January 1992 to cancel the electoral process, install Mohammed Boudiaf and have the FIS dissolved. Processes that combined with mounting social tensions lead to the outburst of a civil war.

The plunge into a tragic civil war led Algeria into international isolation. For nearly ten years, Algeria was absent from international and regional affairs. More than 100 000 citizens are said to have lost their lives.

At the end of the civil war, Algeria re-emerged as a pivotal state in the region due to the so-called War on Terror.[82] Algeria was given recognition for tackling international terrorism. This role has further strengthened as a result of the increasing security challenges posed by the Sahel.

3.2 Conclusion

All through its post-colonial identity formation process, the leadership in Algiers has been highly sensitive about issues related to sovereignty. Early on, this sensitivity had much to do with the establishment of an independent state capable of standing on its own independently of France. It was also about being recognised as a legitimate actor in the international system. Through political and economic means it sought to define its security amid flirting with West and East in the Cold War.

Aside from seeking recognition abroad, Algeria's security posture was increasingly about seeking to tackle growing opposition domestically. As discussed in this chapter, Algeria has been alert to domestic security threats from various sorts of rebellions over time. While financial muscle as a result of considerable energy income has given it opportunities to tackle social demands, a strong security apparatus has also been instrumental in dealing with domestic opposition. Moreover, the tragedy of the 1990s and the legacy that this created are likely to be an important factor in explaining why the revolt did not take root in the country during 2011. After all, the war strained all sectors of society, notably the social order between various interest groups operating under different political, economic, social, cultural and religious beliefs.

The factors noted in this historical analysis need to be coupled with the factors noted above on Algeria's security concerns. The opposition which took place in Algeria in 2011–2013 was usually conducted with the idea that even if the government and the president might fall, this would not mean that the military or the state-within-the state would fall. Finally, in this context, another important factor in the absence of a far-reaching revolt in Algeria was the sense among

[82] Zoubir 2013: 39.

protestors that various opposition leaders were closely affiliated to the regime. Opposition leaders were not therefore able to gain the confidence of the population.

4 Morocco

During the course of the Arab revolts in 2011–2013, Morocco took several reform initiatives to tackle some of the social tensions that had begun to challenge the government of Abbas El Fassi. This strategy to tackle the frustration of the opposition by inclusion might well be explained by historical factors. This chapter explains Morocco's post-independence security identity formation and how it can be linked to the absence of a deep-rooted revolt in the country.

4.1 Post-independence formation

Unlike Algeria, Morocco was never under Ottoman rule. Instead, Morocco developed administratively and militarily in a distinct way. Historically, Morocco's policy course developed in response to regional rivalry with the Ottoman Empire in the East, Spain and Portugal in the North and African kingdoms in the South.

In past centuries, the region was ruled by various Arab families, who claimed to be descendants from the Islamic Prophet.[83] Beginning in 1912, Morocco was effectively run as a French Protectorate under the *Treaty of Fez*, while northern Morocco was submitted to Spain. For most of the time, the French administration was subjected to rebellion by various local communities, not least various Berber communities. In 1944, an independence party, Istiqlāl, was created and, through violent rebellion, France was obliged to grant Morocco independence on March 2, 1956. A few months earlier, on December 6, 1955, Morocco's first Cabinet had been appointed.

It was clear from the outset that an independent Morocco would seek to maintain its relations with the Western powers, not least France and the US. The Sultan at the time stated:

> We rejoice to be able to announce the end of the regime of wardship and protectorate, and the start of an era of freedom and independence….The independence towards which our people aspire must not mean a loosening of our links with France, for the friendship between our two countries is deep-rooted and goes back in history.…Our first objective is the formation of a responsible and representative Moroccan Government which will be an authentic expression of the will of the people. It will have to carry out three tasks: 1. The conduct of public affairs. 2. The creation of democratic institutions, freely elected, and based on the principle of separation of powers

[83] Muhammad. The Saadi dynasty 1549–1659; and the Alaouite dynasty 1666–, who have remained in power since the 17th century and are currently linked to the Moroccan royal family. Mulay Al-Rashid (1664–1672) is allegedly the king that was able to unite Morocco.

> within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, granting to Moroccans of all religious beliefs the rights of citizens and the exercise of political and trade union liberties… 3. The opening of negotiations with the French Government…. [84]

In the same speech it was stated:

> The ideas of liberty and democracy have become so widespread in the post-war world that the conscience of humanity cannot tolerate that independence and dignity should remain the exclusive prerogative of a few peoples only. On the other hand, the problems for the modern world and the interpenetration of interests are driving all countries into closer unity and cooperation, in order to safeguard their patrimony and ensure their security.[85]

Subsequently, a diplomatic agreement was established between Morocco and France on 19 May 1956 that set up a Moroccan army of 15,000 men and a French gendarmerie to protect French nationals.[86]

Aside from setting out its relationship with France and Spain, Morocco maintained a close relationship with the US. Morocco and the US have long and special historic ties, as Morocco was the first nation to recognise the US as a sovereign nation in 1777.[87] Like Morocco's policy on Sweden, Sultan Mohammed III signed a decree to give US merchant ships passing the sultanate safe passage. It also protected US ships against piracy. This historical bond is important in today's relationship.

