Increased robustness in GNSS receivers through detection of spoofing attacks

In this report, we have proposed and evaluated methods for GNSS spoofing detection. A spoofing attack was performed using a GPS simulator and a commercial GPS receiver. The spoofing attack was in the form of a meaconing attack, but the spoofing signal was transmitted without amplifying noise. Data from the spoofing attack was used to evaluate the performance of the proposed detectors. Detection methods that use multiple COTS receivers were proposed. COTS GNSS receivers with additional robustness, such as spoofing and jamming detection, could be a cost efficient alternative in some applications. The receivers were assumed to be low-cost COTS receivers, so that only receiver processed data is available, and baseband or radio frequency (RF) data is not. That is, the detectors exploit data such as the position solutions or pseudo ranges. The proposed detectors do not require any knowledge of the receiver (antenna) positions. All receivers are assumed to be affected similarly by the spoofer, i.e. such that they are all being spoofed to the same position. The detection performance of the proposed detectors was evaluated. A proof-of-concept of the proposed detectors was made. In this work, all receivers were stationary during the tests. The basic principles of the proposed detectors are valid also for moving platforms that are spoofed simultaneously, but some issues occur that were further discussed in the report. In addition, detection with a single receiver based on energy detection or available receiver metrics (e.g. NMEA data), was analyzed and evaluated. The results indicate that by using NMEA data only it might be possible to detect the start of a spoofing attack and, if pseudorange data is used, to determine which satellite signal that is affected. More work is however needed in order to study the performance with different types of spoofers.