Strategic counter-deception - Part 1: Definitions, methods, discussions

For several years a relatively extensive work on information warfare (]W) and information operations (10) has been carried out by various organisations in the Swedish defence sector. The aim of this work is to develop and implement protective measures against threats, risks and vulnerabiifties. A second aim has been to develop an offensive Swedish IW capability. An important part of the IWIIO work is the development of a national policy on [W defence. The [W defence should include both active and passive measures. A review of the Swedish work carried out so far shows a,clear bias towards IT-related threats, risks and vulnera-bilfties. These threats, risks and vulnerabilfties are often of an operational and real-time nature. More subtle and long-term forms of IW aimed at distorting our perception of the surrounding world have not been treated in depth. These forms of W/deception/disinformation are not only spread through computer networks both also by diplomats, economic negotiations, political action, military and mildary-industrial dispositions etc. According to the authors of the report, a balanced W defence should comprise all the elements, which the definition of IW includes. This means that counter-deception and protection against psychological warfare should be put higher up on the agenda than is the case today.