By the time of independence, slight but not insignificant changes had taken place between Morocco and the US. In terms of security, the government of Morocco sought to terminate the security arrangement which has been concluded in secret with the US in the 1950s (the Rabat Agreement), which allowed US airbases on its territory. In principle, the US maintained three large airbases in Morocco in the post-independence era –Nouaser, Sidi Slimane and Bengérir – as well as an auxiliary airbase at Boulhau. It was reviewed when the new officials in Rabat claimed that it had no proper legal basis.[88] The airbases were used by the US Strategic Air Command.[89] [90]

[84] Keesing's (14677).
[85] Ibid. p 14677.
[86] Ibid. p. 14946.
[87] The Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship, signed in 1786.
[88] Keesing's (14782).
[89] In addition to the airbase, there was also a major naval base a Port-Lyautey.
[90] From a Moroccan perspective the US airbases had given it considerable financial benefits. Estimates suggest that Morocco was allowed to keep Moroccan employees on the airbases and a military contribution of USD 1 million per month. In addition, Morocco received economic and military assistance: in 1957 it received USD 20 million under the US foreign aid programme (in1959 nearly USD 40 million) (Keesing's 17124).

4.1.1 Morocco's early security formation

Throughout the Cold War, Morocco skilfully navigated between East and West. Although it did not enjoy the same energy exports-related influence as Algeria, or had the same socialist leaning, its geostrategic location next to the Gibraltar strait was key.[91]

On 2 April 1957, an agreement was signed that would weave Morocco into the US security architecture. Under the agreement, the US would provide considerable economic assistance to Morocco (nearly USD 20 million). Moreover, the US assistance would be used to finance various development projects.[92] In retrospect it is clear that the US was eager to include Morocco in the anti-communist sphere. In fact, in the spring of 1957, US officials held meetings with the Sultan of Morocco to secure the Eisenhower plan for the Middle East aimed at preventing the spread of Communism. Accepting the Eisenhower plan made Morocco eligible for USD 200 million.[93] In recognition of Moroccan sovereignty, Eisenhower agreed to close US bases by 1963.[94] In so doing, Washington strengthened its relationship with Rabat.

Although Morocco was close to the Western powers, it never took sides in the Cold War. On the contrary, Morocco sought both political influence and economic gains by flirting with both Washington and Moscow. While enjoying military support from the US, an announcement was made on 15 November 1960 that it was also accepting an offer of Soviet military aid. The Soviet Union was willing to send aid to all sectors of Morocco's society.[95] One of the few occasions when Morocco was on the same strategic page with Algeria was during the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. At the time Morocco placed its military at the disposal of Egypt, blocked trade with the US and entered several agreements with the Soviet Union.[96]

4.1.2 The Organisation of African Unity

Aside from mainly aligning itself with its Arab states in North Africa and the wider Middle East (e.g., as part of the Arab League since 1958) Morocco has consistently enjoyed a political and economic presence in Africa and African politics. Morocco had long been a member of the Organisation of African Unity

[91] Aside from some energy reserves, Morocco has relied on large phosphate reserves. For instance on 15 June 1965, Morocco opened one of the world's largest Phosphate plants with the capacity to produce 10 000 tonnes per year. This accounted at the time for nearly 40% of Morocco's total exports (Keesing's 20889).
[92] Keesing's (15545).
[93] Ibid. p. 15656.
[94] The last French airbase to be evacuated in 1961 (Keesing's 1832).
[95] 12 Mig fighters and two Ilyushin bombers would be delivered in the first phase.
[96] Keesing's (23388).

(OAU) (May 1963–November 1984). However, the souring conflict over Western Sahara and the rebellion by POLISARIO left Morocco's relationship with the OAU repeatedly strained.[97] Morocco's tense relationship with the OAU came to a head in 1977 when Rabat claimed it had been falsely accused of involvement in a coup attempt against President Kerekou of Benin, and when POLISARIO was allowed to take a more active part in the OAU's official deliberations following this allegation. King Hassan announced that his government would boycott all OAU activities until the organisation resumed "correct and reasonable conduct".[98]

The next important event that strained Morocco's relationship with the OAU was in connection with its 20th Assembly of Heads of State and Government in November 1984. This time, the Moroccan representative announced it would withdraw from membership of the OAU in protest at the participation of a The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) delegation. Given the sensitivity of Western Sahara, Morocco's foreign policy course would face many similar challenges. The unresolved border question impeded Morocco's relations with both north and south. How did the conflict come to escalate?

4.1.3 Towards the end of the Cold War

During the 1980s and 1990s, there was the continued rivalry with Algeria over Western Sahara. Morocco was also involved in several territorial disputes with Spain over undefined territory and sea access rights. Domestically, Morocco experienced increasing social tension as a result of the deteriorating economic situation under Mohammed II. There were also growing Islamist challenges to the monarchy.

