An analysis of the fourth and fifth Swedish ISR contributions to the UN mission in Mali

Both the fourth and the fifth Swedish ISR contingency contributions to MINUSMA have performed well and with high quality. At the same time, they seem to have had marginal operational effect on the mission's goals and effectiveness. This is largely due to MINUSMA's continued lack of experience and ability to command, direct and effectively utilize intelligence resources. The most evident contribution made by the Swedish contingents to the achievement of MINUSMA's mandate is thus not their ISR capabilities, but their basic military qualities: training, equipment and professionalism. Somewhat ironically, the most important contribution made by the Swedish ISR Task Force seems to have been in the role as a classical peacekeeper - maintaining high visibility in Timbuktu and gaining the populations' confidence. There is a risk that a future reorganization of MINUSMA's chain of command will make the ISR capabilities of the Swedish mission redundant, if the Swedish troops are tasked to carry out classical infantry tasks and operations. Already today, the Swedish contingency contribution to MINUSMA is over-ambitious in relationship to what MINUSMA expects, requires and can manage. The Swedish ISR contribution is nevertheless regarded as an important asset in the overall development of a UN peacekeeping intelligence capacity. However, the perception that the ISR forces are withholding information is a risk that can stunt the broader capacity development in the longer-term. A less qualified Swedish contribution, with a limited number of sensitive capabilities and fewer caveats on the sharing of information, would likely generate a more positive effect in MINUSMA. A lower ambition - when it comes to assets - should not be considered as reducing Sweden's support to MINUSMA, since it in fact could boost the Swedish contribution's operational effect on the mission.