Security threats and the chemical industry

The EU has given priority to measures to prevent antagonists including terrorists to get hold of and disseminate CBRN substances and regard this as a serious threat. The EU has taken initiatives to strengthen the protection against CBRN terrorism, and pointed to the need to increase security at facilities that handle hazardous chemicals. The report provides an overview of how the chemical industry who handle dangerous chemical substances, so-called Seveso facilities deal with risks, threats and crime prevention. The study discusses how companies work with security and risk assessment reports. It also analyzes how the responsible authorities at local, regional and central level handle the information received concerning security aspects in their risk and vulnerability assessments. Existing legislation are described and discussed. Chemical industry as a potential target for antagonists including terrorists is analyzed. Accidents involving hazardous chemicals in industries and during transport shows the kind of risks that exist. The work has included interviews with selected municipalities, county councils and companies as well as studies of some official documentation regarding the risks and security of Seveso facilities. A background is the introduction of the EU's Seveso III directive in Swedish law and regulations. The results show that companies and authorities take into account risks of accidents but not enough security aspects in the risk and vulnerability assessments or during inspections. Security perspectives should be included in all stages of the risk assessments and in the current laws and regulations for Seveso facilities in Sweden. Conclusions  The prerequisites to "aggregate" threats, risks and vulnerabilities assessments from the local to the national level, linked to Seveso facilities need to be reviewed and improved.  A national survey and assessment of security risks for Seveso facilities of higher tier of should be carried out.  The risk that the antagonists should be directing attacks against chemical industry or gain access to dangerous chemical substances to disseminate should increasingly be included in the work on risk and vulnerability assessments and in emergency preparedness planning.  The security perspective shouldalso be included in Seveso legislation.  There is both know-how and ambition concerning security aspects in the chemical industry which need to be taken into account and followed up by responsible authorities.  Inspection of Seveso facilities of the upper tier requires that the inspectors have a good experience of advanced chemical process industries why skills may need to be raised at the county administrative boards.  The chemical (C) part of the EU.s CBRN Action Plan for CBRN should be implemented and further developed.  Some form of key recommendations which rectifies judgments about what is appropriate or not appropriate to openly publish on Seveso facilities higher tier should be considered to reduce the risk of misuse of the information.