In the mid-1980s, Morocco strengthened its historical security relations with the US. This occurred as the pact Morocco had previously entered into with Libya (1984–1986) was terminated. The strengthened security relations with the US included US military exports, reductions in loan repayments as well as credits made available by the US. This cooperation built on the long-standing relationship between the two. In the late 1980s, the US and Morocco revisited and re-signed a 1982 agreement that would allow a US Rapid Deployment Force to use Moroccan bases

When Muhammad VI came to power on 23 July 1999, Morocco was pushed towards increasing liberalisation. However, the rivalry with Algeria over

[97] In 1977, an attempt was made to overthrow President Kerekou of Benin. According to an OAU mission to investigate the coup attempt, "…the raid had been prepared for a long time by exiles who, with the complicity of Morocco and Gabon, had been joined by white mercenaries and provided with arms and ammunition" (Keesing's 28444).

[98] Keesing's (28444).

Western Sahara continued and even increased for a while as the new king took power.[99] This rivalry over Western Sahara has been politically and economically very costly.

4.2 Conclusion

Like Algeria, Morocco's post-independence security posture has been its quest to promote integrity, sovereignty and legitimacy. Security promotion has been crucial.

Through a historical lens, Morocco has defended its sovereignty over a long period towards the 'European North', the 'Ottoman East' and the 'Africa continent to its South'. This legacy is likely to have been deeply rooted in the Moroccan monarchy's identity and policy projection. Legacies that may help us understand why the threat from the Arab Spring was quickly thwarted.

Aside from the important role of the Moroccan monarchy, which allegedly traces its roots back to the Prophet Muhammad, and therefore by definition gains legitimacy, there are also other important security features of relevance. Clearly, the quest for Western Sahara has built a considerable security infrastructure in Morocco – an infrastructure that is likely to be very sensitive to violent political opposition. Another feature has been the long-standing threat posed by armed Jihadist groups. Various armed groups are operating not only in the vicinity of Morocco, but also domestically. One could assume that Morocco is highly sensitive to domestic challenges and popular frustration. Why then did it not use more force to counter demonstrations? One important factor may be Morocco's closeness to the US and the EU. It may well have been in the calculation that to get closer to EU (e.g., favourable trade agreements) co-optation of the opposition rather than tougher confrontation would be judged better. All these elements in combination with other domestic challenges over government power might explain why the Moroccan government favoured a swift response to the opposition that came out of the Arab spring.

What then are we to make of Algeria's and Morocco's historic and contemporary rivalry? Chapter 5 discusses the analysis and empirical record from a theoretical viewpoint using systematic studies on the concept of enduring rivalry.

[99] Partly due to a controversial visit by the king to the region.

5 Enduring rivalries: a theoretical lens

As is illustrated in previous chapters, Algeria and Morocco have for decades been embedded in a regional rivalry. This rivalry has been costly on many levels. For example, in terms of tackling regional security it has forced both states to tackle various sorts of challenges on a bilateral level, rather than through joint collective action. Interestingly, however, years of rivalry has also made both countries alert to domestic and regional security challenges. As noted above, this may also explain why the Arab Spring did not spread into these two countries. How then are we to understand rivalry?

A useful framework for understanding the political competition between Algeria and Morocco is the theory of interstate rivalry. According to various scholars, the study of interstate rivalry has provided a major conceptual contribution to the scientific study of war.[100] The point of departure in this chapter is to provide some comparative theoretical insight into how to understand Algeria's and Morocco's security postures, as much of them relate to regional rivalry. The lens is meant to serve as a starting point for how to think about rivalry in general, and what characteristics a rivalry may have for a situation like the one that exists between the two states. As noted above, the theoretical discussion outlined here may help to link the specifics of the Algeria-Morocco rivalry to more general observations on such rivalries that have been made on a global and historically aggregated level. Hopefully it could also help explain why the social protests did not spread into Algeria and Morocco.

5.1 Theoretical approaches to rivalry

Building on systematic identification of armed conflicts, scholars in the early 1990s began to note a series of "repeated conflicts" among the same set of states since 1816.[101] As Thompson (2001) notes, using the enduring rivalries lens has much potential: "Rather than assume all actors are equally likely to engage in conflictual relations, a focus on rivalries permits analysts to focus in turn on the relatively small handful of actors who, demonstrably, are the ones most likely to generate conflict vastly disproportionate to their numbers".[102]

In an armed conflict data collection programme covering the period 1945–1992, scholars found that nearly 45% of all militarised disputes took place in the context of enduring rivalries, in the sense that they repeatedly appear in the time-series data for conflict events.[103] The significance of enduring rivalries became

[100] Vasques and Leskiw 2001: 295.
[101] Goertz and Diehl 1993: 147; Klein, Goertz and Diehl: 2006: 332.
[102] Thompson 2001: 557.
[103] Goertz and Diehl 1993: 148.

even more alluring when, going back in history, it was found that nearly half of all interstate wars were made up of enduring rivalries.[104] In a later analysis presented by Klein et. al., based on a revised list for the period 1816–2001, there were 915 cases of isolated conflicts and 290 cases of rivalry. Of the 290 cases of rivalry, 115 of these were *enduring* rivalries (i.e., they kept on repeating themselves in history).[105] Rivalries are important because they keep coming back across time as disputes without ever being fully settled. As such they stand out from the single-event armed conflicts that flare up, die out or are settled. In this regard, Algeria and Morocco is one of the pairs that appeared in the time series analysis. Others are the Arab-Israeli conflict and the India-Pakistan conflict.[106] If Algeria and Morocco make up a pair of enduring rivals: How are these defined?

