This study analyses Russia's approach since 2014 to armed conflicts in the Caucasus region. The Caucasus continues to be a conflict-ridden part of Russia's neighbourhood, the biggest risk of war being a renewed and expanded war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Of the three regional external powers - Russia, Turkey and Iran - only Russia has military bases in the Caucasus region and is the only one seemingly ready to act militarily. Russia currently appears satisfied with the status quo in the South Caucasus. Unresolved conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia suit Russia's objectives and are therefore unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. The growing convergence of interests of the three external regional powers on Syria and the Middle East affects the Caucasus as well. For all three, the Middle East is more important in the short run, which means that they are all interested in keeping the Caucasus as stable and predictable as possible. Russia's military posture in the Caucasus is over-dimensioned and is designed for a potential large-scale conflict in the Southern war theatre, including the wider Middle East, rather than just local conflicts in the region. Moscow's approach to the South Caucasus in the security sphere also includes using local conflicts to keep the states concerned in a constant state of Russia-controlled instability. All this illustrates how Russia operationalizes ns a sphere of interest in the Caucasus.