There have been many scholarly attempts to define a conflict constellation as an inter-state rivalry.[107] Various elements have been used to identify the presence of a rivalry: two (or more) militarised interstate disputes in a ten-year period,[108] states that have at least three militarised conflicts in a 15-year period,[109] states that have a disproportionate share of the total number of militarised disputes, those states that have a least five reciprocated militarised disputes in a 25-year period and those that have engaged in six or more disputes in a 20-year period.[110] According to Vasques it is:

> …a relationship characterized by extreme competition and psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other rather than by the states at hand.[111]

Bennett defines a rivalry as:

> …a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issues(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other, in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.[112]

[104] ibid.
[105] Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006: 340.
[106] Another historic rivalry was the one between Sweden and Denmark before Prussia and Russia became stronger systemic actors.
[107] Various lists of armed conflicts have been used, of which the *Correlates of War* list is the most frequent. Each list has different criteria for the inclusion and definition of an armed conflict. Similarly, there are different operationalisations of rivalries. This has led to a battle of operationalisations (Thies 2001: 695).
[108] Wayman 2000.
[109] Diehl 1985.
[110] See also Vasques and Leskiw 2001: 296. See also Wayman (2000), Goertz and Diehl1993b, 2000.
[111] Vasques 1996: 296.
[112] Benett 1996: 160.

This useful operationalisation is refined by Goertz and Diehl (1993), who suggest that there are some characteristics of enduring rivalries that make them stand out from other rivalries. The components that need to be considered are competitiveness, time and spatial consistency. Competition, they argue, could be over principled issues such as ideology and religion (and even over more intangible factors such as prestige and influence),[113] or over goods such as natural resources or territory.[114] Although these incompatibilities may vary over time, there must be some connection between these competitions. In terms of time, an enduring rivalry exists over longer time-spans of decades rather than months or years.[115] Finally, the spatial component of an enduring rivalry includes a consistent set of states.[116] While governments may change, the dyadic relationship between the two states remains. Sometimes it overlaps with other states and their enduring rivalries, such as that between the USA and the Soviet Union.

Given the theory outlined above, what insights can be gained and applied to understand Algeria's and Morocco's security identities and regional attitudes?

5.1.1 Algeria and Morocco

Algeria and Morocco are included on various lists of enduring rivalries. This is not surprising as they seem to fulfil the criteria noted above. According to the criteria, both countries have over the years experienced continuing competitiveness in various areas such as foreign, security and defence policy, as well as over domestic and regional economic and political strategies for development.[117]

Thompson identifies three: (a) the Algeria-Morocco rivalry (1962 to date) in the Tindouf region, Western Sahara, and alleged support for the POLISARIO by

[113] Thies 2001: 694.
[114] Goertz and Diehl 1993: 154.
[115] ibid.
[116] ibid.
[117] Algeria and Morocco have experienced various incidents of rivalry in the period 1945–2013. Domestic armed conflicts in Algeria were recorded in 1991–1993, 1994, 1999 and 2002–2011. The armed conflict concerned the state of Algeria and groups such as Takfir wa'l Hijra (Exile and Redemption), AIS, GIA and AQIM (AQIM is said to have been founded in 2007. It is a successor of the Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat) (Pettersson and Themner 2011: 90). The conflicts were contestations over government. The state of Morocco for its part has been in conflict with various groups since 1953: 1953–56, a territorial conflict between France and the Moroccan Nationalist Party, Istiqal; 1957–58, a territorial conflict between France and the NLA and a territorial conflict between Spain and the NLA; 1971, Morocco vs. the military forces of Mohamed Madbouh; and in the 1963 Sand war between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara; 1975–91 (ceasefire between Algeria and Morocco), a territorial conflict, i.e. the battle of Amgala, over Western Sahara with POLISARIO and Algeria (Pettersson and Themner 2011: 103).

Algeria; (b) the Morocco-Mauritania rivalry (1960–1969); and (c) the Morocco-Spanish Rivalry (1956–1991) over Ifni, Western Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, fishing and territorial waters. On top of this, other rivalries such as the US-Soviet rivalry had implications for Morocco and Algeria. What is important in a regional analysis is the historical rivalry that has existed between the two states. This rivalry has caused much tension over the years, and has also become an important explanatory factor for the two states' foreign policy behaviour.[118] The relationship between the two countries has been frosty since the 1960s. Today, Touchard characterises both countries as two countries with two doctrines and two visions of the world.[119]

Effectively, the two states went into complete isolation vis-à-vis each other when the border between the two was closed as a result of an attack on Marrakech in 1994, which Rabat implied was carried out with the support of Algeria. Algeria sealed its border with Morocco in response to these allegations.[120] Another factor in closing the border is Algeria's perceived fear of an increase of cross-border trade in cannabis, which allegedly stems from Morocco.[121] This factor may form part of a broader policy argument to keep the border closed.

Finally, what can be done to bring parties out of an enduring rivalry? In this context, Goertz et al. (2005) identify the factors that maintain a rivalry and how these can be terminated: (a) victory by one side; (b) one party withdraws because it realises it does not have enough resources to win over its rival; (c) parties change incompatibilities; and (d) the governments resort to classic mediation and conflict resolution to permanently end hostilities.[122] In 2014, alternatives C and D look most promising, albeit recognising the stalled positions of the two states. Resorting to war is not in anyone's interest, given the existing insecurity.

5.1.2 Implications

The theory of enduring rivalries proves valuable for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it draws attention to the fact that Algeria and Morocco make up an exceptional conflict pairing in systematic comparisons of armed conflicts.

[118] Interestingly however, Algeria and Morocco have also been in *unity*. This took place in 1967 when the Arab-Israeli war broke out. Notably on 11–15 January 1969, President Boumedienne of Algeria paid a visit to Morocco. During this visit, a Treaty of Solidarity and Cooperation was signed. In an official communiqué, both parties "…expressed a wish to see the armaments race ended, to abstain from the use of force for the solution of differences, and to mobilise 'the whole of Islam' [i.e. not only the Arab States] for the right of the Palestinian Arabs…" (Keesing's 23312).
[119] Touchard 2013. 24.
[120] Later a number of Moroccans were convicted for the attack.
[121] Another aspect is that it would change cross-border trade dynamics.
[122] See Goertz et al. 2005: 744.

Moreover, it could also help us better understand the key security features that explain the absence of an Arab revolt.

Findings suggest that states engaged in enduring rivalries experience high costs. Enduring insecurity and suspicion give rise to high security protection costs related to the maintenance of security services, intelligence gathering, defence spending and maintaining a standing army.[123] Moreover, such rivalries have opportunity costs in loss of trade with rivals and allies.[124] There are also arguably many missed political opportunities for the state, the region and beyond in terms of political cooperation, regional integration, such as in the Maghreb Union and the African Union, or political and economic cooperation between the EU and North Africa.

It is difficult to estimate the cost of such missed political opportunities from a methodological point of view. According to Oueslati and Brini (2013), intra Maghreb trade does not exceed 3% of the total trade of each country.[125] This is far lower than trade within other regional communities (such as the EU and ASEAN). In fact it is exceptionally low. With strong economic integration, these scholars conclude that all the empirical data suggest that "…Maghreb countries could be an economic union crowned with success".[126] According to a study by the Economic Commission for Africa, the wider Maghreb would have much to gain from economic integration and there are no reasons in principle why the region should continue with costly non-Maghreb integration. Instead, it should build on the Treaty of Marrakech (1989) that sets out a plan for economic unification, or a common market.[127] The authors suggest that: "…whatever the scenario chosen, it is more expensive and costly for Maghreb countries to maintain trade barriers and restrictions between them".[128] In fact, they argue, Maghreb would benefit even further if it was integrated into a Euro-Med free market. Even voices such as the European Council on Foreign Relations argue in favour of more active EU support for regional integration of Maghreb and the revitalisation of the AMU project. This would benefit North Africa but also be in the strategic interests of the EU.[129]

5.2 Conclusion

This chapter discussed enduring rivalry to gain a deeper understanding of the security features that explain Algeria's and Morocco's security postures. It is

[123] Goertz et al. 2005: 743.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Oueslati and Brini 2013: 285.
[126] Ibid. p. 290.
[127] Bchir, Hammouda, Oulmane and Jallab 2006: 1.
[128] Ibid. p. 33.
[129] Witney and Dworkin 2012: 10.

clear that both states' entrenched position vis-à-vis each other from their security identity. Huge resources and political attention have gone into preventing the quest for influence over one another.

The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco has been costly. The human suffering and economic and political outlays have absorbed a lot of energy from both countries. These costs have at times been the main impetus behind both parties seeking an end to the rivalry.[130] Interestingly, however, the cost of investing in political and economic infrastructure to maintain the rivalry has led both sides to inoculate themselves against any profound domestic challenges. This important aspect may well be a crucial factor in explaining the absence of a more far-reaching revolt in Algeria and Morocco.

Having thus far laid out Algeria's and Morocco's key security challenges in chapter 2, both countries' post-independence security formation in chapters 3 and 4, and the concept of enduring rivalries in chapter 5, chapter 6 returns to the puzzle set in chapter 1. The aim in the last chapter is to identify key security features in the post-independence era and find out what in this process might explain the absence of any far-reaching revolts in the context of the Arab spring. The study ends with a number of recommendations.

[130] There have been various attempts to end the rivalry. For instance, in the 1980s both the United Nations and the OAU tried to come up with various peace plans. A number of bilateral initiatives has also been taken, for instance, early on the reign of Mohammed VI a number of justice and reconciliation initiatives were taken.

6 Conclusions and observations

At the outset of this study, a puzzle was set as to why the Arab revolts never rooted in Algeria and Morocco. More specifically, the developments in North Africa in 2011–2013 and the absence of any profound regime change in Algeria and Morocco called for an identification of any key features that might help explain the absence of a popular revolt. To answer this question, this study resorted to an examination of both historical and contemporary security behaviours. What then could be observed?

One key finding of this study is that the rivalry that has existed between Algeria and Morocco clearly has contributed to shaping a security posture that is highly sensitive to domestic challenges to existing political orders. The relevance in understanding both states security and defence policy through the lens of an enduring rivalry has also been noted in the research. In fact, as noted by authors such as Goertz and Diehl (1993a, b), the enduring rivalry that both countries are caught up in have a particular set of characteristics with impact on their security posture. This kind of rivalry also suggests particular types of solutions, namely a profound and durable resolution in which both incompatibilities must be addressed but also mechanism to prevent future hostility. How then has this rivalry looked like and what does offer to the puzzle outlined above?

Since independence, and even further back in history, issues related to sovereignty, recognition and legitimacy have been essential. This in turn has made Algeria and Morocco quick to counter any domestic or regional security challenges. In Morocco, the royal family has ultimate sovereign responsibility, while in Algeria the military and the deep-state are in charge of security matters related to its sovereignty. However, it goes without saying that Algeria and Morocco, despite their similarities (e.g. shared cultural and religious identity) are two different states with two different ambitions. Algeria is still a strong state with a socialist-style and military-backed presidential system. Morocco is currently a liberal oriented monarchy with its eyes on Europe. Both countries have also experienced very different post-independence history. Algeria experienced a civil war, while Morocco suffered from the Western Sahara issue. These factors combined may also help to explain why both states essentially managed to prevent the popular demands echoed in the region from taking root. An important question in this regard is: Why has this ability been successfully maintained?

Another important finding that may help explain the absence of a popular revolt is the one that originates in the domestic political systems of both states. As most states in the region, both Algeria and Morocco are elite-led states. Given the lack of transparency and undemocratic practice in political and economic affairs, the elite consensus has no incentive to change the ways politics are made. Their security postures are very much determined behind closed doors. This is also

why the Arab revolts have become such an important framework. Considerable street protests around the region have, on an indefinite basis, changed the calculus of these regimes. The fact that Morocco has realised the need to accommodate opposition, perhaps more so than Algeria, is possibly because Algeria still has a stronger economy and the structural conditions that allow it to survive for the time being, and thereby does not have to accommodate protests at this time. Morocco on the other hand has a longer tradition of aligning itself with regional and international actors, and it realises that it has a lot to gain from increased integration and international engagement.

Yet, an important methodological aspect of the observations in this study is that the two non-cases of Arab revolt can only be properly understood if they also explain why protests erupted in states like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. After all, they shared many regime similarities as well as cultural markers, in the sense that they were elite-led, applied Arab nationalism, used Islamic identity markers, had a poor human rights track-record, and shared a jihadist threat. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Algeria and Morocco have been closely engulfed in a security rivalry, and have different political and economic systems and natural resource bases. It is also worth noting that Tunisia had a strong family led and corrupt regime that over the years had become much distanced from its people. Moreover, there may be a time factor here, as the revolt started in Tunisia, Ben Ali had no notice of what it might lead to. Libya was ruled by a regime with all the political and economic power concentrated in one person – a person who quickly escalated the conflict when opposition came with demands. Lastly, Egypt is a large country with many interests, and where the well organised opposition, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, quickly seized the moment to challenge Mubarak when the "wall of fear" quaked. All in all there are a number of factors that separately, or in combination, led to the revolts in three of the five countries in North Africa. All the factors are unique and may have been favoured by the moment or by the fact that they were reinforced by outside interests (e.g. in Libya, NATO was responding to the demands of the opposition, while for example it did not in Algeria). In any case, further research is warranted to explain the conditions that led the revolts to break out, but also follow through to the point of regime change.

What then are the implications of all of these observations? Below follows a number of general reflections that sets out what the absence of a popular revolt has meant and what the continuation of the enduring rivalry entails in terms of costs and lost momentums.

6.1 Final thoughts

Algeria and Morocco are stable states with much political and economic potential. Both states are entangled in various security architectures, including

the projection of the EU's soft power; US hegemonic support to Morocco and, to a lesser degree, Algeria; the Camp David Accords; and APSA. However, much more could be done to further realise both states' potentials. Again, this starts with each state's genuine call for reform. In Morocco this has begun. Algeria has an opportunity in 2014 as the year will mark presidential elections and therefore much debate on its political and security identity. The chances for genuine reform are not particularly likely if the same political candidates continue to contend for power.

What then has the absence of a far-reaching uprising entailed for both states and their neighbours? And what does it mean that the enduring rivalry continues without far-reaching efforts to tackle it?

6.1.1 Lost momentum 1. The Arab revolts: a lost opportunity for reform

Algeria and Morocco tackled the momentum of the revolts differently. Algeria did not enter into any structural or genuine reform process. Morocco opened up political liberalisation and inclusion of the opposition, although Rabat has not opted to go much further. Simply put, a window of opportunity was opened in 2011 but the potential was never realised. At the peak of the revolt, uncertainty was high. Even if there were many forces working against structural reforms (the strongest being uncertainty over where such a path would lead), the forces of globalisation and modernity cannot be disregarded in the long-run.

Changing global power-shifts, not least a more inward looking US, a rising China and a slow-moving EU, mean that countries like Morocco and Algeria will have to modernise their model of governance. This starts with genuine democratic rule, and turns into recognition of human rights and societal inclusiveness. That is not to rule out the cultural and historical exceptionalism of each country. Economic competitiveness is crucial to provide growth, welfare and lower unemployment rates. At the same time, social tensions can be diffused, securing long-term human security.

Finally, political and economic reform will open up opportunities for regional integration and societal resilience – a key factor that will be much needed when tackling the long-term challenges that will stem from the negative impacts of climate-change – desertification, reduced access to water, increases in temperature, coastal eradication, increased tensions over food production, and so on.[131] All the above will shape both states' security postures positively in the long run, given the high costs of not making such reforms.

[131] See for instance Haldén (2007).

6.1.2 Lost momentum 2. EU support: between ignorance and realpolitik

A long history exists between the EU, Algeria and Morocco. Some member states, notably France, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Italy, have enjoyed a close relationship to these states. In the light of these long-term relationships it is somewhat surprising that developments in North Africa did not attract more political engagement to reduce long-term tensions when the momentum was there.

Using its soft power, the EU could, in its attempt to seek a more profound democratic reform agenda, have applied a carrot and stick approach vis-á-vis both countries. The offer of political inclusion and economic support packages could have been coupled with the threat of far-reaching disincentives should reform not take place (e.g. reducing trade-negations). Some steps along these lines have been taken, but far from enough.

An important explanation for the lack of stronger support is that the Arab revolts came at a bad time from an EU perspective. The EU was preoccupied with its own financial problems. Another factor was that that the EU had allowed itself to be appropriated by its own north-south division – its southern and northern member states with different interests in the area. This in turn prevented more far-reaching political and economic engagement with the region. Although it is difficult to know what the outcome would have been had the EU engaged more profoundly, it is not unlikely to conclude that the passive approach has paved way for further social tension and uncertainty in an already volatile situation. After all, most conventional wisdom suggests that collaboration and support are likely to prevent further social tension and conflicts.

As of 2014, the EU is in the process of increasing its political focus on the region. A menu of proposals is being offered that would lead to political cooperation and integration. Morocco has been eager to engage with the EU, but Algeria remains much more reluctant. Algeria also needs to make more reforms to become more eligible for EU support.

6.1.3 Lost momentum 3. Regional rivalry (AU/Africa): the political cost to the non-Maghreb

The main finding is that the ongoing rivalry between the two countries continues to be politically, economically and socially costly. Since independence, Algeria and Morocco have been engaged in a detrimental rivalry. This has had implications for both states as well as for the integration of North Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This regional rivalry has led to a number of direct confrontations and proxy conflicts, isolated the two countries politically and economically, and resulted in two divergent and not fully coordinated approaches.

As has been discussed throughout this study, there are many historical reasons why Algeria and Morocco have developed distinct political identities: (a) historically through the presence or absence of Ottoman rule and the closeness between Morocco and Algeria and western states such as France, Spain, Portugal and the US; (b) the structural conditions emerging from national resources; (c) the ability to navigate through the Cold War; and (d) the treatment of domestic and regional jihadist rebellions. Aside from their distinct political cultures – one a monarchy the other a socialist-leaning, military-backed presidential administration – the social and religious culture remains much the same between their citizens. In fact, it is very difficult to pinpoint the exact root cause for the existing incompatibility between the two.

Nonetheless, the regional rivalry has had tremendous negative implications for the development of both countries. For example, the unsettled issue of Western Sahara has prevented both states from achieving their full potential within the AU, including the peace and security architecture (e.g. North African Regional Capability). The continued rivalry has also prevented the realisation of the Arab Maghreb Union,[132] although there has been recent interest in revitalising this forum, promoted by Morocco and Tunisia.[133]

Meanwhile, the UN and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) risks cementing the division between the two states at a moment when much energy should be invested in resolving the conflict. The symbolic value and presence of the mission should not overshadow the need for genuine progress on the ground.

Finally, the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco has led to unhealthy competition in the region of the Sahara. Rather than seeking joint political and economic ventures to help stabilise parts of the Sahel, the region is left to become an unstable sphere without government control, leading to rebellions, human trafficking, and illicit flows of arms, drugs and counterfeit goods. It is a region where competition and rivalry are more prevalent than cooperation and integration, and where states pursue their own interests.

6.2 What to do in a changing security landscape?

The Arab revolts have changed the political and security dynamic in North Africa. Despite the fact that Algeria and Morocco did not experience a far-

[132] Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya.

[133] Algeria meanwhile has been more skeptical about such a project as it would be more unfavorable to it from an economic perspective, at least in the short run. For more on Maghreb integration in light of the Arab revolt, see analysis by Zoubir (2012).

reaching popular challenge to the incumbent regimes, both states have felt the consequences in terms of increasing insecurity. A number of aspects are particularly relevant to focus on in terms of supporting both states within the security landscape that has emerged in the region. Ten recommendations seem particularly relevant to supporting and engaging Algeria and Morocco:

1. Support both countries with a far-reaching security sector reform agenda in the light of the security cooperation that exists – one that builds on confronting regional security challenges, but also entails fostering a democratic and human rights-based approach as well as transparency. Support for the reform of the armed forces, including joint exercises, may also prove attractive. This in turn depends on both states willingness of finding common ground.

2. Support partnership programmes with both countries to track down, collect and destroy small arms that are not registered by the states. Unaccounted for arms in the region could easily fall into the hands of local rebels, Jihadists and organised crime (e.g. as in the Sahel). Such support would not only diffuse future threats to each state, but also undermine crime syndicates and terrorist networks in the region.

3. Promote trade and investment opportunities and growth, paying special attention to sectors such as renewable energy, environmental technology, infrastructure, social communication technology and agriculture. These are sectors that both the EU and North Africa can benefit from in an era of the negative consequences of climate change. Such economic carrots may also help change the elite calculus.

4. Promote cultural exchanges, educational (research) transfers and mobility (scholarships, student visits, traineeships, etc.). Only long-term educational and research support can integrate and develop both countries. This starts with revisiting visa and immigration policies.

5. Engage in more far-reaching dialogues on how to establish and promote de-radicalisation programmes. While the EU has much to share in terms of how to tackle violent far-right movements, Algeria and Morocco have vast experience of how to tackle violent Islamist groups. Combined platforms to deal with de-radicalisation could prove fruitful. There are signs that the civil war in Syria has attracted several jihadist groups with origins in North Africa and the Sahel, and these will in the long-run pose a challenge to Europe, Algeria and Morocco.

6. Engage in cultural dialogues, such as the one promoted by the United Nations Alliance for Civilizations. North Africa is undergoing a time of change. Tensions that cut across the region cover ideological, governance, religious and identity issues. Such tensions are not always identified by outside analysts. The direction of state and societal challenges is important because it will determine the contours of the security landscape and ultimately of Europe’s southern neighbourhood. An interesting political strategy, beyond technical support to the

security sector, would be to invest in strategic dialogues with the countries and the peoples around them. In so doing, further insight could be gained that captures the political, religious and social tensions that the Arab states are facing. This will ultimately make the policy decisions of outside actors better informed and better equipped to tackle the regional challenges that North Africa faces. Concrete experience can be gained from Morocco's initiative to promote moderate Imams in the region, thereby defusing radical environments.[134]

7. Support UN initiatives to counter the drugs trade between Morocco and Algeria. The UN and the EU should formulate plans on how to more effectively support Morocco's and Algeria's policies on dealing with drugs smuggling as well as the production of drugs – a sector that undermines both states' long-standing stability.

8. The EU should support the Arab Maghreb Union initiative, albeit that the EU may be interested in tackling its neighbourhood bilaterally. Regional integration appears increasingly important. As of now, Algeria is the most sceptical about such an initiative, but may in the long run benefit from further regional integration.

9. Support a high-level diplomatic initiative between Madrid, Paris, the EU, the UN, Rabat and Algiers – as well as potentially neutral countries – to devise a strategy to tackle the long-standing rivalry between the two states. More than ever, actors in the region concerned will benefit from regional integration. The Arab revolt narrative still offers the momentum and impetus to open up and resolve the Western Sahara issue. Now is the time.

10. Support the integration and active participation of both states in the AU. Without Morocco's inclusion, the potential of and all-encompassing AU security architecture cannot be realised. This in turn will have a negative impact not only on regional affairs, but also for the EU as it seeks further stability on the continent.

[134] Sakthivel (2014)

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The focus of this study is the contemporary security postures of Algeria and Morocco. The analysis is conducted in the light of the recent Arab revolts in the region. The study examines key security challenges for Algeria and Morocco, as well as the regional outlooks of both states.

The study consists of four main parts: the first part situates Algeria and Morocco in the context of the so-called Arab Spring; the second part presents explanations for each state's security posture and a historical analysis of their security identity formation; the third part uses a theoretical lens to examine the theory of regional rivalry. Finally, the study presents a number of recommendations on what do to about the existing security situation in the region.

The main finding is that the ongoing rivalry between the two countries continues to be politically, economically and socially costly not only for both states, but also for the integration of North Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture and the stability of the EU's southern neighbourhood as a whole.

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